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1 Introduction 
1.1 Thesis outline 
In recent years, both tax researchers and policy makers have intensely discussed profit 
shifting of multinational entities (MNEs). The basic idea of profit shifting is to reduce 
taxable income and tax payments in high-tax subsidiaries by strategically locating debt 
and/or intellectual property (IP) within MNEs. Several empirical studies provide evidence 
of profit shifting within MNEs and currently the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and the European Union (EU) aim at restraining these 
strategies. In this thesis, I take three perspectives on profit shifting that have not received 
much attention in research yet. First, I analyze in detail whether profit shifting related firm 
characteristics affect firms’ effective tax rates (ETRs). Second, I comprehensively evaluate 
the effect of profit shifting opportunities within acquirer corporate taxation systems on 
cross-border merger and acquisition (M&A) activity. Third, I approach profit shifting via 
internal debt financing by performing an extensive case study on Belgian finance companies 
of German MNEs. 
In my first perspective (see Figure A 1 in Appendix to Section 1), I consider profit shifting 
related determinants of firm ETRs. The ETR is a commonly used measure to detect profit 
shifting, and I focus on two ETR determinants with a particular relation to profit shifting: 
research and development (R&D) intensity and firm size. A firm’s R&D intensity can serve 
as a proxy for a firm’s IP, which is a main profit shifting tool. This reasoning suggests a 
negative relation between R&D intensity and ETR. However, depending on ETR 
definition, a tax accounting effect may have a further negative effect, which is due to a 
potentially earlier recognition of R&D expenses in the tax accounts than in the financial 
accounts. Applying weighted least squares (WLS) meta-regression analysis on a large meta-
data set from 1975–2012, I confirm a negative relation between R&D intensity and ETR 
and find that the R&D profit shifting effect on the ETR is twice as much as the R&D tax 
accounting effect on the ETR. In addition, I detect that 10% of the profit shifting effect is 
due to R&D tax credits. 
The effect of firm size on ETR is well-discussed in accounting research with some studies 
also arguing from a profit shifting perspective. However, in the past decades, empirical 
studies have provided evidence for two opposing theories on the size-ETR relation: the 
political power theory, suggesting a negative relation, and the political cost theory, 
suggesting a positive relation. I quantitatively summarize these studies in a meta-regression 
analysis and find evidence for the political cost theory. Further, I detect that profit shifting 
opportunities, society- and governance-related elements affect the size-ETR relation. 
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In my second perspective (see Figure A 2 in Appendix to Section 1), I study the corporate 
taxation system in the acquiring MNE’s ultimate parent country and determine the effect 
of profit shifting opportunities on cross-border M&A activity. I apply logit and ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression models on a large cross-border M&A data set from 2002–
2014 provided by SDC Platinum. First, I analyze whether profit shifting opportunities have 
an effect on M&A prices. This analysis is performed via a simple theoretical model 
capturing various characteristics of the acquirer’s taxation system. The model incorporates 
the joint effect of three major components of an acquirer’s taxation system on M&A prices: 
foreign dividends and capital gains taxation, and controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rule 
characteristics that proxy for MNE-wide profit shifting opportunities. In the empirical 
application of the theoretical model, I show that foreign dividends taxation in the acquirer 
country negatively affects M&A prices. In addition, profit shifting opportunities positively 
affect M&A prices if the target country does not apply anti profit shifting measures. Second, 
I analyze the effect of CFC rules on M&A activity and show that the probability of acquiring 
a low-tax target decreases if CFC rules are potentially applicable to this target’s income. 
Correspondingly, I find that CFC rules distort target location choice. Finally, I detect that 
CFC rules negatively affect M&A direction, i.e., countries with CFC rules are less likely to 
attract parent firms in a newly created MNE following a cross-border M&A. 
In my third perspective (see Figure A 3 in Appendix to Section 1), I consider one particular 
profit shifting channel: the use of finance companies to strategically allocate debt within 
MNEs. In particular, I investigate the Belgian notional interest deduction (NID) regime, 
which makes it attractive for an MNE to locate its finance company in Belgium. In an 
extensive case study approach on a hand-collected data set consisting of all majority-owned 
Belgian subsidiaries of DAX and MDAX MNEs from 2011–2014, I detect 14 Belgian 
finance companies; seven of these subsidiaries seem to be also operationally active. Further, 
I estimate the amount of profits shifted to Belgium by these MNEs to be around one billion 
Euro annually, which translates into saved tax payments of up to 242 million Euro by these 
MNEs due to applying the NID regime. Finally, I approximate Belgium’s tax revenue loss 
due to the NID regime to be up to 36 million Euro per year for this data set. 
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. The following two subsections present 
the research contribution of this thesis and the analyzed data. Sections 2 and 3 contain the 
meta-regression analyses on the relation between R&D intensity and ETR and the size-
ETR relation. Sections 4 and 5 contain the analyses on the effect of acquirer corporate 
taxation systems on cross-border M&A activity. Section 6 presents the case study analyzing 
whether large German MNEs use the Belgian NID regime as a tax planning tool within 
their groups. Finally, Section 7 sets forth the main conclusions of this thesis. 
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1.2 Research contribution 
This thesis contributes to literature on profit shifting within MNEs by taking three 
perspectives on this topic that have not yet received much attention in research. I provide 
several insights into understanding how firm characteristics affect ETRs (Sections 2 and 3), 
how corporate taxation systems affect cross-border M&A activity (Sections 4 and 5), and 
how German MNEs make use of Belgian finance companies (Section 6). These insights are 
of interest for both the research community and policy makers. In the following, I provide 
a concise review of essential empirical literature on the respective topic and summarize my 
key research contributions obtained in each perspective. 
1.2.1 Profit shifting related determinants of ETRs 
The first perspective (see Figure A 1 in Appendix to Section 1) investigates two profit 
shifting related determinants of firm ETRs: R&D intensity and firm size. Several studies 
consider R&D intensity a proxy for IP that facilitates profit shifting (e.g., Desai et al. (2006), 
Overesch and Schreiber (2010)). Given that the ETR is a common measure for the degree 
of tax planning in general (e.g., Mills et al. (1998), Phillips (2003)) and for the degree of 
profit shifting in particular (e.g., Rego (2003), Markle and Shackelford (2012)), it is plausible 
to expect a negative relation between R&D intensity and ETR. Indeed, all primary studies 
of my meta-data set (see Section 1.3.1) report at least one negative coefficient of this 
relation, and the median and mean across all estimates is negative; however, there is some 
variation in reported coefficients, for example, about half of the primary studies report at 
least one positive coefficient (see Table 5 and Figure 7 in Section 2). The meta-regression 
analyses in Section 2 not only quantitatively summarize these coefficients but also bring to 
light significant sources of bias and variation in existing empirical studies, two aspects that 
have not been investigated in empirical research yet and may help to improve future 
empirical models on ETR determinants. 
The basic research contribution of this perspective is that it brings forth a negative 
consensus estimate on the effect of R&D intensity on the ETR and allows an understanding 
of which factors are driving this estimate in the sample of 21 primary studies. Besides a 
negative profit shifting effect of R&D intensity on the ETR (e.g., Desai et al. (2006), 
Overesch and Schreiber (2010)), there is also a negative tax accounting effect of R&D 
intensity on the ETR. The latter effect is present if R&D expenses are immediately incurred 
in the tax accounts but capitalized and deferred in the financial accounts (e.g., Gupta and 
Newberry (1997), Armstrong et al. (2012)). However, the relative importance of each effect 
is unclear and has not been addressed in empirical literature yet. In my work, I go beyond 
such a basic meta-regression analysis. My meta-data set characteristics and the meta-
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regression analysis allow me to clearly investigate both effects and, thereby, to contribute 
to this open research question. 
Firm size is another determinant of ETRs and accounting research has been discussing the 
size-ETR relation for more than 40 years. Proponents of the political power theory assume 
a negative relationship by arguing that larger firms have more possibilities to influence the 
political process in their favor, to engage in international tax planning, and to organize their 
activities to achieve optimal tax savings (e.g., Siegfried (1972), Rego (2003)). Proponents of 
the political cost theory assume a positive relationship by arguing that larger firms are 
subject to larger public visibility, which causes them to be exposed to greater regulatory 
actions by the government or to be expected to take more social responsibility (e.g., 
Zimmerman (1983), Omer et al. (1993)). A first look into empirical studies reveals that they 
report significantly positive and significantly negative size-ETR relations as well as 
insignificant results (see Table A 1 in Appendix to Section 3). 
Similar to the meta-regression analysis on the effect of R&D intensity on ETR, I contribute 
to the literature by providing a meta-regression analysis on the size-ETR relation. I calculate 
a positive consensus estimate on the size-ETR relation across 49 primary studies and 
address significant sources of bias and variation in primary studies. Again, I perform an 
analysis beyond these findings by investigating whether the size-ETR relation depends on 
further characteristics. In particular, I find that tax planning elements seem to affect this 
relation. For example, in line with a recent study by Dyreng et al. (2017), I find that the 
size-ETR relation responded to the introduction of the check-the-box rule, which is 
presumed to simplify profit shifting of United States (US) MNEs. Further, I find that 
society- and governance-related elements seem to affect the size-ETR relation. For 
example, the Hofstede Power Distance Index explains variation in the size-ETR relation 
between countries. 
Taken together, the meta-regression analyses on profit shifting related determinants of 
ETRs in Sections 2 and 3 provide consensus estimates based on a rigorous research method 
and point out factors driving these estimates. In additional analyses, I explore profit shifting 
related characteristics that potentially influence the effect of R&D intensity and firm size 
on ETRs. 
1.2.2 Cross-border M&A activity and corporate taxation systems 
The second perspective (see Figure A 2 in Appendix to Section 1) investigates cross-border 
M&A activity in the context of profit shifting opportunities within acquirer corporate 
taxation systems. Figure 1 shows that global cross-border M&A deal volume is substantial 
both in absolute terms, with a yearly average of 546 billion USD, and in relative terms, with 
an average share of 46% of total foreign direct investment (FDI). These numbers suggest 
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that cross-border M&As are economically as important as foreign greenfield investment, 
the other form of FDI. Due to this importance, my empirical analyses on distortionary 
effects of acquirer corporate taxation systems on cross-border M&A activity are highly 
relevant not only for the business world but for tax policy makers as well. 
 
Figure 1. Development of global cross-border M&A deal volume (2001–2016). 
 
This figure provides a graph of the development of global cross-border M&A deal volume from 2001–2016. The 
absolute M&A deal volume is on the left y-axis and is illustrated with blue bars. The relative M&A deal volume 
(global cross-border M&A deal volume divided by global FDI outflows) is on the right y-axis and is illustrated with 
the red line. Years are on the x-axis. Sources: UNCTAD (2007), UNCTAD (2011), UNCTAD (2016), UNCTAD 
(2017a)). 
 
Empirical research has extensively analyzed the sensitivity of FDI to host country tax rates. 
In this context, the meta-regression analysis by Feld and Heckemeyer (2011) summarizes 
45 primary studies and finds that an increase of one percentage point in host country 
corporate income tax rate reduces FDI in the respective country by around three percentage 
points. However, those studies deal with the effect of taxes on FDI in general and typically 
do not distinguish between foreign greenfield investment and cross-border M&As. In a 
cross-border M&A setting, the studies by Hebous et al. (2011), Herger et al. (2016) and 
Arulampalam et al. (2017) find that the corporate income tax rate of a potential target has 
a negative effect on actual acquisition of this target. For example, Hebous et al. (2011) 
calculate that a 1% increase in host country corporate income tax rate reduces the 
probability of receiving an M&A investment by 0.3%. However, empirical research on the 
sensitivity of cross-border M&A activity to acquirer corporate taxation systems is scarce. 
In the following, I summarize three studies in this context. 
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Huizinga and Voget (2009) investigate the direction and volume of cross-border M&A 
activity by analyzing whether the prospect of international double taxation of foreign 
dividends in the acquiring country affects the parent-subsidiary-structure following cross-
border M&As. They calculate that a one percentage point higher double taxation rate on 
foreign dividends results in a nine percentage points lower probability of being the acquiring 
firm, i.e., countries with higher international double taxation are less likely to attract parent 
firms in cross-border M&As. In a further analysis, they simulate that, if the United States 
of America (USA) changes its taxation system from taxing to exempting foreign dividends, 
the proportion of US parent firms would increase from 51% to 58%. Finally, the authors 
consider the effect of international double taxation of foreign dividends on aggregate 
country-level M&A activity and find that a one percentage point higher double taxation rate 
in the residence country results in a 1.7% lower number of cross-border M&As. 
Voget (2011) investigates whether additional taxation in the residence country upon 
repatriation of foreign dividends affects the probability of headquarters relocations away 
from that country. He finds that an increase in a country’s dividend repatriation tax rate by 
ten percentage points increases the share of relocations of headquarters by two percentage 
points. In addition, he detects that the presence of CFC rules positively affects headquarters 
relocations. 
Feld et al. (2016a) investigate whether taxation (credit method) or non-taxation (exemption 
method) of foreign dividends affects the probability of a successful bid for a foreign target. 
They find evidence that the credit method impedes cross-border M&A activity and that a 
country’s change from the credit to the exemption method increases its cross-border M&A 
number. In a further analysis, the authors calculate the gain in efficiency, in the form of 
additional synergies, generated by the change from the credit to the exemption method in 
Japan and the United Kingdom in 2009. For Japan (United Kingdom), this change 
generated 109 million USD (4 million USD) additional annual synergies. For the USA, they 
simulate this synergy gain to be 537 million USD were the USA to change from the credit 
to the exemption method for foreign dividends. 
To my knowledge, although there is extensive empirical evidence on profit shifting activities 
within MNEs (e.g., Huizinga and Laeven (2008), Weichenrieder (2009), Grubert (2012), 
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013)), no empirical study besides Voget (2011) investigates cross-
border M&A activity in light of profit shifting opportunities within an acquirer corporate 
taxation system. 
In Sections 4 and 5, I contribute to empirical literature by analyzing whether acquirer 
corporate taxation systems affect cross-border M&A activity. In particular, Section 4 
investigates whether international double taxation of dividends of foreign targets affects 
M&A prices, which to my knowledge has not been considered yet. In addition, I analyze 
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the effect of acquirer corporate capital gains taxation on M&A prices, which so far has only 
been studied for the seller side (e.g., Ayers et al. (2007), Feld et al. (2016b)) or the individual 
shareholder level (e.g., Ayers et al. (2003), Huizinga et al. (2017)). Finally, I examine whether 
profit shifting opportunities affect M&A prices. I proxy such profit shifting opportunities 
by CFC rules, which are found to significantly affect MNE-wide profit shifting 
opportunities (e.g., Altshuler and Hubbard (2003), Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012)).1 The 
effect of CFC rules within an acquirer corporate taxation system are analyzed in more detail 
in Section 5. In particular, I consider the effect of CFC rules on low-tax target acquisition 
and on cross-border M&A direction, which empirical research has not addressed yet. 
Taken together, by analyzing the effect of acquirer corporate taxation systems on cross-
border M&A activity, I contribute to a strand of literature where little research has been 
undertaken so far. In addition, my analysis also has two relevant tax policy implications. 
First, my finding that CFC rules lead to a competitive disadvantage on the cross-border 
M&A market is interesting in light of current tax policy developments, as the OECD 
suggests effective CFC rule implementation (OECD/G20 (2015a)) and the EU even 
requires its member states to implement CFC rules by 2019 (European Council (2016)). 
Hence, firms residing in the EU, as well as OECD and G20 member states that implement 
CFC rules, may face disadvantages on the cross-border M&A market. Second, my finding 
that exempting foreign dividends from taxation has a positive impact on cross-border M&A 
prices is interesting in light of current proposals to change US tax law (United States 
Department of the Treasury (2017)). I calculate that the proposed change from taxation to 
non-taxation of foreign dividends repatriation to the USA increases cross-border M&A 
prices with US acquirers by up to 38.5%. 
1.2.3 Belgian finance companies of German MNEs 
The third perspective (see Figure A 3 in Appendix to Section 1) investigates whether large 
German MNEs implement a particular profit shifting channel—internal debt shifting—by 
establishing Belgian finance companies that make use of the Belgian NID regime and 
provide debt to affiliates. A large body of empirical research already documents internal 
debt shifting within MNEs (e.g., Desai et al. (2004), Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005), 
Buettner et al. (2009), Overesch and Wamser (2010), Ruf (2010), Buettner et al. (2012), 
Buettner and Wamser (2013)). Feld et al. (2013) conduct a meta-regression analysis on the 
tax sensitivity of firm leverage and summarize that a ten percentage points tax rate increase 
leads to a three percentage points increase in leverage. However, this is a rather small effect. 
One explanation for this small effect may be that debt shifting is not the main profit shifting 
                                              
1 In short, if CFC rules are enacted in the MNE’s parent country, they lead to an immediate taxation of low-tax 
subsidiaries’ income in the parent country, even if no repatriation takes place. Thereby, MNE-wide profit shifting to 
low-tax subsidiaries becomes largely ineffective. 
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channel, as concluded from the meta-regression analysis by Heckemeyer and Overesch 
(2017). Another explanation may be that tax planning opportunities of firms in the analyzed 
data sets are very heterogeneous, for example, due to the presence of loss firms (Feld et al. 
(2013)) or the presence of small MNEs, which may engage to a smaller degree in profit 
shifting (Rego (2003)). 
Based on this argumentation, I intentionally focus on internal debt shifting within the 
largest German MNEs and profitable firms. In particular, I develop a case study, which 
allows a detailed analysis of balance sheets and profit and loss statements of single potential 
finance companies. This case study approach further allows (a) identification of specific 
German MNEs with Belgian finance companies, (b) a check as to whether these finance 
companies are also operationally active, (c) calculation of approximate tax savings of 
German MNEs due to Belgian finance companies, and (d) calculation of approximate tax 
revenue gains or losses of Belgium within the data set due to the NID regime. Besides the 
fact that, to my knowledge, no such case study has been conducted, I contribute to 
empirical studies that find that the introduction of the Belgian NID regime triggered a 
decrease in leverage of Belgian firms (e.g., Princen (2012), Panier et al. (2015), Schepens 
(2016)). Further, I give some practical insights into how equity of a typical finance company 
in an NID country is potentially used within the MNE. Thereby, I contribute to the results 
from Hebous and Ruf (2017), who find two interesting results for subsidiaries that are 
located in an NID regime country and belong to a German MNE. First, such subsidiaries 
report an up to five percentage points lower leverage than subsidiaries in non-NID 
countries. Second, such subsidiaries show a significant increase in passive investments after 
the introduction of an NID regime. 
Taken together, the case study on internal debt shifting in Section 6 provides a detailed 
analysis of Belgian finance companies of large German MNEs. In addition, I estimate the 
volume of internal debt shifting for these finance companies and approximate whether the 
NID regime leads to tax revenue gains or losses for Belgium within the data set. 
1.3 Data 
In any empirical study, a proper understanding of the analyzed data is essential. In the 
following, I provide detailed information on the underlying data analyzed in this thesis. This 
information extends the data description in each section. 
1.3.1 ETR meta-data 
The ETR meta-data set analyzed in Sections 2 and 3 is a hand-collected data set that fulfills 
the reporting guidelines of the Meta-Analysis of Economics Research-Network (MAER-
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Net).2 In a first step, I identified relevant primary studies by extensively searching through 
several online journal databases such as ProQuest or ScienceDirect for published studies 
and the Social Science Research Network (SSRN) for working papers. Additionally, I 
performed Internet research via Google Scholar. I used central keywords such as “effective 
tax rate”, “R&D intensity” or “firm size”, among others, to identify empirical studies that 
examine determinants of ETR or factors explaining variation in ETR across firms. I 
compiled a sample of 49 primary studies; the last sample update was in January 2017. In a 
second step, I collected the data from the primary studies. 
In line with the reporting guidelines of MAER-Net, I sampled the following data: the two 
estimated effect sizes of interest (i.e., the coefficients of R&D intensity and firm size),3 their 
standard errors, the sample size, several dummy variables for the econometric specification 
as well as for the inclusion of theoretically relevant variables and their definition, the 
empirical setting (such as considered period and country), the database used, and whether 
the primary study is published or unpublished. Further, in any meta-regression analysis, it 
is decisive that the effect size of interest is comparable across the underlying primary studies 
(Stanley (2001)). This prerequisite is met in the meta-data set: R&D intensity is calculated 
by scaling a firm’s total R&D expenses either by its total assets or by its total sales; firm size 
is calculated by taking the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets, total sales, or market 
value. Thus, primary effect sizes are comparable and do not have to be standardized or 
converted to a common metric. For summary statistics on the effect sizes and meta-
regressor variables, see Table 4 and Table 5 in Section 2 for the R&D intensity analysis and 
Table 8 and Table 9 in Section 3 for the firm size analysis. 
The final meta-data set has data on 393 primary regressions from 49 studies for the firm 
size analysis and 153 primary regressions from 21 studies for the R&D intensity analysis. 
The decrease occurs as only a fraction of primary regressions includes R&D intensity as an 
explanatory variable. Figure 2 provides an overview of the geographical coverage and shows 
that countries from Asia4 and Europe5 as well as Australia, New Zealand, and the USA are 
present in the meta-data set. 
 
                                              
2 For information on the reporting guidelines of MAER-Net, see Stanley et al. (2013). 
3 To capture within-study variation and avoid subjective decisions on which estimates to use, I sampled all firm size 
and R&D intensity coefficients from each study. If the sample size of a primary study’s subsample was smaller than 
35 observations, I did not include these coefficients in the meta-data set, since statistical inference on small samples 
can lead to spurious results. In robustness analyses, I address the issue of undue weight of primary studies due to 
varying regression numbers per study; I find that this issue does not bias the results. 
4 The countries from Asia are China, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Taiwan, 
and Thailand. 
5 The countries from Europe are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Romania, Spain, 
Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
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Figure 2. Covered regions in ETR meta-data set. 
 
For information on the Asian and European countries, see footnotes 4 
and 5. Source: ETR meta-data set. 
 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the databases analyzed in the primary regressions. Compustat 
North America is the dominating database in the R&D intensity and firm size analysis. A 
substantial number of primary regressions are also based on the Worldscope database 
and—in the firm size analysis—on the Pacific-Basin Capital Market Research Center 
(PACAP) database. In total, the R&D intensity (firm size) analysis considers 8 (16) different 
databases. These databases bring variation into the meta-data set as they differ, for example, 
regarding firm types represented (listed vs. non-listed) or geographic coverage. To account 
for unobserved database fixed effects, I include a dummy variable for each database in the 
meta-regression analyses. 
 
Figure 3. Covered databases in ETR meta-data set (R&D intensity analysis). 
 
Source: ETR meta-data set. 
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Figure 4. Covered databases in ETR meta-data set (firm size analysis). 
 
Other databases contribute fewer than ten primary regressions. These databases are the Aspect-Huntley Financial 
Database, Amadeus, Compustat Global, Datex New Zealand Business Information Database, IBIS Enterprise 
Database, Prowess Corporate Database, Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), and Bucharest Stock Exchange 
(BVB). Source: ETR meta-data set. 
 
Finally, Figure 5 gives an overview of the VHB-JOURQUAL ranking6 of the journals in 
which the primary studies are published. The majority of the underlying primary studies are 
published in highly ranked peer-reviewed journals, and only a small number of primary 
studies are not published. 
 
Figure 5. Ranking of journals in ETR meta-data set. 
 
The journal ranking in which primary studies of ETR meta-data set are published is based on the 
VHB-JOURQUAL ranking (see footnote 6). Source: ETR meta-data set. 
 
                                              
6 For further information, see http://vhbonline.org/vhb4you/jourqual/vhb-jourqual–3/teilrating-steu. 
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1.3.2 Cross-border M&A and corporate taxation system data 
The M&A data analyzed in Sections 4 and 5 are obtained from SDC Platinum, which 
contains global M&A activity and provides information on the acquirer ultimate parent, 
direct acquirer, target ultimate parent, and direct target (in the following: “four involved 
firms”). I downloaded all completed M&A deals from 1990–2014. The minimum 
requirement is that the M&A year and countries of the four involved firms are given, which 
leaves a sample of around 254,000 observations. I further require that the acquirer ultimate 
parent holds the majority of shares in the target after the M&A and that the industry sector 
of the four involved firms is known. These restrictions leave a sample of around 169,000 
observations. Finally, since I put the focus on analyzing cross-border M&As, I require that 
the acquirer ultimate parent and the target reside in different countries, which leaves a 
sample of around 49,000 observations. 
Figure 6 illustrates that 81% of acquirer ultimate parents and 74% of targets in this sample 
come from three industry sectors: manufacturing, transportation, and finance. This 
dominance is confirmed in data on cross-border M&A purchases provided by UNCTAD 
(2017b), which report a share of 84% of these three industry sectors. Around 60% (40%) 
of observations in my sample are horizontal (vertical) M&As. Table 1 shows the origin of 
the acquirer ultimate parents and targets in this sample. In line with prior research (e.g., di 
Giovanni (2005)), countries with the largest financial markets have most observations. This 
M&A data set serves as the basis for the analyses in Sections 4 and 5; data restrictions on 
firm and country control variables may decrease sample size in these analyses. 
 
Figure 6. Relative deal volume of industry sectors of involved M&A firms in the sample compared to 
UNCTAD data (1990–2014). 
 
This figure shows the relative deal volume of main industry sectors (according to SIC code) of the acquirer ultimate 
parents and targets in my cross-border M&A data set in comparison to data on cross-border M&A purchases from 
UNCTAD (2017b). The percentage numbers are the average share from 1990–2014. Sources: Cross-border M&A 
data set and UNCTAD (2017b). 
*Agriculture, forestry, and fishing account for less than 0.5% in each group. 
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Table 1. Countries of acquirer ultimate parents and targets (1990–2014). 
Country No. of acquirer 
ultimate parents 
No. of 
targets 
Country No. of acquirer 
ultimate parents 
No. of 
targets 
Australia 1,807 2,422 Italy 793 980 
Austria 302 199 Japan 1,627 517 
Bahrain 112 10 Kuwait 61 11 
Bailiwick of Jersey 76 45 Luxembourg 206 112 
Belgium 487 510 Malaysia 704 430 
Bermuda 395 91 Mexico 191 532 
Brazil 171 889 Netherlands 1,342 1,134 
British Virgin Islands 148 154 New Zealand 193 565 
Canada 4,349 2,808 Norway 641 634 
Cayman Islands 78 37 Philippines 68 154 
Chile 114 306 Poland 106 511 
China 726 1,655 Portugal 135 186 
Colombia 73 187 Republic of Korea 336 334 
Cyprus 168 53 Russian Federation 219 353 
Denmark 463 557 Saudi Arabia 63 20 
Finland 466 451 Singapore 1,243 688 
France 2,052 2,164 South Africa 441 420 
Germany 1,848 2,308 Spain 814 1,120 
Greece 154 88 Sweden 1,306 1,119 
Guernsey 148 43 Switzerland 1,093 546 
Hong Kong 1,340 962 Taiwan 219 207 
Iceland 81 11 Thailand 128 248 
India 609 564 United Arab Emirates 136 90 
Indonesia 84 400 United Kingdom 8,054 6,026 
Ireland 899 472 United States 10,614 10,541 
Isle of Man 67 35 Other 899 4,153 
Israel 472 269 Sum 49,321 49,321 
 
The corporate taxation system data analyzed in Sections 4 and 5 are hand-collected from 
various sources.7 For the 49 OECD, EU, and G20 member states, information is collected 
on statutory corporate income tax rate (STR), corporate capital gains tax rate, dividend 
withholding tax rate, anti profit shifting measures such as CFC rules, thin capitalization or 
interest stripping rules, and transfer pricing documentation rules as well as on the unilateral 
methods of avoiding double taxation on foreign dividends and capital gains. Table 2 
provides information on these data for 2014. In addition, bilateral (i.e., tax treaty) or 
multilateral (i.e., EU-wide) information is collected regarding a more beneficial dividend 
withholding tax rate or double taxation avoidance method. If the outcome on these levels 
is more beneficial for tax payers, the lower withholding tax rate or the more beneficial 
double taxation avoidance method is used in my analyses. For an extensive descriptive 
survey of this corporate taxation system data set for 2002–2015, see Section 4.3. 
  
                                              
7 The sources are, in general, national tax law, IBFD European Tax Handbook (2002-2016) and Ernst & Young (2004-
2016). For CFC rules, additional sources are Deloitte (2015) and KPMG (2008). For thin capitalization or interest 
stripping rules, additional sources are Lund et al. (2008), Buettner et al. (2012), Blouin et al. (2014), and Buettner et al. 
(2017). For transfer pricing documentation rules, additional sources are Riedel et al. (2015), Zinn et al. (2014), Beer 
and Loeprick (2015), Buettner et al. (2017), Deloitte (2011-2016), Ernst & Young (2009-2016), KPMG (2012-2016), 
and PwC (2008-2016). 
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Table 2. Corporate taxation system data (2014). 
Country Statutory 
corporate 
income 
tax rate 
Corporate 
capital 
gains 
tax rate 
Dividend 
withhol-
ding tax 
rate 
CFC 
rule 
Thin 
capitalization or 
interest 
stripping rule 
Transfer 
pricing 
document-
tation rule 
Double taxation 
avoidance 
method (foreign 
dividends) 
Double taxation 
avoidance 
method (foreign 
capital gains) 
Argentina 35% 35% 10% 1 2 5 0 0 
Australia 30% 30% 30% 1 3 4 1 1 
Austria 25% 25% 25% 0 n/a 2 1 1 
Belgium 34% 34% 25% 0 5a 2 1 1 
Brazil 34% 34% 0% 1 2 5 0 0 
Bulgaria 10% 10% 5% 0 3 2 –2 0 
Canada 26% 13% 25% 1 1.5 4 0 0 
Chile 21% 21% 18% 0 3 3 0 0 
China 25% 25% 10% 1 2 5 0 0 
Croatia 20% 20% 12% 0 4 4 1 0 
Cyprus 12.5% 20% 0% 0 n/a 1 1 1 
Czech Republic 19% 19% 15% 0 4 2 –1 –1 
Denmark 24.5% 24.5% 27% 1 4 4 1 1 
Estonia 21% 21% 0% 0b n/a 3 1 0 
Finland 20% 20% 20% 1 25%c 4 –2 0 
France 38% 38% 30% 1 1.5 3 1 1 
Germany 30% 30% 25% 1 30%c 3 1 1 
Greece 26% 26% 10% 1 60%c 3 –2 0 
Hungary 19% 19% 0% 1 3 3 1 0 
Iceland 20% 20% 18% 1 n/a 3 1 1 
India 34% 23% 0% 0 4 5 0 0 
Indonesia 25% 25% 20% 1 3 5 0 0 
Ireland 12.5% 33% 20% 0 Dividendd 3 0 –1 
Israel 26.5% 26.5% 30% 1 n/a 4 0 0 
Italy 31% 31% 20% 1 30%c 4 1 1 
Japan 37% 37% 20% 1 3 4 1 0 
Latvia 15% 15% 0% 0 4 3 1 0 
Lithuania 15% 15% 0% 1 4 3 1 0 
Luxembourg 29.2% 29.2% 15% 0 5.7 2 1 1 
Malta 35% 35% 0% 0 n/a 1 1 1 
Mexico 30% 30% 10% 1 3 3 0 0 
Netherlands 25% 25% 15% 0 n/a 4 1 1 
New Zealand 28% 0% 30% 1 1.5 2 1 1 
Norway 27% 27% 25% 1 30%c 4 1 1 
Poland 19% 19% 19% 0 3 4 0 0 
Portugal 31.5% 31.5% 25% 1 60%c 4 1 1 
Romania 16% 16% 16% 0 3 3 0 0 
Republic of Korea 24.2% 24.2% 20% 1 3 4 0 0 
Russian Federation 20% 20% 15% 0 3 3 1 0 
Saudi Arabia 20% 20% 5% 0 n/a 2 –3 –3 
Slovak Republic 22% 22% 0% 0 n/a 3 1 –3 
Slovenia 17% 17% 15% 0 4 4 1 0 
South Africa 28% 18.6% 15% 1 3 2 1 0 
Spain 30% 30% 21% 1 30%c 3 1 1 
Sweden 22% 22% 0% 1 Min. taxatione 3 1 1 
Switzerland 21% 21% 35% 0 Asset classf 2 1 1 
Turkey 20% 20% 15% 1 3 3 1 1 
United Kingdom 21% 21% 0% 1 1 3 1 1 
United States 39% 39% 30% 0 1.5 4 0 0 
This table shows corporate taxation system data for the 49 OECD, EU and G20 member states for 2014. In the CFC rule column, 0 (1) 
stands for non-presence (presence) of CFC rules. In the thin capitalization or interest stripping rule column, the strictness of the rule 
is shown. The number represents the amount of debt units in relation to equity, which is accepted for unrestricted interest expense deduction 
from tax base. Special rules for financial institutions and holdings are not reported. n/a indicates no formal restriction. In the transfer 
pricing documentation rule column, the classification of documentation requirements follows Zinn et al. (2014). 0 represents no transfer 
pricing and documentation requirements; 1 represents presence of arm’s length principle but no documentation requirements; 2 represents 
presence of arm’s length principle and existence of documentation requirements in practice (e.g., in tax audits); 3 represents presence of 
arm’s length principle and documentation requirements upon request (codified in national tax law); 4 (5) represents presence of the arm’s 
length principle and short (long) documentation requirements upon disclosure (codified in national tax law). In the two double taxation 
avoidance method columns, 1 represents exemption method, 0 represents indirect credit method, –1 represents deduction method, –2 
represents direct credit method and –3 represents no relief from double taxation. 
a Debt-to-equity ratio is only applicable if interest recipient is not subject to taxation. 
b CFC rules are only applicable at individual level. 
c Net interest expenses are deductible up to the percentage number applied on EBIDTA. 
d Interest paid to non-resident parent is re-qualified as a dividend; rule does not apply if parent resides in an EU member state or tax treaty 
country. 
e Interest expenses are deductible if tax rate on interest income at affiliate is at least 10%. 
f Debt-to-equity ratio depends on asset class. 
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1.3.3 Belgian subsidiary data 
In Section 6, I investigate whether large German MNEs set up Belgian finance companies 
to use the NID regime in Belgium. This analysis requires detailed financial data on these 
companies. Most importantly, information on the amount of loans granted to affiliated 
companies and interest income is needed. While classic financial databases such as Amadeus 
do not provide such detailed data, the Central Balance Sheet Office of the National Bank 
of Belgium publishes on its website detailed, unconsolidated annual reports of practically 
all incorporated firms in Belgium. 
To keep data collection feasible, I focus on German MNEs listed in the DAX and MDAX. 
These two stock indices are a good representation of the industrial structure of the German 
economy (boerse.de (2016a), boerse.de (2016b)) and are considered a representative subset 
of large German MNEs. I analyze data covering four financial years (2011–2014) from all 
153 majority-owned Belgian subsidiaries of 45 DAX and MDAX MNEs. I dropped MNEs 
from the financial and insurance sector, MNEs without subsidiaries in Belgium, and 
subsidiaries with a loss in all four years. From these 45 MNEs, the majority comes from 
the manufacturing sector (35 MNEs); 4 MNEs come from the service sector, 3 MNEs from 
the trade sector and 3 MNEs from the transportation and communication sector. For 
information on the number of Belgian subsidiaries per group and information on the 
relative importance of these subsidiaries within the group, see Table 41 in Section 6. 
Table 3 provides information on relevant financial data from the balance sheets and profit 
and loss statements of the Belgian subsidiaries. The table illustrates that the Belgian 
subsidiaries are very heterogeneous in size, as total assets, employee number, and turnover 
show. In addition, some subsidiaries do not report any loans to affiliated companies, cash, 
financial income, and financial expenses whereas some subsidiaries report relatively high 
values for these positions. Further, a small number of subsidiaries report, on average, a loss 
and negative equity. 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics on Belgian subsidiary data (2011–2014). 
Variable No. of obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Total assets 153 551,000 20,800 2,550,000 80 19,300,000 
No. of employees 153 202 62 429 1 3,012 
Turnover 153 199,000 37,300 651,000 0 7,040,000 
Loans to affiliated companies 153 325,000 239 2,030,000 0 17,500,000 
Cash 153 26,900 643 140,000 0 1,570,000 
Financial income 153 16,100 61 97,700 0 917,000 
Financial expense 153 13,600 119 83,300 0 843,000 
Earnings before taxes 153 14,400 1,368 67,000 –45,100 747,000 
Equity 153 333,000 8,014 1,630,000 –15,000 14,500,000 
The values are the four-year average (2011–2014) of the respective balance sheet or profit and loss statement position. 
Numbers are in thousand Euro (except for employee number). 
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Finally, besides the data set’s high level of detail, another advantage of this data set 
compared to using the Amadeus database is that it verifiably contains all majority-owned 
Belgian subsidiaries of the considered DAX and MDAX MNEs because I took the 
participation data directly from the published and audited consolidated group reports. Since 
Amadeus also provides ownership data, it would have been less work-intensive to 
download the participation data from Amadeus; however, such a download does not 
provide all majority-owned Belgian subsidiaries I identified using the consolidated group 
reports. If I had used Amadeus data, I would have only detected two Belgian finance 
companies instead of seven (see Table 48 in Section 6). 
In the following five sections, I present five papers that analyze in detail the data sets 
described above. Thereby, I contribute to empirical tax literature as highlighted in Section 
1.2. 
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2 R&D Intensity and the Effective Tax Rate: A Meta-
Regression Analysis8 
 
Abstract: We apply meta-regression techniques to provide a quantitative review of the 
empirical literature on how R&D expenses affect the ETR. R&D expenses relate to a well-
accepted profit shifting channel, strategic placement of IP within an MNE. Using a unique 
hand-collected data set, we add a new perspective to the current base erosion and profit 
shifting (BEPS) state of research and debate, in three ways: First, observing that primary 
studies report mixed evidence on how R&D expenses affect ETR, we provide a consensus 
estimate for this effect. Second, we consider this effect in more detail by separating a tax 
accounting effect and a profit shifting effect, which to our knowledge has not yet been 
investigated. We detect that one-third of the R&D effect on the ETR is due to the tax 
accounting effect and could be mitigated via book-tax conformity. We further find that 
10% of the profit shifting effect can be traced back to R&D tax credits. Third, our meta-
regression reveals factors that are possible sources of variation and bias in previous 
empirical studies. 
 
Keywords: Effective tax rate • R&D intensity • Intangible assets • Profit shifting • Tax 
accounting • Meta-regression analysis 
 
JEL Classification: F23 • H25 • H26 • M41 
 
Publication: This paper is published in the Journal of Economic Surveys 31 (4): 988–1010. The 
author thanks the publisher John Wiley and Sons for granting a license to reuse the paper in 
this dissertation. 
 
Presentations: This paper has been presented at the Accounting & Taxation Brown Bag 
Seminar (Mannheim University, 12th November 2014), the MaTax CampusMeeting 2014 
(ZEW Mannheim, 10th December 2014), and the ZEW Public Finance Conference 2015 
(ZEW Mannheim, 27th April 2015).   
                                              
8 This paper is joint work with Dr. Thomas Belz and Dr. Christian Steffens. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Numerous empirical studies investigate tax-driven profit shifting of MNEs. In the empirical 
literature, there is general evidence of profit shifting to low-tax countries between the parent 
and its subsidiaries or among subsidiaries (e.g., Huizinga and Laeven (2008), Weichenrieder 
(2009), Dharmapala and Riedel (2013)). Some studies consider transfer pricing an explicit 
shifting channel and find that transfer prices are used to shift income to low-tax 
jurisdictions (e.g., Jacob (1996), Clausing (2003)). Other studies analyze the location of IP 
within an R&D-intensive MNE and come to the conclusion that these MNEs have an 
incentive to locate IP at low-tax subsidiaries or in countries with favorable IP tax treatment 
(e.g., Dischinger and Riedel (2011), Griffith et al. (2014)). Further, profit shifting is a highly 
relevant topic in the public debate, culminating in the Action Plan of the BEPS Project of 
the OECD, in which leading industrial countries aim to restrain profit shifting behavior of 
MNEs (OECD/G20 (2015a)). 
At the heart of the current BEPS debate are R&D-intensive and innovative firms such as 
Apple Inc., Google Inc., or Amgen Inc. publicly accused of having low ETRs (e.g., Sullivan 
(2012)). To avoid taxes in high-tax countries, many of these R&D-intensive firms are 
known to have subsidiaries in tax havens. These subsidiaries are allocated IP that facilitates 
intragroup profit pooling at tax haven subsidiaries via tax-optimized royalty payments from 
subsidiaries in high-tax countries for using this IP. The reason for this is that objective 
market prices usually do not exist for such royalty payments. Hence, these intragroup 
transfer prices can be clearly manipulated in a tax-optimal way and are actually the main 
profit shifting channel for MNEs, as the meta-regression analysis of Heckemeyer and 
Overesch (2017) detects. 
Our paper joins this profit shifting debate by quantitatively analyzing the empirical literature 
on how R&D intensity affects a firm’s ETR. Both variables are at the heart of the empirical 
literature on BEPS: R&D activity is often used as a proxy for IP that facilitates profit 
shifting (e.g., Overesch and Schreiber (2010)); ETR is often used as a measure to evaluate 
the effectiveness of tax planning in general (e.g., Mills et al. (1998), Phillips (2003)) and to 
detect profit shifting behavior in particular (e.g., Rego (2003), Markle and Shackelford 
(2012)). 
We find several empirical studies that directly analyze the relationship between R&D 
activity and ETR. Applying meta-regression techniques, we summarize the status quo of 
research and enrich the profit shifting and tax accounting literature in three ways: 
First, we quantitatively investigate the R&D intensity effect on ETR and provide an overall 
consensus estimate across our primary studies. This contribution is of interest because 
primary studies report mixed evidence on how R&D intensity affects ETR (see Section 
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2.4). Further, and quite surprisingly, R&D intensity is not the primary variable of interest 
in some studies. Moreover, some studies simply use R&D intensity as a proxy for profit 
shifting opportunities in innovative firms, and they insufficiently review the empirical 
relation between R&D intensity and ETR. However, in light of the BEPS debate, this 
relation is in itself of interest and importance. Hence, we aim to contribute in detail to the 
understanding of how R&D intensity affects ETR; we estimate the consensus estimate to 
range between –0.17 and –0.25 depending on ETR definition, i.e., a ten percentage points 
increase in R&D intensity leads to a 1.7 to 2.5 percentage points decrease in ETR. This 
estimate is robust to controlling for intangible assets, which are usually only a share of a 
firm’s IP. Therefore, R&D intensity seems to be a robust proxy for profit shifting 
opportunities in general, even beyond activated IP in the balance sheet. 
Second, we go beyond our consensus estimate. In particular, we separate out two distinct 
R&D effects on ETR by taking advantage of a large degree of variation across different 
databases and time periods in our meta-data set. On the one hand, there is a profit shifting 
effect because R&D activity gives rise to IP. On the other hand, there is a tax accounting 
effect: While R&D expenses may be immediately incurred in the tax accounts, they may be 
capitalized and deferred in the financial accounts. Both effects generally decrease a firm’s 
ETR; however, the relative importance of each effect is not clear. Nevertheless, both the 
profit shifting literature (e.g., Harris (1993), Overesch and Schreiber (2010)) and the tax 
accounting literature (e.g., Gupta and Newberry (1997), Armstrong et al. (2012)) refer to 
R&D intensity in the context of tax planning and tax avoidance. By quantifying the profit 
shifting and tax accounting effect separately, we are able to draw inference on the relative 
importance of each effect in existing empirical studies. Our meta-regression analysis thereby 
contributes to the status quo of profit shifting and tax accounting research. 
In our analysis, we show that the R&D effect of profit shifting and tax accounting on ETR 
is 2:1. This result has two implications: On the one hand, we find profit shifting evidence 
for transfer pricing with IP (proxied by R&D) that is located in low-tax countries, driving 
down ETR. On the other hand, one-third of the effect of R&D intensity could be mitigated 
by tax legislation via book-tax conformity. In a robustness test, we further identify that 
about 10% of the profit shifting effect can be traced back to R&D tax credits granted by 
some countries, i.e., a tax incentive that allows deduction of an additional fraction of R&D 
expenses from the firm’s tax base. Overall, these considerations give important insights for 
tax researchers and tax policy makers. 
Third, by applying meta-regression techniques, we are able to detect significant sources of 
bias and variation in existing empirical studies. These findings can be used to design future 
empirical models in a more coherent and consistent manner, improving the quality of the 
estimation results. 
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The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 describes the profit shifting 
and the tax accounting effect in detail. Section 2.3 briefly presents the meta-regression 
methodology followed by information on our meta-data set in Section 2.4. The meta-
regression results and robustness analysis are discussed in Section 2.5. Finally, Section 2.6 
sets forth our conclusions. 
2.2 Effect of  R&D intensity on ETR 
In this meta-regression analysis, the empirical relationship between firms’ R&D intensity 
and their average ETR is our focus. Both variables are intensely debated in tax policy 
discussions. On the one hand, ETR is a widely used measure in evaluating effective tax 
planning in a profit shifting context (e.g., Rego (2003), United States Government 
Accountability Office (2008), Markle and Shackelford (2012), Sullivan (2012), Herbert and 
Overesch (2014)). On the other hand, the empirical literature often refers to R&D activity 
as a proxy for IP-based profit shifting (e.g., Overesch and Schreiber (2010)) and especially 
R&D-intensive and innovative firms such as Apple Inc. and Google Inc. are at the heart of 
the current profit shifting debate, as these firms report very low ETRs. However, besides 
this profit shifting effect of R&D intensity on ETR, a tax accounting effect could also be 
present due to different timing of R&D expenses in financial and tax accounts. 
Both the profit shifting literature and the tax accounting literature refer to R&D intensity 
in the context of tax planning and tax avoidance. However, in their model design and 
argumentation, researchers in the profit shifting literature do not consider the R&D tax 
accounting effect, while researchers in the tax accounting literature do not consider the 
R&D profit shifting effect. As a result, the relative importance of the two effects is 
unknown. 
Consequently, the question arises whether an effect of a firm’s R&D intensity on its tax 
burden can empirically be verified and whether the profit shifting or the tax accounting 
effect dominates in empirical studies on how R&D intensity affects ETR. In the following, 
we explore the profit shifting and tax accounting effect of R&D intensity on ETR. 
2.2.1 R&D profit shifting effect on ETR 
R&D activity may lead to IP generation within a firm. To avoid taxation in high-tax 
countries, many R&D-intensive firms place their IP in tax haven subsidiaries, such as in 
Bermuda. The idea behind this is that profits are shifted to these tax havens via royalty 
payments from high-tax countries where the IP is actually used (e.g., Fuest et al. (2013)). 
Consequently, taxable income is substantially reduced in the high-tax countries and the tax 
burden of the group is significantly lowered. Therefore, a negative effect of R&D intensity 
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on the group’s ETR can hint at profit shifting via IP. While there is a large body of empirical 
research on IP-based profit shifting, let us review the empirical studies that explicitly 
consider R&D intensity as a proxy for IP in their research designs. 
Desai et al. (2006) examine the types of firms most likely to establish tax haven operations 
that facilitate tax avoidance. One indicator for firms’ presence in tax havens is a high level 
of R&D intensity. These authors argue that this may be due to the quite easy ability to shift 
profits produced by IP or the relative ease of relocating IP itself. In particular, they show 
that a 10% greater R&D/sales ratio increases the share of affiliates in tax havens by 4%. 
This finding is in line with a robustness test in Graham and Tucker (2006), who find that 
large and profitable firms with high R&D intensity are likely to engage in tax avoidance 
through corporate tax shelters. Considering German outbound FDI, Overesch and 
Wamser (2009) observe a high tax sensitivity of R&D-intensive firms when deciding 
whether to set up an affiliate abroad. This result shows that affiliates play a role in tax 
planning with IP within MNEs. Overesch and Schreiber (2010) use R&D intensity as a 
proxy for IP and intragroup services provided within the context of R&D activities. These 
authors find evidence that for R&D-intensive MNEs, the tax sensitivity of intragroup 
transactions increases while the tax sensitivity of investments decreases. The studies by 
Grubert (2003) and Grubert (2012) show that R&D-intensive firms engage in a greater 
volume of intragroup transactions and have more profit shifting opportunities. The author 
argues that this is due to the difficult task of valuing high-tech patents and products, i.e., IP 
derived from R&D activity. 
Overall, these empirical studies support the assumption that there is a negative impact of 
R&D intensity on ETR, since R&D intensity may serve as a proxy for ETR decreasing 
profit shifting via IP created by R&D activity (profit shifting effect). 
2.2.2 R&D tax accounting effect on ETR 
R&D expenses are usually treated differently between financial and tax accounting. For tax 
purposes, the costs of R&D are an immediate expense (e.g., Section 174 US Internal 
Revenue Code, Section 5 German Income Tax Code); however, financial accounting 
standards prescribe a capitalization of R&D expenses as intangible assets under certain 
conditions (e.g., ASC 350, IAS 38). 
At first glance, this different treatment may have a negative effect on ETR of firms (tax 
accounting effect) and several empirical ETR studies make this argument (e.g., Gupta and 
Newberry (1997), Richardson and Lanis (2007), Armstrong et al. (2012)). Consider the 
following example: Earnings before taxes are 100 and R&D expenses amount to 10. For 
tax purposes, these expenses are immediately deductible, i.e., the tax base is 90 and the 
current tax expense is 27, assuming a 30% corporate income tax rate. In the financial 
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accounts, the R&D expenses can be capitalized, i.e., they are not deducted, and ETR is 27% 
(27/100). However, in this context, it is important to consider deferred tax legislation, 
which is common to accounting principles worldwide since the 1970s.9 These principles 
require recognition of deferred taxes for temporary book-tax differences (BTD).10 In future 
periods, ceteris paribus, there will be higher earnings in the tax accounts than in the financial 
accounts; therefore, deferred taxes—in this case deferred tax expenses—of 3 (30% from 
the BTD of 10) must be recognized immediately. Consequently, the total tax expense 
(current and deferred taxes) is 30 and ETR is 30% (30/100). 
Overall, this reasoning suggests that ETR calculation plays a decisive role in whether the 
tax accounting effect drives down ETR: A negative effect of R&D intensity on ETR due 
to the tax accounting effect is suspected if, and only if, current taxes are taken into account 
in ETR calculation. In this case, there is no control for the different treatment of R&D 
expenses in financial and tax accounting. However, if current and deferred taxes are taken 
into account, then no tax accounting effect of R&D intensity on ETR is present. In this 
case, a negative effect of R&D intensity on ETR can be attributed solely to the profit 
shifting effect.11 
In summary, both the profit shifting effect and the tax accounting effect suggest a negative 
effect of how R&D intensity affects ETR. Hence, we generally expect a negative consensus 
estimate. However, the inclusion or exclusion of deferred taxes in ETR calculation 
determines whether a tax accounting effect can be observed. Since we have variation in our 
meta-data set in ETR definition between studies and also within studies in this regard, we 
are able to control for the (temporary) tax accounting effect and isolate it from the 
(permanent) profit shifting effect in our meta-regression.12 In this case, only the profit 
shifting effect remains, and the consensus estimate is presumed to be less negative than 
without such control. However, the consensus estimate is still expected to be negative 
because of the presence of the profit shifting effect. 
                                              
9 US-GAAP has prescribed deferred tax accounting since 1967, when APB Opinion No. 11 was issued. This opinion 
was replaced by FASB 96 in 1987. Since 1992, SFAS 109 (ASC 740) addresses deferred tax accounting. IFRS has 
prescribed deferred tax accounting since 1979, when IAS 12 was issued. 
10 See, for example, for US-GAAP ASC 740–10–25–2(b), for IFRS IAS 12.15 and IAS 12.24. In the context of this 
paper, the term “deferred taxes” refers to the net amount of deferred tax expense and deferred tax income. 
11 In the USA, for example, a so-called R&D tax credit is granted to firms for tax purposes (Section 41 US Internal 
Revenue Code). Under certain conditions, an additional fraction of R&D expenses qualifies for a deduction from the 
tax base. This deduction leads to a permanently negative effect on ETR and may bias our profit shifting effect. 
However, a robustness test shows that our results are relatively robust concerning this issue. 
12 There is no recognition of deferred taxes in case of profit shifting, because generally profit shifting does not lead to 
BTD. Therefore, the profit shifting effect can be seen as having a “permanently” negative effect on ETR, in contrast 
to the tax accounting effect, which can be seen as having only a “temporarily” negative effect on ETR. 
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2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Meta-regression approach 
The primary studies underlying this meta-regression analysis identify their data analysis 
clearly and have the following classic linear regression model: 
𝐸𝑇𝑅 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀. (2.1) 
The dependent variable is a firm’s global average ETR, i.e., a measure of worldwide income 
tax expense divided by a measure of worldwide pre-tax financial income, both of which 
observed in firm annual financial reports.13 In our meta-regression, the explanatory variable 
of interest is 𝑅&𝐷 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 measured as the ratio of R&D expenses to total assets or 
total sales. In addition to this variable, primary studies use a wide range of additional 
variables captured in vector X. 𝛽0 is the intercept. 
In our research context, the coefficient of interest is the reported 𝛽1 of the R&D intensity 
variable in equation (2.1). Generally, a negative 𝛽1 could be expected, for two reasons (see 
Section 2.2): First, R&D expenses may serve as a proxy for ETR decreasing profit shifting 
with IP. Second, R&D expenses are usually immediately tax deductible as opposed to a 
possible capitalization in the financial accounts under certain conditions. Although we 
expect this negative relationship, we detect some mixed evidence in our meta-data set, with 
only 54% of the 153 estimates being significantly negative in the underlying primary 
studies.14 
Such variation can be quantitatively investigated by pursuing meta-regression analysis. This 
statistical approach formally evaluates and combines empirical results from different 
studies, and explores the reasons for heterogeneity across empirical studies (e.g., Smith and 
Glass (1977), Stanley (2001), Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer (2005), Égert and 
Halpern (2006)). The research contribution of this meta-regression analysis is to generalize 
the central tendency of the empirical literature on how R&D intensity affects ETR by 
providing a consensus estimate. Further, we consider this effect in more detail by separating 
the profit shifting and tax accounting effects on ETR, which, to our knowledge, has not yet 
                                              
13 All underlying primary studies use annual ETRs. Dyreng et al. (2008) propose using long-run (10-year) cash ETRs 
to measure tax avoidance practices of firms because annual ETRs may be subject to year-to-year variation. However, 
in our meta-regression, we are bound to the approach of the primary studies and consider the effect of firm size on 
annual ETRs. In addition, marginal ETRs—defined as the marginal tax burden if one additional monetary unit of 
income is earned—are not within the scope of this paper. See Callihan (1994) for a broad review of the accounting 
and public finance literature on average and marginal ETRs as well as for terminology and methodology in the ETR 
literature. 
14 43% are insignificant and 3% are significantly positive; the level of statistical significance is at 10%, two-sided. 
Additionally, every second study reports at least one non-negative estimate. For further indicators of mixed evidence, 
see Section 2.4. 
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been investigated. Finally, potential sources of bias and variation in the estimated 
coefficients are explained, which helps to improve future empirical and analytical models. 
We analyze the coefficient of 𝛽1 in the following linear meta-regression model: 
𝑦𝑗𝑖 = 𝛿0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖 ,  with  𝐸[𝜀𝑗𝑖
2] = 𝜎2𝜔𝑗𝑖  
(𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝐽)   (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝐼)   (𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝐾). 
(2.2) 
In equation (2.2), 𝑦𝑗𝑖  is the reported 𝛽1 of regression i from a total of I regressions of 
primary study j in a literature of J studies. 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑘 is a vector of explanatory variables that 
measures differences in specific study and model characteristics K of the primary studies 
and controls for heterogeneity between primary studies (see Section 3.2 for meta-regressor 
variable definitions). The meta-regression coefficient 𝛿𝑘 indicates the estimated impact on 
primary firm size effects if an empirical study design features characteristic k, ceteris 
paribus. 𝛿0 is the intercept. 
It is crucial to consider the meta-regression error term 𝜀𝑗𝑖 . It captures all unobserved 
differences across primary regressions and is expected to be normally distributed since 𝑦𝑗𝑖  
are taken from classic linear regression models. However, 𝜀𝑗𝑖 is assumed to be 
heteroscedastic because respective study and model characteristics (𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑘) influence the 
precision of 𝑦𝑗𝑖 , i.e., Var(𝑦𝑗𝑖| ∑ 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 ) = 𝜎𝑗𝑖
2  (Stanley and Jarrell (1989), Feld et al. 
(2013)). 
With heteroscedastic standard errors, estimates of OLS regression remain unbiased and 
consistent; yet, they lose efficiency. We bypass this problem by applying generalized least 
squares (GLS) regression, which allows for heteroscedastic errors. 
Assume that 𝜎𝑗𝑖
2 depends only on a single known variable 𝜔 so that 
𝜎𝑗𝑖
2 = 𝜎2𝜔𝑗𝑖. (2.3) 
Applying GLS regression, we transform equation (2.2) by dividing the jith equation by 
√𝜔𝑗𝑖 . Let  𝑦𝑗𝑖
∗ = 𝑦𝑗𝑖 √𝜔𝑗𝑖⁄ ,   𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑘
∗ = 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑘 √𝜔𝑗𝑖⁄   and  𝜀𝑗𝑖
∗ = 𝜀𝑗𝑖 √𝜔𝑗𝑖⁄ ,  then we get the 
transformed model 
𝑦𝑗𝑖
∗ = 𝛿0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑘
∗𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖
∗ ,  with  𝐸[𝜀𝑗𝑖
∗2] = 𝜎2 
(𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝐽)   (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝐼)   (𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝐾). 
(2.4) 
The transformed model shown in (2.4) corrects for the heteroscedasticity problem outlined 
above. Now error term 𝜀𝑗𝑖
∗  is homoscedastic. Hence, the best linear unbiased estimator of 
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𝛿𝑘 is obtained by applying GLS regression, i.e., WLS regression in (2.4).15 Accordingly, we 
apply WLS in our meta-regression. This approach is also in line with the theoretical 
literature on meta-regression (Stanley (2008)) and existing meta-regression analyses.16 The 
employed weights (1/𝜔𝑗𝑖) are known and correspond to the inverse of the squared standard 
error of each primary studies’ coefficient. Thus, primary study coefficients with relatively 
precise (i.e., low) standard errors are given greater weight in our meta-regression. 
Finally, multiple estimates per primary study may be jointly influenced by unobserved 
factors inherent to the respective study such as study quality or the researcher’s ideology 
(Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012), pp. 112–113). Since we include all estimates of a primary 
study, we cannot assume that (homoscedastic) 𝜀𝑗𝑖
∗  calculated for each observation within a 
primary study are independent of each other. Moreover, they are presumably autocorrelated 
because 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑦𝑗𝑖 , 𝑦𝑗𝑖+𝑙) ≠ 0 for observations 𝑙 ≠ 0. (2.5) 
Such autocorrelation (within-study dependence) violates the assumptions of the classic 
linear regression model (Fahrmeir et al. (2013), p. 191). Therefore, we relax the assumption 
of independence between observations within each primary study by clustering standard 
error 𝜀𝑗𝑖
∗  on study level.17 This technique changes the standard errors of the estimates 
compared to heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors because any possible dependence 
among the estimates within a study is accounted for (e.g., Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012), 
p. 100). 
2.3.2 Meta-regressor variables 
∑ 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1  of equation (2.4) captures differences within and between the specifications of 
the primary studies, which may lead to systematic variation of the R&D intensity effect on 
ETR within and between studies. We classify such specification differences under the 
following categories: definition of R&D intensity, definition of ETR, control variables, data 
sample characteristics, econometric specification, and publication bias. 
2.3.2.1 Definition of R&D intensity in primary studies 
In any meta-regression, it is decisive that the effect size of interest is comparable across the 
underlying primary studies (Stanley (2001)). This prerequisite is met in our meta-data set: 
                                              
15 The derivation of the WLS model is based on Heij et al. (2004), pp. 327–328 and Greene (2012), pp. 317–319. 
16 Examples of economic meta-regression analyses that apply WLS: Longhi et al. (2005), Rose and Stanley (2005), de 
Dominicis et al. (2008), Cipollina and Salvatici (2010), Efendic et al. (2011), Feld and Heckemeyer (2011), Havranek 
and Irsova (2011), Doucouliagos et al. (2012), Gechert and Will (2012), Feld et al. (2013), Lichter et al. (2015), Rusnak 
et al. (2013). 
17 This technique is also applied in other economic meta-regression analyses (e.g., Görg and Strobl (2001), Card et al. 
(2010), Cipollina and Salvatici (2010), Efendic et al. (2011), Adam et al. (2013)). 
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The primary studies calculate R&D intensity by scaling total R&D expenses either by total 
assets or by total sales.18 Thus, primary effect sizes are comparable and do not have to be 
standardized or converted to a common metric. R&D intensity measures the percentage 
point change of ETR in response to a one percentage point change of R&D intensity. We 
address the variation in the R&D intensity definition by coding the dummy variable R&D 
by Assets one (zero) if the underlying primary study’s regression measures R&D intensity as 
total R&D expenses divided by total assets (total sales). 
2.3.2.2 Definition of ETR in primary studies 
There is variation in the ETR definition across primary regressions. In the context of our 
research question, it is straightforward to group these definitions into an ETR including or 
excluding deferred taxes (see Section 2.2). Therefore, our variable of interest is the dummy 
variable ETR Including Deferred Taxes, which is coded one if the underlying primary study’s 
regression considers deferred taxes in the ETR calculation, and zero if deferred taxes are 
not considered. This variable is defined on the primary regression-level and not the study-
level and can therefore take different values within a primary study (see Section 2.4). 
Further, throughout our analysis, a firm’s global consolidated ETR is considered, i.e., a 
firm’s worldwide income tax expense divided by worldwide pre-tax income. We expect a 
positive coefficient of this dummy variable in the meta-regression. The reason for this is as 
follows: Primary studies that include deferred taxes in ETR calculation control for BTD 
that result from a possible immediate deduction of R&D expenses in the tax accounts and 
a deferred deduction of R&D expenses in the financial accounts (see Section 2.2.2). 
Consequently, a positive coefficient of this variable stands for a less negative effect size of 
R&D intensity on an ETR using current and deferred taxes in the calculation. 
2.3.2.3 Control variables in primary studies 
We include an Intangibles dummy variable in the meta-regression, which is coded one if the 
underlying primary study’s regression controls for intangible asset intensity (intangible 
assets divided by total assets), and zero otherwise. The exclusion of a control variable for 
intangible asset intensity in the primary studies could overestimate the R&D intensity 
coefficient, since both variables may capture ETR decreasing profit shifting with IP. Thus, 
controlling for this possible overestimation, we expect a positive coefficient for the 
Intangibles dummy variable in the meta-regression. 
Additionally, we include a Capital Intensity dummy variable that is coded one if the 
underlying primary study’s regression controls for fixed asset intensity (property, plant and 
                                              
18 Harris and Feeny (2003) define R&D intensity as R&D expenses divided by total income. Although we expect total 
income to be highly correlated with total sales, we exclude this study in a robustness test. Indeed, we get very similar 
results. 
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equipment divided by total assets), and zero otherwise. It could be that a firm with high 
R&D intensity also engages in large capital expenditures on fixed assets that lead to greater 
depreciation deductions. Indeed, fixed asset intensity is included in some primary studies 
to capture different treatments of depreciation for tax and financial reporting purposes (e.g., 
Gupta and Newberry (1997), Hope et al. (2013)) and to capture tax planning opportunities 
by strategically locating fixed assets (Robinson et al. (2010)). 
Inventory-intensive firms are considered to have less tax planning opportunities than 
capital-intensive firms.19 Hence, no or even a positive influence on ETR can be expected 
(e.g., Stickney and McGee (1982), Gupta and Newberry (1997)). Lee and Swenson (2012), 
however, refer to inventory tax benefits, such as the “last in first out” method or profit 
shifting opportunities with inventory (transfer pricing), which may have a negative effect 
on ETR. To capture these effects, we include an Inventory Intensity dummy variable that is 
coded one if the underlying primary study’s regression controls for inventory intensity 
(inventory divided by total assets), and zero otherwise. 
One common control variable in regressions on firms’ ETR is firm size, for example, the 
natural logarithm of total assets. However, because firm size is used as a control variable in 
all primary regressions, we do not include a control for firm size in our meta-regression. 
See the meta-regression analysis of Belz et al. (2017b) for an investigation of the relationship 
between firm size and ETR in light of two competing accounting theories, the political cost 
theory and the political power theory. 
2.3.2.4 Data sample characteristics of primary studies 
Some primary studies explicitly exclude loss-making firms. This exclusion is decisive in the 
context of this paper, since loss-making firms are generally less tax responsive, i.e., a study 
that excludes these firms may include relatively more firms with the possibility of profit 
shifting than a study that includes these firms. One may even consider an additional 
measurement error of the tax incentive if loss-making firms are included in an empirical 
profit shifting analysis (Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017)). Therefore, we include the 
dummy variable Loss-Making Firms Excluded, which marks primary studies that exclude loss-
making firms in their sample. We expect a negative coefficient for this dummy variable. 
Further, some primary studies truncate or winsorize ETR outliers. To control for this 
heterogeneity, we code the dummy variable ETR Outliers Truncated or Winsorized one if a 
primary study truncates or winsorizes ETR outliers (negative ETRs or ETRs larger than 
100%), and zero otherwise. 
                                              
19 Tax benefits associated with capital investments are, for example, investment tax credits or accelerated depreciation 
schedules. Regularly, inventory does not fall under the scope of such beneficial tax treatment. 
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The time span of the primary studies’ data covers more than 40 years. Two points must be 
considered regarding this issue: First, R&D became increasingly important during the past 
several decades, providing more opportunities for firms to engage in tax planning with 
R&D expenses and IP derived from R&D. Second, tax advisors may have searched for new 
(IP) tax planning opportunities over the past several years. To capture these effects, we 
include Average Sample Year of the underlying primary study’s regression. 
Further, the number of observations per study varies substantially; by including the 
Observation Number of the underlying primary study’s regression, we control for this 
variation. 
Finally, the primary studies cover eight databases that are quite heterogeneous.20 They 
mainly differ regarding geographic coverage, collection of data (hand-collected vs. database 
download), types of firm represented (listed vs. non-listed firms) and time span covered. 
Additional variation may also derive from different financial reporting standards across 
countries. We include dummy variables for each database to control for such unobserved 
database fixed effects. 
2.3.2.5 Econometric specification of primary studies 
Some primary studies include time fixed effects to control for unobserved time trends, like 
business cycles or changing tax legislation. Such non-modeled trends may affect the level 
of R&D intensity in a firm. Additionally, some primary studies control for unobserved 
industry-specific heterogeneity by including industry fixed effects. From a profit shifting 
perspective, it is decisive to consider industry fixed effects, since it is empirically shown that 
there is variation in profit shifting among industries (e.g., Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003), 
Beer and Loeprick (2015)). Controlling for time and industry fixed effects may reduce the 
effect of R&D intensity on ETR, because cross-time and cross-sectional variation is 
absorbed. However, possible omitted variable biases may be reduced. Since unconsidered 
time and industry fixed effects could influence the effect of R&D intensity on ETR, we 
include two dummy variables, Time Fixed Effects Included and Industry Fixed Effects Included, 
which are coded one if the underlying primary study’s regression controls for these 
unobserved fixed effects, and zero otherwise. 
2.3.2.6 Publication bias of primary studies 
Researchers may have a preference for publishing results that are statistically significant and 
in line with theoretical predictions and models. Thus, researchers could be reluctant to 
report insignificant results and may even search for specifications that produce expected 
                                              
20 The eight databases are Amadeus, Aspect-Huntley Financial Database, Australian Tax Office Tax Return Database, 
Compustat North America, Compustat Global, IBIS Enterprise Database, Worldscope, and a hand-collected data set 
on firms listed on the ASX. 
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and significant results. This circumstance is commonly referred to as publication bias (Card 
and Krueger (1995), Doucouliagos (2005), Stanley (2005)). To address this issue, we include 
the Primary Standard Error of primary estimates, which is the standard procedure in meta-
regression analysis (e.g., Feld and Heckemeyer (2011), Doucouliagos et al. (2012), Stanley 
and Doucouliagos (2012), pp. 60–61, Feld et al. (2013)). 
Table 4 contains detailed variable descriptions and summarizes the meta-regressor 
variables. 
 
Table 4. Definitions and summary statistics of meta-regressor variables. 
Variable Description Mean Std. dev. 
ETR Including 
  Deferred Taxes 
Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the primary regression uses the 
ratio of “total income tax expense to pre-tax income” as 
dependent variable, and 0 if the primary regression uses either the 
ratio of “current income tax expense to pre-tax income” or “cash 
income taxes paid to pre-tax income” as dependent variablea 
0.497 0.502 
R&D by Assets Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the primary regression uses the 
ratio of R&D expenses to total assets, and 0 if the primary 
regression uses the ratio of R&D expenses to total sales 
0.314 0.466 
Intangibles Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the primary regression controls 
for intangible assets intensity (ratio of intangible assets to total 
assets), and 0 otherwise 
0.163 0.371 
Capital Intensity Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the primary regression controls 
for capital assets intensity (ratio of property, plant and equipment 
to total assets), and 0 otherwise 
0.582 0.495 
Inventory 
  Intensity 
Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the primary regression controls 
for inventory intensity (ratio of inventory to total assets), and 0 
otherwise 
0.386 0.488 
Loss-Making 
  Firms Excluded 
Binary dummy variable coded 1 if loss-making firms are excluded 
from the sample underlying the primary regression, and 0 
otherwise 
0.549 0.499 
ETR Outliers 
  Truncated or 
  Winsorized 
Binary dummy variable coded 1 if ETR outliers (negative ETRs 
or ETRs larger than 100%) are truncated or winsorized in the 
sample underlying the primary regression, and 0 otherwise 
0.739 0.441 
Average Sample 
  Year 
Continuous variable capturing the average sample year of the 
primary regression 
1998.8 5.823 
Observation 
  Number 
Continuous variable capturing the observation number of the 
primary regression 
12,876.7 20,700.1 
Industry Fixed 
  Effects Included 
Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the primary regression controls 
for unobserved industry fixed effects, and 0 otherwise 
0.876 0.331 
Time Fixed 
  Effects Included 
Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the primary regression controls 
for unobserved time fixed effects, and 0 otherwise 
0.510 0.502 
Primary Standard 
  Error 
Continuous variable capturing the standard error of the primary 
R&D intensity effect estimate 
0.111 0.122 
Data on database dummy variables are not reported but are available upon request. 
a Although cash and current income tax expense differ from each other (e.g., under US-GAAP), these tax positions 
do not consider BTD and, hence, do not include deferred taxes, which are the focus of our analysis. In a robustness 
test, we drop primary regressions with ETR definition “current income tax expense divided by pre-tax income” and 
run regressions with only “cash income taxes paid divided by pre-tax income” vs. “total income tax expense divided 
by pre-tax income”. The results remain quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged and are available upon request. 
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2.4 Data 
Our meta-data set consists of 153 observations from 21 primary studies (published and 
unpublished) by 43 different researchers. To identify relevant primary studies, we searched 
through online databases such as ProQuest or ScienceDirect for published studies, and 
SSRN for working papers. Additionally, we performed Internet research via Google 
Scholar. Using keywords like (e.g., “effective tax rate”, “research and development”, “tax 
planning”, “tax avoidance”), we searched for empirical studies that examine determinants 
of ETR or that examine factors explaining variation of ETR across firms. By March 2016, 
we formed a sample of 49 studies; however, only 21 studies include R&D intensity as an 
explanatory variable in their empirical models. 
We sampled all R&D intensity coefficients from each primary study.21 There are two main 
reasons for this approach (Disdier and Head (2008)): First, an inherent characteristic of 
meta-regression is to exploit data heterogeneity. From this perspective, it would be 
inefficient to discard information by arbitrarily selecting only one estimate per study, 
because variation of model specifications within a study would get lost. Second, it would 
be quite subjective to decide which estimate should be used. 
Table 5 provides summary statistics on the meta-data set and Figure 7 provides the kernel 
density function of the R&D intensity coefficient. 
  
                                              
21 This approach is not possible for four estimates of one study (Buijink et al. (1999)) that reports p-values for the 
coefficients. In this case, the standard error can generally be inferred by concluding the t-statistic from the p-value; 
however, four estimates are zero, i.e., the standard error remains unknown. If the p-value reported to three decimal 
places is zero, a “cautious” p-value of 0.00044 is assumed. In addition, eight regressions in Buijink et al. (1999) refer to 
subsamples with less than 35 observations. We do not include these estimates in our meta-data set, since statistical 
inference on samples with less than 35 observations can lead to spurious results. However, including these estimates 
does not change our results, both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
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Table 5. Summary statistics of primary studies in ETR meta-data set. 
Study 
 
Country 
or Region 
Published 
(P) or 
Unpub-
lished (U) 
No. of 
effects 
Regres-
sions with 
ETR incl. 
def. taxes 
Effect of R&D intensity on ETR 
Mean Median Min. Max. Std. 
dev. 
Armstrong et al. (2012) USA P 8 50% –0.141 –0.140 –0.362 0.082 0.234 
Buijink et al. (1999) Belgium U 37 100% –0.040 –0.020 –0.250 0.210 0.102 
Crabbé (2010) Europe U 7 100% –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 0.000 
Donohoe (2015) USA P 6 33% –0.192 –0.190 –0.606 0.058 0.234 
Dyreng et al. (2016) UK P 2 100% –0.065 –0.065 –0.161 0.032 0.136 
Gupta and Newberry (1997) USA P 6 0% –0.162 –0.020 –0.683 0.192 0.363 
Harris and Feeny (1999) Australia U 5 100% –0.713 –0.562 –1.003 –0.521 0.229 
Harris and Feeny (2003) Australia P 10 0% –1.321 –1.279 –2.213 –0.872 0.406 
Hoi et al. (2013) USA P 2 0% –0.148 –0.148 –0.152 –0.144 0.005 
Hoopes et al. (2012) USA P 24 4% –0.272 –0.299 –0.370 0.116 0.094 
Hope et al. (2013) USA P 11 27% –0.229 –0.292 –0.479 0.139 0.197 
Jennings et al. (2012) USA P 2 100% –0.282 –0.282 –0.616 0.053 0.473 
Klassen et al. (2014) USA P 6 0% –0.022 –0.218 –0.303 0.439 0.357 
Lanis and Richardson (2012) Australia P 4 0% –0.011 –0.013 –0.014 –0.002 0.006 
Lee and Swenson (2012) Europe P 2 0% –0.193 –0.193 –0.193 –0.193 0.000 
McGuire et al. (2012) USA P 4 50% –0.436 –0.437 –0.497 –0.374 0.070 
McGuire et al. (2014) USA P 4 50% –0.124 –0.107 –0.277 –0.004 0.123 
Richardson and Lanis (2007) Australia P 2 100% –0.538 –0.538 –0.731 –0.345 0.273 
Richter et al. (2009) USA P 3 100% –0.003 –0.004 –0.004 +0.000 0.002 
Robinson et al. (2010) USA P 4 50% +0.000 –0.002 –0.002 0.002 0.002 
Taylor and Richardson (2012) Australia P 4 50% –0.084 –0.085 –0.103 –0.064 0.022 
Overall meta-data set 153 50% –0.234 –0.152 –2.213 0.439 0.374 
Last update of meta-data set: March 2016. 
 
Figure 7. Distribution of R&D intensity coefficient. 
 
This figure provides a graph of the Epanechnikov kernel density function 
of the R&D intensity coefficient. Density is on the y-axis and the R&D 
intensity coefficient is on the x-axis. Source: ETR meta-data set with 
N = 153 (full sample). 
 
As shown in Table 5 and Figure 7, there is some variation across the primary studies, which 
suggests pursuing a meta-regression analysis, as follows: 
First, the absolute value of the coefficient of variation, a measure of relative dispersion, is 
1.60, suggesting that there is a high degree of variation of reported primary estimates relative 
to the mean. Additionally, an arithmetic mean of the R&D intensity coefficient of –0.23 
0
.5
1
1
.5
2
D
e
n
s
it
y
-2 -1.5 -1 -.5 0 .5 1
R&D intensity coefficient
2 R&D Intensity and the Effective Tax Rate: A Meta-Regression Analysis 32 
 
and a median of –0.15 over all primary estimates suggests a negatively skewed distribution 
of the estimates. 
Second, 50% of ETR calculations in the meta-data set include current and deferred taxes, 
while the other half includes current taxes only; 62% of the studies use an ETR either 
including or excluding deferred taxes, while 38% of the studies use both definitions in their 
regressions. Hence, there is variation of ETR calculation between and within studies.22 
Third, the data of the primary studies cover a broad time period (1976–2012) from eight 
different databases, with geographic variation: 52% of the data are from studies on US 
firms, 32% from European firms, and 16% from Australian firms. 
These summary statistics suggest that there is some variation across primary studies. 
However, it is an empirical question whether there is systematic variation in how R&D 
intensity affects ETR across primary studies. We quantitatively investigate this variation in 
our meta-regression analysis and explore the heterogeneity of the meta-data set in detail. 
2.5 Meta-regression analysis 
2.5.1 Results 
Table 6 presents the results from our meta-regression. The dependent variable is the 
coefficient of R&D intensity found in primary studies, and the explanatory variables are 
specific study and model characteristics of the primary studies. For variable descriptions, 
see Section 2.3.2. 
Specification (1) contains the baseline specification, including the definition of R&D 
intensity and ETR as well as the econometric specification and publication bias. The 
coefficient of ETR Including Deferred Taxes is positive and statistically significant at the 5% 
level. Ceteris paribus, the coefficient of 0.11 indicates that the R&D intensity effect 
becomes less negative by 0.11 percentage points if a primary study controls for the tax 
accounting effect (by considering deferred taxes in ETR calculation) in comparison to a 
study that does not control for the tax accounting effect (by considering only current taxes 
in ETR calculation). In other words, depending on ETR calculation in an empirical study, 
the tax accounting effect can have a significantly negative effect on ETR. This is an 
important insight, because the profit shifting literature argues that a negative effect of R&D 
intensity on ETR is due to profit shifting with IP not taking into account the tax accounting 
R&D effect. This result remains stable in the following specifications. 
                                              
22 Further, ETR Including Deferred Taxes also varies across time periods: After 2000 (median average sample year), 41% 
of ETR calculations include deferred taxes; in 2000 and before, 54% include deferred taxes. Studies on US firms 
include deferred taxes in 26% of cases, for Australia, 36% and Europe, 96%. 
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In Specification (2), we include Intangibles, which controls for considering firms’ intangible 
assets in the primary regressions. The coefficient is significantly positive (1% level), which 
confirms the expected overestimation of the R&D estimate in primary regressions that do 
not control for intangible assets. This overestimation results from the fact that both 
intangible assets and R&D intensity capture ETR decreasing profit shifting with IP. 
Intangible assets, however, are generally only a share of a firm’s IP, because not all IP fulfills 
the recognition criteria of intangible assets in the balance sheet. Therefore, approximating 
IP with intangible assets may lead to some measurement error of the real IP present in a 
firm. Observing that the consensus estimate decreases but remains negative suggests that 
R&D intensity (partly) accounts for this measurement error and could serve as a better 
proxy for IP. 
In Specification (3), we add another important explanatory variable, Loss-Making Firms 
Excluded. This dummy variable is significantly negative (5% level), indicating that primary 
studies that consider only profitable firms report more negative R&D intensity estimates. 
This finding could plausibly be explained by loss-making firms engaging to a lesser degree 
in profit shifting than profitable firms. 
Specification (4) includes several other control variables: in particular, Capital Intensity, 
Inventory Intensity, ETR Outliers Truncated or Winsorized, Average Sample Year, and Observation 
Number. These variables are not significant, and the results described above remain 
qualitatively unchanged. 
We observe that the econometric specification is a source of substantial variation across 
primary studies. The dummy variables Industry Fixed Effects Included and Time Fixed Effects 
Included are both significantly negative throughout all specifications, except for Industry Fixed 
Effects Included being insignificant in Specification (1). The coefficient of R&D by Assets is 
insignificant for all specifications. Therefore, the definition of R&D intensity does not seem 
to play a major role in explaining variation across primary studies. Primary Standard Error as 
a control for publication bias is negative throughout all specifications, but significant only 
at the 10% level in Specifications (1) and (2). These specifications, however, lack further 
explanatory variables. In the more sophisticated models (3) and (4), publication bias 
becomes insignificant and less negative. Thus, we conclude that there is no evidence for 
substantial publication bias in our meta-data set. 
Overall, substantial variation across primary studies stems from ETR definition, inclusion 
of a control variable for intangible assets, excluding loss-making firms from the data set 
and econometric specification of the primary studies, i.e., whether time and industry fixed 
effects are included in the primary regressions. 
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Table 6. WLS meta-regression results. 
Explanatory variables Predicted 
sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Definition of ETR 
 
    
  ETR Including Deferred Taxes + 0.1101** 0.0595*** 0.0805*** 0.0855*** 
(0.0415) (0.0193) (0.0235) (0.0295) 
Definition of R&D 
     
  R&D by Assets ? 0.0478 0.0120 0.0023 0.0371 
(0.1267) (0.0573) (0.0458) (0.1001) 
Control Variables 
 
    
  Intangibles +  0.2013*** 0.1479*** 0.1631*** 
 (0.0209) (0.0359) (0.0292) 
  Capital Intensity ?    –0.0509 
   (0.0404) 
  Inventory Intensity ?    0.0062 
   (0.0997) 
Data Sample Characteristics 
 
    
  Loss-Making Firms Excluded –   –0.0543** –0.0857** 
  (0.0259) (0.0404) 
  ETR Outliers Truncated or Winsorized ?    0.0287 
   (0.0489) 
  Average Sample Year ?    +0.0000 
   (0.0000) 
  Observation Number ?    +0.0000 
   (0.0000) 
Econometric Specification 
 
    
  Industry Fixed Effects Included ? 0.0021 –0.1989*** –0.1517*** –0.1941*** 
(0.0122) (0.0221) (0.0362) (0.0273) 
  Time Fixed Effects Included ? –0.1102** –0.0618*** –0.0838*** –0.0887*** 
(0.0411) (0.0189) (0.0236) (0.0297) 
Publication Bias 
 
    
  Primary Standard Error – –2.8541* –1.1719* –0.7195 –0.7112 
(1.4056) (0.5859) (0.5508) (0.5624) 
Constant ? 0.2267** 0.2533*** 0.0796 0.0358  
(0.0900) (0.0569) (0.0730) (0.0736) 
Database dummy variables included in meta-regression YES YES YES YES 
No. of primary estimations 153 153 153 153 
No. of primary studies 21 21 21 21 
Adjusted R-squared 0.6602 0.8088 0.8200 0.8191 
Predicted effect size of R&D intensity 
(ETR calculation excludes deferred taxes) 
–0.4360 –0.1728 –0.2409 –0.2520 
Predicted effect size of R&D intensity 
(ETR calculation includes deferred taxes) 
–0.3258 –0.1133 –0.1604 –0.1666 
Regressions of the coefficients of R&D intensity found in primary studies on study and model characteristics; see equation (2.4). 
All study and model characteristics are coded as dummy variables (except for Average Sample Year, Observation Number and Primary 
Standard Error). For detailed variable descriptions and data sources, see Sections 2.3.2 and 2.4 as well as Table 4. The coefficients 
indicate the estimated effect of respective study or model characteristics on primary R&D intensity effects, ceteris paribus. The 
results for the database dummy variables are not displayed but are available upon request. All regressions are estimated using 
WLS. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in 
parentheses and are clustered on the study level to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (within-study dependence). 
Predicted effect sizes of R&D intensity are calculated assuming a hypothetical empirical study including all study and model 
characteristics that prove to be significant in the meta-regressions, i.e., respective dummy variables are set to one. With respect 
to continuous or insignificant characteristics, sample means are used for the prediction. The same is done for database fixed 
effects because we attempt to generalize empirical findings, rather than refer to specific databases. 
 
We now calculate the predicted effect size (consensus estimate) of R&D intensity in two 
steps. The calculation procedure is based on Feld et al. (2013) and Heckemeyer and 
Overesch (2017). 
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First, we include all explanatory variables except for ETR Including Deferred Taxes. 
Specifically, each coefficient of the insignificant dummy and continuous variables is 
multiplied by its sample mean. Also, the database dummy variables are evaluated at their 
sample mean, irrespective of their significance, because we aim to generalize empirical 
findings, rather than refer to specific databases (Feld et al. (2013)). The significant dummy 
variables are found to be important sources of variation and, hence, are not evaluated at 
their sample mean: These dummy variables are set to one because these variables or 
specification properties should be considered in an empirical study examining how R&D 
intensity affects ETR. This calculation leads to a predicted R&D intensity effect of –0.2520, 
i.e., a ten percentage point increase in R&D intensity leads to a 2.52 percentage points 
decrease of ETR.23 Since the dummy variable ETR Including Deferred Taxes does not enter 
this calculation, this prediction measures the effect of R&D intensity on an ETR that takes 
into account current taxes only. Hence, this effect could be due to the profit shifting or tax 
accounting effects. 
Second, to separate these two effects, we add the significantly positive coefficient of ETR 
Including Deferred Taxes to the predicted R&D intensity effect of –0.2520. This calculation 
leads to a prediction of –0.1666 (= –0.2520 + 0.0855*1), which takes account of deferred 
taxes and therefore “cancels out” the tax accounting effect on ETR. In other words, the 
effect of –0.1666 is due to profit shifting with IP created by R&D activity. 
Accordingly, we find evidence for the profit shifting and the tax accounting effects in our 
meta-data set. Moreover, after controlling for deferred taxes, we observe a decline in the 
consensus estimate by 34%, from –0.2520 to –0.1666. In other words, around two-thirds 
of the negative effect of R&D intensity on ETR can be attributed to the profit shifting 
effect. This finding is suggestive evidence that R&D may serve as a proxy for IP that is 
used for profit shifting within an MNE. However, the remaining one-third of the negative 
effect of R&D intensity on ETR can be attributed to the tax accounting effect. Hence, 
R&D expenses also influence the tax burden of a firm from a pure tax accounting view, 
i.e., an immediate deduction of R&D expenses in the tax accounts as opposed to a possible 
capitalization in the financial accounts. Therefore, the profit shifting and tax accounting 
literature correctly refer to a negative effect of R&D intensity on a firm’s tax burden from 
a profit shifting or tax accounting point of view. However, researchers in both strands of 
literature should be aware of and refer to the respective other effect in their model designs 
and argumentation. 
                                              
23 –0.2520 = 0.0371*0.3137 (R&D by Assets) + 0.1631*1 (Intangibles) – 0.0509*0.5817 (Capital Intensity) 
+ 0.0062*0.3856 (Inventory Intensity) – 0.0857*1 (Loss-Making Firms Excluded) + 0.0287*0.7386 (ETR Outliers Truncated or 
Winsorized) + 0.00005*1998.8 (Average Sample Year) + 0.0001 (Observation Number) 
– 0.1941*1 (Industry Fixed Effects Included) – 0.0887*1 (Time Fixed Effects Included) – 0.7112*0.1110 (Primary Standard Error) 
– 0.1031 (Database Fixed Effects) + 0.0358 (Constant). Differences are due to rounding error. 
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2.5.2 Robustness analysis 
In Table 7, we check whether our main regression results are robust to model variations, 
taking Specification (4) in Table 6 as a starting point. 
One of our main assumptions is that the error terms calculated for observations within a 
primary study are not independent of each other and are autocorrelated (within-study 
dependence, see Section 2.3.1). In Specification (1), we consider observations within a study 
as independent and provide heteroscedasticity-robust (instead of cluster-robust) standard 
errors. The level of statistical significance is robust: The insignificant estimates of 
Specification (4) of Table 6 remain insignificant, while the significant estimates remain 
significant. Hence, calculation of the predicted effect size of R&D intensity does not 
change. 
In Specification (2), we use squared primary standard error as a control variable for 
publication bias, which some simulations propagate as a better control (Stanley and 
Doucouliagos (2012), p. 61). Nevertheless, our results remain qualitatively and 
quantitatively unchanged. 
In our meta-regression analysis, we find no evidence for publication bias. Longhi et al. 
(2005) argue that in the absence of publication bias, the primary standard error can be 
omitted from the meta-regression. Therefore, in Specification (3), we leave the primary 
standard error out and observe no qualitative change in our results. Quantitatively, we 
obtain a slight decrease of 0.02 in the predicted R&D intensity effect. 
In Specification (4), we control for the country considered in the respective primary 
regression, i.e., using country fixed effects instead of database fixed effects. This approach 
leads to qualitatively robust results; the p-value of ETR Including Deferred Taxes is 0.108. 
Quantitatively, we actually observe an increase in the predicted R&D intensity effect of 0.03 
and 0.06, respectively. Primary Standard Error as a control for publication bias is significantly 
negative (5% level); however, the coefficient is below 2, which suggests that publication 
bias is not substantial. The reason for this is that, in case of substantial publication bias, 
estimates less than twice their standard errors (t-statistic of 2) remain unreported. Thus, 
there would be correlation between R&D intensity coefficients and their associated primary 
standard errors with a regression slope of at least 2 (Card and Krueger (1995), Feld et al. 
(2013)). 
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Table 7. Robustness analysis of WLS meta-regression results. 
Explanatory variables Predicted 
sign 
(1) 
Heteroscedas-
ticity-robust 
standard 
errors 
(2) 
Squared 
standard 
errors 
(3) 
Without 
standard 
errors 
(4) 
Country 
fixed effects 
(5) 
Large study 
dummy 
variable 
(6) 
Excl. Harris 
and Feeny 
(2003) 
(7) 
R&D tax 
credit 
dummy 
variable 
Definition of ETR 
 
       
  ETR Including Deferred Taxes + 
0.0855*** 0.0920*** 0.0922*** 0.0601 0.0740* 0.0877*** 0.0810**  
(0.0210) (0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0357) (0.0394) (0.0306) (0.0306) 
Definition of R&D 
        
  R&D by Assets ? 0.0371 –0.0266 –0.0719 0.2985 0.0823 0.0259 0.1151  
(0.1065) (0.0545) (0.0536) (0.1883) (0.1320) (0.1021) (0.1509) 
Control Variables 
 
       
  Intangibles + 0.1631*** 0.1624*** 0.1605*** 0.0884* 0.1360*** 0.1600*** 0.1552***  
(0.0442) (0.0334) (0.0341) (0.0494) (0.0446) (0.0283) (0.0271) 
  Capital Intensity ? –0.0509 –0.0489 –0.0480 0.0260 –0.0697 –0.0491 –0.0430  
(0.0370) (0.0411) (0.0406) (0.0589) (0.0509) (0.0399) (0.0437) 
  Inventory Intensity ? 0.0062 –0.0290 –0.0657 0.2648 0.0766 0.0007 0.0788  
(0.0904) (0.0802) (0.0761) (0.1875) (0.1450) (0.1006) (0.1482) 
Data Sample Characteristics 
 
       
  Loss-Making Firms Excluded – –0.0857*** –0.0992** –0.1018** –0.0624** –0.0791 –0.0873** –0.0850*  
(0.0270) (0.0421) (0.0422) (0.0285) (0.0474) (0.0406) (0.0410) 
  ETR Outliers Truncated or Winsorized ? 0.0287 0.0328 0.0347 0.0477 0.0340 0.0274 0.0334  
(0.0307) (0.0543) (0.0549) (0.0462) (0.0544) (0.0496) (0.0473) 
  Average Sample Year ? +0.0000 +0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000  
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
  Observation Number ? +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000 +0.0000   
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Econometric Specification 
 
       
  Industry Fixed Effects Included ? –0.1941*** –0.1952*** –0.1951*** –0.1399*** –0.1728*** –0.1894*** –0.1914***  
(0.0403) (0.0278) (0.0277) (0.0430) (0.0316) (0.0282) (0.0284) 
  Time Fixed Effects Included ? –0.0887*** –0.0950*** –0.0952*** –0.0637* –0.0773* –0.0909*** –0.0843**  
(0.0210) (0.0303) (0.0302) (0.0358) (0.0395) (0.0308) (0.0307) 
Publication Bias 
 
       
  Primary Standard Error – –0.7112   –1.8802** –0.7396 –0.6262 –0.8538  
(0.4852)   (0.7751) (0.5749) (0.5789) (0.6500) 
  Primary Standard Error Squared –  –1.5541      
  (0.9438)      
Regression Number 
 
       
  Large Study ?     –0.0623    
    (0.0967)   
R&D tax credit 
 
       
  R&D Tax Credit –       –0.0443  
      (0.0338) 
Constant ? 0.0999 –0.0081 –0.0192 0.1417 0.0932 0.0235 0.0634  
(0.2520) (0.1020) (0.1043) (0.0925) (0.1426) (0.0730) (0.0680) 
Database dummy variables included in meta-
regression 
 
YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Country dummy variables included in meta-
regression 
 
NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
No. of primary estimations 
 
153 153 153 153 153 143 153 
No. of primary studies 
 
21 21 21 21 21 20 21 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.8191 0.8165 0.8160 0.7624 0.8190 0.6428 0.8188 
Predicted effect size of R&D intensity 
(ETR calculation excludes deferred taxes; 
column (7): country does not grant R&D tax credit) 
 
–0.2520 –0.2591 –0.2348 –0.2818 –0.2223 –0.1839 –0.2257 
Predicted effect size of R&D intensity 
(ETR calculation includes deferred taxes; 
column (7): country grants R&D tax credit) 
 
–0.1666 –0.1672 –0.1426 –0.2217 –0.1483 –0.0962 –0.1748 
Predicted effect size of R&D intensity 
(ETR calculation includes deferred taxes; 
column (7): country does not grant R&D tax credit) 
 
–0.1666 –0.1672 –0.1426 –0.2217 –0.1483 –0.0962 –0.1447 
Regressions of the coefficients of R&D intensity found in primary studies on study and model characteristics; see equation (2.4). All study and model characteristics are 
coded as dummy variables (except for Average Sample Year, Observation Number and Primary Standard Error). For detailed variable descriptions and data sources, see Sections 
2.3.2 and 2.4 as well as Table 4. The coefficients indicate the estimated effect of respective study or model characteristics on primary R&D intensity effects, ceteris paribus. 
The results for the database and country dummy variables are not displayed but are available upon request. All regressions are estimated using WLS. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on the study level (except for Specification (1) 
with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors instead of clustered standard errors), to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (within-study dependence). Predicted 
effect sizes of R&D intensity are calculated assuming a hypothetical empirical study including all study and model characteristics that prove to be significant in the meta-
regressions, i.e., respective dummy variables are set to one. With respect to continuous or insignificant characteristics, sample means are used for the prediction. The same 
is done for database and country fixed effects, because we attempt to generalize empirical findings, rather than refer to specific databases or countries. 
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Specification (5) controls for undue weight of certain studies, because we observe a 
relatively large degree of variation in the number of regressions per study (see Table 5). We 
include a dummy variable coded one for studies that have more regressions than the average 
study (12 regressions or more).24 Still, these robustness tests resemble our main meta-
regression findings and we observe no qualitative change in our results. Quantitatively, we 
find a slight decrease of 0.02 in the predicted R&D intensity effect. 
In Specification (6), we leave out Harris and Feeny (2003), who define R&D intensity as 
R&D expenses divided by total income instead of total sales. Since total income is probably 
highly correlated with total sales, we expect no significant change in our results. Indeed, 
although sample size decreases by 10 observations, the results are qualitatively robust. 
Finally, in Specification (7), we control for countries that grant firms an R&D tax credit, 
i.e., allowing firms to deduct an additional fraction of R&D expenses from their tax base 
under certain conditions. This circumstance may bias our profit shifting effect, since the 
R&D tax credit also leads to a permanently negative effect on ETR (see footnote 11). We 
include an R&D Tax Credit dummy variable coded one if a primary regression refers to a 
country that granted an R&D tax credit during the time period the primary regression refers 
to, and zero otherwise (mean of R&D Tax Credit: 0.7273). The coefficient (–0.0443) is 
negative though insignificant. Hence, in case a primary regression is based on a data set 
with firms that are resident in countries with an R&D tax credit, the R&D intensity effect 
is slightly more negative, by 0.04 percentage points.25 Our main meta-regression findings 
remain qualitatively robust; however, the profit shifting effect now varies between –0.1447 
and –0.1748, depending on whether a country grants an R&D tax credit to its firms. 
This robustness test can further be used to disentangle the R&D tax credit effect from the 
R&D profit shifting effect that, to our knowledge, is yet to be investigated. Consider the 
predicted R&D intensity effect of –0.1447, which controls for the tax accounting effect for 
a firm residing in a country that does not grant an R&D tax credit (i.e., ETR Including Deferred 
Taxes is set to one and R&D Tax Credit is set to zero in the R&D effect size calculation). 
In other words, this R&D intensity estimate reveals the profit shifting effect for a primary 
regression on firms that reside in countries not granting R&D tax credits. Comparing this 
estimate with the profit shifting effect of –0.1666 from Specification (4) in Table 6, which 
                                              
24 Excluding these studies would significantly lower number of observations and between-study variation. By clustering 
the standard error on the study level, we already control for the high degree of dependency of estimates within each 
study. 
25 Interestingly, the estimate of –0.04 resembles an estimate we calculate for the US R&D tax credit, independently of 
our meta-data set: For 2001–2011, the share of R&D tax credit granted to US firms was about 6% of total qualified 
R&D expenses (http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Corporation-Research-Credit, last accessed: 11 September 
2016). For an average US firm, we calculate an ETR decrease of 0.04 percentage points when R&D expenses increase 
by one percentage point. For the top 10% of R&D firms in the USA, we calculate a respective ETR decrease of 0.05 
percentage points. This calculation is based on Compustat North America; data are available upon request. 
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does not control for an R&D tax credit, shows that we overestimated the profit shifting 
effect by 0.02 percentage points. Hence, our profit shifting effect from our main regression 
is overestimated by about 10% (= 0.02/0.1666). In other words, approximately 10% of the 
profit shifting effect can be traced back to R&D tax credits in our meta-data set. 
Overall, the results from the robustness analysis are consistent with our main regression 
results: The consensus estimate for the R&D intensity effect on ETR is negative and 
declines by about one-third if a primary study controls for the tax accounting effect.26 
2.6 Conclusion 
Profit shifting by MNEs is of high interest in academic research and public debate and 
especially IP is considered a main shifting channel. While R&D activity often serves as a 
proxy for IP-based profit shifting, ETR is a widely used measure in evaluating effective tax 
planning in a profit shifting context. However, the relationship between R&D intensity and 
ETR is insufficiently addressed in the empirical literature. 
Consequently, our research question focuses on how R&D intensity—a proxy for IP—
affects firm ETR. The empirical literature shows that there is some variation in the effect 
of R&D intensity on ETR. To understand this variation and quantify a consensus estimate 
for this effect, we apply meta-regression techniques. Concerning the consensus estimate of 
the R&D effect, we obtain the following results that are robust to variation in model 
specifications. 
For primary studies considering only current taxes in ETR calculation, a ten percentage 
point increase in R&D intensity leads to a 2.5 percentage points decrease in ETR. This 
finding may be due to two distinct effects: a profit shifting effect, i.e., R&D may serve as a 
proxy for IP used for profit shifting within an MNE, and a tax accounting effect, i.e., an 
immediate deduction of R&D expenses in the tax accounts, as opposed to a possible 
capitalization in the financial accounts. 
For primary studies considering both current and deferred taxes in ETR calculation, a ten 
percentage point increase in R&D intensity leads to a 1.7 percentage points decrease in 
ETR. This effect is attributable solely to the profit shifting effect, because the tax 
accounting effect is controlled for by including deferred taxes. In other words, we find 
profit shifting evidence for transfer pricing with IP located in low-tax countries, which 
drives down firms’ tax burden. 
                                              
26 In a further robustness test, we exclude the variable Industry Fixed Effects Included, which 88% of primary regressions 
control for. Qualitatively, our results remain unchanged, except for Intangibles being still positive though insignificant. 
Quantitatively, we observe consensus estimates of –0.3898 and –0.2767, i.e., we underestimate our consensus estimates 
in our main regression results. In the interest of brevity, this robustness test is not tabulated but is available upon 
request. 
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In general, this finding supports empirical studies using R&D intensity as a proxy for IP in 
a profit shifting context. However, in their model designs and argumentation, researchers 
in the profit shifting literature do not consider the R&D tax accounting effect, while 
researchers in the tax accounting literature do not consider the R&D profit shifting effect. 
Therefore, the two distinct R&D effects on firms’ tax burden are not comprehensively 
addressed in the profit shifting and tax accounting literature and the relative importance of 
the two effects is unknown. 
In the meta-regression analysis, we observe that, after controlling for a firm’s intangible 
assets, the predicted R&D intensity effect declines but remains negative. Hence, the 
negative effect of R&D expenses on ETR cannot be fully explained by firms’ intangible 
assets. This result is a hint that approximating IP with intangible assets may lead to 
measurement error, because intangible assets are only a share of a firm’s IP, since not all IP 
fulfills the recognition criteria of intangible assets on the balance sheet. By additionally 
considering R&D intensity in empirical specifications, this measurement error may be 
(partly) accounted for. 
Our general finding that inclusion or exclusion of deferred taxes in ETR calculation has a 
decisive impact on the size of the effect of a primary regression’s explanatory variable (R&D 
intensity in our paper) illustrates that considering ETR definition in a research setting is 
crucial: An ETR calculation that considers current and deferred taxes is not affected by tax 
deferral strategies, while current ETR is affected by such strategies. Consequently, 
depending on the research question, scholars should carefully point out which effect ETR 
shall measure in their research setting, then decide whether to include or exclude deferred 
taxes in ETR calculation. 
Finally, our robustness analysis allow us to further disentangle the profit shifting effect from 
the R&D tax credit effect: We detect that about 10% of the profit shifting effect can be 
traced back to R&D tax credits. 
The policy implications of this meta-regression analysis are twofold. First, we provide 
additional evidence that IP is used for profit shifting by strategically setting transfer prices 
to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions, thereby lowering firms’ tax burden. This finding 
supports OECD BEPS Action Plans Numbers 8, 9, and 10, which aim to set transfer prices 
in line with value creation. Second, with respect to R&D activity, the R&D effect of profit 
shifting and tax accounting on ETR is 2:1, i.e., one-third of the effect of R&D intensity on 
a firm’s tax burden could be mitigated by tax legislation via book-tax conformity. 
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contribute to the discussion on the size-ETR relation in three ways: First, applying meta-
regression analysis on a US meta-data set, we provide evidence supporting the political cost 
theory. Second, our analysis reveals factors that are possible sources of variation and bias 
in previous empirical studies; these findings can improve future empirical and analytical 
models. Third, in further analyses on a cross-country meta-data set, we find additional 
explanations for the two competing theories. To our knowledge, these explanations have 
not yet been investigated in our research context. We find that tax planning aspects, such 
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3.1 Introduction 
For more than 40 years, accounting literature has been discussing two competing theories 
about the relationship between ETR and firm size. The political power theory assumes a 
negative relationship, i.e., the greater the firm size the lower the ETR, as larger firms have 
more possibilities to influence the political process in their favor, to engage in international 
tax planning, and to organize their activities to achieve optimal tax savings (Siegfried 
(1972)). In contrast, the political cost theory—which considers taxes as a part of firms’ 
political costs—assumes a positive relationship, as larger firms are subject to larger public 
visibility, which causes them to be exposed to greater regulatory actions by the government 
or to be expected to take more social responsibility (Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
Zimmerman (1983), Watts and Zimmerman (1986)). 
These two viewpoints have led to further empirical research, without conclusive results. In 
fact, as Table A 1 in the Appendix to Section 3 shows, empirical studies over the past 
decades provide evidence in favor of both theories: From 49 primary studies in our meta-
data set, we find 20 (9) studies that provide evidence for the political cost (political power) 
theory, nine studies show no clear tendency towards either theory, and 11 studies provide 
evidence for both theories. 
We investigate this inconsistency by applying a WLS meta-regression analysis to our large 
meta-data set of primary studies that all use ETR as the dependent variable and firm size as 
an explanatory variable. Besides the vast amount of empirical studies on the size-ETR 
relation in light of the two competing theories, which itself prompts performing meta-
regression analysis, we consider this approach the most appropriate as it provides a large 
meta-data set with data from numerous countries and various explanatory variables and 
time spans. No other available database was found with a variety of variables large enough 
to make a firm-level analysis with a scope comparable to that from our meta-data set. In 
addition, meta-regression analysis enables us to consider individual research designs and 
varying variable definitions, which might bias the results in the primary studies. Further, we 
are able to control for publication bias, i.e., reporting expected and significant results in 
primary studies to increase the chance of being published. 
Our meta-regression analysis contributes threefold to research: 
First, we quantitatively summarize 25 primary studies with 161 observations that consider 
only US firms and provide a consensus estimate for the size-ETR relation in these studies. 
Our estimate is positive and implies that a ten percent increase in firm size roughly leads to 
a one percentage point increase in ETR. This finding supports the political cost theory. In 
an additional analysis of the US meta-data set, we investigate tax planning elements. As 
already discussed, large, multinational firms can take advantage of multiple tax planning 
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opportunities by optimizing their global activities to achieve highest possible tax savings. 
One such tax planning opportunity can be pursued by using intangible assets and intragroup 
transfer pricing, which facilitates separating where firms generate their profits and where 
they report their taxable income. This cross-border profit shifting strategy enables large 
firms to shelter their worldwide income from high tax rates and to reduce their ETRs (e.g., 
Rego (2003)). Current examples are Apple Inc. and Google Inc., which reported an ETR 
on their foreign earnings of 1.2 and 2.4 percent, respectively, in 2010 (Drucker (2010); 
Godfrey (2012)). For the US meta-data set, we find that the size-ETR relation significantly 
decreases after the introduction of the check-the-box rule in the USA in 1997. This rule 
simplified profit shifting to low-tax hybrid subsidiaries within US MNEs. This finding 
suggests that, after 1997, large firms effectively decreased their ETR to a significantly higher 
degree than small firms due to enhanced profit shifting opportunities. However, the size-
ETR relation still remains positive in line with the political cost theory. 
Second, we are able to identify various study characteristics that significantly influence the 
effect of firm size on ETR. We show that estimation results are significantly affected by 
definition of firm size, definition of ETR, sample period, and inclusion of control variables 
for a firm’s capital intensity and a firm’s R&D intensity. Our meta-regression analysis 
therefore explains why there is variation in effect sizes in the underlying primary studies 
and reveals possible sources of variation and bias that future research should take into 
account. Hence, our findings can be used to design future empirical models in a more 
coherent and consistent manner, improving the quality of estimation results. 
Third, we extend our US-based analysis by quantitatively analyzing 49 primary studies with 
393 observations on various countries (including the USA). This cross-country meta-data 
set allows us to examine additional explanations of the two competing theories. Thereby, 
we shed light on individual elements of both theories that have not yet been investigated in 
our research context. 
Within this cross-country analysis, we find evidence that studies relying on relatively large, 
presumably multinationally operating firms show a significantly lower size-ETR relation, 
which translates into a decrease of ETR with increasing firm size. This finding may hint at 
international tax planning activities of large firms, as was found in the US-based analysis. 
However, as in the US sample, the size-ETR relation remains positive in line with the 
political cost theory. 
In addition, we find evidence that society-related elements affect the size-ETR relation. As 
already discussed, according to the political cost theory, larger firms are subject to greater 
public scrutiny and visibility, which forces them to adapt their activities to what is viewed 
as socially or morally responsible. Hence, we argue that the effect of public scrutiny is 
stronger in societies where people strive to equalize the distribution of power and where 
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people demand justification of inequalities of power among people (Hofstede (1980), 
Hofstede (2001), Hofstede et al. (2010)). Using Hofstede’s Power Distance Index as a 
measure of how much people in a country expect and accept the equal distribution of 
power, we confirm that a stronger tendency towards equalization is associated with a more 
positive size-ETR relation. In other words, support for the political cost theory is especially 
pronounced in studies based on countries where people expect more equal treatment and 
demand justification for inequalities of power among people. 
Finally, we find evidence that the transparency index developed by Williams (2014) explains 
variation in the size-ETR relation. In particular, the size-ETR relation is more positive in 
countries with a high degree of transparency. 
We apply a wide variety of robustness tests to confirm our findings for the US and cross-
country meta-data set. First, we vary the definition of primary standard errors to validate 
the significance of our initial estimates in light of possible publication bias. Second, we 
exclude especially large and small firm size coefficients to overcome the threat of spurious 
results due to extreme values. Third, we control for the number of observations per study 
to consider possible over-representation of certain empirical studies. Fourth, we distinguish 
between other ETR definitions to deal with possible misspecifications. Fifth, for the cross-
country meta-data set, we include country fixed effects instead of database fixed effects. In 
sum, all results prove to be robust in light of different specifications. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 presents the political cost and 
political power theories in more detail. Section 3.3 describes the meta-regression approach, 
defines variables, and gives an overview of our control variables. Section 3.4 provides the 
data and summary statistics. Section 3.5 discusses the results from the meta-regression on 
the US and cross-country meta-data set and provides the robustness analysis. Finally, 
Section 3.6 sets forth our conclusions. 
3.2 Effect of  firm size on ETR: Political cost theory versus political 
power theory 
3.2.1 Political cost theory 
The relationship between firm size and firm’s political costs has been intensively debated 
in accounting research for several decades. Aichian and Kessel (1962) state that, for larger 
and more profitable firms, the possibility of public policy and government action directed 
against these firms increases. Jensen and Meckling (1976) point out that larger firms have a 
higher degree of public visibility and thus are more exposed to public and social pressure 
than smaller firms. Boynton et al. (1992) detect that “larger firms are generally subject to 
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closer surveillance from both the financial markets and from the IRS” (Boynton et al. 
(1992), 147) and Jensen and Meckling (1978) even assert that “larger corporations as we 
know them are destined to be destroyed” due to government actions “destroying the system 
of contract rights” (Jensen and Meckling (1978), 32). Watts and Zimmerman (1978) note 
that the political sector has the power to redistribute wealth between various groups and 
that the relative magnitude of such wealth transfer increases with firm size. 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986) base the political cost theory on these findings. The 
reasoning behind the political cost theory can be subdivided into two main arguments: First, 
larger firms are subject to more governmental regulations. Second, they are politically more 
prone to public pressure and scrutiny, which forces them to act socially responsible and to 
adjust their actions and corporate behavior to what their social environment expects. 
Several studies have been conducted in support of this argument (e.g., Ernst & Young 
(2014), Graham et al. (2014), Dyreng et al. (2016)). The political cost theory can be 
empirically examined by considering the relationship between taxes—as one component of 
political costs—and firm size: If larger firms indeed face systematically higher ETRs 
compared to smaller firms, this result is consistent with the political cost theory. 
Zimmerman (1983) empirically examines the size-ETR relation and finds a positive 
relationship. The author concludes that this finding is evidence for using firm size as a 
proxy for a firm’s political costs. His results are robust for alternative databases as well as 
for different definitions of ETR and firm size; however, the relationship varies across time 
and industries. Omer et al. (1993) confirm Zimmerman’s (1983) results in a study applying 
five different ETR definitions; in addition, their results are robust to controlling for time 
and industry effects. For further studies on a positive size-ETR relation, see Table A 1 
(column (2)) in the Appendix to Section 3. 
3.2.2 Political power theory 
First described by Siegfried (1972), the political power theory hypothesizes that large firms 
have greater economic resources and political power than small firms. Three arguments 
support this negative size-ETR relation. First, large firms can use their resources and power 
to negotiate their tax burden or influence legislation in their favor (e.g., lobbying activities), 
resulting in lower ETRs for large firms compared to small firms (e.g., Siegfried (1972), pp. 
32–36, Stickney and McGee (1982), Gupta and Newberry (1997), Nicodème (2007)). 
Second, larger firms are able to invest more in tax experts that help maximize tax savings, 
and Scholes et al. (1992) find evidence that tax-motivated income shifting increases with 
firm size. Those authors trace this relationship back to smaller firms engaging in less 
opportunistic tax planning because they may have less sophisticated tax departments. 
Further, Mills et al. (2013) note that large firms may structure complex tax-reducing 
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transactions by hiring the best tax advisors. Third, larger, presumably multinational, firms 
benefit from economies of scale in international tax planning, which results in lower ETRs, 
by taking advantage of their size as they optimally arrange their global activities to minimize 
their overall tax burden. Results from Rego (2003) confirm this argument and large 
multinational firms appear to lower their tax burden by using profit shifting opportunities 
such as locating production or IP in low-tax countries or by taking advantage of tax 
subsidies in various host countries. 
Porcano (1986) provides early evidence for the political power theory. He finds that larger 
firms have smaller ETRs although his results are sensitive to the database used (Kern and 
Morris (1992)). His findings are supported by work from McIntyre and Spinner (1986) and 
Dyreng et al. (2008). In related work, Mills et al. (2013) use ETR as a measure of a firm’s 
political costs and investigate the interactive effects of a firm’s political sensitivity and 
bargaining (i.e., political) power on its political costs. Interestingly, they find that firms that 
rely on government contracts report higher ETRs because their political sensitivity 
increases. However, the relation between political sensitivity and ETR decreases with a 
firm’s political power. They conclude that some firms have sufficient political power to 
eliminate their tax-related political costs. For further studies on a negative size-ETR 
relation, see Table A 1 (column (3)) in the Appendix to Section 3. 
3.2.3 Inconclusive empirical research on the effect of firm size on ETR 
The empirical studies cited in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 provide evidence for either the 
political cost theory or the political power theory. However, several empirical studies 
investigating the relation between taxes and firm size do not find any relation or come to 
inconclusive results. For example, Bao and Romeo (2013) generally confirm the political 
cost theory except for the largest 5 percent of firms in their data set, where the political 
power theory holds. Wu et al. (2012a) find that the size-ETR relation depends on firm 
ownership: The political cost theory holds for privately-owned firms, while the political 
power theory holds for state-controlled firms. Nicodème (2007) comes to inconclusive 
results by first finding a negative correlation between ETR and firm size proxied by number 
of employees but then finding a positive correlation when firm size is proxied by total 
assets. Holland (1998) examines the effect of firm size on ETR over a 26-year period (1968–
1993); only in four years (1978–1981) does the author find a significantly negative size-ETR 
relation. Kern and Morris (1992) consider the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which introduced 
significant changes to US tax law. The authors are able to replicate the results from both 
Zimmerman (1983) and Porcano (1986) for the period before the Tax Reform Act; 
however, post-1986, they find no systematic difference in the ETRs of large and small firms. 
Wilkie and Limberg (1990) reconcile the conflicting results from Zimmerman (1983) 
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(political cost theory) and Porcano (1986) (political power theory). The authors find that 
diverging empirical settings such as different data sets and different ETR and firm size 
definitions affect the direction and degree of the size-ETR relation. Stickney and McGee 
(1982) and Shevlin and Porter (1992) do not find evidence that ETRs significantly differ 
between large and small firms. For further studies that do not find any size-ETR relation 
or come to inconclusive results, see Table A 1 (columns (1) and (4)) in the Appendix to 
Section 3. 
Overall, the empirical studies discussed in this section provide heterogeneous and 
conflicting results on the size-ETR relation. In our meta-data set, we consider a large set of 
primary studies and explore considerable heterogeneity concerning the magnitude and 
direction of the firm size coefficient (see Section 3.4). To quantitatively summarize and 
systematically examine these contradicting empirical findings, we perform meta-regression 
analysis on this large meta-data set with data from numerous countries and various 
explanatory variables and time spans. The following section explains our meta-regression 
approach in detail. 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Meta-regression approach 
The primary studies underlying this meta-regression analysis identify their data analysis 
clearly and have the following classic linear regression model: 
𝐸𝑇𝑅 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀. (3.1) 
The dependent variable is a firm’s global average ETR, i.e., a measure of worldwide income 
tax expense divided by a measure of worldwide pre-tax financial income, both of which 
observed in firm annual financial reports.28 In our meta-regression, the explanatory variable 
of interest is FIRMSIZE measured as total assets, market value, or sales. In addition to this 
variable, primary studies use a wide range of additional variables captured in vector X. 𝛽0 is 
the intercept. 
In our research context, the coefficient of interest is the reported 𝛽1 of the firm size variable 
in equation (3.1). As outlined in Section 3.2, the sign of 𝛽1 can be predicted via two 
                                              
28 All underlying primary studies use annual ETRs. Dyreng et al. (2008) propose using long-run (10-year) cash ETRs 
to measure tax avoidance practices of firms because annual ETRs may be subject to year-to-year variation. However, 
in our meta-regression, we are bound to the approach of the primary studies and consider the effect of firm size on 
annual ETRs. In addition, marginal ETRs—defined as the marginal tax burden if one additional monetary unit of 
income is earned—are not within the scope of this paper. See Callihan (1994) for a broad review of the accounting 
and public finance literature on average and marginal ETRs as well as for terminology and methodology in the ETR 
literature. 
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competing theories, the political cost theory (positive 𝛽1) or the political power theory 
(negative 𝛽1). 
Indeed, there is substantial variation in the underlying empirical studies on the effect of 
firm size on ETR: In the full meta-sample, 50 percent of coefficients are statistically 
significant at 10% level (two-sided) and 63 percent (37 percent) of these significant 
estimates are positive (negative). Hence, which theory dominates in empirical literature is 
not clear. 
We investigate this ambiguity in our US meta-data set using meta-regression analysis. We 
did not find any other database with a variety of variables large enough to make a firm-level 
analysis with a scope comparable to our meta-data analysis over the period 1975–2012. 
Thereby, we contribute to research in three ways. First, we generalize the central tendency 
of the empirical literature on the effect of firm size on ETR by providing a consensus 
estimate of this effect across primary studies. By considering the sign of the consensus 
estimate, we can conclude which theory holds for our meta-data set. Second, we explore 
reasons for heterogeneity across empirical studies and identify possible sources of bias and 
variation in the estimated coefficients, which helps to improve future empirical and 
analytical models. Third, we go beyond this basic analysis in further analyses on the size-
ETR relation. In particular, we consider how firms’ degree of internationality (as related to 
firm size), time trends, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory, and a transparency index 
affect the size-ETR relative. To our knowledge, these aspects have not yet been investigated 
in our research context. 
We analyze the coefficient of 𝛽1 in the following linear meta-regression model: 
𝑦𝑗𝑖 = 𝛿0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖 ,  with  𝐸[𝜀𝑗𝑖
2] = 𝜎2𝜔𝑗𝑖  
(𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝐽)   (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝐼)   (𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝐾). 
(3.2) 
In equation (3.2), 𝑦𝑗𝑖  is the reported 𝛽1 of regression i from a total of I regressions of 
primary study j in a literature of J studies. 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑘 is a vector of explanatory variables that 
measures differences in specific study and model characteristics K of the primary studies 
and controls for heterogeneity between primary studies (see Section 3.3.2 for meta-
regressor variable definitions). The meta-regression coefficient 𝛿𝑘 indicates the estimated 
impact on primary firm size effects if an empirical study design features characteristic k, 
ceteris paribus. 𝛿0 is the intercept. 
It is crucial to consider the meta-regression error term 𝜀𝑗𝑖 . It captures all unobserved 
differences across primary regressions and is expected to be normally distributed as 𝑦𝑗𝑖  are 
taken from classic linear regression models. However, 𝜀𝑗𝑖 is assumed to be heteroscedastic 
3 Taxes and Firm Size: Political Cost or Political Power? 49 
 
because respective study and model characteristics (𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑘) influence the precision of 𝑦𝑗𝑖 , i.e., 
Var(𝑦𝑗𝑖| ∑ 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑘
𝐾
𝑘=1 ) = 𝜎𝑗𝑖
2  (Stanley and Jarrell (1989), Feld et al. (2013)). 
With heteroscedastic standard errors, estimates of OLS regression remain unbiased and 
consistent; yet, they lose efficiency. We bypass this problem by applying GLS regression, 
which allows for heteroscedastic errors. 
Assume that 𝜎𝑗𝑖
2 depends only on a single known variable 𝜔 so that 
𝜎𝑗𝑖
2 = 𝜎2𝜔𝑗𝑖. (3.3) 
Applying GLS regression, we transform equation (3.2) by dividing the jith equation by 
√𝜔𝑗𝑖 . Let  𝑦𝑗𝑖
∗ = 𝑦𝑗𝑖 √𝜔𝑗𝑖⁄ ,   𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑘
∗ = 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑘 √𝜔𝑗𝑖⁄   and  𝜀𝑗𝑖
∗ = 𝜀𝑗𝑖 √𝜔𝑗𝑖⁄ ,  then we get the 
transformed model 
𝑦𝑗𝑖
∗ = 𝛿0 + ∑ 𝛿𝑘𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑘
∗𝐾
𝑘=1 + 𝜀𝑗𝑖
∗ ,  with  𝐸[𝜀𝑗𝑖
∗2] = 𝜎2 
(𝑗 = 1,2, … , 𝐽)   (𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝐼)   (𝑘 = 1,2, … , 𝐾). 
(3.4) 
The transformed model shown in (3.4) corrects for the heteroscedasticity problem outlined 
above. Now error term 𝜀𝑗𝑖
∗  is homoscedastic. Hence, the best linear unbiased estimator of 
𝛿𝑘 is obtained by applying GLS regression, i.e., WLS regression in (3.4).29 Accordingly, we 
apply WLS in our meta-regression. This approach is also in line with theoretical literature 
on meta-regression (Stanley (2008)) and existing meta-regression analyses.30 The employed 
weights (1/𝜔𝑗𝑖) are known and correspond to the inverse of the squared standard error of 
each primary studies’ coefficient. Thus, primary study coefficients with relatively precise 
(i.e., low) standard errors are given greater weight in our meta-regression. 
Finally, multiple estimates per primary study may be jointly influenced by unobserved 
factors inherent to the respective study such as study quality or the researcher’s ideology 
(Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012), 112–113). Since we include all estimates of a primary 
study, we cannot assume that (homoscedastic) 𝜀𝑗𝑖
∗  calculated for each observation within a 
primary study are independent of each other. Moreover, they are presumably autocorrelated 
because 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑦𝑗𝑖 , 𝑦𝑗𝑖+𝑙) ≠ 0 for observations 𝑙 ≠ 0. (3.5) 
Such autocorrelation (within-study dependence) violates the assumptions of the classic 
linear regression model (Fahrmeir et al. (2013), 191). Therefore, we relax the assumption of 
                                              
29 The derivation of the WLS model is based on Greene (2012), 317–319 and Heij et al. (2004), 327–328. 
30 Examples of economic meta-regression analyses that apply WLS: Longhi et al. (2005), Rose and Stanley (2005), de 
Dominicis et al. (2008), Cipollina and Salvatici (2010), Efendic et al. (2011), Feld and Heckemeyer (2011), Havranek 
and Irsova (2011), Doucouliagos et al. (2012), Gechert and Will (2012), Feld et al. (2013), Lichter et al. (2015), Rusnak 
et al. (2013). 
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independence between observations within each primary study by clustering standard error 
𝜀𝑗𝑖
∗  on study level.31 This technique changes the standard errors of the estimates compared 
to heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors because any possible dependence among the 
estimates within a study is accounted for (e.g., Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012), 100). 
3.3.2 Meta-regressor variables 
∑ 𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑘
∗𝐾
𝑘=1  of equation (3.4) captures differences within and between specifications of 
primary studies that may lead to systematic variation in the size-ETR relation within and 
across studies. We classify such specification differences under the following categories: 
definition of firm size, definition of ETR, control variables, data sample characteristics, 
econometric specification, and publication bias. 
3.3.2.1 Definition of firm size in primary studies 
In any meta-regression, the effect size of interest must be comparable across the underlying 
primary studies (Stanley (2001)). This prerequisite is met in our meta-data set: Primary 
studies calculate firm size by taking the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets, market 
value, or total sales. Thus, firm size measures the percentage point change in ETR in 
response to a percent change in firm size. 
As outlined in Section 3.2, definition of firm size itself may affect the magnitude and 
direction of the size-ETR relation (e.g., Wilkie and Limberg (1990), Nicodème (2007)). The 
underlying primary studies use ln(Total Assets), ln(Market Value), and ln(Total Sales) as 
firm size definitions. In the meta-regression, we account for different firm size definitions 
by including the dummy variables Assets and Market Value. The coefficients of Assets and 
Market Value measure the incremental firm size effect in a primary regression applying this 
definition, relative to the omitted definition (Sales), holding constant the other regressors. 
3.3.2.2 Definition of ETR in primary studies 
There is variation in the ETR definition across primary studies: 65 percent of primary 
regressions calculate the ETR including only current taxes, while the other 35 percent 
consider both current and deferred taxes. Deferred tax legislation has been common in 
accounting principles worldwide since the 1970s32 and requires the recognition of deferred 
                                              
31 This technique is also applied in other economic meta-regression analyses (e.g., Görg and Strobl (2001), Card et al. 
(2010), Cipollina and Salvatici (2010), Efendic et al. (2011), Adam et al. (2013)). 
32 US-GAAP has prescribed deferred tax accounting since 1967, when APB Opinion No. 11 was issued. This opinion 
was replaced by FASB 96 in 1987. Since 1992, SFAS 109 (ASC 740) addresses deferred tax accounting. IFRS has 
prescribed deferred tax accounting since 1979, when IAS 12 was issued. 
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taxes for temporary BTD, i.e., differences in income between the financial accounts and 
tax accounts that reverse in future periods.33 
In the context of investigating the size-ETR relation, whether or not deferred taxes are 
considered in ETR calculations is important since temporary BTD can be caused by two 
different kinds of firm’s “deferral strategies” or a mix of both. First, there may be a tax 
management driven earlier recognition of expenses in the tax accounts than in the financial 
accounts. Second, there may be an earnings management driven deferral of expenses in the 
financial accounts. These two strategies may systematically vary between large and small 
firms. Smaller, private firms may face less strong financial accounting constraints and report 
tax management driven lower income in the tax accounts as well as in the financial accounts 
(conforming tax avoidance). Larger firms, however, face greater financial accounting 
constraints and report lower income in the tax accounts (tax management) but higher 
income in the financial accounts (earnings management) leading to non-conforming tax 
avoidance (for this argumentation see Hanlon and Heitzman (2010)). Hence, if only current 
taxes are considered in ETR calculation, there may be a negative correlation between firm 
size and ETR. This is the case because, for larger firms, the ETR denominator increases 
(income in the financial accounts) while the ETR numerator decreases (current taxes) 
compared to smaller firms with a constant ETR due to conforming tax avoidance. 
To account for this variation, we follow the ETR classification of Hanlon and Heitzman 
(2010), p. 140, regarding deferral strategies. In particular, we code the dummy variable ETR 
Including Deferred Taxes one if the underlying primary study’s regression defines ETR as “total 
income tax expense divided by pre-tax income”. In this case, no deferral strategies may bias 
the size-ETR relation. We code ETR Including Deferred Taxes zero if primary study’s 
regression defines ETR as “current income tax expense divided by pre-tax income” or 
“cash income taxes paid divided by pre-tax income”. In this case, deferral strategies may 
bias the size-ETR relation. We expect a positive coefficient for this variable in the meta-
regression because primary studies that include deferred taxes control for ETR decreasing 
non-conforming tax avoidance of large firms. 
3.3.2.3 Control variables in primary studies 
ETR Including Deferred Taxes controls for the simultaneous occurrence of tax management 
and earnings management that leads to temporary BTD. Tax-driven profit shifting, 
however, is not captured by this control variable as it does not result in temporary BTD 
                                              
33 See, for example, for IFRS IAS 12.15 and IAS 12.24, for US-GAAP ASC 740–10–25–2(b) or for German GAAP 
Section 274 paragraph 1 (1) HGB and Section 306 (1) HGB. In this paper, the term “deferred taxes” refers to the net 
amount of deferred tax expense and deferred tax income. 
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and does not cause realization of deferred taxes. Moreover, profit shifting has a 
permanently negative effect on ETR.34 
According to the meta-regression analysis by Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017), the 
dominating profit shifting channel for multinational firms is transfer pricing and licensing. 
Especially IP, gained from R&D activity, gives firms opportunities for tax-optimized 
intragroup transfer pricing. To control for profit shifting opportunities related to IP, we 
include two dummy variables in the meta-regression. First, an R&D Intensity dummy 
variable is coded one if the underlying primary study’s regression controls for R&D 
intensity (R&D expenses divided by total assets or total sales), and zero otherwise. Second, 
an Intangibles dummy variable is coded one if the underlying primary study’s regression 
controls for intangible assets intensity (intangible assets divided by total assets), and zero 
otherwise. The exclusion of a control variable for R&D or intangible assets intensity in the 
primary studies could overestimate a negative size-ETR relation because both variables may 
capture ETR decreasing profit shifting opportunities, which may be more prevailing in 
large, multinational firms.35 Thus, controlling for this possible overestimation, we expect a 
positive coefficient R&D Intensity and Intangibles in the meta-regression. 
Further, we include a Capital Intensity dummy variable that is coded one if the underlying 
primary study’s regression controls for fixed asset intensity (property, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets), and zero otherwise. This variable is included in some primary 
studies to capture different treatments of depreciation for tax and financial reporting 
purposes (e.g., Gupta and Newberry (1997), Hope et al. (2013)) and to capture tax planning 
opportunities by strategically locating fixed assets (e.g., Robinson et al. (2010)). 
Inventory-intensive firms are considered to have fewer tax planning opportunities than 
capital-intensive firms.36 Hence, no or a positive influence on ETR can be expected (e.g., 
Stickney and McGee (1982), Gupta and Newberry (1997)). Lee and Swenson (2012), 
however, refer to inventory tax benefits such as the “last in first out” method or profit 
shifting opportunities with inventory (transfer pricing), which may have a negative effect 
on ETR. To capture these effects, we include an Inventory Intensity dummy variable that is 
coded one if the underlying primary study’s regression controls for inventory intensity 
(inventory divided by total assets), and zero otherwise. 
                                              
34 Under the credit method as the method to avoid double taxation, which is applicable in the USA, this permanently 
negative effect is only present if foreign profits are declared “permanently reinvested earnings” (PRE), i.e., these profits 
are not repatriated. See the studies by Blouin et al. (2012) and Krull (2004) that provide evidence that US firms have a 
substantial amount of PRE abroad and that US firms use PRE for earnings management. 
35 See the meta-regression analysis by Belz et al. (2017a), where the authors detect a significantly negative effect of 
R&D intensity on ETR. 
36 Tax benefits associated with capital investments are, for example, investment tax credits or accelerated depreciation 
schedules. Generally, inventory does not fall under the scope of such beneficial tax treatment. 
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3.3.2.4 Data sample characteristics of primary studies 
Some primary studies exclude loss-making firms from their data set. This exclusion is 
decisive in the context of tax planning since loss-making firms are generally less tax 
responsive, i.e., a study excluding loss-making firms may include relatively more firms with 
tax planning possibilities than a study including these firms. The inclusion of loss-making 
firms in empirical profit shifting analyses may even lead to additional measurement errors 
of tax incentives (Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017)). Therefore, we include a dummy 
variable Loss-Making Firms Excluded, which marks primary studies that exclude loss-making 
firms in their sample. 
The time span of the primary studies’ data covers more than 40 years. To capture time 
trends, we include the Average Sample Year of the underlying primary study’s regression. A 
tax-related time trend could be that, over the past years, the increasing relevance of highly 
mobile intangible assets has created more tax planning opportunities for large, multinational 
firms. Combined with the finding in Section 3.2.2 that larger firms may invest more in tax 
planning to maximize tax savings, this time trend could lead to variation in the firm size 
coefficient over time. 
Further, some primary studies exclude firms from regulated sectors such as the banking 
sector. To control for this heterogeneity, we code the dummy variable Regulated Sectors 
Excluded one if a primary study excludes firms from regulated sectors and code it zero 
otherwise. 
While the primary studies in the US meta-data set are based on Compustat North America 
only, the studies in the cross-country meta-data set cover 16 databases that are 
heterogeneous.37 They mainly differ regarding geographic coverage (single countries vs. 
multiple countries), collection of data (hand-collected vs. database download), types of 
firms represented (listed vs. non-listed firms), and time span covered. We include dummy 
variables for each database to control for such unobserved database fixed effects in our 
cross-country analysis. 
3.3.2.5 Econometric specification of primary studies 
Some primary studies include time fixed effects to control for unobserved time trends such 
as business cycles or changing tax legislation. Such non-modeled trends may affect firm 
size, for example, in an economic crisis, firm’s market value or sales may decrease for 
exogenous reasons. Additionally, some primary studies control for unobserved industry 
                                              
37 The 16 databases are Aspect-Huntley Financial Database, Australian Tax Office Tax Return Database, Amadeus, 
China Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) Database, Compustat North America, Compustat Global, 
Datex New Zealand Business Information Database, IBIS Enterprise Database, JuYuan Database, PACAP Database, 
Prowess Corporate Database, REACH Database, Worldscope as well as hand-collected data sets on firms listed on 
the ASX, on the BVB and on the German Stock Exchanges (DAX, MDAX, SDAX, TecDAX). 
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specific heterogeneity by including industry fixed effects. Firm size may systematically vary 
depending on industry and, in sectors where intangible assets such as patents play an 
important role, for example, the pharmaceutical sector, market value or sales may be higher 
than in other industries. 
Controlling for time and industry fixed effects may reduce the effect of firm size on ETR 
because cross-time and cross-sectional variation are absorbed. However, possible omitted 
variable biases may be reduced. Since unconsidered time and industry fixed effects could 
influence the effect of firm size on ETR, we include two dummy variables, Time Fixed Effects 
Included and Industry Fixed Effects Included, which are coded one if the underlying primary 
study’s regression controls for these unobserved fixed effects, and zero otherwise. 
3.3.2.6 Publication bias of primary studies 
Researchers may have a preference for publishing results that are statistically significant and 
in line with theoretical predictions and models. Thus, researchers could be reluctant to 
report insignificant results and may even search for specifications that produce expected 
and significant results. This circumstance is commonly referred to as publication bias (e.g., 
Card and Krueger (1995), Doucouliagos (2005), Stanley (2005), Feld and Heckemeyer 
(2011)). 
To address this issue, we include the Primary Standard Error of primary estimates, which is 
the standard procedure in meta-regression analysis (e.g., Feld and Heckemeyer (2011), 
Doucouliagos et al. (2012), Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012), 60–61, Feld et al. (2013)). The 
idea for including the primary standard error is as follows: If there is substantial publication 
bias, then estimates less than twice their standard errors (t-statistic of 2) remain unreported 
in empirical literature. Thus, there would be correlation between the magnitude of firm size 
coefficients and their associated primary standard errors with a regression slope of around 
2 (Card and Krueger (1995)). 
Table 8 contains variable definitions and summarizes the meta-regressor variables. 
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Table 8. Definitions and summary statistics of meta-regressor variables. 
Variable Description US meta-data set 
(N=161) 
Cross-country 
meta-data set 
(N=393) 
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. 
Assets Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the primary regression 
uses ln(Total Assets) as firm size definition, and 0 otherwise 
0.553 0.499 0.646 0.479 
Market Value Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the primary regression 
uses ln(Market Value) as firm size definition, and 0 
otherwise 
0.342 0.476 0.140 0.347 
ETR Including 
  Deferred Taxes 
Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the primary regression 
uses the ratio of “total income tax expense to pre-tax 
income” as dependent variable, and 0 if the primary 
regression uses either the ratio of “current income tax 
expense to pre-tax income” or “cash income taxes paid to 
pre-tax income” as dependent variable 
0.354 0.480 0.450 0.498 
R&D Intensity Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the primary regression 
controls for R&D intensity (ratio of R&D expenses to total 
assets or total sales), and 0 otherwise 
0.615 0.488 0.435 0.496 
Intangibles Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the primary regression 
controls for intangible assets intensity (ratio of intangible 
assets to total assets), and 0 otherwise 
0.373 0.485 0.158 0.365 
Capital Intensity Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the primary regression 
controls for capital assets intensity (ratio of property, plant 
and equipment to total assets), and 0 otherwise 
0.665 0.474 0.634 0.482 
Inventory Intensity Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the primary regression 
controls for inventory intensity (ratio of inventory to total 
assets), and 0 otherwise 
0.404 0.492 0.351 0.478 
Loss-Making Firms 
  Excluded 
Binary dummy variable coded 1 if loss-making firms are 
excluded from the sample underlying the primary 
regression, and 0 otherwise 
0.596 0.492 0.598 0.491 
Average Sample Year Continuous variable capturing the average sample year of 
the primary regression 
1999.4 5.205 1998.3 7.037 
Regulated Sectors 
  Excluded  
Binary dummy variable coded 1 if firms from regulated 
sectors are excluded from the sample underlying the 
primary regression, and 0 otherwise 
0.373 0.485 0.664 0.473 
Industry Fixed Effects 
  Included 
Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the primary regression 
controls for unobserved industry fixed effects, and 0 
otherwise 
0.776 0.418 0.654 0.476 
Time Fixed Effects 
  Included 
Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the primary regression 
controls for unobserved time fixed effects, and 0 otherwise 
0.683 0.467 0.524 0.500 
Primary Standard 
  Error 
Continuous variable capturing the standard error of the 
primary firm size effect estimate 
0.194 0.560 0.117 0.376 
Post 1997 Binary dummy variable coded 1 if Average Sample Year of a 
single primary regression is after 1997 (year of introduction 
of check-the-box rule), and 0 otherwise 
0.783 0.414 n/a n/a 
Large Firm Regression Binary dummy variable coded 1 if the mean of firm size in 
a single primary regression lies above the mean of all 
primary regressions, and 0 otherwise 
n/a n/a 0.522 0.500 
Data on database and country fixed effects are not reported but are available upon request. 
 
3.4 Data 
Our meta-data set for primary studies on US firms consists of 161 observations from 
25 published primary studies. To identify relevant primary studies, we searched through 
online databases such as ProQuest or ScienceDirect for published studies and SSRN for 
working papers. Additionally, we performed Internet research via Google Scholar. Using 
central keywords (e.g., “effective tax rate”, “firm size”, “political cost theory”, “political 
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power theory”, “tax planning”), we searched for empirical studies that examined 
determinants of ETR or factors explaining variation in ETR across firms. 
Numerous studies investigate the size-ETR relation. However, some of these (e.g., Stickney 
and McGee (1982), Zimmerman (1983), Porcano (1986), Wilkie and Limberg (1990), Kern 
and Morris (1992)) cannot be considered in our meta-regression analysis since these studies 
do not run a regression of firm size on ETR (see Section 3.3.1). 
We sampled all firm size coefficients from each primary study, which is the standard 
procedure in meta-regression analyses (e.g., Égert and Halpern (2006), Feld and 
Heckemeyer (2011), Rusnak et al. (2013)). There are two main reasons for sampling all firm 
size coefficients (Disdier and Head (2008)). First, an inherent characteristic of meta-
regression is to exploit data heterogeneity. From this perspective, it would be inefficient to 
discard information by arbitrarily selecting only one estimate per study because variation in 
specifications within a study would be lost. Second, the decision on which estimate should 
be used would be subjective. In our robustness analysis, we address the issue of undue 
weight of primary studies because we observe some variation in the number of regressions 
per study; we find that this issue does not bias our regression results.  
Table 9 provides summary statistics on the meta-data set and shows substantial variation in 
the meta-data set, which suggests pursuing a meta-regression analysis, as follows. 
First, firm size coefficients vary considerably across primary studies between a minimum 
value of –3.130 and a maximum value of 3.450. In addition, the arithmetic mean of firm 
size coefficients per study varies from –2.097 to 2.011. 
Second, the absolute value of the coefficient of variation, a measure of relative dispersion, 
is 6.474, suggesting that there is a high degree of variation in reported primary estimates 
relative to the mean. Additionally, an arithmetic mean of firm size coefficient of 0.133 and 
a median of 0.003 suggest a positively skewed distribution of the estimates. 
Third, definition of firm size varies: 55 percent of firm size definitions refer to ln(Total 
Assets) while 34 percent refer to ln(Market Value) and 11 percent to ln(Total Sales). 
Fourth, data of the primary studies cover a broad time period (1975–2012). In addition, the 
cross-country meta-data set covers 16 different databases with geographic variation: 
41 percent of the data are from studies on US firms, 25 percent are on European firms, 
26 percent are on Asian firms, and 7 percent are on firms from Australia or New Zealand.38 
To our knowledge, there is no firm-level database with a comparable geographic variation 
over the period 1975–2012. 
  
                                              
38 One percent are other countries and regions (Brazil and China/USA). 
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Table 9. Summary statistics of primary studies in ETR meta-data set. 
Study Published (P) or 
unpublished (U) 
No. of 
effects 
Effect of firm size on ETR 
Mean Median Min. Max. Std. dev. 
  United States        
Armstrong et al. (2012) P 8 0.004 0.005 –0.001 0.009 0.004 
Boone et al. (2013) P 3 –0.019 –0.022 –0.022 –0.014 0.005 
Chen et al. (2010) P 5 –0.002 –0.002 –0.003 –0.001 0.001 
Chyz et al. (2013) P 8 0.001 –0.001 –0.010 0.013 0.010 
Donohoe (2015) P 6 0.005 0.006 –0.005 0.013 0.006 
Gallemore and Labro (2015) P 8 –0.003 –0.002 –0.014 0.003 0.006 
Gupta and Mills (2002) P 5 0.072 0.081 –0.004 0.150 0.073 
Gupta and Newberry (1997) P 6 –0.010 –0.002 –0.092 0.041 0.049 
Higgins et al. (2015) P 4 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.010 0.003 
Hoi et al. (2013) P 2 –0.000 –0.000 –0.001 0.001 0.001 
Hoopes et al. (2012) P 23 +0.000 0.003 –0.076 0.019 0.018 
Hope et al. (2013) P 11 0.011 0.010 –0.002 0.019 0.007 
Huseynov and Klamm (2012) P 6 –1.212 –1.310 –1.940 –0.520 0.511 
Jacob (1996) P 4 +0.000 +0.000 –0.000 0.001 0.001 
Jennings et al. (2012) P 2 –0.120 –0.120 –0.240 0.001 0.170 
Klassen et al. (2014) P 6 0.012 0.005 0.001 0.029 0.013 
Kubick et al. (2015) P 9 0.003 0.004 –0.003 0.006 0.003 
McGuire et al. (2012) P 4 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.012 0.005 
McGuire et al. (2014) P 4 0.003 0.005 –0.001 0.005 0.003 
Mills et al. (1998) P 3 –2.097 –1.780 –3.130 –1.380 0.917 
Mills et al. (2013) P 3 0.004 0.006 –0.001 0.008 0.004 
Phillips (2003) P 2 –0.003 –0.003 –0.003 –0.002 0.001 
Rego (2003) P 8 0.051 0.050 0.001 0.087 0.024 
Richter et al. (2009) P 17 2.011 2.356 –0.200 3.450 1.314 
Robinson et al. (2010) P 4 0.005 0.006 –0.004 0.010 0.006 
  Europe        
Buijink et al. (1999) U 43 0.084 0.050 –0.400 0.540 0.190 
Dyreng et al. (2016) P 2 0.026 0.026 0.021 0.031 0.007 
Herbert and Overesch (2014) U 13 –0.001 –0.001 –0.010 0.015 0.006 
Jaafar and Thornton (2015) P 4 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.001 
Janssen (2003) U 22 –0.006 –0.002 –0.060 0.037 0.022 
Kraft (2014) P 7 0.016 0.020 –0.021 0.031 0.017 
Lazăr (2014) P 6 0.010 0.009 0.004 0.018 0.005 
Lee and Swenson (2012) P 2 –0.005 –0.005 –0.005 –0.005 0.000 
  Asia        
Guha (2007) P 2 –0.012 –0.012 –0.016 –0.008 0.006 
Kim and Limpaphayom (1998) P 40 0.005 –0.004 –0.033 0.022 0.011 
Liu and Cao (2007) P 5 –0.003 –0.003 –0.008 0.004 0.005 
Noor et al. (2010) P 3 0.024 0.023 0.021 0.027 0.003 
Wu et al. (2013) P 14 1.089 1.667 0.017 1.712 0.829 
Wu et al. (2012a) P 28 0.002 –0.001 –0.153 0.239 0.055 
Wu et al. (2012b) P 4 1.528 1.286 1.162 2.378 0.571 
Zeng (2010) P 4 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.013 0.002 
  Australia and New Zealand        
Harris and Feeny (1999) U 5 0.011 0.004 0.003 0.022 0.010 
Harris and Feeny (2003) P 10 –0.011 –0.013 –0.017 0.001 0.005 
Lanis and Richardson (2012) P 4 –0.018 –0.018 –0.022 –0.014 0.004 
Richardson and Lanis (2007) P 2 –0.016 –0.016 –0.024 –0.007 0.012 
Taylor and Richardson (2012) P 4 0.022 0.021 0.016 0.028 0.006 
Wilkinson et al. (2001) P 2 1.458 1.458 0.845 2.072 0.868 
  Other        
Fernández-Rodríguez and 
Martínez-Arias (2012) 
P 2 0.050 0.050 0.047 0.053 0.005 
Fernández-Rodríguez and 
Martínez-Arias (2014) 
P 4 0.011 0.008 –0.047 0.075 0.052 
US meta-data set  161 0.133 0.003 –3.130 3.450 0.861 
Cross-country meta-data set  393 0.126 0.003 –3.130 3.450 0.635 
Last update of meta-data set: January 2017. 
 
However, these summary statistics may be biased since several important influencing 
factors are not taken into account at this point. Hence, it is an empirical question whether 
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there is systematic variation in firm size coefficients across primary studies. In the following 
section, we quantitatively investigate this variation in our meta-regression analysis and 
explore heterogeneity of the US and cross-country meta-data set in detail. 
3.5 Meta-regression analysis 
3.5.1 US analysis 
In this section, we analyze our US meta-data set, i.e., we consider only primary studies that 
are based on Compustat North America and focus on US firms. This approach has two 
main advantages. First, firms in the underlying primary studies have to comply with the 
same set of tax and accounting rules, i.e., firms are exposed, for example, to the same STR, 
deferred tax legislation or treatment of R&D expenses. Second, these primary studies refer 
to only one database, i.e., variable definitions are more precise compared to the cross-
country meta-data analyzed in Section 3.5.3. Consequently, considering primary studies 
based on only one database and country enables us to perform a meta-regression analysis 
on a “clean” meta-data set. However, there is still variation between these US studies 
regarding, for example, included control variables (see Table 8) or reported size-ETR 
relation: 16 (9) of these studies report a positive (negative) size-ETR relation on average 
and 4 (5) of these studies report exclusively positive (negative) size coefficients (see Table 
9). 
Table 10 presents the results from our basic meta-regression on the US meta-data set. The 
dependent variable is the coefficient of firm size found in primary studies, and explanatory 
variables are specific study and model characteristics of the primary studies. For variable 
descriptions, see Section 3.3.2. 
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Table 10. WLS meta-regression results for US meta-data set. 
Explanatory variables Predicted 
sign 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Definition of Firm Size 
     
  Assets ? –0.0284** –0.0295** –0.0268** –0.0253**  
(0.0133) (0.0127) (0.0117) (0.0114) 
  Market Value ? –0.0301** –0.0276** –0.0249* –0.0233*  
(0.0130) (0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0119) 
Definition of ETR 
     
  ETR Including Deferred Taxes + 0.0026 0.0036* 0.0042*** 0.0049***  
(0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Control Variables 
     
  R&D Intensity + 
 
0.0067** 0.0071 0.0110**   
(0.0028) (0.0042) (0.0045) 
  Intangibles + 
 
0.0017 0.0020 0.0070*   
(0.0037) (0.0054) (0.0036) 
  Capital Intensity ? 
 
–0.0094 –0.0104 –0.0117*   
(0.0056) (0.0066) (0.0067) 
  Inventory Intensity ? 
 
–0.0046 –0.0064 –0.0048   
(0.0038) (0.0053) (0.0045) 
Data Sample Characteristics 
     
  Loss-Making Firm Excluded ? 
  
0.0032 0.0042    
(0.0056) (0.0043) 
  Average Sample Year ? 
  
–0.0002 
 
   
(0.0003) 
 
  Regulated Sectors Excluded ? 
  
0.0022 0.0010    
(0.0047) (0.0042) 
Econometric Specification 
     
  Industry Fixed Effects Included ? –0.0068** –0.0083*** –0.0085** –0.0059**  
(0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0025) 
  Time Fixed Effects Included ? 0.0058 0.0041 0.0046 0.0031  
(0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0035) 
Publication Bias 
     
  Primary Standard Error ? 0.4507 0.5756 0.4918 0.4659  
(0.8205) (0.8209) (0.8856) (0.8609) 
Check-the-Box Rule 
     
  Post 1997 – 
   
–0.0104**      
(0.0044) 
Constant ? 0.0311** 0.0345** 0.3326 0.0303***  
(0.0126) (0.0130) (0.6017) (0.0101) 
Database fixed effects included in meta-regression NO NO NO NO 
No. of primary estimations 161 161 161 161 
No. of primary studies 25 25 25 25 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3605 0.3958 0.3941 0.4811 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Total Assets) 0.0883 0.1141 0.0956 0.0934 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Market Value) 0.0866 0.1160 0.0976 0.0954 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Total Sales) 0.1167 0.1436 0.1225 0.1187 
Regressions of the coefficients of firm size found in primary studies on study characteristics; see equation (3.4). All study 
characteristics are coded as dummy variables (except for Average Sample Year and Primary Standard Error). For detailed variable 
descriptions and data sources, see Sections 3.3.2 and 3.4. The coefficients indicate the estimated effect of the respective study or 
model characteristics on primary firm size effects, ceteris paribus. No database fixed effects are included as the primary studies in 
the US meta-data set are based on only one database (Compustat North America). All regressions are estimated using WLS. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are 
clustered on study level to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (within-study dependence). Predicted effect sizes of 
firm size are calculated assuming a hypothetical empirical study including all study characteristics that prove to be significant in the 
meta-regressions, i.e., respective dummy variables are set to one. With respect to continuous or insignificant characteristics, sample 
means are used for the prediction. 
 
In a first step, we consider the predicted effect size (consensus estimate), which can be 
calculated using the meta-regression results in Table 10.39 We multiply each coefficient of 
the insignificant dummy variables and continuous variables by its sample mean. We use 
                                              
39 The calculation procedure is based on Feld et al. (2013) and Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017). 
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sample mean because these study and model characteristics did not prove to have a 
significant effect on the firm size estimate. All significant explanatory dummy variables are 
not evaluated at their sample mean because these variables are found to be significant 
sources of variation. These variables are set to one because they reflect study and model 
characteristics that should be considered in an empirical study examining the effect of firm 
size on ETR. 
For Specification (3), we derive the following three consensus estimates: 
 0.0956 for firm size defined as ln(Total Assets),40 
 0.0976 for firm size defined as ln(Market Value), 
 0.1225 for firm size defined as ln(Total Sales). 
The interpretation is as follows. A ten percent increase in firm size leads to a roughly 
one percentage point increase in ETR when a primary study defines firm size as ln(Total 
Assets). For the other two firm size definitions, the effect is slightly higher. Hence, in our 
US meta-data set, the political cost theory dominates. 
In a second step, we explore reasons for variation in the predicted effect sizes, which is 
helpful for future empirical studies on the size-ETR relation. 
We find that the definition of firm size in primary studies has a significant effect. The 
coefficients of Assets and Market Value are significantly negative, i.e., compared to the 
omitted firm size definition ln(Total Sales), these definitions have a negative effect on the 
size-ETR relation. This result is in line with some empirical studies’ findings that the size-
ETR relation is dependent on the definition of firm size (e.g., Wilkie and Limberg (1990), 
Nicodème (2007)). 
Further, the coefficient of ETR Including Deferred Taxes is significantly positive, as expected. 
The coefficient indicates that a study considering current and deferred taxes in ETR 
calculation reports a more positive size-ETR relation than a study considering only current 
taxes. One explanation is that deferred taxes cancel out BTD resulting from ETR 
decreasing non-conforming tax avoidance, which may be more pronounced in larger firms 
(see Section 3.3.2.2). 
With respect to the dummy variables R&D Intensity and Intangibles, which control for a firm’s 
profit shifting possibilities, we find positive coefficients, as expected. The coefficient for 
R&D Intensity is significant in Specifications (2) and (4); in Specification (3), the p-value 
                                              
40 0.0956 = –0.0268*1 (Assets) – 0.0249*0 (Market Value) + 0.0042*1 (Including Deferred Taxes) + 0.0071*0.6149 (R&D 
Intensity) + 0.0020*0.3727 (Intangibles) – 0.0104*0.6646 (Capital Intensity) – 0.0064*0.4037 (Inventory Intensity) 
+ 0.0032*0.5963 (Loss-Making Firms Excluded) – 0.0002*1999.4 (Average Sample Year) + 0.0022*0.3727 (Regulated Sectors 
Excluded) – 0.0085*1 (Industry Fixed Effects Included) + 0.0046*0.6832 (Time Fixed Effects Included) + 0.4918*0.1943 
(Primary Standard Error) + 0.3326*1 (Constant). Differences are due to rounding error. Calculation for ln(Market Value) 
and ln(Total Sales) is done accordingly. 
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is 0.104. The coefficient of 0.0110 implies that a primary study not controlling for R&D 
Intensity reports a size-ETR relation that is lower by 0.0110 than that of a study controlling 
for this variable. Hence, not controlling for R&D intensity in primary studies leads to a 
downward bias of the size-ETR relation, possibly because larger firms may engage to a 
higher degree in profit shifting with IP (proxied by R&D intensity). Intangibles is also positive 
but only significant in Specification (4). A weaker effect of activated intangible assets may 
arise because these assets are generally only a share of a firm’s IP since not all IP fulfills the 
recognition criteria of intangible assets in the balance sheet. Hence, approximating IP with 
intangible assets may lead to some measurement error of real IP, and R&D intensity may 
be the better proxy for IP. 
Regarding the variables that control whether primary studies consider firm’s capital and 
inventory intensity, we obtain the following. While Inventory Intensity is insignificantly 
negative, the coefficient of Capital Intensity is significantly negative in Specification (4); in 
Specifications (2) and (3), the p-values are 0.108 and 0.125. The coefficient of –0.0117 
implies that a primary study not controlling for capital intensity reports a size-ETR relation 
that is higher by 0.0117 than a study controlling for this variable. Hence, not controlling 
for capital intensity in primary studies leads to an upward bias of the size-ETR relation. 
This finding is particularly interesting in combination with the significantly negative 
coefficient of R&D Intensity: While large capital-intensive firms report higher ETRs, large 
R&D-intensive firms seem to report lower ETRs. This may suggest that heterogeneity in 
the asset-structure among firms, in this case capital-intensive firms vs. R&D-intensive 
firms, affects ETR-decreasing tax avoidance behavior. 
With respect to varying data sample characteristics, we find that the control variables Loss-
Making Firms Excluded and Regulated Sectors Excluded are insignificantly positive and Average 
Sample Year is insignificantly negative. 
With respect to the econometric specification, we obtain the following results. The dummy 
variable Industry Fixed Effects Included is significantly negative, while Time Fixed Effects Included 
is insignificantly positive throughout all specifications. Consequently, controlling for 
industry fixed effects is a source of substantial variation across primary studies. 
Primary Standard Error as a control for publication bias is positive throughout all 
specifications but insignificant and well below two. Thus, we find no evidence for 
substantial publication bias in our meta-data set (see Section 3.3.2.6). The explanation could 
be that most researchers refer to the two conflicting theories on the size-ETR relation in 
their studies and, therefore, have no expectation of the sign of the firm size coefficient. 
Consequently, publication bias may be less pronounced in studies on the size-ETR relation. 
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In a third step, we investigate the introduction of the check-the-box rule in the USA in 
1997. This rule is considered an important tax planning instrument since it is presumed to 
simplify the use of hybrid entities for tax avoidance activities within US MNEs. In 
particular, the rule allows avoidance of CFC rules of subpart F of the US Internal Revenue 
Code, which aim to restrain international profit shifting activities by immediate taxation of 
intragroup payments, such as interest and royalties, to tax haven subsidiaries (e.g., Altshuler 
and Grubert (2006), Mutti and Grubert (2009)). In other words, the introduction of the 
check-the-box rule makes it possible for US firms to reduce their tax payments and ETR 
by profit shifting to low-tax hybrid subsidiaries under certain circumstances. Based on the 
argumentation in Section 3.2.2, we argue that large, presumably multinationally operating 
firms have more profit shifting opportunities than small firms and benefit from economies 
of scale in international tax planning (Rego (2003)). Consequently, we hypothesize that, 
after 1997, especially large firms are able to reduce their tax payments by profit shifting 
activities, leading to a negative effect on these firms’ ETR. In Specification (4), we consider 
a dummy variable that is coded one if Average Sample Year of a single primary regression is 
after 1997, and zero otherwise. We observe that this variable is significantly negative. In 
particular, we find that after the introduction of the check-the-box rule, the size-ETR 
relation decreases by about 0.01 but remains positive in line with the political cost theory. 
This may be evidence that, after 1997, large firms effectively decrease their ETR to a 
significantly higher degree than small firms due to enhanced profit shifting opportunities 
using hybrid entities. This finding is in line with Dyreng et al. (2017), who also find a 
decrease in ETRs of large US firms after the introduction of the check-the-box rule. 
Taken together, based on this purely US meta-data set, we find that a ten percent increase 
in firm size leads to a roughly one percentage point increase in ETR. In addition, we detect 
that definitions of firm size and ETR as well as the time period of the sample being 
examined significantly impact the size-ETR relation. Further, a control for R&D intensity 
and capital intensity significantly explains variation across primary studies. Future research 
on the size-ETR relation should consider these findings to avoid possibly spurious 
regression results. 
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3.5.2 Robustness analysis of US analysis 
Table 11 and Table 12 provide the results from our check on whether our basic regression 
results on the US meta-data set are robust to specification variations, taking 
Specification (3) in Table 10 as a starting point. 
In Specification (1) of Table 11, we use the squared primary standard error as a control 
variable for publication bias, which some simulations propagate as a better control variable 
(Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012), p. 61). Primary Standard Error Squared is insignificantly 
positive. Specification (2) excludes 18 firm size coefficients from three primary studies that 
are the ten percent most extreme primary coefficients, i.e., we drop the top 5 percent lower 
and upper firm size coefficients (coefficients smaller than –0.520 and larger than 2.356) to 
overcome the thread of spurious results due to extreme values. The results remain 
quantitatively and qualitatively stable regarding these two robustness tests. 
In Specification (1) of Table 12, we control for undue weight of certain studies as we 
observe some variation in number of regressions per study (see Table 9). We include a 
dummy variable (Large Study) that is coded one for studies that have more regressions than 
the average study (more than six regressions). Large Study is insignificant and this robustness 
test resembles our regression findings, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The consensus 
estimates decrease by about 0.05 but remain positive. In Specifications (2) and (3), we 
consider ETR definitions in more detail. In Specification (2), we insert an additional dummy 
variable that is coded one if the ETR definition in the underlying primary study’s regression 
uses firms’ cash flow as an income figure, and zero otherwise. In Specification (3), we 
exclude 11 firm size coefficients that are taken from primary regressions with ETR 
definitions that slightly differ from the other definitions.41 The results concerning these two 
robustness tests resemble our regression findings, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
  
                                              
41 Instead of dividing income tax expense by pre-tax financial income, these ETRs are calculated by dividing income 
tax expense by, for example, taxable income. 
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Table 11. Robustness analysis I for US meta-data set. 
Explanatory variables Predicted 
sign 
(1) 
Primary standard 
error squared 
(2) 
Excl. regressions with size 
coefficient in 5 percent 
upper and lower range 
Definition of Firm Size    
  Assets ? –0.0270** –0.0265** 
   (0.0119) (0.0116) 
  Market Value ? –0.0253* –0.0244* 
   (0.0124) (0.0120) 
Definition of ETR      
  ETR Including Deferred Taxes + 0.0042*** 0.0042*** 
   (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Control Variables      
  R&D Intensity + 0.0070 0.0072* 
  (0.0042) (0.0041) 
  Intangibles + 0.0020 0.0021 
   (0.0055) (0.0052) 
  Capital Intensity ? –0.0100 –0.0110 
   (0.0066) (0.0065) 
  Inventory Intensity ? –0.0067 –0.0060 
   (0.0053) (0.0053) 
Data Sample Characteristics      
  Loss-Making Firm Excluded ? 0.0036 0.0025 
   (0.0056) (0.0055) 
  Average Sample Year ? –0.0001 –0.0002 
   (0.0003) (0.0003) 
  Regulated Sectors Excluded ? 0.0021 0.0024 
   (0.0047) (0.0046) 
Econometric Specification      
  Industry Fixed Effects Included ? –0.0089** –0.0078** 
   (0.0036) (0.0030) 
  Time Fixed Effects Included ? 0.0048 0.0045 
   (0.0046) (0.0045) 
Publication Bias      
  Primary Standard Error ?   1.1684 
     (0.8011) 
  Primary Standard Error Squared ? 0.3702   
   (0.3409)   
Constant ? 0.3111*** 0.3497*** 
   (0.6156) (0.5850) 
Database fixed effects included in meta-regression NO NO 
No. of primary estimations 161 143 
No. of primary studies 25 23 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3930 0.4174 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Total Assets) 0.1301 0.0938 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Market Value) 0.1319 0.0959 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Total Sales) 0.1572 0.1203 
Regressions of the coefficients of firm size found in primary studies on study characteristics; see equation (3.4). All study 
characteristics are coded as dummy variables (except for Average Sample Year and Primary Standard Error). For detailed variable 
descriptions and data sources, see Sections 3.3.2 and 3.4. The coefficients indicate the estimated effect of the respective study or 
model characteristics on primary firm size effects, ceteris paribus. No database fixed effects are included as the primary studies in 
the US meta-data set are based on only one database (Compustat North America). All regressions are estimated using WLS. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are 
clustered on study level to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (within-study dependence). Predicted effect sizes of 
firm size are calculated assuming a hypothetical empirical study including all study characteristics that prove to be significant in 
the meta-regressions, i.e., respective dummy variables are set to one. With respect to continuous or insignificant characteristics, 
sample means are used for the prediction. 
  
3 Taxes and Firm Size: Political Cost or Political Power? 65 
 
Table 12. Robustness analysis II for US meta-data set. 
Explanatory variables Predicted 
sign 
(1) 
Large study (dummy 
variable: studies > 
avg. reg. no.) 
(2) 
ETR with cash flow 
denominator 
(dummy variable) 
(3) 
Excl. other ETR 
definitions 
Definition of Firm Size     
  Assets ? –0.0260** –0.0271** –0.0306* 
   (0.0122) (0.0118) (0.0165) 
  Market Value ? –0.0239* –0.0251* –0.0299 
   (0.0131) (0.0122) (0.0180) 
Definition of ETR        
  ETR Including Deferred Taxes + 0.0041** 0.0044*** 0.0037*** 
   (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0013) 
  ETR with Cash Flow Denominator ?   0.0140*   
    (0.0075)   
Control Variables        
  R&D Intensity + 0.0057 0.0078* 0.0052 
   (0.0073) (0.0042) (0.0045) 
  Intangibles + 0.0009 0.0034 0.0003 
   (0.0062) (0.0052) (0.0060) 
  Capital Intensity ? –0.0090 –0.0117* –0.0067 
   (0.0055) (0.0067) (0.0076) 
  Inventory Intensity ? –0.0057 –0.0074 –0.0061 
   (0.0041) (0.0054) (0.0066) 
Data Sample Characteristics        
  Loss-Making Firm Excluded ? 0.0032 0.0038 0.0034 
   (0.0057) (0.0054) (0.0062) 
  Average Sample Year ? –0.0002 –0.0002 –0.0003 
   (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
  Regulated Sectors Excluded ? 0.0025 0.0017 0.0011 
   (0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0056) 
Econometric Specification        
  Industry Fixed Effects Included ? –0.0078* –0.0088** –0.0064** 
   (0.0043) (0.0035) (0.0028) 
  Time Fixed Effects Included ? 0.0049 0.0047 0.0052 
   (0.0041) (0.0046) (0.0040) 
Publication Bias        
  Primary Standard Error ? 0.4993 0.3470 0.4111 
   (0.8860) (0.9117) (0.9003) 
Regression Number        
  Large Study ? 0.0011     
   (0.0047)     
Constant ? 0.3473*** 0.3888*** 0.7252*** 
   (0.6195) (0.5693) (0.9397) 
Database fixed effects included in meta-regression NO NO NO 
No. of primary estimations  161 161 150 
No. of primary studies  25 25 24 
Adjusted R-squared  0.3905 0.3959 0.3905 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Total Assets) 0.0481 0.0974 0.0805 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Market Value) 0.0495 0.0995 0.0825 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Total Sales) 0.0746 0.1234 0.1076 
Regressions of the coefficients of firm size found in primary studies on study characteristics; see equation (3.4). All study 
characteristics are coded as dummy variables (except for Average Sample Year and Primary Standard Error). For detailed variable 
descriptions and data sources, see Sections 3.3.2 and 3.4. The coefficients indicate the estimated effect of the respective study or 
model characteristics on primary firm size effects, ceteris paribus. No database fixed effects are included as the primary studies in 
the US meta-data set are based on only one database (Compustat North America). All regressions are estimated using WLS. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and 
are clustered on study level to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (within-study dependence). Predicted effect sizes 
of firm size are calculated assuming a hypothetical empirical study including all study characteristics that prove to be significant 
in the meta-regressions, i.e., respective dummy variables are set to one. With respect to continuous or insignificant characteristics, 
sample means are used for the prediction. 
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3.5.3 Cross-country analysis 
In this section, we analyze our cross-country meta-data set, i.e., we extend our analysis to 
include US primary studies as well as studies that focus on other countries. This cross-
country approach has the advantage of exploiting between-country variation and analyzing 
whether there are systematic differences in the size-ETR relation between countries. The 
cross-country meta-data set, however, is not as precise as the US-only meta-data set and, 
therefore, is not used for the basic meta-regression analysis in Section 3.5.1. Table 13 
presents the results from an extended meta-regression on the cross-country meta-data set. 
The results regarding significant control variables in Specifications (1) to (3) are very similar 
to the results in Table 10 for the US meta-data set. However, the consensus estimates 
decrease by around 0.04 but remain positive. Hence, based on the cross-country meta-data 
set, we generally verify our results from the US meta-data set and find that the political cost 
theory also dominates in the cross-country analysis. In the following, we exploit variation 
in the cross-country meta-data set concerning specific countries considered in the primary 
regressions to investigate whether tax planning, culture, and transparency-related elements, 
which vary across countries, affect the size-ETR relation. 
As outlined in Section 3.2.2, a negative size-ETR relation could be present because large, 
multinational firms have enhanced profit shifting opportunities and benefit from 
economies of scale in international tax planning (Rego (2003)). To capture these 
opportunities, we investigate whether there is a significant difference between primary 
studies that consider relatively larger firms on average than other primary studies. More 
specifically, we make use of summary statistics provided in primary studies: In 
Specification (4), we refer to the mean of the firm size variable in each primary regression. 
If the mean of firm size in a single primary regression lies above the mean over all primary 
regressions, we code a dummy variable (Large Firm Regression) one, and zero otherwise.42 
This variable may be considered a proxy for the presence of large, presumably multinational 
firms with profit shifting opportunities such as tax-optimized intragroup transfer pricing 
(e.g., Rego (2003)). Indeed, the coefficient of Large Firm Regression is significantly negative, 
suggesting that primary studies with larger, presumably multinationally operating firms on 
average report a significantly lower—though still positive—effect size.43 
  
                                              
42 Due to the different firm size definitions, it is not possible to include firm size as a continuous variable in the meta-
regression. 
43 For small firm regressions, the predicted effect for firm size defined as ln(Total Assets) is 0.0678 (vs. 0.0630 for large 
firm regressions), for firm size defined as ln(Market Value), is 0.0698 (vs. 0.0650), and for firm size defined as ln(Total 
Sales), is 0.0920 (vs. 0.0872). 
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Table 13. WLS meta-regression results for cross-country meta-data set. 
Explanatory variables Predicted sign (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Definition of Firm Size 
     
  Assets ? –0.0273** –0.0283** –0.0258** –0.0242**  
(0.0134) (0.0129) (0.0117) (0.0112) 
  Market Value ? –0.0300** –0.0274** –0.0244** –0.0222*  
(0.0134) (0.0129) (0.0120) (0.0115) 
Definition of ETR 
     
  ETR Including Deferred Taxes + 0.0056* 0.0067** 0.0071*** 0.0065***  
(0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0023) 
Control Variables 
     
  R&D Intensity + 
 
0.0049* 0.0063* 0.0040   
(0.0028) (0.0037) (0.0041) 
  Intangibles + 
 
0.0016 0.0025 0.0009   
(0.0029) (0.0048) (0.0048) 
  Capital Intensity ? 
 
–0.0081 –0.0095* –0.0086   
(0.0049) (0.0055) (0.0057) 
  Inventory Intensity ? 
 
–0.0022 –0.0037 –0.0033   
(0.0035) (0.0052) (0.0053) 
Data Sample Characteristics 
     
  Loss-Making Firm Excluded ? 
  
0.0033 0.0015    
(0.0055) (0.0055) 
  Average Sample Year ? 
  
–0.0003* –0.0003*    
(0.0002) (0.0002) 
  Regulated Sectors Excluded ? 
  
0.0027 0.0020    
(0.0045) (0.0045) 
Econometric Specification 
     
  Industry Fixed Effects Included ? –0.0024 –0.0031* –0.0027 –0.0019  
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0017) 
  Time Fixed Effects Included ? 0.0040 0.0029 0.0031 0.0040  
(0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0029) 
Publication Bias 
     
  Primary Standard Error ? 0.3127 0.3557 0.3236 0.4757  
(0.4192) (0.4218) (0.4432) (0.4425) 
Profit Shifting 
     
  Large Firm Regression – 
   
–0.0048*** 
  
    
(0.0010) 
Constant ? 0.0102 0.0160 0.6030* 0.6987** 
  
 
(0.0137) (0.0154) (0.3456) (0.3420) 
Database fixed effects included in meta-regression YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects included in meta-regression NO NO NO NO 
No. of primary estimations 393 393 393 393 
No. of primary studies 49 49 49 49 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5474 0.5645 0.5713 0.5832 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Total Assets) 0.0502 0.0546 0.0527 0.0630 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Market Value) 0.0474 0.0555 0.0541 0.0650 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Total Sales) 0.0775 0.0829 0.0785 0.0872 
Regressions of the coefficients of firm size found in primary studies on study characteristics; see equation (3.4). All study 
characteristics are coded as dummy variables (except for Average Sample Year, Primary Standard Error, and Power Distance Index). For 
detailed variable descriptions and data sources, see Sections 3.3.2 and 3.4. The coefficients indicate the estimated effect of the 
respective study or model characteristics on primary firm size effects, ceteris paribus. The results for the database and country 
variables are not displayed but are available upon request. All regressions are estimated using WLS. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on study level 
to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (within-study dependence). Predicted effect sizes of firm size are calculated 
assuming a hypothetical empirical study including all study characteristics that prove to be significant in the meta-regressions, i.e., 
respective dummy variables are set to one. With respect to continuous or insignificant characteristics, sample means are used for 
the prediction. The same is done for database and country fixed effects because we attempt to generalize empirical findings rather 
than refer to specific databases or countries. 
 
Table 14 shows the results from our check on whether the Hofstede Power Distance Index 
and a Transparency Index explain variation of the size-ETR relation, taking 
Specification (3) in Table 13 as a starting point. Instead of database fixed effects, we include 
country fixed effects, which absorb any country-specific characteristics (e.g., differences in 
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tax regulation and/or financial accounting requirements), which may affect the size-ETR 
relation and which may be correlated with the country-specific indices. Table A 2 in the 
Appendix to Section 3 contains the variable descriptions and summary statistics of both 
indices. 
In Specification (1), we consider the Power Distance Index of Hofstede’s Cultural 
Dimensions Theory Data Set.44 Developed by Hofstede (1980), Hofstede (2001) and 
Hofstede et al. (2010), this data set has been used in many studies from various disciplines.45 
We find that Power Distance Index is significantly negative. Hence, we confirm that a stronger 
tendency towards equalization, i.e., a decreasing Power Distance Index,46 is associated with a 
larger consensus estimate of firm size. This finding supports the political cost theory, in 
line with assuming that large firms have to deal with a higher degree of public scrutiny in 
countries with a low Power Distance Index.47 
In Specification (2), we consider the Information and Accountability Transparency Data 
Set developed by Williams (2014).48 Basically, transparency means in this context that 
economic, social, and political information is available to all relevant stakeholders in a timely 
and reliable way. Overall, we expect that countries with a greater degree of transparency 
show a more positive size-ETR relation because corruption activity between the 
government and large firms may be detected more easily where the level of transparency is 
high. In line with this argumentation, we find that an increase in transparency positively 
affects the firm size coefficient in a significant way, supporting the political cost theory. 
Taken together, based on this cross-country meta-data set, we find that a society’s tendency 
not to accept inequalities has a positive effect on the size-ETR relation, which implies 
greater public pressure on larger firms in those countries. In addition, we find that countries 
with a high degree of transparency have a more positive size-ETR relation. Both results are 
in line with the political cost theory. 
  
                                              
44 Eight primary regressions (three studies) do not explicitly refer to a certain country; hence, we cannot attribute a 
Power Distance Index to these primary estimates and our sample decreases to 385 observations (46 studies). Further, 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory is based on a survey conducted between 1967 and 1973. However, although 
Power Distance Index have changed in absolute terms over the past decades, countries’ scores relative to others have 
changed only slightly (Beugelsdijk et al. (2015)). 
45 For accounting literature, see, for example, Schultz et al. (1993), Kachelmeier and Shehata (1997) and Matoussi and 
Jardak (2012); for taxation literature, see, for example, Tsakumis et al. (2007) and Richardson (2008); for finance 
literature, see, for example, Chui et al. (2010). 
46 A lower Power Distance Index value means that people in that country tend to accept hierarchies less, demand 
justification for inequalities of power among people and strive to equalize distribution of power. In contrast, a higher 
Power Distance Index value stands for people that accept hierarchies and possibly accept large, powerful firms and do 
not question their political power and influence. 
47 Evaluated at the mean of Power Distance Index (49.9), the consensus estimate for firm size defined as ln(Total 
Assets) is 0.1177. A country with a one standard deviation higher (lower) Power Distance Index results in consensus 
estimates of 0.0565 (0.1788). 
48 Eight primary regressions (three studies) do not explicitly refer to a certain country and Williams considers a time 
span between 1980 and 2010 so that our sample decreases to 367 observations (46 studies). 
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Table 14. Analysis of Hofstede Power Distance Index and Transparency Index in cross-country meta-data set. 
Explanatory variables Predicted 
sign 
(1) 
Hofstede Power 
Distance Index 
(2) 
Transparency Index 
Definition of Firm Size 
   
  Assets ? –0.0274** –0.0280** 
  
 
(0.0128) (0.0129) 
  Market Value ? –0.0257* –0.0266** 
  
 
(0.0130) (0.0132) 
Definition of ETR 
   
  ETR Including Deferred Taxes + 0.0049*** 0.0055*** 
  
 
(0.0015) (0.0017) 
Control Variables 
   
  R&D Intensity + 0.0058 0.0082*   
(0.0039) (0.0045) 
  Intangibles + 0.0013 0.0041 
  
 
(0.0045) (0.0044) 
  Capital Intensity ? –0.0083 –0.0094* 
  
 
(0.0051) (0.0051) 
  Inventory Intensity ? –0.0027 –0.0024 
  
 
(0.0046) (0.0043) 
Data Sample Characteristics 
   
  Loss-Making Firm Excluded ? 0.0010 0.0021 
  
 
(0.0054) (0.0048) 
  Average Sample Year ? –0.0002 –0.0003 
  
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) 
  Regulated Sectors Excluded ? 0.0018 0.0009 
  
 
(0.0044) (0.0044) 
Econometric Specification 
   
  Industry Fixed Effects Included ? –0.0030* –0.0028 
  
 
(0.0017) (0.0018) 
  Time Fixed Effects Included ? 0.0033 0.0028 
  
 
(0.0025) (0.0023) 
Publication Bias 
   
  Primary Standard Error ? 1.0166** 0.9442* 
  
 
(0.4916) (0.5075) 
Hofestede Index & Transparency Index 
   
  Power Distance Index – –0.0031*** 
 
  
 
(0.0011) 
 
  Transparency Index + 
 
0.0005* 
  
  
(0.0003) 
Constant ? 0.7262* 0.8716 
  
 
(0.3461) (0.5397) 
Country fixed effects included in meta-regression 
 
YES YES 
No. of primary estimations 
 
385 367 
No. of primary studies 
 
46 46 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.5311 0.5399 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Total Assets) 
 
0.1437 0.1464 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Market Value) 
 
0.1163 0.1183 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Total Sales) 
 
0.1180 0.1197 
Regressions of the coefficients of firm size found in primary studies on study characteristics; see equation (3.4). All study 
characteristics are coded as dummy variables (except for Average Sample Year, Primary Standard Error, Power Distance Index, and 
Transparency Index). For detailed variable descriptions and data sources, see Sections 3.3.2 and 3.4. The coefficients indicate the 
estimated effect of the respective study or model characteristics on primary firm size effects, ceteris paribus. The results for the 
country variables are not displayed but are available upon request. All regressions are estimated using WLS. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on 
study level to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (within-study dependence). Predicted effect sizes of firm size are 
calculated assuming a hypothetical empirical study including all study characteristics that prove to be significant in the meta-
regressions, i.e., respective dummy variables are set to one. With respect to continuous or insignificant characteristics, sample 
means are used for the prediction. The same is done for country fixed effects because we attempt to generalize empirical findings 
rather than refer to countries. 
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3.5.4 Robustness analysis of cross-country analysis 
Table 15 and Table 16 provide the results from our check on whether our regression results 
are robust to specification variations, taking Specification (3) in Table 13 as a starting point. 
In our regressions so far, we find no evidence for substantial publication bias. Still, in 
Specifications (1) to (3) of Table 15, we consider this issue in more detail. As in the 
robustness analysis of the US meta-data set, we alternatively use the squared primary 
standard error as a control variable for publication bias. In Specification (1), we observe 
that Primary Standard Error Squared is significantly positive but well below four so the 
publication bias is plausibly not substantial (see Section 3.3.2.6). The coefficients remain 
qualitatively and quantitatively stable; however, the consensus estimates increase by about 
0.07. In Specification (2), instead of Primary Standard Error, we include a dummy variable 
Published Study that is coded one if the underlying primary study is published, and zero 
otherwise. Published Study is significantly positive. This finding is considered in more detail 
in Specification (3), where we run the meta-regression on published studies only. Primary 
Standard Error remains insignificant, and also the other coefficients and their significance 
levels remain stable; however, the consensus estimates increase by about 0.04, which 
indicates that published studies report a significantly higher size-ETR relation.49 Similar to 
the robustness analysis of the US meta-data set, Specification (4) drops the top 5 percent 
lower and upper firm size coefficients (coefficients smaller than –0.060 and larger than 
1.676) from 11 primary studies to overcome the threat of spurious results due to extreme 
values. The results remain quantitatively and qualitatively stable. 
In Specification (1) of Table 16, we control for the country considered in the respective 
primary regression, i.e., we use country fixed effects instead of database fixed effects.50 
Thereby, we capture country-specific characteristics such as special tax benefits that are 
only applicable to firms below a certain firm size threshold, which could lead to bunching 
of firms below these thresholds. The coefficients remain qualitatively stable and the 
consensus estimates increase by about 0.07. As in the robustness analysis of the US meta-
data set, we control for undue weight of certain studies as we observe some variation in the 
number of regressions per study (see Table 9) in Specification (2). We include a dummy 
variable (Large Study) that is coded one for studies that have more regressions than the 
average study (more than eight regressions). Large Study is insignificant and this robustness 
test resembles our regression findings, both quantitatively and qualitatively. In 
Specifications (3) and (4), we consider ETR definitions in more detail, as we did in the 
                                              
49 As all primary studies in the US meta-data set are published, those two robustness tests are not done for the US 
meta-data set. 
50 Eight primary regressions (three studies) do not explicitly refer to a certain country; hence, we exclude them from 
this robustness test. 
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robustness analysis of the US meta-data set. The results concerning these two robustness 
tests resemble our regression findings, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
In further robustness tests, we exclude primary regressions that include loss-making firms. 
Although sample size decreases significantly, we obtain qualitatively robust results for the 
US and cross-country analysis. In the interest of brevity, these robustness tests are not 
tabulated but are available upon request. 
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Table 15. Robustness analysis I for cross-country meta-data set. 
Explanatory variables Predicted 
sign 
(1) 
Primary 
standard 
error 
squared 
(2) 
Published study 
(dummy 
variable) 
(3) 
Excl. 
unpublished 
studies 
(4) 
Excl. regressions 
with size 
coefficient in 5 
percent upper and 
lower range 
Definition of Firm Size      
  Assets ? –0.0261** –0.0262** –0.0262** –0.0255** 
   (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0117) 
  Market Value ? –0.0247** –0.0248** –0.0246** –0.0242* 
   (0.0122) (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0120) 
Definition of ETR          
  ETR Including Deferred Taxes + 0.0070*** 0.0070*** 0.0072*** 0.0072*** 
   (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0026) 
Control Variables          
  R&D Intensity + 0.0064 0.0065* 0.0066* 0.0062* 
  (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0037) 
  Intangibles + 0.0027 0.0028 0.0027 0.0022 
   (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0047) 
  Capital Intensity ? –0.0094* –0.0096* –0.0100* –0.0094* 
   (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0055) 
  Inventory Intensity ? –0.0038 –0.0039 –0.0036 –0.0034 
   (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0051) 
Data Sample Characteristics          
  Loss-Making Firm Excluded ? 0.0036 0.0035 0.0029 0.0031 
   (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0055) 
  Average Sample Year ? –0.0003* –0.0003* –0.0003* –0.0003 
   (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
  Regulated Sectors Excluded ? 0.0026 0.0026 0.0028 0.0029 
   (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) 
Econometric Specification          
  Industry Fixed Effects Included ? –0.0028 –0.0028 –0.0027 –0.0028 
   (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
  Time Fixed Effects Included ? 0.0030 0.0029 0.0030 0.0031 
   (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Publication Bias          
  Primary Standard Error ?     0.6536 0.5807 
       (0.6088) (0.3945) 
  Primary Standard Error Squared ? 0.7015**      
   (0.3287)      
  Published Study ?   0.0486***    
     (0.0120)    
Constant ? 0.6157* 0.5766 0.6381 0.5964*** 
   (0.3499) (0.3467) (0.3463) (0.3537) 
Database fixed effects included in meta-regression YES YES YES YES 
No. of primary estimations 393 393 310 353 
No. of primary studies 49 49 45 47 
Adjusted R-squared 0.5723 0.5709 0.5790 0.6073 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Total Assets) 0.1203 0.0218 0.0927 0.0367 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Market Value) 0.1217 0.0232 0.0943 0.0380 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Total Sales) 0.1464 0.0480 0.1188 0.0622 
Regressions of the coefficients of firm size found in primary studies on study characteristics; see equation (3.4). All study 
characteristics are coded as dummy variables (except for Average Sample Year and Primary Standard Error). For detailed variable 
descriptions and data sources, see Sections 3.3.2 and 3.4. The coefficients indicate the estimated effect of the respective study or 
model characteristics on primary firm size effects, ceteris paribus. The results for the database variables are not displayed but are 
available upon request. All regressions are estimated using WLS. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on study level to control for heteroscedasticity 
and autocorrelation (within-study dependence). Predicted effect sizes of firm size are calculated assuming a hypothetical empirical 
study including all study characteristics that prove to be significant in the meta-regressions, i.e., respective dummy variables are set 
to one. With respect to continuous or insignificant characteristics, sample means are used for the prediction. The same is done for 
database fixed effects because we attempt to generalize empirical findings rather than refer to specific databases. 
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Table 16. Robustness analysis II for cross-country meta-data set. 
Explanatory variables Predicted 
sign 
(1) 
Country 
fixed effects 
(2) 
Large study (dummy 
variable: studies > 
avg. reg. no.) 
(3) 
ETR with cash 
flow denominator 
(dummy variable) 
(4) 
Excl. other 
ETR 
definitions 
Definition of Firm Size      
  Assets ? –0.0273** –0.0265** –0.0258** –0.0306* 
   (0.0128) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0159) 
  Market Value ? –0.0257* –0.0251** –0.0244** –0.0306* 
   (0.0130) (0.0119) (0.0121) (0.0172) 
Definition of ETR          
  ETR Including Deferred Taxes + 0.0048*** 0.0077*** 0.0068*** 0.0070** 
   (0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0029) 
  ETR with Cash Flow Denominator ?    0.0018   
     (0.0030)   
Control Variables         
  R&D Intensity + 0.0061 0.0102* 0.0063* 0.0049 
   (0.0039) (0.0054) (0.0037) (0.0047) 
  Intangibles + 0.0016 0.0051 0.0027 0.0014 
   (0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0065) 
  Capital Intensity ? –0.0083 –0.0130* –0.0096* –0.0064 
   (0.0051) (0.0062) (0.0055) (0.0058) 
  Inventory Intensity ? –0.0027 –0.0046 –0.0038 –0.0037 
   (0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0052) (0.0061) 
Data Sample Characteristics          
  Loss-Making Firm Excluded ? 0.0012 0.0036 0.0033 0.0039 
   (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0064) 
  Average Sample Year ? –0.0002 –0.0003* –0.0003* –0.0004* 
   (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
  Regulated Sectors Excluded ? 0.0017 0.0019 0.0026 0.0015 
   (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0053) 
Econometric Specification          
  Industry Fixed Effects Included ? –0.0029 –0.0028 –0.0028 –0.0021 
   (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0017) 
  Time Fixed Effects Included ? 0.0033 0.0028 0.0031 0.0034 
   (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0025) 
Publication Bias          
  Primary Standard Error ? 1.0196** 0.2724 0.3405 0.3038 
   (0.4910) (0.4446) (0.4433) (0.4958) 
Regression Number         
  Large Study ?  –0.0038     
    (0.0026)     
Constant ? 1.5856*** 0.6295* 0.5917* 0.7424* 
   (0.3982) (0.3555) (0.3401) (0.4262) 
Database fixed effects included in meta-regression NO YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects included in meta-regression YES NO NO NO 
No. of primary estimations  385 393 393 351 
No. of primary studies  46 49 49 46 
Adjusted R-squared  0.5322 0.5753 0.5721 0.5753 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Total Assets) 0.1177 0.1177 0.0543 0.0506 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Market Value) 0.1193 0.1193 0.0558 0.0506 
Predicted effect of firm size—ln(Total Sales) 0.1450 0.1450 0.0802 0.0812 
Regressions of the coefficients of firm size found in primary studies on study characteristics; see equation (3.4). All study 
characteristics are coded as dummy variables (except for Average Sample Year and Primary Standard Error). For detailed variable 
descriptions and data sources, see Sections 3.3.2 and 3.4. The coefficients indicate the estimated effect of the respective study or 
model characteristics on primary firm size effects, ceteris paribus. The results for the database and country variables are not 
displayed but are available upon request. All regressions are estimated using WLS. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on study level to control for 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (within-study dependence). Predicted effect sizes of firm size are calculated assuming a 
hypothetical empirical study including all study characteristics that prove to be significant in the meta-regressions, i.e., respective 
dummy variables are set to one. With respect to continuous or insignificant characteristics, sample means are used for the 
prediction. The same is done for database and country fixed effects because we attempt to generalize empirical findings rather than 
refer to specific databases or countries. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the effect of firm size on ETR. Interest in academic literature on 
this relation generally arises from two competing theories: the political cost theory and the 
political power theory. Based on a unique hand-collected meta-data set of 49 primary 
studies (393 observations) over the period 1975–2012 and various countries, we apply meta-
regression analysis to quantitatively summarize and analyze empirical studies on the size-
ETR relation. Our findings contain three important messages. 
First, taking advantage of a large degree of within-study and between-study variation among 
25 empirical studies (161 observations) on US firms, we find a positive consensus estimate 
for the size-ETR relation that varies between 0.0956 and 0.1225. This translates into an 
increase in ETR of about one percentage point with a ten percent increase in firm size. This 
finding supports the political cost theory, which predicts a positive size-ETR relation due 
to greater regulatory actions as well as public pressure and scrutiny on larger firms. For this 
US meta-data set, we further find suggestive evidence that particularly large, presumably 
multinationally operating firms decrease their ETR by profit shifting to low-tax hybrid 
subsidiaries. The use of these hybrid structures for tax avoidance was presumably simplified 
by the introduction of the check-the-box rule in the USA in 1997. However, the size-ETR 
relation remains positive so that the political cost theory still holds in our meta-data set. 
Second, we identify sample characteristics that significantly affect the size-ETR relation and 
explain variation in the underlying primary studies. Our results show that future research 
could avoid possibly spurious results by paying particular attention to definitions of firm 
size and ETR. In addition, the sample period and a control variable for R&D intensity and 
capital intensity explain variation across primary studies. Hence, heterogeneity in the asset-
structure among firms, in this case capital-intensive firms vs. R&D-intensive firms, 
significantly affects the size-ETR relation. 
Third, beyond this basic analysis, we isolate society-related and tax planning effects and 
thus investigate whether these aspects affect the size-ETR relation, which, to our 
knowledge, has not yet been investigated in our research context. For this purpose, we 
analyze our cross-country meta-data set. First, we find that the consensus estimate remains 
positive and our basic analysis is still valid. Second, we identify social acceptance of 
hierarchies as an element affecting the size-ETR relation. In particular, a society’s tendency 
not to accept inequalities has a positive effect on the size-ETR relation, which implies 
greater public pressure on larger firms in those countries, supporting the political cost 
theory. Third, we find that countries with a high degree of transparency show more positive 
firm size estimates. Fourth, we find suggestive evidence that tax planning of relatively large, 
presumably multinational firms has a negative effect on the size-ETR relation, while the 
overall size-ETR relation remains positive supporting the political cost theory.    
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border M&A prices from the acquirer’s perspective and theoretically compare different 
taxation systems. In a next step, we empirically validate our model in a regression analysis 
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4.1 Introduction 
Cross-border M&As are a prominent form of FDI52 and an important tool for MNEs in 
their portfolio management, i.e., investing in and restructuring their group. When MNEs 
from various countries bid for a certain foreign target, each country’s corporate taxation 
system for foreign dividends and capital gains impacts reservation prices and thus may have 
a decisive impact on ownership allocation. 
The question of how to neutrally tax M&A transactions has been widely discussed in CON 
literature (e.g., Desai and Hines (2003), Becker and Fuest (2010), Becker and Fuest (2011), 
Ruf (2012), Devereux et al. (2015)). To achieve CON, one crucial requirement is that all 
countries apply the same taxation system, i.e., variation among taxation systems leads to 
inefficient ownership structures and a violation of CON. However, we find substantial 
variation among taxation systems across 49 countries over the 2002–2015 period, which 
suggests that the requirements for CON are not fulfilled in reality. 
Given that CON is not reached in the taxation environment faced by MNEs, the question 
arises as to how a national tax policy maker can strengthen the position of its MNEs in 
acquiring foreign targets. Such a strong position is in the interest of a national tax policy 
maker due to positive spillovers of cross-border M&A activity to the MNE’s residence 
country (e.g., Manne (1965), Scharfstein (1988), Bresman et al. (1999), Devos et al. (2009), 
Wang and Xie (2009), Bena and Li (2014), Sapra et al. (2014), Stiebale (2016)). In addition, 
it is in a country’s interest to strengthen the position of its MNEs as buyers in cross-border 
M&A because the range of suitable targets is limited for operational reasons (e.g., specific 
IP that can be acquired). 
To give detailed guidance to national tax policy makers on how to strengthen the position 
of their respective MNEs in bidding for foreign targets, i.e., increase the MNEs’ reservation 
price, we model the joint impact of foreign dividends and capital gains taxation at the 
corporate level on the acquiring MNE’s reservation price for a specific target in a multi-
period design. For dividends taxation, we analyze whether (non-)taxation of repatriated 
profits affects the reservation price. In determining profit taxation, we take into account 
STRs, withholding tax rates and profit shifting opportunities. For capital gains taxation, we 
analyze whether the reservation price is affected by a potential tax treatment of participation 
losses arising from liquidating the target in the future. 
In an empirical application on a large cross-border M&A data set, we show that our model 
holds in reality. In particular, we conclude that foreign dividends taxation plays a decisive 
role in determining the reservation price, whereas the capital gains taxation effect is 
                                              
52 In 2016, cross-border M&As accounted for 869 billion USD. The other prominent form of FDI is foreign greenfield 
investment, which accounted for 828 billion USD in 2016 (UNCTAD (2017a)). 
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irrelevant. These results have important implications for tax policy. We propose that it is in 
a country’s interest to exempt foreign dividends to improve the position of its MNEs when 
bidding for foreign targets. Additionally, countries should refrain from imposing CFC rules 
at acquirer level that hinder profit shifting and, consequently, increase the tax burden. 
Our paper contributes to theoretical M&A tax research by deriving a model that 
implements the joint effect of foreign dividends and capital gains taxation on M&A prices 
from the acquirer perspective. While these effects have already been discussed in literature, 
our model differs in that it discusses these effects without taking into account taxation at 
the personal level. Additionally, different from Devereux et al. (2015), we allow for profit 
shifting between subsidiaries rather than only between parent and subsidiary. Finally, we 
additionally model the impact of selling the target in future periods instead of liquidating it 
and of indefinite profit retention with debt-financed payouts to shareholders. These two 
aspects have not been discussed in CON literature so far. 
Our paper contributes to empirical M&A tax research by jointly considering the effect of 
foreign dividends and capital gains taxation on cross-border M&A activity. While a few 
studies investigate the effect of acquirers’ taxation systems on M&A activity, they focus 
only on foreign dividends taxation. Further, the M&A studies by Hebous et al. (2011), 
Herger et al. (2016) and Arulampalam et al. (2017) find that the corporate income tax rate 
of a potential target has a negative effect on its actual acquisition; however, these studies 
focus only on the target corporate income tax rate and, consequently, do not allow policy 
implications to be drawn on how to design the taxation system of the acquirer’s residence 
country. Additionally, to our knowledge, our study is the first to analyze the impact of 
capital gains taxation at the acquirer level on M&A prices. Finally, we show that tax planning 
plays a role in cross-border M&A activity; thereby, we contribute to a growing body of 
empirical literature on tax planning and M&As (e.g., Belz et al. (2016)). 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, we provide a short 
review of relevant theoretical literature on optimal M&A taxation systems, and in Section 
4.3, we survey the taxation systems of the OECD, G20 and EU member states over the 
2002–2015 period. We develop our theoretical model in Section 4.4, and in Section 4.5 , we 
provide an empirical application of our model and tax policy suggestions. Finally, 
Section 4.6 concludes our paper. 
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4.2 Optimal M&A taxation systems: Review of  theoretical literature 
The question how M&As should be taxed best from an economic point of view has been 
extensively discussed in literature. In the following, we give a brief overview of the most 
relevant CON literature53. 
Desai and Hines (2003) were the first to define CON. They claim that “[t]ax systems satisfy 
[CON] if they do not distort ownership patterns.” Based on the transaction cost theory, 
the authors expect that there are productivity differences among several potential owners 
of an asset. Consequently, CON requires “the most productive ownership of assets within 
the set of feasible investors.” The paper does not give a formal approach to CON, but from 
their work, Desai and Hines (2003) postulate that CON is achievable under the exemption 
or the credit method. However, to achieve CON, it is crucial that all countries apply an 
identical taxation system, i.e., all countries either exempt or tax foreign income. 
A first formal approach to CON is taken by Becker and Fuest (2010). They analyze M&A 
and greenfield investment under two different assumptions. Their first assumption is that 
ownership advantage is a private (i.e., scarce) good within the firm. In this case, domestic 
and foreign investment are substitutes and the authors argue that CON cannot be achieved. 
Their second assumption is that ownership advantage is a public good within the firm. In 
this case, domestic and foreign investment are complements and the authors argue that 
CON can be achieved by either the exemption method or the cross-border cash flow 
taxation system. Becker and Fuest (2010) derive these results in a setting without taxation 
of capital gains and interest. 
Becker and Fuest (2011) advance the model by Becker and Fuest (2010) by adding interest 
taxation in the residence country of the owner.54 However, capital gains taxation is still not 
implemented, and their paper does not look at CON referring to MNEs but at CON 
referring to the direct (and ultimate) shareholder being an individual. Therefore, corporate 
taxation only matters at target level. If dividends are taxed at the individual shareholder’s 
level, CON is only achievable if interest and dividends tax rates of the domestic and the 
foreign country have equal ratios to each other. Again, the models by Becker and Fuest 
(2010) and Becker and Fuest (2011) show that CON is only achievable if all countries apply 
an identical taxation system. 
A different approach to CON is taken by Ruf (2012). He implements CON in a setting 
with a classic taxation system, where interest income is subject to taxation 
(1 + 𝑟(1 − 𝜏)). However, his model deviates from taxation systems applied in reality in 
                                              
53 CON has been first mentioned in Devereux (1990). 
54 Interest taxation is modelled differently to that in a classic taxation system. While, usually, the interest rate alone is 
taxed (1 + 𝑟 ∙ (1 − 𝜏)), Becker and Fuest (2011) model a cash flow tax (1 + 𝑟) ∙ (1 − 𝜏). 
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assuming economic depreciation instead of historical cost depreciation because interest 
taxation otherwise distorts the intertemporal allocation of resources. In such a taxation 
system, CON can be achieved by using the credit method. The assumption of historical 
cost accounting introduces distortions and CON can no longer be achieved using the credit 
method. Under the exemption method, the MNE refrains from selling foreign subsidiaries 
even though an acquirer has higher ownership advantage. Consequently, CON cannot be 
achieved by the exemption method either. 
Devereux et al. (2015) set up a model allowing for either greenfield or M&A investment. 
Additionally, they implement management capacity as a restriction for greenfield or M&As 
investment. Contrary to Ruf (2012), the MNE maximizes its value by discounting the after-
tax cash flows with the gross interest rate. This approach implies that the MNE does not 
take into account taxation at the individual shareholder level. Capital gains taxation is not 
modelled explicitly, but the final tax payment of the MNE depends on the taxation method 
of domestic and foreign profits as well as on an allowance granted to the MNE in the first 
period. This allowance can be interpreted as a discounted value of depreciation of the 
participation in future periods and, therefore, could principally be the same as modelling 
capital gains taxation. For M&A investment, CON can be achieved by applying a cross-
border cash flow taxation system on foreign investment. If unlimited management capacity 
is given, the exemption method also ensures CON. Further, the authors show that their 
results hold in the presence of profit shifting. In addition, as no country has so far 
implemented a cross-border cash flow taxation system on foreign investment, the authors 
discuss how the results change with historical cost accounting. Depending on the height of 
costs and the relation of the tax rates in both countries to each other, the exemption method 
can dominate the credit method (or vice versa) in welfare terms, but neither of these 
taxation systems leads to CON. 
As this review shows, CON can only be achieved under specific circumstances. The most 
important requirement is that all countries apply an identical taxation system and most 
papers argue that CON is achievable in a cross-border cash flow taxation system if 
investment at home and abroad are not perfect complements. Further, capital gains taxation 
plays an important part but usually results in CON being distorted if the tax base for capital 
gains is historical cost accounting. In the following section, these requirements undergo a 
reality check. 
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4.3 Extensive survey on corporate taxation systems and anti profit 
shifting measures 
4.3.1 Variation in corporate taxation systems 
To check whether the requirements of the theoretical CON literature outlined in 
Section 4.2 hold in reality, we undertake an extensive survey on the actual corporate 
taxation systems in place across the OECD, G20 and EU member states (49 countries) 
over the 2002–2015 period. For this purpose, we collect data on the unilateral method, 
whereby the national tax law of the respective country stipulates how double taxation of 
foreign dividends and capital gains can be avoided. 
As Figure 8 shows, the applied taxation systems are diverse, with 11 different taxation 
systems. The most common are the exemption method (in place in 20 countries in 2015) 
and the credit method (13 countries) for both foreign dividends and capital gains. While 
the exemption method has gained in popularity over the last years, the credit method has 
lost. The split taxation system of exempting foreign dividends and crediting foreign capital 
gains is also common (9 countries) and remains stable over time. We observe 18 countries 
that change their taxation system over time. 
 
Figure 8. Changes in corporate taxation systems for 49 countries (OECD, G20 and EU member 
states) for 2002–2015. 
 
Source: Corporate taxation system data set. 
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21 countries apply a different taxation method on foreign dividends to that on foreign 
capital gains. More specifically, in 205 from a total of 686 country-year observations, foreign 
dividends and capital gains are taxed differently. Further, four countries that apply the credit 
method on foreign dividends and capital gains apply different tax rates on the respective 
income (see Figure A 4, Figure A 5, Figure A 6 and Figure A 7 in Appendix to Section 4). 
In addition, some EU member states differentiate in their taxation system depending on 
foreign subsidiary location. For example, since 2008, the Czech Republic has applied the 
exemption method on EU subsidiaries and the deduction method on non-EU subsidiaries. 
Finally, as Figure 9 shows, the countries under consideration concluded a substantial 
number of double taxation conventions (DTCs) with each other. The median number of 
DTCs is 44, and only very few countries have a relatively low number of DTCs. Favorable 
taxation methods on foreign dividends and capital gains in a DTC overrule the unilateral 
taxation method. Hence, an additional dimension of variation in taxation systems is present. 
 
Figure 9. Number of DTCs between OECD, G20 and EU member states (2015). 
 
Source: Corporate taxation system data set. 
 
Taken together, we observe substantial variation of taxation systems in reality. This 
observation is in sharp contrast to the identical taxation system across countries required 
to achieve CON, as outlined in Section 4.2. Thus, CON cannot be achieved in reality and 
the question arises how the different taxation systems distort cross-border M&A activity in 
general and M&A prices in particular. However, empirical research on the effect of taxation 
systems on cross-border M&A activity is scarce as the following short review shows, and 
we aim to extend this strand of literature. 
To our knowledge, there are three empirical studies on the effect of foreign dividends 
taxation on M&A activity. Feld et al. (2016a) start from an ownership neutrality point of 
view. They argue that CON is violated if the system to avoid double taxation of dividends 
of potential foreign targets varies across countries. This effect is due to second-best 
ownership structures that may evolve because after-tax dividends of foreign targets differ 
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across countries, depending on their taxation system. Indeed, the authors find evidence that 
the credit method impedes cross-border M&A activity. Huizinga and Voget (2009) 
investigate the direction and volume of cross-border M&A activity by analyzing whether 
the prospect of international double taxation of foreign dividends in the acquiring country 
affects the parent-subsidiary-structure following cross-border M&As. They show that 
countries with a higher rate of international double taxation are less likely to attract parent 
firms in a newly created MNE after cross-border M&As. Finally, Voget (2011) finds that, 
upon repatriation of foreign dividends, additional taxation in the residence country 
increases the probability of headquarters relocations away from that country. 
To our knowledge, there are two empirical studies on the effect of corporate capital gains 
taxation on M&A activity. These studies base their argumentation on the fact that selling a 
subsidiary may trigger capital gains taxation. This tax burden could be seen as additional 
transaction costs that increase the reservation price of sellers. Ayers et al. (2007) consider 
this so-called lock-in effect and argue that capital gains taxation reduces the number and 
trading volume of M&As. Indeed, in a US M&A data set, they find a negative association 
between acquisitions and capital gains tax rate. Feld et al. (2016b) investigate this lock-in 
effect in a global M&A data set, where a vendor sells one of its domestic subsidiaries. They 
find that a decrease in capital gains tax rate increases M&A activity. Additionally, to our 
knowledge, two studies focus on the impact of individual shareholder capital gains taxation 
on M&A premiums. Ayers et al. (2003) show a positive relation between the M&A premium 
and capital gains taxation at the level of the selling individual shareholder. Huizinga et al. 
(2017) show that future capital gains taxation at the acquirer individual shareholder level 
negatively affects the M&A premium with an increasing tax rate differential between 
acquirer and seller capital gains taxation. 
4.3.2 Variation in anti profit shifting measures 
In addition to observed variation in taxation systems, profit shifting opportunities might 
impact reservation prices. MNE-wide profit shifting has been in the focus of the public, 
politicians, practitioners and researchers over the last years.55 However, the impact of profit 
shifting on M&A prices has rarely been discussed. Devereux et al. (2015) argue that profit 
shifting does not distort CON assuming of a worldwide cross-border cash flow taxation 
system incorporating the credit method. However, as our model developed in Section 4.4.2 
shows, profit shifting has an impact on M&A prices and, thereby, distorts CON in a non-
                                              
55 For empirical evidence on tax-motivated profit shifting see, for example, Huizinga and Laeven (2008), Weichenrieder 
(2009), Dischinger and Riedel (2011), Grubert (2012), Buettner and Wamser (2013) and Dharmapala and Riedel (2013). 
For anecdotal evidence see, for example, Sullivan (2012). In addition, profit shifting has a high priority on the agenda 
of current tax policy debates, as the OECD BEPS Project (OECD/G20 (2015a)) or the anti tax avoidance directive 
of the EU (European Council (2016)) show. 
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cash flow taxation world with various taxation systems. In the following survey, we show 
that MNEs’ profit shifting opportunities vary substantially among countries. 
One important anti profit shifting measure are CFC rules. These rules aim at MNE-wide 
book profit shifting strategies, i.e., shifting profits generated in high-tax subsidiaries to low-
tax subsidiaries via internal debt-financing or IP-licensing. If CFC rules are applicable, they 
lead to immediate taxation of low-tax subsidiaries’ profits in the MNE’s ultimate parent’s 
country. Consequently, these profit shifting strategies are ineffective. Indeed, empirical 
research has shown that the presence of CFC rules in the ultimate parent’s country severely 
mitigates profit shifting opportunities within the MNE (e.g., Altshuler and Hubbard (2003), 
Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012)). As shown in Figure 10, CFC rules are present in 29 of the 
49 countries in 2015, compared to 22 countries in 2002. Among the two major taxation 
systems, 52% (65%) of countries that apply the credit (exemption) method on foreign 
dividends and capital gains have CFC rules. Consequently, there is substantial variation in 
the presence and non-presence of CFC rules and also countries with the same taxation 
system may or may not apply CFC rules. 
 
Figure 10. Changes in CFC rules and corporate taxation systems for 49 countries (OECD, G20 and 
EU member states) for 2002–2015. 
 
Source: Corporate taxation system data set. 
 
Figure 11 and Figure 12 summarize the findings on taxation systems and MNE-wide profit 
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consider the year 2015 and those countries that apply the exemption or credit method on 
foreign dividends and capital gains. The tax burden of foreign dividends and capital gains 
taxation reflects the STR on the respective income. The tax burden of profit retention in a 
tax haven is calculated in the following way: Generally, we assume full profit shifting within 
the MNE and set the profit retention tax burden equal 0% as this is the logical lower bound 
for profit taxation. If the residence country of the MNE applies CFC rules, the tax burden 
is set to the tax rate threshold that triggers the application of CFC rules in the residence 
country.56 Consequently, the tax burden on profit retention is the minimum tax burden an 
MNE can achieve using MNE-wide profit shifting. 
Both figures start with countries that apply the exemption method for both foreign 
dividends and capital gains, followed by countries that apply the exemption method for 
foreign dividends and apply the credit method for capital gains, followed by countries that 
apply the credit method for both foreign dividends and capital gains. Figure 11 shows 
countries without CFC rules and Figure 12 shows countries with CFC rules. Both figures 
show a diverse picture. Countries such as the Netherlands or Switzerland have no CFC 
rules and exempt foreign dividends and capital gains, whereas countries such as Mexico and 
Brazil have relatively high tax rate thresholds for the application of CFC rules and a 
relatively high tax rate on foreign dividends and capital gains. Several countries exempt 
foreign dividends and apply the credit method on capital gains in both CFC rule countries 
(e.g., Japan) and non-CFC rule countries (e.g., Russian Federation). 
 
Figure 11. Non-CFC rule countries: Tax burden of foreign dividends, capital gains and profit retention 
(2015). 
 
Source: Corporate taxation system data set. 
 
                                              
56 Some countries use a blacklist (whitelist) that triggers (does not trigger) the application of CFC rules. In this case, 
the tax burden is derived based on the countries mentioned in these lists. For EEA member states in the years after 
the Cadbury-Schweppes ruling of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2006 (European Court of Justice (2006)), we 
assume that CFC rule countries apply a clause allowing firms to escape CFC rule application if they prove sufficient 
economic activity in the respective low-tax EEA member state. Therefore, we set the tax burden equal to the lowest 
STR within the EEA. This is consistent with empirical evidence provided by Ruf and Weichenrieder (2013), who show 
that European MNEs preferably shift profits to EEA subsidiaries after the ECJ decision. For the USA, we set the tax 
burden equal to 0% as the check-the-box rule may allow US MNEs to escape from CFC rules under special 
circumstances (e.g., Altshuler and Grubert (2006), Mutti and Grubert (2009)). 
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Figure 12. CFC rule countries: Tax burden of foreign dividends, capital gains and profit retention (2015). 
 
Source: Corporate taxation system data set. 
 
Two further anti profit shifting measures may partly impede profit shifting strategies; 
however, they are applicable at the subsidiary level and, consequently, have no link to the 
taxation systems analyzed above. Thin capitalization or interest stripping rules may restrict 
the deduction of excessive interest expenses; transfer pricing rules require the application 
of the arm’s length principle on intra-group transfer prices and may restrict the deduction 
of unjustifiably high interest or royalty expenses. Figure 13 shows that mandatory transfer 
pricing documentation rules57 more than doubled over the 2002–2015 period and thin 
capitalization or interest stripping rules increased by around 50%. However, not all 
countries apply those anti profit shifting measures and profit shifting strategies are still 
(partly) implementable within an MNE depending on the location of subsidiaries. 
 
Figure 13. Changes in anti profit shifting measures for 49 countries 
(OECD, G20 and EU member states) for 2002–2015. 
 
Source: Corporate taxation system data set. 
                                              
57 We define mandatory transfer pricing documentation rules to be present in a country if the country’s tax law requires 
the application of the arm’s length principle on intra-group transfer prices and requires documentation or disclosure 
of those transfer prices. 
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4.4 Theoretical model on the impact of  corporate taxation systems 
on acquirer reservation prices 
4.4.1 Motivation of model 
Section 4.3 illustrates that countries apply various corporate taxation systems regarding 
foreign dividends and capital gains taxation; in addition, there is a wide spectrum of profit 
shifting opportunities and tax rates. These findings are in sharp contrast to the theoretical 
results from CON literature presented in Section 4.2 that claim that CON can only be 
achieved if all countries apply an identical taxation system, in particular, a cross-border cash 
flow taxation system using the credit method (Devereux et al. (2015)). Combining the 
findings of Section 4.2 and 4.3 and taking into account the empirical evidence showing that 
taxing foreign dividends or capital gains impedes the M&A activity of that country’s MNEs, 
it is clear that CON cannot be reached in the current taxation environment. Moreover, a 
country that implements a taxation system satisfying CON may put its own MNEs at a 
disadvantage relative to other MNEs in bidding for foreign targets if the taxation system 
those MNEs are subject to enhances M&A activity. 
It is not easy to answer the question as to which taxation system enhances or hinders cross-
border M&A activity. As outlined in Section 4.3.1, empirical results suggest that taxing 
foreign dividends leads to fewer acquisitions, while taxing capital gains leads to fewer 
sellings. Further, the focus of those studies lies on the effects of either dividends or capital 
gains taxation, i.e., those effects are not considered jointly. While this isolated consideration 
does not imply that the results from those studies are biased in answering their research 
questions, a joint consideration may help to comprehensively understand the effect of the 
taxation system on the acquirer’s reservation price. Especially, differences in tax rates for 
foreign dividends or capital gains cannot be covered by looking at only one of the two 
aspects. Further, taking profit shifting opportunities into account seems to be relevant in 
determining the tax impact on reservation prices. Besides a huge body of empirical literature 
showing that profit shifting takes place in general (see Section 4.3.2), a growing body of 
empirical literature specifically investigates M&As in light of profit shifting. For example, 
Belz et al. (2016) find that domestic targets experience a decrease in their ETRs by up to 
8% following acquisition by a tax aggressive MNE. Additionally, the well-known 
phenomenon of tax induced inversions, i.e., a tax motivated relocation of headquarters by 
a merger with a foreign firm located in a tax haven country, has been researched in several 
studies (e.g., Desai and Hines (2002), Cloyd et al. (2003), Babkin et al. (2017)). 
Based on theoretical CON literature as outlined in Section 4.2, we argue that when an 
acquirer determines the reservation price for a foreign target, he considers tax consequences 
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of future dividends repatriation as well as tax consequences of future capital gains or losses58 
once the target is eventually sold or liquidated. Further, based on empirical tax literature 
mentioned above, we argue that he may consider profit shifting opportunities available to 
him, tax strategies such as delaying repatriation and additional taxes such as withholding 
taxes. Therefore, a joint consideration of all these effects is necessary to provide detailed 
guidance for the national tax policy maker on a corporate taxation system that enhances 
cross-border M&A activity. 
Based on this argumentation, we derive a simple model of how a potential acquirer 
determines the taxation impact on his reservation price. This model encompasses all of the 
aforementioned aspects of taxation systems and is based on the models developed by Ruf 
(2012) and Devereux et al. (2015). However, we do not allow for economic depreciation 
(Ruf (2012)) or an immediate deduction of the acquisition price from the tax base 
(Devereux et al. (2015)) but rather restrict our model to the more realistic case of 
depreciation of the book value of a participation in the target to account for capital gains 
taxation at the acquirer level. In addition, we explicitly allow for profit shifting. Finally, by 
considering capital gains taxation at the acquirer side, we add another dimension to 
empirical tax literature that so far focuses on the seller side in investigating the effect of 
capital gains taxation. 
4.4.2 Development of model 
Figure 14 shows the basic setup of our model: An MNE located in Country A wants to 
acquire a certain target firm (TARGET) located in Country T.59 MNE is the global ultimate 
owner of the group and acquires TARGET directly. Subsequent to the acquisition, profits 
generated by TARGET may be shifted to a tax haven subsidiary (TAX HAVEN SUB) 
located in Country TH. 
 
                                              
58 In this paper, the term “capital gains” refers to capital gains and losses. 
59 To finance the acquisition, MNE raises equity from multiple individual shareholders located in different countries. 
As these shareholders are assumed to be relatively small, their individual tax rules do not impact the gross market 
interest rate they demand from MNE. Consequently, MNE does not take into account the specific tax rules of its 
shareholders and discounts with the gross market interest rate. Further, we assume MNE to have access to shareholders 
globally. Therefore, the gross market interest rate is not country-specific, but a worldwide uniform rate. This would 
also be the result if arbitrage on investment opportunities amongst savers “leads to an outcome in which all projects 
offer the same rate of return to savers before personal tax” (King and Fullerton (1984), p. 12). This assumption is 
reasonable, as the presence of untaxed investors (e.g., pension funds) should otherwise result in an equilibrium with 
zero personal taxes for all investors. The same result will also follow if MNE finances the acquisition by using (untaxed) 
profit reserves from a tax haven subsidiary. Given that many US MNEs have retained large amounts of (almost 
untaxed) profits in tax havens (e.g., Cox (2016)), this scenario is also a plausible explanation for assuming that personal 
taxes do not matter. 
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Figure 14. Theoretical model overview. 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The acquirer’s reservation price (𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞) is then determined as follows: 
𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞 = 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑐𝑞 ∙ 𝑃𝑉𝐹𝑡 ∙ ( 1 − 𝜏𝐴𝑐𝑞) +
𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺∙𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞
(1+𝑟)𝑡
. 
(4.1) 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑐𝑞 stands for dividend payments that MNE receives from TARGET. 𝜏𝐴𝑐𝑞 represents 
the potential tax burden that dividend payments face upon repatriation to MNE and 𝑃𝑉𝐹𝑡 
is the present value factor for dividend payments. 𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺  is the tax rate applied on capital 
gains in MNE’s country. The reservation price is driven by two tax effects outlined in the 
following. 
The first term represents the effect of the present value of the after-tax cash flow (i.e., 
dividend payments) that MNE receives from TARGET. The acquirer’s reservation price 
decreases if 𝜏𝐴𝑐𝑞 increases, and this effect is strictly time invariant (although the absolute 
value changes with the number of periods taken into account). 
The second term represents the effect of the present value of the potential tax refund that 
the acquirer receives upon liquidation or sale of TARGET in period 𝑡. The tax refund 
emerges as the acquirer can potentially either depreciate the book value of the participation 
in TARGET upon liquidation or reduce the gains from selling TARGET by the book 
value.60 The higher the capital gains tax rate 𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺 , the higher the tax refund. However, 
unlike dividends taxation, the capital gains taxation effect is strictly time dependent—it 
occurs only once—and decreases with an increasing number of periods taken into account. 
                                              
60 It is assumed that MNE generates sufficient profits from other sources to make use of the capital loss. Further, it is 
important to note that our model design assumes that the capital loss is used at the acquirer level only. However, the 
capital losses may also be considered in Country T if MNE is subject to limited tax liability in T. Therefore, the method 
to avoid double taxation for capital gains in Country A might also impact the reservation price if a tax refund in 
Country T occurs. However, Article 13 (5) of the OECD Model Tax Convention (OECD (2014)) prohibits the country 
in which the shares are alienated (T in this case) to tax such proceeds. See footnote 73 for how we deal with the rare 
case in our empirical application, where limited tax liability in T may be problematic if no DTC between A and T exists. 
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As a result, the acquirer’s reservation price decreases if 𝜏𝐴𝑐𝑞 decreases or the number of 
periods increases; the acquirer’s reservation price increases if 𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺 increases. 
TARGET’s dividends are assumed to be the full profits of TARGET and equal TARGET’s 
cash flows.61 They consist of two components: The profit generated by TARGET’s 
business activities (denoted by 𝜀) and an additional profit created solely because MNE 
becomes the parent of TARGET, i.e., a synergy (denoted by ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞). Consequently, 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑐𝑞 
could be written as 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑐𝑞 = 𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞. 
It is assumed that TARGET has neither paid-in capital nor profit reserves at the beginning 
of the first period. As a result, there are no assets left in TARGET after the repatriation of 
profits at the end of the last period. Consequently, TARGET is liquidated.62 A modification 
of this assumption is discussed in the Appendix to Section 4. There we allow for subsequent 
acquisitions instead of liquidation. As the liquidation occurs in the books of the acquirer, 
the depreciation yields tax refunds in the acquirer residence country.63 
From a tax perspective, 𝜏𝐴𝑐𝑞 depends on multiple characteristics. If no profits are shifted, 
no withholding taxes exist and foreign dividends are exempted from taxation in the 
acquirer’s residence country, then 𝜏𝐴𝑐𝑞 simply equals the tax rate in the target residence 
country, i.e., 𝜏𝐴𝑐𝑞
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝜏𝑇. If, however, withholding taxes are levied, 𝜏𝐴𝑐𝑞
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑊𝐻𝑇 =
𝜏𝑇 + 𝜏𝑊𝐻𝑇
𝑇 ∙ (1 − 𝜏𝑇). If, on the contrary, no profits are shifted and foreign dividends are 
taxed in the acquirer’s residence country with a credit granted for underlying foreign taxes 
paid, then 𝜏𝐴𝑐𝑞 equals the tax rate in the acquirer residence country, i.e., 𝜏𝐴𝑐𝑞
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝜏𝐴. 
Further, we analyze the setting in which all profits are shifted to a tax haven without costs, 
resulting in 𝜏𝐴𝑐𝑞
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
= 𝜏𝑇𝐻 with 𝜏𝑇𝐻 being the tax rate in the tax haven. For 
MNEs from residence countries applying the credit method, profit shifting does not impact 
the dividends tax burden if 𝜏𝑇 ≤ 𝜏𝐴 and works as a means to avoid excess foreign tax 
credits if 𝜏𝑇 > 𝜏𝐴.64 
                                              
61 Accordingly, we use the terms “profit” and “cash flow” synonymously throughout the remainder of this paper. 
62 If TARGET has paid-in capital at the beginning of the first period, this paid-in capital is accounted for in the 
reservation price and can be repatriated tax free to MNE, resulting in a tax neutral reduction of the book value of 
TARGET. Consequently, each unit of paid-in capital will increase the reservation price by one unit. If TARGET has 
profit reserves at the beginning of the first period, these profit reserves are also paid for in the reservation price; 
however, their repatriation to MNE may lead to dividends taxation in A. The calculation looks similar to the one below 
except that the profit reserves are already taxed at rate 𝜏𝑇 and, therefore, cannot be shifted to TH. 
63 In principle, target residence country could also tax capital losses upon TARGET liquidation and thus also grant a 
tax refund. This case, however, is highly unlikely. First, Article 13 (5) of the OECD Model Tax Convention (OECD 
(2014)) prohibits TARGET residence country from taxing such proceeds and, second, the tax refund would only 
materialize if the acquirer has other income in TARGET residence country. Therefore, we abstain from this case. 
64 As shown in Appendix to Section 4, the complexity of the model increases once costs of profit shifting are taken 
into account. However, costs of profit shifting are covered by several variables in the empirical application (e.g., CFC 
rules, transfer pricing regulations or thin capitalization rules). Therefore, we limit our model to the case without costs 
of profit shifting to increase model readability. 
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𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺  is also dependent on the taxation system that the acquirer residence country applies. 
If foreign capital gains are exempted from taxation, the capital gains tax rate is zero, i.e., 
𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺 = 0. If foreign capital gains are taxed, the capital gains tax rate is positive and—in 
most cases—equals the STR, i.e., 𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺 = 𝜏𝐴. 
 𝑃𝑉𝐹𝑡 is the present value of the terminal value factor 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡, i.e., 𝑃𝑉𝐹𝑡 =
𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡
(1+𝑟)𝑡
. 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 takes 
the value 
{1+
𝑟
1−𝜏𝐴
∙(1−𝜏𝑇)}
𝑡
−1
𝑟
1−𝜏𝐴
∙(1−𝜏𝑇)
 if no profits are shifted and 
{1+
𝑟
1−𝜏𝐴
∙(1−𝜏𝑇𝐻)}
𝑡
−1
𝑟
1−𝜏𝐴
∙(1−𝜏𝑇𝐻)
 if profits are 
shifted. The underlying assumption is that profits are reinvested at the cost of capital of the 
firm. As the acquirer is assumed to be financed with equity only, the cost of capital depend 
on the rate of return that the investors demand (𝑟) and the tax rate the MNE faces. As the 
ETR of the MNE depends on all its investments and not only on the acquisition whose 
price is determined, we approximate this ETR by 𝜏𝐴. Consequently, the cost of capital is 
calculated as 
𝑟
1−𝜏𝐴
. 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 is thus country specific.65 
Section 3.1 has shown that the most relevant methods to avoid double taxation are the 
credit method and the exemption method. Consequently, we focus on these two methods 
when analyzing the impact of dividends taxation on M&A deal values. Additionally, 
countries may choose between taxing or not taxing foreign capital gains.66 
Thus, the following four different taxation systems are analyzed: 
 DIV0CG0: 
Foreign dividends are taxed and underlying foreign taxes as well as withholding 
taxes are credited (DIV0); foreign capital gains are taxed (CG0). 
 DIV0CG1: 
Foreign dividends are taxed and underlying foreign taxes as well as withholding 
taxes are credited (DIV0); foreign capital gains are exempted (CG1). 
 DIV1CG0: 
Foreign dividends are exempted (DIV1); foreign capital gains are taxed (CG0). 
 DIV1CG1: 
Foreign dividends and foreign capital gains are exempted (DIV1 & CG1). 
                                              
65 If the MNE’s ETR regarding this investment (
Π𝐴𝑐𝑞
𝜀+∆𝐴𝑐𝑞
∙ 𝜏𝑇𝐻 + (1 −
Π𝐴𝑐𝑞
𝜀+∆𝐴𝑐𝑞
) ∙ 𝜏𝑇) is higher than 𝜏𝐴, the rate of return 
upon reinvestment falls below the required rate of return of the investors (𝑟). Consequently, it is assumed that the 
MNE does not reinvest but repatriates the earnings and 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 takes the value 
(1+𝑟)𝑡−1
𝑟
. 
66 Double taxation of capital gains does not play a role in our analysis, as our sample consists of almost only M&A 
deals between countries that have concluded DTCs with each other. For additional information, see footnote 60. 
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Table 17 shows the calculation of TAX in detail. Based on the values of TAX, we can draw 
conclusions with respect to differences in TAX between countries and analyze which 
taxation system yields the highest reservation prices for M&A bidders. 
 
Table 17. Calculation of TAX among the four corporate taxation systems. 
DIV0CG0 DIV0CG1 DIV1CG0 DIV1CG1 
Full profit shifting (𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆) 
𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 ∙
(1 − 𝜏𝐴)
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡 − 𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺
 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 ∙
(1 − 𝜏𝐴)
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 ∙
(1 − 𝜏𝑇𝐻)
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡 − 𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺
 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 ∙
(1 − 𝜏𝑇𝐻)
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
 
No profit shifting (𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆) 
1 − (1 − 𝜏𝑇) ∙ (1 − 𝜏𝑊𝐻𝑇
𝑇 ) < 𝜏𝐴 
𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 ∙
(1 − 𝜏𝐴)
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡 − 𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺
 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 ∙
(1 − 𝜏𝐴)
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 ∙
(1 − 𝜏𝑇) ∙ (1 − 𝜏𝑊𝐻𝑇
𝑇 )
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡 − 𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺
 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 ∙
(1 − 𝜏𝑇) ∙ (1 − 𝜏𝑊𝐻𝑇
𝑇 )
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
 
1 − (1 − 𝜏𝑇) ∙ (1 − 𝜏𝑊𝐻𝑇
𝑇 ) > 𝜏𝐴 
𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 ∙
(1 − 𝜏𝑇) ∙ (1 − 𝜏𝑊𝐻𝑇
𝑇 )
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡 − 𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺
 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 ∙
(1 − 𝜏𝑇) ∙ (1 − 𝜏𝑊𝐻𝑇
𝑇 )
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 ∙
(1 − 𝜏𝑇) ∙ (1 − 𝜏𝑊𝐻𝑇
𝑇 )
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡 − 𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺
 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 ∙
(1 − 𝜏𝑇) ∙ (1 − 𝜏𝑊𝐻𝑇
𝑇 )
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
 
Table illustrates calculation of tax component (TAX) based on our model among the four taxation systems. 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆 considers the assumption that all profits are shifted from TARGET to TAX HAVEN SUB. 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 
considers the assumption of no profit shifting. 
 
Based on the calculation of TAX, the following analysis can be undertaken for a country 
applying the DIV1CG1 system. This country’s MNEs have a higher reservation price for a 
certain target than MNEs from a country applying the DIV0CG1 system (i.e., 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑉1𝐶𝐺1
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
> 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑉0𝐶𝐺1
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
) as dividends are taxed only at the target or the tax haven tax 
rate.67 On the contrary, a higher capital gains tax rate increases the reservation price of 
MNEs for a certain target as the tax refund they get in the last period becomes more 
valuable to them (i.e., 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑉1𝐶𝐺1
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
< 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑉1𝐶𝐺0
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
).68 
The same analysis can be undertaken for a country applying the DIV0CG0 system. That 
country’s MNEs have a lower (higher) reservation price for a certain target than MNEs 
from a country applying the DIV1CG0 (DIV0CG1) system. Consequently, we expect 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑉0𝐶𝐺0
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
< 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑉1𝐶𝐺0
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
 and 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑉0𝐶𝐺0
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
> 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐷𝐼𝑉0𝐶𝐺1
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
. 
Finally, it is unclear whether MNEs from a country applying the DIV0CG0 system derive 
lower or higher reservation prices than MNEs from countries applying the DIV1CG1 
system. The reason is that it is unclear which of the two effects—the value increasing effect 
of lower dividends taxation or the value decreasing effect of no capital gains taxation—
dominates. 
                                              
67 Given that the target or tax haven has a lower tax rate than the MNE residence country, i.e., 𝜏𝑇𝐻 < 𝜏𝑇 < 𝜏𝐴. 
68 Given that the potential difference in tax haven tax rates (𝜏𝑇𝐻) between two acquirer countries does not 
overcompensate the capital gains effect. 
4 International Taxation and M&A Prices 92 
 
4.4.3 Extension of model 
So far, we have assumed that an acquirer calculates the reservation price for a certain target 
over a predefined period. However, tax literature (e.g., Foley et al. (2007)) argues that several 
US firms claim a large portion of their foreign earnings as permanently reinvested abroad, 
i.e., these firms do not plan on repatriating these foreign earnings. The cumulative amount 
of these permanently reinvested earnings is currently estimated at more than 2.4 trillion 
USD (McKeon (2016)). Applying this idea to our model results in the following problem: 
If a firm never repatriates foreign earnings, no payout to its shareholders can be made. 
Consequently, the value of the foreign profits for the MNE and its shareholders drops to 
zero. To circumvent this problem, MNEs may choose to pay their shareholders dividends 
financed by taking up loans, a structure known from Apple Inc. (e.g., Apple Inc (2015), 
Thielman (2016)). 
The economic effects of Apple Inc.’s structure are as follows: As foreign earnings are 
reinvested abroad, repatriation taxes are saved. The interest expenses generated by this 
structure are tax deductible in the USA, i.e., 1 USD paid in interest saves US taxes of about 
0.39 USD. Consequently, there is a liquidity disadvantage of about 61% of the interest 
payments made. As it is not reasonable to assume that Apple Inc. can cover these 
(increasing) interest expenses with US earnings forever, the liquidity disadvantage should 
be covered by the foreign operations. Consequently, Apple Inc. should repatriate just 
enough money from foreign operations to cover for this liquidity disadvantage.69 
To implement this strategy in our model, we adjust the model under the full profit shifting 
assumption as follows: The individual shareholders do not value foreign cash flow directly 
(as this is almost completely retained abroad), but rather the cash flow that the acquirer 
pays out to its shareholders (i.e., the debt the acquirer takes up). In the first period, the 
MNE takes up a loan of 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑞. This loan bears interest at the gross market interest rate 𝑟. 
It is assumed that all loans have a maturity of one year. Consequently, the loan taken up in 
the first period has to be paid back at the end of the second period. To fund this payback, 
another loan is taken up in period two amounting to the amount of debt paid back plus the 
constant payout to the shareholders, i.e., 𝑛 ∙ 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑞 in period 𝑛. The foreign earnings are 
assumed to be reinvested at the capital market rate 𝑟70 and are then repatriated to fund 
interest payments on the loan. Dividend payments from the tax haven subsidiary to the 
MNE consequently amount to (𝑛 − 1) ∙ (𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (1 − 𝜏
𝑇𝐻)2 ∙ 𝑟 in period 𝑛. Given 
                                              
69 In the year 2016, about 50% of all foreign cash of subsidiaries of Apple Inc. were accounted for as permanently 
reinvested earnings. Consequently, Apple Inc. plans on repatriating the other half of foreign cash in the forseeable 
future (Apple Inc (2016), p. 55), indicating that this money could be used to fund interest payments on debt taken up 
in the USA. 
70 In the long run, it is not reasonable to assume that the firm will always be able to find investment projects that yield 
a higher return than the capital market rate. 
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that the residence country applies the credit method and no additional profits exist at MNE 
level to make use of potential excess foreign tax credits, the profit maximizing constant 
payout to the individual shareholders of the MNE amounts to 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑞
∗ = (𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙
(1 − 𝜏𝑇𝐻)2.71 For this amount of annual (additional) debt, the liquidity effect (dividends 
received ./. interest paid ./. taxes) at the level of the MNE equals zero, as interest payments 
equal dividends payments. As a result, the tax basis is zero and no tax payments are due at 
MNE level. 
The acquirer’s reservation price can then be expressed as follows: 
𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡,𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) = (𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙
(1−𝜏𝑇𝐻)
2
𝑟
. 
(4.2) 
If the acquirer had not used this structure, his reservation price would be derived as follows: 
𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞
𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡,𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) = (𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙
1−𝜏𝐴
𝑟
. 
(4.3) 
Therefore, for acquirers from credit countries, using the structure is beneficial as long as 
𝜏𝐴 > 𝜏𝑇𝐻 ∙ (2 − 𝜏𝑇𝐻). 
Acquirers from exemption countries do not use this structure. As they do not have any 
taxable income (due to dividends exemption), no tax effect of taking up loans emerges 
because potential loss carry forwards can never be used. As a result, the highest possible 
debt-financed payout equals the amount derived above for credit countries. However, this 
will always be lower than the reservation price when the structure is not used: 
𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞
𝐸𝑥𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) = (𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙
(1−𝜏𝑇𝐻)
𝑟
. 
(4.4) 
We account for this model adjustment in a further analysis in the empirical application. In 
calculating 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆,𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒
, we assume that acquirers from exemption countries will 
always repatriate foreign earnings. Acquirers from credit countries will use the proposed 
structure as long as 𝜏𝐴 > 𝜏𝑇𝐻 ∙ (2 − 𝜏𝑇𝐻) and repatriate foreign earnings otherwise. 
4.5 Empirical application 
4.5.1 M&A data and calculation of TAX 
4.5.1.1 M&A data 
In this section, we apply our theoretical model derived in the previous section to real world 
M&A data. These data are taken from SDC Platinum, which contains worldwide M&A 
                                              
71 See Table A 4 in Appendix to Section 4 for an overview of all liquidity and tax effects. 
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transactions and provides information on the countries of the acquirer ultimate parent, 
direct acquirer and target. We investigate the period 2002–2014. In line with our theoretical 
model assumptions outlined in Section 4.4.2, we have selected all completed M&As through 
which 100% of target shares are acquired and restrict our sample to cross-border M&As 
defined as an acquirer buying the shares of a foreign target. To eliminate the possibility that 
a subsidiary in a third country is involved in the M&A, we require that the acquirer ultimate 
parent directly acquires the target. Further, we exclude acquirer ultimate parents from the 
financial sector. Finally, as our model and empirical application focus on the credit method 
and the exemption method as the most common methods to avoid double taxation, we do 
not consider country-years in which no relief or the deduction method is implemented. 
Table 18 shows that 9,108 cross-border M&As and 40 countries remain. In line with di 
Giovanni (2005), we observe that countries with the largest financial markets have most 
observations in our sample. Our sample decreases by 92% to 709 observations from 
29 countries once we take into account firm level control variables, which are needed for 
our regression analysis in Section 4.5.2. As Table 18 shows, the decrease is very close to 
92% in most countries and, hence, is not driven by specific countries. Further, it is not a 
single variable that causes the reduction in observations but the combination of financial 
data needed for the empirical application. Hence, we assume that the smaller sub-sample is 
a representative subset of the larger one and that focusing on this subset does not bias our 
subsequent empirical work.72 Table 18 also gives an overview of the M&A deal numbers 
and M&A deal values per acquirer ultimate parent country. Further, the table shows that 
almost half of the considered countries changed their taxation system between 2002 and 
2014. More details on the respective taxation systems of the considered countries are shown 
in Table A 3 in the Appendix to Section 4. 
  
                                              
72 This argumentation follows Huizinga and Voget (2009), p. 1228, who face the same problem using firm level data 
from SDC Platinum and who observe a similar decrease in sample size. To expand our sub-sample, we follow Huizinga 
and Voget (2009) and use Compustat North America and Compustat Global that are together global in coverage to 
fill-up firm level control variables. We use CUSIP and SEDOL firm identification codes to link the Compustat 
databases with SDC Platinum. 
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Table 18. Cross-border M&As with acquirer ultimate parents resident in the 40 countries under consideration (2002–2014). 
Country No. of 
deals 
No. of deals 
with given 
control 
variables 
Sample decrease 
(column (2) to 
column (3)) 
Total deal 
value in small 
sample (in 
million USD) 
Mean of 
TAX in 
small 
sample 
Std. dev. of 
TAX in small 
sample 
Min. of 
TAX in 
small 
sample 
Max. of 
TAX in 
small 
sample 
Change in 
taxation 
system? 
Australia 513 22 96% 9,342 11.7 0.87 10.0 12.7 YES 
Austria 53 2 96% 210 12.1 0.10 12.0 12.2 NO 
Belgium 97 12 88% 3,668 11.5 0.73 10.0 12.8 NO 
Brazil 23  100%      NO 
Canada 1,418 60 96% 53,470 12.1 2.35 10.0 20.0 NO 
Chile 12 1 92% 3,425 15.5  15.5 15.5 NO 
China 90 2 98% 44 10.7 0.54 10.4 11.1 NO 
Croatia 3  100%      NO 
Cyprus 9  100%      NO 
Denmark 76 8 89% 4,360 11.5 1.06 9.4 12.5 NO 
Estonia 1  100%      YES 
Finland 139 10 93% 10,172 12.4 2.10 10.0 17.6 NO 
France 217 23 89% 63,580 12.3 1.71 10.3 16.3 YES 
Germany 248 20 92% 56,932 12.5 1.42 10.3 15.0 NO 
Hungary 5  100%      NO 
Iceland 25 6 76% 1,336 11.5 0.65 11.0 12.8 YES 
India 192 16 92% 1,396 11.6 1.43 9.3 14.2 NO 
Israel 125 12 90% 26,917 11.4 2.37 9.4 16.9 NO 
Italy 117 9 92% 7,096 12.2 1.40 9.7 14.3 YES 
Japan 257 21 92% 15,555 13.5 2.50 11.2 20.9 YES 
Latvia 1  100%      NO 
Lithuania 1  100%      NO 
Luxembourg 29 2 93% 563 9.9 0.26 9.7 10.1 NO 
Malta 3  100%      YES 
Mexico 37 2 95% 15,912 14.8 2.11 13.3 16.3 NO 
Netherlands 217 33 85% 43,007 11.7 1.43 10.2 16.8 NO 
New Zealand 65 2 97% 92 10.9 0.97 10.2 11.6 YES 
Norway 159 8 95% 3,206 12.2 1.26 9.2 12.9 YES 
Portugal 18 2 89% 12 12.2 0.14 12.1 12.3 YES 
Republic of Korea 88 2 98% 177 12.0 2.33 10.4 13.7 NO 
Romania 3  100%      NO 
Russian Federation 18 2 89% 1,130 10.4 0.00 10.4 10.4 YES 
Slovenia 4  100%      YES 
South Africa 39 5 87% 2,118 12.9 0.81 12.2 14.3 YES 
Spain 154 12 92% 64,875 11.2 1.58 9.0 13.6 NO 
Sweden 384 34 91% 27,353 12.1 1.40 10.0 16.0 YES 
Switzerland 200 21 89% 39,165 11.2 1.16 9.7 13.9 NO 
Turkey 11  100%      YES 
United Kingdom 1,633 80 95% 78,087 11.4 1.19 9.7 17.4 YES 
United States 2,424 280 88% 174,536 13.2 1.19 10.3 16.6 NO 
Total 9,108 709 92% 707,738 12.4 1.64 9.02 20.9  
This table shows number of acquirer ultimate parents per country in the cross-border M&A sample where the acquirer ultimate parent is resident in 
one of the 40 considered countries (OECD, G20 and EU member states) that apply the exemption or credit method on foreign dividends and capital 
gains. Argentina and Indonesia, which apply the credit method, do not have observations. The target is resident in a member state of the OECD, 
G20 or EU. The sample decrease shows the relative decrease in observed M&As from the base sample (9,108 observations) to the sample including 
firm level control variables (lnTarEBITDA, lnTarEquity, lnTarTotAss, TarLeverage, lnAcqUltParTotAss, AcqUltParROA). Cross-border M&As are 
defined as acquirer ultimate parent and target being in different countries. TAX refers to 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 for a period of 30 years. 
 
4.5.1.2 Calculation of TAX 
To avoid double taxation on foreign dividends and capital gains as described in Section 4.3, 
the calculation of TAX according to Table 17 is based on the unilateral method. However, 
relying only on this unilateral method in analyzing observed cross-border M&A 
transactions would lead to spurious results as most countries in our sample have a large 
DTC network, as Figure 9 shows. These bilateral tax treaties overrule national tax law when 
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there is a beneficial outcome for the tax payer. Therefore, we consider all DTC country-
year pairs and replace the unilateral method by the DTC method for the case of a beneficial 
outcome. Further, based on our findings in Section 4.3.1, we check for each EU member 
state whether it has any beneficial method to avoid double taxation for subsidiaries residing 
in another EU member state. If that is the case, we replace the unilateral or bilateral method 
to avoid double taxation with this EU method. 
The necessary tax rates to calculate TAX are STRs of the acquirer ultimate parent and target 
country (𝜏𝐴, 𝜏𝑇) and capital gains tax rates of the acquirer ultimate parent country (𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺).73 
For calculating 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆, we include the lowest possible tax haven tax rate (𝜏𝑇𝐻) for each 
acquirer ultimate parent country, as derived in Section 4.3.2. If 𝜏𝑇𝐻 is higher than 𝜏𝑇, we 
set 𝜏𝑇𝐻 equal to 𝜏𝑇 as it would not make sense to shift profits to the higher taxed tax haven 
subsidiary.74 Under the assumption of no profit shifting (𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆), we include the 
withholding tax rate on dividends of the target country (𝜏𝑊𝐻𝑇
𝑇 ). 𝜏𝑊𝐻𝑇
𝑇  equals the unilateral 
withholding tax rate and is replaced by the potentially lower withholding tax rate of the 
DTC, if a DTC is present between the acquirer ultimate parent and target country. Under 
the assumption of full profit shifting from the target to a tax haven subsidiary (𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆), 
we set the withholding tax rate to zero since we assume that tax haven countries do not 
apply withholding taxes on dividends. Finally, as the measure of 𝑟 in TAX, we use average 
long-term interest rate for government bonds of selected countries where the capital 
repayment is guaranteed by governments. These government bonds represent the 
alternative financial investment that is used as the benchmark investment in our theoretical 
model. 
Based on Table 17 and our detailed tax data set, we can now calculate the values of TAX 
for each deal in our cross-border M&A sample. Table 18 shows the summary statistics of 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆  for each country for a period of 30 years and Table 19 shows summary statistics 
of 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 among each of the four taxation systems. Overall, we observe substantial 
variation in 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 between and within the different taxation systems. However, it is still 
an empirical question whether this variation explains the differences in observed M&A 
                                              
73 We assume that no capital gains taxation in the target country occurs. However, as outlined in footnote 60, this 
assumption is critical if no DTC between the acquirer ultimate parent and target exists. Therefore, we drop very few 
observations if no DTC between those countries exists and (1) where the acquirer ultimate parent country exempts 
capital gains and the target country may tax those capital gains due to limited tax liability, or (2) where the acquirer 
ultimate parent country taxes capital gains applying the credit method and the target country may tax those capital 
gains due limited tax liability at a higher capital gains tax rate than the acquirer ultimate parent country, i.e., no excess 
foreign tax credits should occur. Additionally, we ensure that each of the countries that is identified as taxing capital 
gains also permits the deduction of capital losses. 
74 CFC rules are not applicable to the income of this low-tax target since we assume that the target generates active 
income, which does not fall under the scope of CFC rules applicable in our data set. 
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prices in our M&A data set. Therefore, we apply a multivariate regression analysis to our 
data set in the following. 
 
Table 19. Summary of TAX among the four corporate taxation systems. 
 DIV0CG0 DIV0CG1 DIV1CG0 DIV1CG1 
No. of obs. 325 56 90 238 
Share 45.8% 7.9% 12.7% 33.6% 
Mean 13.02 11.09 12.41 11.89 
Median 12.98 11.20 12.13 11.83 
Std. dev. 1.37 0.83 2.38 1.42 
Min. 9.27 9.74 9.98 9.02 
Max. 16.95 12.58 20.91 17.64 
This table shows summary statistics on 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 for a period of 30 years. 
 
4.5.2 Regression analysis 
4.5.2.1 OLS regression analysis 
In this section, we investigate whether the tax component TAX as summarized in Table 19 
explains variation in M&A deal values75 in our sample of cross-border M&A transactions. 
Equation (4.1) of our theoretical model gives rise to the following regression equation to 
investigate the effect of taxation systems on cross-border M&A prices: 
𝑀&𝐴_𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾1𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑗𝑡 + 𝛾2𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
𝛾3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 +Φ𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 + 𝜙𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑈𝑙𝑡𝑃𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜙𝑇𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜙𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +
𝜙𝑇𝑎𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 
(4.5) 
where 𝛼 is the intercept, 𝛽 is the coefficient of interest, 𝛾1, 𝛾2, 𝛾3 are coefficients 
corresponding to model-specific firm variables, Φ is a vector of coefficients corresponding 
to further firm level control variables, and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the residual. To account for any 
unobserved effects, we include fixed effects for acquirer ultimate parent country, target 
country, year and target industry. All variables are defined and summarized in Table 20. 
 
 
                                              
75 We do not observe the reservation price of the acquirer ultimate parent. However, the acquirer’s reservation price 
should impact the acquisition price as long as bargaining power is not fully on the side of the acquirer. Consequently, 
we assume that deal value is a reasonable proxy for the reservation price. 
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Table 20. Definitions, data sources and summary statistics of variables for OLS regression. 
Variable Description Source No. of obs. Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min. Max. 
lnValueUSD M&A deal value (natural logarithm) SDC Platinum 709 18.87 2.07 12.10 24.18 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,1 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 Tax component for no profit shifting for 1 periods Tax Guides & OECD 709 0.78 0.14 0.50 1.14 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,10 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠 Tax component for no profit shifting for 10 periods Tax Guides & OECD 709 6.26 0.86 4.34 9.46 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,30 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠 Tax component for no profit shifting for 30 periods Tax Guides & OECD 709 12.41 1.64 9.02 20.91 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,1 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
 Tax component for profits only for no profit shifting for 1 periods Tax Guides & OECD 709 0.61 0.05 0.48 0.86 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,10 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
 Tax component for profits only for no profit shifting for 10 periods Tax Guides & OECD 709 5.32 0.48 4.19 7.65 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,30 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
 Tax component for profits only for no profit shifting for 30 periods Tax Guides & OECD 709 11.61 1.35 8.52 18.87 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑐𝑔
1 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
 Tax component for capital gains only for 1 periods Tax Guides & OECD 709 1.29 0.27 1.00 1.64 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑐𝑔
10 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
 Tax component for capital gains only for 10 periods Tax Guides & OECD 709 1.18 0.17 1.00 1.40 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑐𝑔
30 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
 Tax component for capital gains only for 30 periods Tax Guides & OECD 709 1.07 0.06 1.00 1.20 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆,30 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
 Tax component for profits only for full profit shifting for 30 periods Tax Guides & OECD 709 16.53 2.93 10.65 25.48 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆,𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒
 Tax component for indefinite profit retention and full profit shifting Tax Guides & OECD 709 22.54 3.92 13.55 34.18 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣,𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,30 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
 Tax component for profits only for no profit shifting for 30 periods using corporate average effective tax rate Tax Guides, OECD & ZEW 613 11.08 1.09 7.04 16.92 
lnTarEBITDA EBITDA of target (natural logarithm) 
SDC Platinum; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
709 16.34 2.11 9.85 24.27 
lnTarTotAss Total assets of target (natural logarithm) 
SDC Platinum; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
709 18.41 2.11 12.90 26.20 
lnTarEquity Equity of target (natural logarithm) 
SDC Platinum; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
709 17.47 2.25 11.75 25.35 
TarLeverage Leverage of target (in %) 
SDC Platinum; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
709 52.90 23.50 0.58 99.58 
lnAcqUltParTotAss Total assets of acquirer ultimate parent (natural logarithm) 
SDC Platinum; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
709 21.32 2.10 14.22 27.25 
AcqUltParROA Return on assets (ROA) of acquirer ultimate parent (in %) 
SDC Platinum; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
709 6.21 10.32 –72.74 78.31 
AcqUltParCSTR STR, including typical local taxes, in acquirer ultimate parent country (in %) Tax Guides 709 33.55 5.87 17.00 40.00 
AcqUltParCGTR Capital gains tax rate in acquirer ultimate parent country (in %) Tax Guides 709 31.80 7.97 13.00 40.00 
AcqUltParTHCSTR Lowest possible tax haven tax rate for acquirer ultimate parent (in %) Tax Guides 709 8.90 11.01 0.00 36.00 
TarCSTR STR, including typical local taxes, in target country (in %) Tax Guides 709 31.53 5.52 10.00 41.00 
TarCATR EATR in target country (in %) ZEW 613 0.37 0.04 0.14 0.56 
TarWHTR Withholding tax rate in target country on dividend payments to acquirer ultimate parent country Tax Guides 709 1.92 3.49 0.00 22.00 
TarTC_presence Binary dummy variable coded 1 if thin capitalization or interest stripping rules exist in target country, and 0 otherwise Tax Guides 709 0.95 0.23 0.00 1.00 
TarTP_docu Binary dummy variable coded 1 if mandatory transfer pricing documentation rules exist in target country, and 0 otherwise Tax Guides 709 0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Interest_rate_1 Mean interest rate for government bonds of DE, ES, FR, IT, JP, UK and US maturing in 1 year (in %) Investing.com 709 5.11 1.84 2.57 8.18 
Interest_rate_10 Mean interest rate for government bonds of DE, ES, FR, IT, JP, UK and US maturing in 10 years (in %) Investing.com 709 3.75 0.33 3.24 4.61 
Interest_rate_30 Mean interest rate for government bonds of DE, ES, FR, IT, JP, UK and US maturing in 30 years (in %) Investing.com 709 4.03 0.37 2.93 4.67 
sameIndustry 
Binary dummy variable coded 1 if acquirer ultimate parent and target have the same SIC code, and 0 otherwise, and 0 
otherwise 
SDC Platinum; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
709 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 
lnTarGDP GDP in target country (natural logarithm) World Bank 709 28.41 1.21 24.72 30.48 
lnAcqUltParGDP GDP in acquirer ultimate parent country (natural logarithm) World Bank 709 28.71 1.51 23.34 30.48 
Data on acquirer ultimate parent country, target country, year and target industry fixed effects are not reported but are available upon request. Data sources for the tax variables are IBFD European Tax Handbook (2002-2016), various 
corporate tax guides (Ernst & Young (2004-2016), Ernst & Young (2009-2016), Deloitte (2011-2016), KPMG (2012-2016), KPMG (2003-2015), PwC (2008-2016)) and Zinn et al. (2014). 
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We estimate the regression using OLS regression. The dependent variable 
(𝑀&𝐴_𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡) is the natural logarithm of the M&A deal value where acquirer 
ultimate parent i acquirers target j in year t. Our variable of interest (𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡) represents our 
measure of the taxation system that jointly considers foreign dividends and capital gains 
taxation if acquirer ultimate parent i acquires target j in year t, see Table 17. 
As prior literature has shown, the target country tax rate has a significant impact on target 
acquisition (e.g., Hebous et al. (2011), Herger et al. (2016), Arulampalam et al. (2017)). 
Therefore, we start our analysis with 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆, i.e., with the assumption of no profit 
shifting, where profits are taxed in the target country and not shifted to a tax haven 
subsidiary. 
If an acquirer considers foreign dividends and capital gains taxation in determining the 
reservation price in the way our theoretical model predicts, we expect the coefficient of 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 to take a value slightly above 1 in the one period model. That is because the value 
of 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 varies around 0.8 in the one period model.76 As 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 increases over time 
due to an increasing 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡, the coefficient should decrease over time following a convex 
function. Based on our theoretical model, we hypothesize the following, stated in 
alternative form: 
Hypothesis 1: 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 has a positive effect on M&A deal value. 
To investigate the individual importance of foreign dividends and capital gains taxation, we 
disentangle 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆  into 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 and 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝐺 , i.e., we consider the two effects of foreign 
dividends and capital gains taxation separately. 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 incorporates dividends taxation 
upon repatriation, i.e., 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐴𝑐𝑞 ∙ ( 1 − 𝜏
𝐴), and the 𝑃𝑉𝐹𝑡. As 𝑃𝑉𝐹𝑡 reflects profit taxation 
of retained or redistributed earnings, 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 covers all aspects of profit taxation and 
increases with an increasing time period. Based on our theoretical model, we hypothesize 
the following, stated in alternative form: 
Hypothesis 2: 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 has a positive effect on M&A deal value and the coefficient 
decreases following a convex function with an increasing time period. 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝐺  takes the value of one if capital gains are exempt and a value larger than one if 
capital gains are taxed. It decreases with an increasing time period. Based on our theoretical 
model, we hypothesize the following, stated in alternative form: 
Hypothesis 3: 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝐺  has a positive effect on M&A deal value and the coefficient increases 
following a concave function with an increasing time period. 
                                              
76 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 has a mean of 0.78 with minimum (maximum) values of 0.50 (1.14). 
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As empirical literature provides evidence of profit shifting within MNEs (see Section 4.3.2), 
we also analyze the dividend component of TAX under the assumption of full profit 
shifting, i.e., 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
. However, profit shifting opportunities crucially depend on anti 
profit shifting measures in the target country. In particular, thin capitalization or interest 
stripping rules and mandatory transfer pricing documentation may hinder profit shifting 
from the target to a tax haven subsidiary.77 We, therefore, hypothesize the following, stated 
in alternative form: 
Hypothesis 4: 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
 has a positive effect (no effect) on M&A deal value when targets 
with (without) profit shifting opportunities are acquired. 
On the firm level, we use three variables from firms’ consolidated financial statements to 
control for firm-specific characteristics that are also considered in our theoretical model. 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑗𝑡 is used to control for target cash flow and refers to 𝜀 in our theoretical model.78 
As highlighted in Section 4.4.2, cash flow and profit are assumed to be equal in our 
theoretical model. Consequently, one could take pre-tax income for the reservation price 
calculation. However, in the real world, an important difference between cash flow and 
profit is depreciation and amortization. Therefore, we take earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA) as our proxy for cash flow as it corrects for 
depreciation and amortization. The acquirer’s size (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡) and profitability measured as 
the acquirer’s ROA (𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡) are used to control for synergies generated at the target level 
due to joining the MNE and refer to ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞 in our theoretical model. We do not observe the 
real synergies; however, empirical studies argue that synergies generated through M&As are 
positively related to the acquirer’s size and profitability. For example, Huyghebaert and 
Luypaert (2013) point out that economies of scale and economies of scope can lead to cost-
based synergies after M&As. The larger the acquirer, the higher the degree of labor 
specialization and the higher the potential to allocate fixed costs of target operations over 
a large number of units within the acquirer. 
The vector 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑂𝐿𝑆 captures further target control variables. Equity controls for 
the presence of paid-in capital and/or profit reserves of the target, which are presumed to 
have a positive effect on M&A deal values. Leverage considers the debt level of the target 
and controls for two target characteristics. First, high leverage can be considered as a 
measure of a high borrowing capacity, for example, due to the presence of valuable fixed 
                                              
77 Several empirical studies provide evidence that these provisions are effective in reducing profit shifting opportunities; 
see, for example, Buettner et al. (2012) or Riedel et al. (2015). 
78 We exclude targets with a negative EBITDA as estimating prices based on a negative EBITDA may result in negative 
prices. Thereby, we additionally ensure that there is no selection bias amongst acquirers as acquirers from countries 
that tax capital gains could tend to invest more in riskier targets because these acquirers can make use of capital losses 
as opposed to acquirers from countries who exempt capital gains. 
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assets at target level (Huizinga and Voget (2009)). Second, high leverage may prevent the 
target from additional borrowing to finance worthwhile investments (Huizinga et al. 
(2012)). Both arguments suggest a positive effect of leverage on M&A deal values. 
We expect that country- or industry-specific shocks (such as the financial crisis in 2008) are 
controlled for by including country, year and industry fixed effects. Further, following the 
argumentation by Feld et al. (2016a), we expect that these shocks do not distort our 
empirical results since our variable of interest (TAX) also varies due to changes at a bilateral 
level (e.g., DTC between acquirer ultimate parent and target country). It is reasonable to 
assume that these shocks are not correlated with our bilateral-specific variable of interest 
and, consequently, these shocks should not bias our empirical results. 
Table 21 presents our main OLS regression results with 𝑀&𝐴_𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 as the 
dependent variable under the assumption of no profit shifting. 
In columns (1) to (3), we investigate Hypothesis 1 and consider the joint effect of the 
taxation system of foreign dividends and capital gains. We observe a non-significant 
positive estimate for the one and thirty period consideration; for the ten period 
consideration, we observe significance at the 10% level. Hence, we find only weak evidence 
in support of Hypothesis 1. To investigate the individual importance of foreign dividends 
and capital gains taxation as hypothesized under Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3, we 
disentangle TAX in columns (4) to (6) into a dividends taxation component (𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆) 
and a capital gains taxation component (𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝐺). We observe that 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 is significantly 
positive at the 1% or 5% level, which supports Hypothesis 2. However, we do not find 
evidence in support of Hypothesis 3, as 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝐺 is insignificant throughout all specifications. 
Rejecting Hypothesis 3 implies that acquirers do not consider capital gains taxation in 
determining their reservation price. This irrelevance of capital gains taxation could be 
explained in three ways. First, valuation literature typically does not include the capital gains 
effect on the acquirer side as the firm is typically valued under the going concern 
assumption (e.g., Penman (2013)). Second, even if valuation is undertaken with regard to a 
limited time horizon, the capital gains effect could be neglectable as it becomes rather small 
with long time horizons. Third, time horizons taken into account in firm valuation could 
differ among acquirers and, therefore, the height of the capital gains effect could differ 
drastically between observations in our data set. 
  
4 International Taxation and M&A Prices 102 
 
Table 21. OLS regression results under no profit shifting assumption. 
Explanatory variables Joint 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 Disentangled 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,1 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 1.221 
(0.938) 
     
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,10 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠  0.294* 
(0.147) 
    
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,30 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠   0.123 
(0.073) 
   
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,1 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
    3.428*** 
(1.192) 
 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝐺
1𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑
    –0.840 
(0.921) 
  
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,10 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
     0.377** 
(0.147) 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝐺
10𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
     0.248 
(1.677) 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,30 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
      0.159** 
(0.074) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝐺
30𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
      –1.701 
(2.678) 
lnTarEBITDA 0.347*** 0.346*** 0.343*** 0.345*** 0.346*** 0.342*** 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) 
lnTarEquity 0.331*** 0.333*** 0.335*** 0.331*** 0.332*** 0.336*** 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.047) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) 
TarLeverage 0.003 0.003 0.003* 0.003 0.003 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
lnAcqUltParTotAss 0.237*** 0.239*** 0.237*** 0.237*** 0.238*** 0.236*** 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
AcqUltParROA 0.016** 0.016** 0.016** 0.017** 0.017** 0.016** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Constant 1.536** 0.808 1.169 1.046 0.127 2.487 
 (0.682) (0.706) (0.740) (1.148) (1.752) (2.862) 
No. of observations 709 709 709 709 709 709 
Acquirer Ultimate Parent 
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Target Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Target Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of clusters 29 29 29 29 29 29 
Regression of natural logarithm of M&A deal value on TAX; see equation (4.5). For variable definitions and data sources, 
see Table 20. Results for country, year and industry fixed effects are not displayed but are available upon request. All 
regressions are estimated using OLS regression. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on acquirer ultimate parent country level to 
control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
Further, we find that the coefficient of 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 decreases following a convex function the 
more years are taken into account. This also supports Hypothesis 2 and is consistent with 
our model expectation because 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 increases the more periods are considered. The 
interpretation of the 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆  coefficient in column (6) is as follows: If 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 changes 
by one unit in a certain country and year, the price an MNE in this country and year is 
willing to pay for a target increases by 15.9%. For example, if the USA changes from the 
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credit method to the exemption method for foreign dividends as proposed by the United 
States Department of the Treasury (2017), the value of 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 will increase from 14.04 
to 16.46, which translates into an M&A price increase of around 38.5%.79 
The coefficients for target cash flow (lnTarEBITDA) and equity (lnTarEquity) are 
significantly positive as expected and suggest that a 1%-increase in cash flow (equity) leads 
to a 0.35% (0.33%) increase in M&A deal value. Target leverage (TarLeverage) has a positive 
though mostly insignificant coefficient. The synergy control variables at acquirer ultimate 
parent level are significantly positive as expected: If the acquirer’s size (profitability) 
increases by 1% (1 percentage point), M&A prices are higher by 0.24% (1.6%). 
In Table 22, we check the explanatory power of our model under the assumption of full 
profit shifting. Under this assumption, we still observe substantial variation in 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆 
as the presence of CFC rules with different tax haven tax rate thresholds creates variation 
for MNEs from exemption countries and MNEs from credit countries vary along their 
STR. We observe in column (1) that the coefficient of 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆 is significantly positive at 
the 10% level, suggesting that our model weakly explains variation in observed M&A deal 
values under this assumption. However, 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆 only incorporates possible application 
of CFC rules in the acquirer ultimate parent country and, thereby, only reflects anti profit 
shifting provisions at acquirer level. Yet, also at target level, profit shifting opportunities 
may be severely reduced by thin capitalization or interest stripping rules and mandatory 
transfer pricing documentation. Therefore, we split our sample into targets that reside in 
countries with maximally one of those two anti profit shifting measures, i.e., countries 
where profit shifting is still possible (column (2)) and into targets that reside in countries 
with both of those anti profit shifting measures, i.e., countries where profit shifting is very 
limited or even impossible (column (3)). We observe that the coefficient of 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆  is 
significantly positive at the 1% level in the sample of targets with profit shifting 
opportunities, while it is insignificant in the sample of targets with very limited profit 
shifting opportunities. This finding supports Hypothesis 4 and suggests that acquirers take 
into account anti profit shifting provisions in the target country in determining their 
reservation price. A deeper investigation of the target country taxation system on M&A 
prices would go beyond the scope of this paper and would be an interesting area for future 
research. Column (4) addresses the same sample as column (2) based on the definition of 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆 for the case of indefinite profit retention as modelled in Section 4.4.3. The 
coefficient remains significantly positive.     
                                              
79 (𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣,2017,25.5%
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,𝑈𝑆 − 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣,2017,39%
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,𝑈𝑆 ) ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 =  (16.46 − 14.04) ∙ 0.159 = 0.385. Under the 
exemption method and the assumption of no profit shifting, only the target STR is relevant; we use a target tax rate of 
25.5%, which is the mean target tax rate across our M&A observations. 
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Table 22. OLS regression results under full profit shifting assumption. 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Full sample Sample of targets 
with profit shifting 
opportunities 
Sample of targets 
with very limited 
profit shifting 
opportunities 
Indefinite profit 
retention in the 
sample of targets 
with profit shifting 
opportunities 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆,30 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
 0.050* 0.532*** 0.007  
(0.026) (0.150) (0.040)  
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝐺
30𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
 –0.505 26.975 –0.562  
(2.549) (15.983) (2.661)  
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆,𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑒
    0.855*** 
(0.160) 
lnTarEBITDA 0.350*** 0.480** 0.360*** 0.421** 
 (0.039) (0.224) (0.040) (0.196) 
lnTarEquity 0.331*** –0.070 0.355*** –0.040 
 (0.048) (0.229) (0.041) (0.196) 
TarLeverage 0.003 0.004 0.004** 0.009 
 (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.008) 
lnAcqUltParTotAss 0.240*** 0.414*** 0.211*** 0.401*** 
 (0.032) (0.069) (0.031) (0.052) 
AcqUltParROA 0.016** –0.000 0.014** 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.029) (0.006) (0.028) 
TarTC_presence –0.605 
(0.459) 
   
TarTP_docu –0.006 
(0.249) 
   
Constant 2.842 –28.257* 2.568 –7.256* 
 (2.740) (15.118) (2.989) (3.564) 
No. of observations 709 106 603 106 
Acquirer Ultimate Parent 
Country Fixed Effects 
YES YES YES YES 
Target Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
Target Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES 
No. of clusters 29 18 29 18 
Regression of natural logarithm of M&A deal value on TAX; see equation (4.5). For variable definitions and data 
sources, see Table 20. Results for country, year and industry fixed effects are not displayed but are available upon 
request. All regressions are estimated using OLS regression. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are provided in parentheses and are clustered on acquirer ultimate parent 
country level to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
In Table 23, we apply a variety of robustness tests to confirm our findings, taking 
column (6) of Table 21 as a starting point. In column (1), we use the corporate effective 
average tax rate (EATR) of the target country provided by ZEW, instead of the STR. We 
observe that the coefficient’s level of significance decreases, which may indicate that 
acquirers use statutory instead of effective tax rates in target valuation. In columns (2) and 
(3), we consider cross-border M&As, where the acquirer ultimate parent and target are in 
the same industry. It may be argued that taxes play a more important role in such horizontal 
M&As rather than in vertical M&As. The results remain robust using a dummy variable 
(column (2)) or a sample reduced to horizontal M&As (column (3)). In column (4), we 
include the gross domestic product (GDP) of the target and acquirer ultimate parent 
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country and observe no change in our main regression results. Target equity is substituted 
by target total assets in column (5) and our results prove to be robust. In column (6), we 
exclude year fixed effects and observe a decrease of the coefficient; yet, it remains 
significantly positive. An exclusion of target industry fixed effects (column (7)) does not 
change our main regression results. To check whether outliers may bias our results, we 
exclude M&As where the deal value is in the 1st and 99th percentile and observe 
quantitatively and qualitatively robust results (column (8)). Finally, in columns (9) and (10), 
we vary the calculation of standard errors. The levels of significance remain stable regarding 
no clustering (heteroscedastic standard errors, column (9)) and clustering at target country 
level (column (10)). Overall, our results prove to be quantitatively and qualitatively robust 
to a variety of robustness tests. 
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Table 23. Robustness analysis of OLS regression results. 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Target EATR Same 
industry 
(dummy) 
Same industry 
(sample 
reduction) 
With country 
control 
variables 
With target 
total assets 
Excl. year 
fixed effects 
Excl. target 
industry fixed 
effects 
Trimmed deal 
value 
Robust 
standard 
errors 
Standard errors 
clustered on 
target country 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣,𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,30 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
 0.073* 
(0.043) 
         
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,30 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
  0.159** 0.216** 0.163** 0.135* 0.093** 0.151* 0.168* 0.159** 0.159** 
 (0.075) (0.085) (0.074) (0.072) (0.043) (0.076) (0.086) (0.075) (0.063) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝐺
30𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
 –0.167 –1.804 –2.549 –1.474 –1.665 –2.086 –0.925 –3.211 –1.701 –1.701 
(2.071) (2.689) (3.164) (2.630) (2.433) (1.953) (2.498) (2.779) (2.936) (3.090) 
lnTarEBITDA 0.347*** 0.341*** 0.309*** 0.343*** 0.278*** 0.344*** 0.347*** 0.335*** 0.342*** 0.342*** 
 (0.047) (0.038) (0.041) (0.038) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.048) (0.021) 
lnTarEquity 0.321*** 0.335*** 0.330*** 0.335***  0.331*** 0.338*** 0.315*** 0.336*** 0.336*** 
 (0.054) (0.047) (0.066) (0.048)  (0.049) (0.049) (0.041) (0.058) (0.053) 
lnTarTotAss     0.418*** 
(0.051) 
     
TarLeverage 0.004* 0.003 0.003 0.003* –0.007*** 0.003 0.003* 0.003* 0.003 0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
lnAcqUltParTotAss 0.250*** 0.238*** 0.264*** 0.236*** 0.228*** 0.238*** 0.235*** 0.230*** 0.236*** 0.236*** 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.040) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.040) 
AcqUltParROA 0.016*** 0.016** 0.022** 0.017** 0.016** 0.017** 0.016** 0.015** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
lnTarGDP    0.055 
(0.300) 
      
lnAcqUltParGDP    0.189 
(0.494) 
      
sameIndustry  0.055 
(0.068) 
        
Constant 1.750 2.545 3.042 –4.317 2.474 3.759* 2.038 4.480 2.487 2.487 
 (2.212) (2.875) (3.231) (17.536) (2.603) (1.944) (2.603) (3.242) (3.062) (2.989) 
No. of observations 613 709 514 709 709 709 709 663 709 709 
Acquirer Ultimate Parent 
Country Fixed Effects 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Target Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES YES 
Target Industry Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
No. of clusters 28 29 27 29 29 29 29 29 n/a 29 
Regression of natural logarithm of M&A deal value on TAX; see equation (4.5). For variable definitions and data sources, see Table 20. Results for country, year and industry fixed effects are not 
displayed but are available upon request. All regressions are estimated using OLS regression. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Standard errors are 
provided in parentheses and are clustered on acquirer ultimate parent country level to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (except for columns (9) and (10) with heteroscedastic standard 
errors and standard errors clustered on target country level). 
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4.5.2.2 Logit regression analysis 
In our OLS regression analysis, we analyze the influence of the acquirer country’s taxation 
system on cross-border M&A prices using firm level data. In the following, we take a 
macroeconomic perspective on our theoretical model. In particular, we investigate whether 
taxation systems affect the probability of being the acquiring country of a given foreign 
target. This analysis and empirical approach follow Feld et al. (2016a), who find that foreign 
dividends taxation applying the credit method impedes cross-border M&A activity 
compared to exempting foreign dividends from taxation. We extend Feld et al. (2016a) in 
two ways: First, we additionally implement capital gains taxation. Second, we use a different 
measure—TAX based on our theoretical model—to investigate the effect of taxation 
systems on cross-border M&A activity. 
Equation (4.1) of our theoretical model gives rise to the following regression equation to 
investigate the effect of a country’s taxation system on the probability (𝑃) of being the 
actual acquiring country of a foreign target: 
𝑃(𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑘 ≥ 𝑉ℎ𝑗𝑘|𝑋) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖+𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑖+𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘)
𝐼
𝑙=1
     ∀ ℎ ∈ (1,… , 𝐼), 
(4.6) 
where i is the actual acquirer ultimate parent country from a total of I candidate acquirer 
ultimate parent countries and j is the country of target k.80 Given that the observed M&As 
reflect synergies from combining two firms and that acquirers value the individual firms 
and M&A correctly at their fair value, equation (4.6) can be considered a choice model. 
Using conditional logit and mixed logit regression models, we analyze whether a country’s 
taxation system, i.e., TAX from our theoretical model, affects 𝑃(𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑘 ≥ 𝑉ℎ𝑗𝑘|𝑋). 
We consider various control variables in vector 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘 to capture owner-country-specific 
synergies realized through a potential M&A. In particular, we control for GDP, GDP per 
capita and GDP growth of the candidate acquirer ultimate parent country. These controls 
capture productivity levels in the acquirer country, and we expect positive coefficients of 
these variables. We further control for bilateral factors such as distance, common language, 
colonial relationships and common origins of the legal systems between the candidate 
acquirer ultimate parent and target country. These controls capture bilateral transaction 
costs, and we expect a significant influence of these variables. Further, we include acquirer 
ultimate parent fixed affects. The target is the same for every (potential) deal; therefore, we 
automatically account for target, target country, year and target industry fixed effects. All 
variables are defined and summarized in Table 24. Section 4.5.1.1 provides information on 
the considered data set with 9,103 cross-border M&As.     
                                              
80 We suppress a time subscript t in the interest of readability of the model. 
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Table 24. Definitions, data sources and summary statistics of variables for logit regression. 
Variable Description Source No. of obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,30 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠 Tax component for no profit shifting for 
30 periods (retention) 
Tax Guides & 
OECD 
314,626 11.67 2.04 7.05 25.35 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,30 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
 Tax component for profits only for no 
profit shifting for 30 periods (retention) 
Tax Guides & 
OECD 
314,626 11.20 1.93 6.78 22.15 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑐𝑔
30 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
 Tax component for capital gains only for 
30 periods 
Tax Guides & 
OECD 
314,626 1.04 0.04 1.00 1.20 
lnAcqUltParGDP GDP in candidate acquirer ultimate 
parent country (natural logarithm) 
World Bank 314,626 26.58 1.82 22.18 30.48 
lnAcqUltParGDP_percapita GDP per capita in candidate acquirer 
ultimate parent country (natural 
logarithm) 
World Bank 314,626 9.87 0.99 6.13 11.54 
AcqUltParGDP_growth Growth of GDP in candidate acquirer 
ultimate parent country (in %) 
World Bank 314,626 2.77 3.53 –14.81 14.23 
lnDistance Simple distance in km between most 
populated cities of candidate acquirer 
ultimate parent and target country 
(natural logarithm) 
Mayer and 
Zignago (2011) 
314,626 8.44 1.04 4.09 9.88 
CommonLanguage Common language index (0 (low 
similarity) to 1 (high similarity)) 
Melitz and 
Toubal (2014) 
314,626 0.23 0.19 0.00 0.99 
ColonialRelationship Binary dummy variable coded 1 if 
candidate acquirer ultimate parent and 
target country were ever in a colonial 
relationship, and 0 otherwise 
Mayer and 
Zignago (2011) 
314,626 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
CommonLegalSystem Binary dummy variable coded 1 if legal 
system of candidate acquirer ultimate 
parent and target country have common 
legal origins, and 0 otherwise 
Head et al. 
(2010) 
314,626 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Data on acquirer ultimate parent country fixed effects are not reported but are available upon request. Data sources for the tax variables are IBFD 
European Tax Handbook (2002-2016) and various corporate tax guides (Ernst & Young (2004-2016), KPMG (2003-2015)). 
 
Table 25 presents the results from our logit regressions. The results regarding 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 are 
similar to the results presented in the previous section: A higher value of 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 
significantly increases the probability of acquisitions from the respective country. 
Disentangling 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆 into a dividends and capital gains component confirms the finding 
that dividends taxation drives this significant influence. This finding is in line with Feld et 
al. (2016a). Regarding significant control variables, GDP growth in the acquirer ultimate 
parent country strongly affects M&A activity; GDP and GDP per capita show positive 
coefficients. Further, M&A activity is strongly affected by a shorter distance between the 
acquirer ultimate parent country and target country, a common language, former colonial 
relationships and a similar legal system. 
Taken together, the logit regression analysis shows that our theoretical model, which is 
primarily set up to explain cross-border reservation prices on a firm level, also explains 
M&A activity on a macroeconomic level. 
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Table 25. Logit regression results. 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Conditional logit (I) Conditional logit (II) Mixed logit (I) Mixed logit (II) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,30 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠 0.118***  0.079***  
(0.019)  (0.021)  
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑛𝑜𝑃𝑆,30 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
  0.127***  0.088*** 
 (0.020)  (0.022) 
𝑇𝐴𝑋𝐶𝐺
30𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑠
  –0.858  –1.333 
 (0.870)  (0.961) 
lnAcqUltParGDP 0.292 0.363 0.239 0.308 
 (0.234) (0.236) (0.251) (0.254) 
lnAcqUltParGDP_percapita 0.450* 0.291 0.489* 0.327 
 (0.238) (0.243) (0.257) (0.263) 
AcqUltParGDP_growth 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
lnDistance –0.464*** –0.462*** –0.505*** –0.503*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) 
CommonLanguage 0.658*** 0.666*** 0.370*** 0.376*** 
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.141) (0.141) 
ColonialRelationship 0.323*** 0.320*** 0.332*** 0.330*** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.052) (0.052) 
CommonLegalSystem 0.434*** 0.433*** 0.491*** 0.490*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.045) (0.045) 
No. of observations 314,626 314,626 165,218 165,218 
Acquirer Ultimate Parent 
Country Fixed Effects 
YES YES YES YES 
Log-likelihood –19,259 –19,257 –17,597 –17,595 
Regressions of probability of being the acquirer ultimate parent country on TAX; see equation (4.6). For each deal, the dependent 
variable equals one if the respective country is the actual acquirer’s country of origin, and zero if the respective country is a 
counterfactual acquirer country. All regressions control for acquirer ultimate parent country fixed effects, which follow a random 
distribution in the mixed logit regressions; results for acquirer ultimate parent country fixed effects are not displayed but are 
available upon request. To keep the mixed logit regressions computationally feasible, the set of 40 acquiring countries considered 
in the conditional logit regression is restricted to the 20 most frequent acquirer countries. For variable definitions and data sources, 
see Table 24. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are 
provided in parentheses. 
 
4.5.3 Tax policy implications 
Our regression analysis shows that our theoretical model holds in reality and in a final step, 
we aim to derive implications for national tax policy makers. Generally, our model suggests 
a two-fold impact of an acquirer’s taxation systems on his reservation price for a foreign 
target. On the one hand, the price should decrease with increasing dividends taxation; on 
the other hand, the price should increase with increasing capital gains taxation. 
As our empirical analysis has shown, higher dividends taxation at the acquirer level 
negatively affects M&A prices, while capital gains taxation at the acquirer level does not 
have an effect. This finding indicates that acquirers do not take capital gains taxation into 
account when determining their reservation price. If national tax policy makers aim at 
improving the position of their MNEs in bidding for foreign targets, they should therefore 
focus on reducing dividends taxation rather than trying to impact reservation prices by 
applying capital gains taxation. Reducing dividends taxation can be undertaken in two ways. 
First, the tax burden can be directly reduced by switching from the credit method to the 
exemption method, by lowering the STR, or by allowing for unlimited tax credits (i.e., 
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refunding foreign taxes paid). Second, the tax burden can be indirectly reduced by allowing 
for profit shifting. As column (2) of Table 22 shows, 𝑇𝐴𝑋𝑑𝑖𝑣
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆  proves to be significant if 
outbound profit shifting is possible from the target country. As the tax haven tax rate is 
determined based on CFC rules of the acquirer residence country, MNEs from countries 
without CFC rules (or low CFC tax rate thresholds) are able to engage in more profit 
shifting. Consequently, acquirer residence countries should refrain from applying CFC 
rules. 
Figure 15 provides an overview of the ranks in 2015 of those 10 countries with most 
observations in our M&A data set with regard to the impact of acquirer countries’ taxation 
systems on reservation prices. A higher rank indicates a lower value of TAX and, 
consequently, MNEs residing in that country can only pay a lower price. 
 
Figure 15. Selected countries ranked by their value of TAX (2015). 
 
The bars show the rank for the respective country in 2015 under the assumption of no profit shifting (dark blue), 
full profit shifting (mid-blue) and the indefinite profit retention model (light blue). All ranks are derived based on 
TAX calculated by the model shown in Section 4.4 for a period of 30 years. The target tax rate is set to 25.5%, 
which is the mean target tax rate across our M&A observations. Ranks for full and no profit shifting are calculated 
under the assumption of identical costs of capital to simplify depiction. Lower ranks indicate higher values of TAX. 
The shown countries are the 10 countries with most observations in our M&A data set. Sources: Corporate taxation 
system data set and cross-border M&A data set. 
 
We observe that countries that exempt foreign dividends offer their firms the best 
environment under the no profit shifting assumption. Under the full profit shifting 
assumption and no CFC rules (e.g., Netherlands), this position can be retained. Countries 
that exempt foreign dividends but have CFC rules (e.g., France) weaken their position by 
applying CFC rules. This is true for both, the full profit shifting and the indefinite profit 
retention assumptions. France, Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom have identical 
ranks as their respective tax haven tax rate is assumed to be identical (see Section 4.3.2). 
Japan and Australia have higher tax haven tax rates and, thus, worse ranks. 
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Contrary to our proposal to refrain from applying CFC rules, the OECD BEPS project 
calls on countries to implement effective CFC rules (OECD/G20 (2015b)). The EU 
requires all member states to implement CFC rules by 2019 (European Council (2016)). 
The argument above that CFC rules reduce acquisition prices and thus worsen the position 
of domestic MNEs in bidding for foreign targets refers to a case where some countries 
apply CFC rules while others do not. Consequently, a uniform application of CFC rules by 
all (or in the case of the BEPS project at least by the OECD and G20 countries) could 
therefore be one way to secure tax basis, while not putting domestic MNEs at a 
disadvantage. However, the OECD and EU proposal lacks a uniform definition of the CFC 
tax rate threshold and, consequently, countries can still compete via the CFC tax rate 
threshold. 
Countries applying the credit method have generally higher ranks than exemption countries. 
However, this is mainly due to high tax rates in these credit countries. Under the no profit 
shifting assumption, credit countries with low tax rates would have no disadvantage to 
exemption countries, even if excess foreign tax credits result. Under the full profit shifting 
assumption, credit countries generally have higher ranks as the tax haven tax rate is typically 
lower than the acquirer country tax rate. CFC rules worsen the ranks for credit countries 
(e.g., Canada), while no CFC rules (or ineffective CFC rules) improve the rank (e.g., United 
States). However, this effect is relatively low due to the low interest rate in 2015. In the 
indefinite profit retention model with the full profit shifting assumption and debt financing 
of distributions, residence country tax rates are irrelevant for determining the final price for 
credit countries.81 The price is then only determined by the tax haven tax rate. 
Consequently, a credit country without or with ineffective CFC rules (e.g., United States) 
has an identical rank as an exemption country without CFC rules (e.g., Netherlands) and a 
better rank than an exemption country with CFC rules (e.g., Germany). Taken together, in 
the indefinite profit retention model, in which capital gains no longer occur, an 
improvement in the relative position of a country can mainly be achieved by not applying 
CFC rules or lowering CFC tax rate thresholds. 
Independent of the question how a country reduces profit taxation, it will most likely suffer 
a tax revenue loss. Therefore, the size of positive spillovers from cross-border M&A activity 
is highly relevant to national tax policy makers. Even though the absolute height remains 
unclear, positive spillovers have been shown empirically. For example, Bresman et al. (1999) 
and Bena and Li (2014) show that home investment benefits from knowledge spillovers 
from cross-border M&A activity. Further, M&As are found to increase productivity (e.g., 
Devos et al. (2009)), management efficiency (e.g., Manne (1965), Wang and Xie (2009)), 
                                              
81 This is only true if retaining profits abroad makes sense, as described in Section 4.3. Credit countries with very high 
CFC tax rate thresholds (e.g., Canada) and all exemption countries would choose immediate repatriation. 
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discipline (e.g., Scharfstein (1988), Sapra et al. (2014)) and innovation (e.g., Stiebale (2016)). 
Thus, in a mid- or long-term calculation, tax revenue losses should (at least partially) be 
compensated by additional tax revenue gains through increasing inbound investment and 
increasing earnings in the residence country. Nevertheless, national tax policy makers might 
want to compensate tax revenue losses in the short-term. This could be undertaken by 
broadening the tax base through hindering outbound profit shifting of resident target firms 
via interest stripping rules or tightening transfer pricing regulations.82 Such a reduction in 
outbound profit shifting is also on the political agenda in many countries. While the OECD 
only recommends that countries introduce an interest stripping rule (OECD/G20 (2015a)), 
the EU came forward with a mandatory interest stripping rule for all EU member states as 
of 2019 (European Council (2016)). As a result, profit shifting opportunities via internal 
debt financing will be limited for EU targets. Additionally, the OECD has implemented 
new OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD (2017)) that redefine the arm’s length 
price especially for license payments to locate profits to where value creation measured by 
functions and risks takes place. Consequently, profit shifting via internal licensing should 
get harder. 
Finally, the irrelevance of capital gains taxation for acquirer reservation price determination 
has a significant impact on results in the CON literature and the question of whether to tax 
capital gains or not. We find that capital gains taxation is irrelevant in acquirer reservation 
price determination; consequently, the question whether to tax capital gains or not should 
be answered by looking solely at the seller. On the seller-side, the lock-in effect of capital 
gains taxation is an empirically validated obstacle to selling firms. Consequently, capital 
gains should not be taxed at all. As a result, optimal M&A taxation would only be 
determined by profit taxation. 
4.6 Conclusion 
CON is the concept of neutral taxation of M&As. One crucial assumption is that all 
countries apply the same taxation system on foreign dividends and capital gains. However, 
in analyzing the actual taxation systems of the 49 EU, OECD and G20 member states over 
the 2002–2015 period, we show that countries apply different taxation systems and that 
these taxation systems differ in many aspects. Hence, CON is globally not achievable. 
Given this tax distortion and positive spillovers of cross-border M&A activity that have 
been extensively documented in empirical literature, we argue that a national tax policy 
maker should focus on how to improve the position of its MNEs in bidding for foreign 
                                              
82 Of course, there are also other ways to compensate tax revenue loss, for example, increasing non-profit taxes such 
as value added tax. 
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targets instead of setting up a taxation system that is neutral regarding M&As but might put 
its MNEs at a disadvantage in bidding for foreign targets. 
To address this tax policy issue, we develop a multi-period theoretical model that considers 
the joint effect of foreign dividends and capital gains taxation on the acquiring MNE’s 
reservation price for a specific target. Our model also implements profit shifting 
opportunities and tax deferral of dividends taxation. We derive a tax factor (TAX) for 
different taxation systems that allows us to theoretically compare these taxation systems. 
Thereby, guidance can be given to national tax policy makers on how to improve the 
position of their MNEs in bidding for foreign targets regarding tax base, tax rates and profit 
shifting restrictions. 
In the empirical application of our theoretical model, we apply TAX to a large sample of 
cross-border M&A transactions. In our regression analysis, we find that dividends taxation 
has a significant effect on M&A prices, whereas capital gains taxation seems to be irrelevant. 
Further, we provide evidence that profit shifting positively affects M&A prices if the target 
country allows for a certain degree of profit shifting. Moreover, we provide evidence that 
acquirer country’s CFC rules negatively impact prices paid for targets. In addition, it follows 
from the irrelevance of capital gains taxation for acquirers that capital gains taxation should 
be avoided as empirical literature documents that taxing capital gains impedes M&A activity 
with regard to selling firms. 
Our policy suggestion is that countries that want to enhance the position of their MNEs in 
acquiring foreign targets should best apply the exemption method and not hinder profit 
shifting by imposing CFC rules. Not imposing CFC rules and taxing foreign dividends is 
also a suitable strategy, as long as the acquirer country’s tax rate is low and an unlimited tax 
credit is granted. Hence, countries with high tax rates should primarily reduce their tax rate, 
if they do not want to change to the exemption method. 
The irrelevance of capital gains taxation on the acquirer side should also impact the way 
CON is currently discussed in literature. If capital gains are irrelevant in determining the 
acquirer’s price for a certain target, then the acquirer can never be taxed neutrally unless the 
tax rate is zero. In the presence of positive tax rates, the only way of determining identical 
prices for the acquirer and the seller, and thus neutrally taxing the acquisition, is to exempt 
foreign dividends and capital gains while preventing profit shifting at the source. 
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83 This paper is joint work with Axel Prettl, M.Sc. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Globalization and its accompanying effects in various business fields such as reallocation 
of production or new customers all around the world are current challenges that MNEs are 
facing. Further, in all these various dimensions, MNEs and countries, which are concerned 
about their tax revenue, compete against each other. In addition, international tax law, once 
a rather minor concern in corporate tax planning, has become increasingly important and 
MNEs try to use tax loopholes within international tax law to minimize their overall tax 
payments. One way to minimize tax payments can be realized by MNE-wide profit shifting, 
which is intensely discussed in current tax policy debates as the OECD BEPS project 
(OECD/G20 (2015a)) or the anti tax avoidance directive of the EU (European Council 
(2016)) show. Further, empirical literature provides extensive evidence of MNE-wide profit 
shifting strategies (e.g., Huizinga and Laeven (2008), Weichenrieder (2009), Grubert (2012), 
Dharmapala and Riedel (2013)). The basic idea of such profit shifting strategies is to reduce 
taxable income in high-tax countries by, for example, royalty or interest payments from 
high-tax to low-tax subsidiaries.84 
Several countries, however, have implemented anti tax avoidance measures to counteract 
this profit shifting behavior. The three major measures are transfer pricing rules, thin 
capitalization or interest stripping rules and CFC rules. This study tries to shine some light 
on CFC rules, which aim at MNE-wide profit shifting strategies by immediately taxing 
profits of low-tax subsidiaries, redistributed or not, in the MNE’s parent country if certain 
conditions are fulfilled. Hence, CFC rules make typical profit shifting strategies unattractive 
for an MNE (e.g., Altshuler and Hubbard (2003), Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012)), since 
these strategies do no longer reduce the MNE’s tax burden. 
If a company decides to engage in tax avoidance or to extend its existing tax avoidance 
strategies, it could try to establish a foreign subsidiary in a low-tax country as a profit 
shifting vehicle, where profits are taxed at a low rate. There are two common ways to 
establish a foreign subsidiary: greenfield investment in a new firm or buying an existing 
firm. Our study focuses on the latter one, cross-border M&As, which is considered an 
important form of FDI (UNCTAD (2017a)). Additionally, even more profit shifting 
opportunities may be given by acquiring a foreign firm, such as using existing loss carry 
forwards. Based on the argumentation above, one can easily imagine that the existence and 
strength of CFC rules that try to counteract such behavior could have an impact on cross-
border M&As and, thereby, on ownership structures of MNEs. 
                                              
84 A typical profit shifting strategy looks as follows: An MNE equips a subsidiary in a low-tax country with IP and 
equity. This subsidiary then may license IP to the parent or subsidiaries in high-tax countries that pay transfer prices 
(royalties) in exchange for using IP. Further, the low-tax subsidiary may provide debt to the parent or subsidiaries in 
high-tax countries that pay interest in exchange for the internal loan. Taken together, the royalty and interest expenses 
reduce taxable income in high-tax countries and increase income in low-tax countries. 
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We investigate whether CFC rules influence ownership patterns on a global scale by 
analyzing the effect of CFC rules on cross-border M&As. In our different econometric 
analyses, we investigate a large data set of worldwide M&A deals with around 
14,000 observations and a hand-collected detailed CFC rule data set of 29 countries, 
extended by countries that do not have CFC rules, for 2002–2014. We find that CFC rules 
impact cross-border M&A activity in two ways. 
First, we detect that CFC rules distort the acquisition of low-tax targets. In particular, we 
observe that the probability of acquiring a low-tax target is negatively influenced by 
potential CFC rule application on the low-tax target’s income. Our explanation for this 
finding is that MNEs with parents in non-CFC rule countries (non-CFC rule MNEs) 
calculate higher reservation prices for low-tax targets than MNEs with parents in CFC rule 
countries (CFC rule MNEs), because these targets may be used as valuable profit shifting 
vehicles within non-CFC rule MNEs. CFC rule MNEs, on the other side, fear the 
application of CFC rules on low-tax targets’ income, which decreases after-tax cash flows. 
Hence, they calculate lower reservation prices for low-tax targets than non-CFC rule 
MNEs. 
Second, we detect that CFC rules distort the direction of cross-border M&As between 
firms. In particular, we observe that if a firm acquires another non-domestic firm, CFC 
rules negatively affect the M&A direction, i.e., which firm becomes the acquirer and, 
thereby, the parent of the newly formed MNE. This finding is in line with previous research 
by Voget (2011), who detects that the presence of CFC rules increases the number of 
headquarters relocation. However, our approach differs from Voget (2011) by using a 
different identification strategy and analyzing M&A observations from a different database. 
Our paper contributes to tax research and policy considerations in three ways. First, we 
contribute to empirical tax research on the effects of CFC rules on firm behavior, where 
little research has been undertaken so far (see Section 5.2). As Egger and Wamser (2015) 
point out, this may be due to the difficulty of isolating the effect of anti tax avoidance 
measures on MNEs who operate in multiple jurisdictions and avail complex group 
interrelations with respect to, for example, financing decisions. In addition, the effect of 
CFC rules is difficult to identify as the applicability of CFC rules depends on the foreign 
subsidiary’s characteristics as well as its host-country’s characteristics. To overcome these 
identification difficulties, we do not only follow a mere dummy variable approach on the 
presence or non-presence of CFC rules; moreover, we go into the details of each country’s 
CFC rules by considering individual components of CFC rules. 
Second, we contribute to empirical tax research in the field of M&As and their tax-related 
determinants. Indeed, there are many empirical studies on the effect of taxes on M&As 
from various perspectives, for example, repatriation taxes (Voget (2011), Hanlon et al. 
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(2015), Edwards et al. (2016), Feld et al. (2016a)), international double taxation (Huizinga 
and Voget (2009), Huizinga et al. (2012)) or capital gains taxes (Ayers et al. (2003), Ayers et 
al. (2007), Feld et al. (2016b), Huizinga et al. (2017)). However, besides Voget (2011), there 
are to our knowledge no published empirical studies that compare the effect of anti tax 
avoidance measures on M&A activity over various countries. In particular, there is no such 
study about the increasingly important CFC rules. However, since anti tax avoidance 
measures are expanding as shown in Figure 13 in Section 4.3.2, the strand of empirical 
literature dealing with location choices of MNEs and their tax-related elements becomes 
more important. 
Third, understanding how CFC rules influence M&A activity on a global scale is also of 
economic interest, as cross-border M&As are an important form of FDI: In 2016, the value 
of cross-border M&As accounted globally for 869 billion USD, which slightly exceeded the 
value of announced greenfield projects (828 billion USD, UNCTAD (2017a)). Hence, our 
analysis on distortionary tax effects on cross-border M&As is also of interest from a global 
economic perspective and not only from countries’ tax policy perspective. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 gives a brief review of 
empirical literature on CFC rules. Section 5.3 provides our analysis of the effect of CFC 
rules on the acquisition of low-tax targets. Section 5.4 analyzes the effect of CFC rules on 
the direction of cross-border M&As. Finally, Section 5.5 sets forth our conclusions. 
5.2 Empirical literature on CFC rules 
CFC rules are applicable at an MNE’s parent level and usually work as follows: If an MNE’s 
foreign subsidiary fulfills certain requirements, at least a part of its income is taxed in the 
MNE’s parent country where the CFC rule is enacted, even if no repatriation takes place. 
Thereby, MNE-wide profit shifting strategies become mostly ineffective. Typically, three 
requirements are crucial for CFC rule application: Low taxation of the foreign subsidiary, 
passive income of the subsidiary, and minimum ownership in the subsidiary. There is a high 
degree of variation in how CFC rules are specified, for example, regarding what is 
considered low taxation or regarding a passive-to-active-income ratio that may trigger CFC 
rule application. 
Despite the far-reaching consequences of CFC rules on MNEs’ tax burdens, empirical 
studies on the effects of CFC rules on firm behavior are scarce. Altshuler and Hubbard 
(2003) find that tightening US CFC rules in 1986 has substantially reduced tax planning 
opportunities with financial services firms in low-tax countries; three years later, Altshuler 
and Grubert (2006) show that the so-called check-the-box rule, which may allow for an 
escape from CFC rules for US MNEs, abolished these effects. For a panel of German 
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MNEs, Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012) detect that German CFC rules are effective in 
reducing passive investments in low-tax countries. These studies show that CFC rules reach 
the intended goal of reducing profit shifting opportunities with low-tax subsidiaries. 
However, Egger and Wamser (2015) find that German MNEs, whose subsidiaries are 
subject to CFC rules, also show significantly lower fixed assets in these subsidiaries. They 
conclude that CFC rules lead to an increase in cost of capital if subsidiaries are treated by 
CFC rules. Hence, by influencing real activity abroad, the application of CFC rules can also 
have non-intended “real” effects. These findings contradict the theoretical thoughts from 
Weichenrieder (1996) who shows that certain characteristics of CFC rules, such as an 
accepted passive-to active-income ratio, can lower the cost of capital in foreign subsidiaries 
under certain circumstances. 
We aim to contribute to the scarce literature on CFC rules by investigating the effects of 
CFC rules on an important form of FDI—cross-border M&A activity—that accounts for 
almost 1 trillion USD in 2016 (UNCTAD (2017a)). In particular, in Section 5.3, we 
investigate whether CFC rules influence the acquisition of low-tax targets that potentially 
fall under the scope of CFC rules. In Section 5.4, we investigate whether CFC rules 
influence the direction of cross-border M&As between firms, i.e., which firm becomes the 
acquirer and, thereby, the parent of the newly formed MNE. 
5.3 CFC rules and the acquisition of  low-tax targets 
5.3.1 Hypothesis development 
Non-CFC rule MNEs face fewer constraints in implementing profit shifting strategies 
within their group than CFC rule MNEs.85 That is because CFC rules aim at profits shifted 
to low-tax subsidiaries within the MNE and, thereby, make typical profit shifting strategies 
less attractive for an MNE. Following the argumentation and findings of Egger and 
Wamser (2015), CFC rules even increase the cost of capital of subsidiaries that fall under 
the scope of CFC rules. Consequently, it is less attractive for a CFC rule MNE to acquire a 
low-tax target that may fall under the scope of CFC rules compared to a non-CFC rule 
MNE. Put differently, for a non-CFC rule MNE, a low-tax target could function—in 
addition to other synergies—as a profit shifting vehicle within the MNE. This additional 
function could make a candidate target more valuable for this MNE compared to a CFC 
                                              
85 In our analysis on the effects of CFC rules on cross-border M&A activity, we consider CFC rules in the country of 
the MNE’s parent to be relevant. The reason is straightforward: On the one side, a non-CFC rule MNE gets into a 
worse tax position if the acquisition is done via a CFC rule subsidiary; hence, the MNE would not acquire through this 
subsidiary. In support of this reasoning, Lewellen and Robinson (2014) find that the likelihood of choosing a subsidiary 
as a holding firm within an MNE is significantly lower if that subsidiary resides in a CFC rule country. On the other 
side, a CFC rule MNE does not get into a better tax position if the acquisition is done via a non-CFC rule subsidiary, 
because the parent’s CFC rule would overall still be applicable in the MNE. 
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rule MNE without such profit shifting opportunities. Due to this competitive advantage, 
non-CFC rule MNEs may calculate higher reservation prices for foreign low-tax targets 
compared to CFC rule MNEs. We, therefore, hypothesize the following, stated in 
alternative form: 
Hypothesis 1a: The probability of being the acquirer of a given low-tax target in a cross-
border M&A is higher for non-CFC rule MNEs compared to MNEs that potentially have 
to apply CFC rules on this target’s income. 
Hypothesis 1a investigates the influence of CFC rules on the likelihood of acquiring a given 
target that acquirers from various countries bid for. We also take the “opposite” perspective 
that a given acquirer has the choice to buy a target out of a pool of targets from various 
countries. Based on the reasoning above—it is less attractive for a CFC rule MNE to 
acquire a low-tax target that may fall under the scope of CFC rules compared to a target 
that does not fall under the scope of CFC rule—we hypothesize the following, stated in 
alternative form: 
Hypothesis 1b: The probability of being the target of a given acquirer in a cross-border 
M&A is lower for targets that potentially fall under the scope of CFC rules of this acquirer 
compared to targets that do not fall under the scope of CFC rules of this acquirer. 
Almost all observed CFC rules include a so-called “minimum low tax rate threshold” 
requirement, which determines whether the foreign subsidiary’s country is considered a 
low-tax country. This requirement varies over countries and time. We use these low tax rate 
thresholds to determine whether the target is located in a low-tax country so that CFC rules 
are potentially applicable. Acquirers from countries with CFC rules and a low tax rate 
threshold could especially aim for targets that are located in countries with an STR below 
their own one but above the low tax rate threshold to achieve tax rate advantages. If, 
however, the target is located in a country with a higher STR than the acquirer’s country 
STR, we argue that non-CFC rule acquirers may be more prone to buy these targets. This 
argument is motivated by the following consideration: These acquirers—other than CFC 
rule acquirers—could shift profits out of the high-tax target country to low-tax countries. 
We, therefore, hypothesize the following, stated in alternative form: 
Hypothesis 1c: The probability of being the acquirer (medium-tax target86) of a given 
medium-tax target (given acquirer) in a cross-border M&A is higher for CFC rule MNEs 
compared to non-CFC rule MNEs. Additionally, the probability of being the acquirer of a 
target in a country with a higher STR than in the acquirer’s country is lower for CFC rule 
acquirers than for non-CFC rule acquirers. 
                                              
86 A “medium-tax target” is a target, which is located in a country with an STR above the minimum low tax rate 
threshold but below the STR of the specific acquirer country. 
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5.3.2 Empirical approach 
Our empirical approach to analyze the probability of being the actual acquirer country 
among several candidate acquirer countries follows the common assumption in M&A 
literature that M&As reflect synergies from combining two firms with all assets being priced 
at their fair value (e.g., Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Becker and Fuest (2010), Feld et al. 
(2016a)) where 
𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝛼𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽𝑏𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘 (5.1) 
is the value of target k in country j if it was owned by an acquirer from country i.87 The 
term 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑗 reflects the higher burden of potential taxation of target income due to CFC 
rules in the acquirer country i if the target is located in country j. The variable vector 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑘 
contains various country control variables to capture owner-country-specific synergies 
realized through a potential M&A. 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the residual. Coefficients 𝛼 and 𝛽 are the 
estimated parameters. In this approach, the target is the same for every concerned M&A; 
therefore, we automatically account for target firm, target country and time fixed effects. 
Hence, these fixed effects do not need to be included. We control for acquirer country 
fixed effects. In robustness checks, we also include specific target and acquirer firm 
controls. 
We use the fact that a foreign firm from country i will acquire a target if the value for this 
target is higher than for any other candidate acquirer from country h, i.e., 
𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑘 ≥ 𝑉ℎ𝑗𝑘, ∀ ℎ ∈ (1, … , 𝐼), (5.2) 
where I indicates the number of candidate acquirer countries. We analyze the probability 
that a particular acquirer buys a target, depending on potential application of CFC rules in 
the country of that particular acquirer and given that we know that the transaction takes 
place, which is given by: 
𝑃(𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑘 > 𝑉ℎ𝑗𝑘|𝑋) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑖𝑗+𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘)
∑ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛼𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑙𝑗+𝛽𝑋𝑙𝑗𝑘)
𝐼
𝑙=1
 ∀  ℎ ∈ (1,… , 𝐼). (5.3) 
Equation (5.3) considers a choice model assuming that M&As reflect synergies from 
combining two firms and that acquirers value the individual firms and the M&A correctly 
at their fair value. Using conditional logit and mixed logit regression models, we aim to 
calculate 𝑃(𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑘 > 𝑉ℎ𝑗𝑘|𝑋).88 
In our first approach, the difference between CFC rules is shown by a treatment effect 
using a simple dummy variable if a CFC rule is enacted in the acquirer country i and is 
                                              
87 We suppress a time subscript t in the interest of readability of the model. 
88 The presented multinomial choice model is based on Feld et al. (2016a), p. 15. 
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potentially applicable on target income, i.e., the STR in target country j is below the 
minimum low tax rate threshold of the CFC rule of the candidate acquirer country i. Hence, 
the first variable of interest is constructed as 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 = {
1,        𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 > 𝑡𝑗  𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝐹𝐶  
𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑎 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑   
0,        𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,                                                              
 
(5.4) 
where 𝑡𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 is the tax rate threshold of the CFC rule of the candidate acquirer country 
i and 𝑡𝑗 is the STR in the target country j. 
In our first approach, the treatment effect is assumed to be homogenous. In our second 
approach, we consider heterogeneity by using the tax rate differential between the home 
and host countries as a finer metering of the treatment. In particular, we consider the 
additional taxes payable due to CFC rule application if the target is used as a profit shifting 
vehicle89: 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 = {
𝜏𝑖 − 𝜏𝑗 ,       𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 > 𝑡𝑗  𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝐹𝐶 
        𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑎 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 
0,                 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.                                                              
 
(5.5) 
For both approaches, we expect a negative sign of the regression coefficients 𝛼 according 
to Hypothesis 1a and 1b derived in Section 5.3.1. 
In a third step, to address Hypothesis 1c, we take a different approach and split up the 
targets into three groups: Group (1) contains targets with STRs below the low tax rate 
threshold of the CFC rule; group (2) contains targets with STRs below the acquirer STRs 
but above the tax rate threshold of the CFC rule; group (3) contains targets with STRs 
higher than the acquirer STRs if the acquirer country applies CFC rules. Figure 16 illustrates 
this target grouping. 
 
Figure 16. Target grouping among the three groups. 
 
    Below (1)     Above (2)                       Higher (3) 
     
Target STR  
                  0  Tax rate threshold of CFC rule   Acquirer STR 
Source: Own illustration.  
 
                                              
89 𝜏𝑖 − 𝜏𝑗 (and not 𝜏𝑖) are the additional taxes because the observed CFC rules grant a credit for the taxes paid by the 
foreign subsidiary in its host country. 
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𝐵𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑤 =  {
𝜏𝑖 − 𝜏𝑗 ,          𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 > 𝑡𝑗  𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝐹𝐶             
                     𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑎 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑡𝑖 > 𝑡𝑗
0,                    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,                                                                          
 
(5.6) 
 
𝐴𝑏𝑜𝑣𝑒 =  {
𝜏𝑖 − 𝜏𝑗 ,           𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 < 𝑡𝑗  𝐴𝑁𝐷 𝑡𝑖 > 𝑡𝑗                            
 
0,                    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,                                                              
 
(5.7) 
 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 =  {
𝜏𝑗 − 𝜏𝑖 ,        𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑖 < 𝑡𝑗  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝐹𝐶 𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠   
 
0,                  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,                                                                
 
(5.8) 
 
If the target STR (𝜏𝑗) is below the tax rate threshold of the CFC rule, there is additional 
taxation in the acquirer country at the acquirer STR (𝜏𝑖) as already shown in (5.5). We expect 
a negative coefficient of Below since these targets are unattractive to acquire from a CFC 
rule perspective. 
If 𝜏𝑗 is above the tax rate threshold of the CFC rule but below 𝜏𝑖, the acquirer could shift 
profits to the target and reduce his effective tax burden by 𝜏𝑖 − 𝜏𝑗. We expect a positive 
coefficient of Above as profits could be shifted—without CFC rule application—to the 
target, which may be particularly attractive for CFC rule acquirers. 
If 𝜏𝑗 is higher than 𝜏𝑖, profit shifting in the here observed way to the target does not make 
sense as the target resides in a higher taxed country. We expect a negative coefficient of 
Higher since the high-tax target is unattractive for CFC rule acquirers from a tax perspective. 
Moreover, non-CFC rule acquirers could be more prone to acquire such targets as these 
acquirers may shift profits out of the high-tax target to low-tax subsidiaries. 
In our robustness test, we check whether our results are robust to considering EATRs as 
CFC rules usually take into account the effective tax burden of the foreign low-tax 
subsidiary. Since we do not observe the effective tax burden of the targets, we use country-
level EATRs from the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation to determine 
whether a target may fall under the scope of CFC rules: 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅 = {
𝜏𝑖 − 𝜏𝑗 ,       𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 > 𝑡𝑗𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅  𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝐹𝐶 
        𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑎 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑         
0,                𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.                                                                      
 
(5.9) 
In a further robustness test, we consider the scope of income included by the CFC rule. 
While some CFC rules only include passive income of the subsidiary, some CFC rules 
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include passive and active income. Therefore, we let the treatment effect differ in this 
regard: 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 = 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝜏𝑖 ,                𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ > 𝑡𝑗  𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝐹𝐶 
            𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑎 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
     𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒
(𝜏𝑖 + 𝜏𝑗)
2
,         𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ > 𝑡𝑗  𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠 𝐶𝐹𝐶 
            𝑟𝑢𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑎 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
             𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒
𝜏𝑗 ,                 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.                                                         
 
(5.10) 
According to this differentiation, all targets are taxed at their STR. Further, this 
differentiation takes into account the additional CFC rule tax burden—assuming that active 
and passive income in the target are at the same height—in the following way: If CFC rules 
include the full target income once triggered, the total tax burden is set to the acquirer STR. 
If CFC rules include only target’s passive income once triggered, the total tax burden is set 
to the average between target and acquirer STR. 
The approach presented above takes an acquirer perspective by analyzing why a given target 
is bought by an acquirer from a specific country (Hypothesis 1a). In a second analysis, we 
follow the same logic but take a target perspective by analyzing why a given acquirer 
chooses to buy a target from a specific country (Hypothesis 1b).90 
Following Feld et al. (2016a) and Arulampalam et al. (2017), we include several control 
variables in both perspectives. We control for STR and economic indicators, such as GDP 
per capita, GDP growth, stock market capitalization per GDP and credits granted to private 
sector per GDP in the country of the candidate acquirer (or target), depending on whether 
the acquirer (or target) perspective is taken. Further, we control for several distance 
variables, such as the distance between the acquirer and target country, whether the acquirer 
and target have a common language, whether the acquirer and target were ever in a colonial 
relationship and whether the legal system of the acquirer and target country have common 
legal origins. In the target perspective, we additionally include variables to control for the 
institutional framework of the candidate target country, such as corruption control, 
business start-up costs, unemployment rate and number of listed domestic firms. 
5.3.3 Data 
Data for the empirical analysis is taken from SDC Platinum, which contains worldwide 
M&A transactions. We have selected all completed M&As for 2002–2014 through which 
                                              
90 Such a target perspective is also taken by Arulampalam et al. (2017). 
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majority control (>50%) of the targets has been attained.91 Further, for each M&A, country 
of the acquirer ultimate parent, direct acquirer, target ultimate parent and direct target must 
be given.92 In addition, we require that the acquirer ultimate parent and the target reside in 
different countries and that the acquirer ultimate parent and direct acquirer reside in the 
same country to reduce the possibility of a subsidiary in a third country involved in the 
M&A. To keep the mixed logit regressions computationally feasible, the set of considered 
candidate acquirer countries (Hypothesis 1a) or candidate target countries (Hypothesis 1b) 
is restricted to the 30 most frequent acquirer or target locations.93 These restrictions leave 
a sample of 14,421 cross-border M&As involving 55 countries to investigate Hypothesis 1a 
and a sample of 13,447 cross-border M&As involving 54 countries to investigate 
Hypothesis 1b. Table 26 and Table 27 give an overview over the number of acquirer 
ultimate parents and targets in the respective cross-border M&A sample per country. In 
line with di Giovanni (2005), we observe that countries with the largest financial markets 
have most observations in both samples. Further, these tables provide information on 
whether CFC rules are implemented in those countries. 
Data on CFC rules are based on IBFD European Tax Handbook (2002-2016), various 
corporate tax guides (Ernst & Young (2004-2016), Deloitte (2015), KPMG (2003-2015)) 
and the specific tax law of each country. We have sampled various dimensions of CFC rules 
for 2002–2014, such as: 
 tax rate threshold that triggers CFC rule, 
 country lists that trigger (blacklists) or do not trigger (whitelists) CFC rule, 
 threshold for passive-to-active-income ratio that triggers CFC rule, 
 whether active or only passive income of CFC is included at the parent level, or 
 significant exemptions to CFC rule. 
  
                                              
91 All observed CFC rules have a participation threshold below or equal to 50% so that the majority control requirement 
of CFC rules is always fulfilled. 
92 Throughout our paper, we use the terms “ultimate parent” and “parent” synonymously. 
93 To investigate Hypothesis 1a, important control variables are missing for Guernsey, Luxembourg and Taiwan so 
that we effectively consider 27 candidate acquirer countries. To investigate Hypothesis 1b, important control variables 
are missing for Indonesia and Sweden so that we effectively consider 28 candidate target countries. 
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Table 26. Cross-border M&A sample (2002–2014) for analyzing the effect of acquirer CFC rules on 
probability of being acquirer country (Section 5.3.4.1). 
Country CFC 
rule 
No. of 
acquirers 
No. of 
targets 
Country CFC 
rule 
No. of 
acquirers 
No. of 
targets 
Australia 1 923 663 Japan 1 529 166 
Austria 0 125 73 Latvia n/a n/a 2 
Belarus n/a n/a 6 Lithuania n/a n/a 14 
Belgium 0 154 186 Malaysia 0 212 157 
Bermuda n/a n/a 29 Malta n/a n/a 4 
Brazil n/a n/a 251 Mexico n/a n/a 197 
British Virgin Islands n/a n/a 70 Netherlands 0 421 355 
Bulgaria n/a n/a 30 New Zealand 1 68 196 
Canada 1 1,124 1,074 Norway 1 296 144 
Cayman Islands n/a n/a 17 Panama n/a n/a 10 
Chile n/a n/a 95 Poland n/a n/a 140 
China 1 338 846 Portugal n/a n/a 69 
Croatia n/a n/a 20 Republic of Korea 1 187 147 
Cyprus n/a n/a 16 Russian Federation 0 39 112 
Czech Republic n/a n/a 81 Seychelles n/a n/a 2 
Denmark 1 42 158 Singapore 0 490 271 
Estonia n/a n/a 12 Slovak Republic n/a n/a 16 
Finland 1 62 142 Slovenia n/a n/a 15 
France 1 644 667 South Africa n/a n/a 119 
Germany 1 622 842 Spain 1 324 360 
Greece n/a n/a 25 Sweden 1 71 369 
Hong Kong 0 560 343 Switzerland 0 344 209 
Hungary n/a n/a 45 Taiwan n/a n/a 105 
Iceland n/a n/a 3 Turkey n/a n/a 79 
India 0 337 214 Ukraine n/a n/a 31 
Ireland 0 342 152 United Kingdom 1 1,670 1,772 
Israel 1 206 129 United States 1 4,020 2,857 
Italy 1 271 314 Total  14,421 14,421 
This table shows number of acquirer ultimate parents and targets per country in our cross-border M&A 
sample to investigate Hypothesis 1a. In this context, cross-border M&As are defined as acquirer ultimate 
parent and target residing in different countries; the direct acquirer and acquirer ultimate parent reside in 
the same country. CFC rule takes the value one, if the country has implemented CFC rules in 2014. 
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Table 27. Cross-border M&A sample (2002–2014) for analyzing the effect of acquirer CFC rules 
on probability of being target country (Section 5.3.4.2). 
Country CFC 
rule 
No. of 
acquirers 
No. of 
targets 
Country CFC 
rule 
No. of 
acquirers 
No. of 
targets 
Australia 1 712 801 Italy 1 198 334 
Austria 0 77 n/a Japan 1 431 170 
Belarus 0 1 n/a Lithuania 1 5 n/a 
Belgium 0 123 197 Malaysia 0 178 174 
Bermuda 0 56 n/a Malta 0 5 n/a 
Brazil 1 40 320 Mexico 1 54 270 
British Virgin Islands 0 28 n/a Netherlands 0 296 404 
Bulgaria 0 1 n/a New Zealand 1 92 141 
Canada 1 1,824 594 Norway 1 130 260 
Cayman Islands 0 17 n/a Panama 0 5 n/a 
Chile 0 19 n/a Poland 0 25 170 
China 1 271 897 Portugal 1 35 n/a 
Croatia 0 1 n/a Republic of Korea 1 162 153 
Cyprus 0 35 n/a Russian Federation 0 51 82 
Czech Republic 0 7 n/a Seychelles 0 7 n/a 
Denmark 1 118 35 Singapore 0 416 290 
Estonia 0 1 n/a Slovak Republic 0 2 n/a 
Finland 1 112 44 Slovenia 0 5 n/a 
France 1 490 708 South Africa 1 58 156 
Germany 1 433 951 Spain 1 239 369 
Greece 1 17 n/a Sweden 1 365 n/a 
Hong Kong 0 487 377 Switzerland 0 268 240 
Hungary 1 7 n/a Taiwan 0 90 n/a 
Iceland 1 38 n/a Turkey 1 17 n/a 
India 0 295 227 Ukraine 0 8 n/a 
Ireland 0 253 181 United Kingdom 1 2,023 1,084 
Israel 1 172 n/a United States 1 2,647 3,818 
    Total  13,447 13,447 
This table shows number of acquirer ultimate parents and targets per country in our cross-border M&A 
sample to investigate Hypothesis 1b. In this context, cross-border M&As are defined as acquirer ultimate 
parent and target residing in different countries; the direct acquirer and acquirer ultimate parent reside in 
the same country. CFC rule takes the value one, if the country has implemented CFC rules in 2014. 
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5.3.4 Regression analysis 
5.3.4.1 Acquirer perspective 
Table 28 provides definitions, data sources and summary statistics of all variables analyzed 
in the acquirer perspective. Table 29 presents the baseline results from different 
multinomial choice models to test Hypothesis 1a on the influence of CFC rules on the 
likelihood of being the acquirer country of a given target (acquirer perspective). For each 
deal, the dependent variable equals one for the actual acquirer country of origin and zero 
for all other counterfactual acquirer countries.  
In the conditional logit regression (1), 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 from equation (5.4) is the variable of 
interest, which indicates potential taxation of target income via CFC rules in the acquirer 
country. We observe a negative coefficient, which suggests that potential taxation in the 
acquirer country due to CFC rule application has a negative influence on the probability of 
being the acquirer country for a given target. To be more specific, we consider 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 
from equation (5.5) in regression (2). 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 measures the magnitude of a potential 
additional tax burden on target income due to CFC rule application and the coefficient is 
significantly negative. The substantially lower p-value of 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 (p<0.000) compared to 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 (p=0.199) is probably due to introducing heterogeneity to the treatment effect 
by considering the specific tax rate differential between the acquirer and target country in 
case CFC rules apply. The coefficient of –1.4569 implies that if the target is potentially 
treated by CFC rules and 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 increases by 1%, the likelihood of acquiring this targets 
decreases by 0.05%. Taken together, we provide evidence that potential CFC rule 
application on a target’s income reduces the probability of acquiring this target; this finding 
supports Hypothesis 1a. However, the calculated economic effect seems to be very low for 
small STR differences. 
As argued in Feld et al. (2016a), a violation of the assumption of the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA) in the conditional logit model could be problematic because 
estimates may be biased. Consequently, we randomize our variables of interest by using a 
mixed logit estimator. This randomization follows a normal distribution with mean g and 
covariance W; the parameters are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood with 
50 Halton draws.94 In our mixed logit regressions, we observe that the estimated standard 
deviations of the normal distribution are highly significant; therefore, we prefer this 
approach and apply mixed logit regressions in the remaining regressions. 
 
                                              
94 In untabulated regression results, we find that using 100 Halton draws produces very similar results in both the 
acquirer and target perspective; these results are available upon request. 
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Table 28. Definitions, data sources and summary statistics of variables for analyzing the effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of being acquirer country. 
Variable Definition Data source No. of obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 Binary dummy variable coded 1 if target country STR is smaller than acquirer country’s tax rate threshold of CFC 
rule or acquirer country applies CFC rules without a tax rate threshold, and 0 otherwise 
Tax Guides 317,835 0.111 0.315 0 1 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 Difference between acquirer country STR and target country STR if target country STR is smaller than acquirer 
country’s tax rate threshold of CFC rule or acquirer country applies CFC rules without a tax rate threshold, and 
0 otherwise 
Tax Guides 317,835 0.012 0.043 0.000 0.409 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅 Difference between acquirer country STR and target country STR if target country EATR is smaller than acquirer 
country’s tax rate threshold of the CFC rule or acquirer country applies CFC rules without a tax rate threshold, 
and 0 otherwise 
Tax Guides; Oxford 
University Centre for 
Business Taxation 
317,835 0.011 0.039 –0.011 0.409 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐴 Same as 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓; however, set to zero if acquirer and target country are both EEA member states and M&A 
year is after 2006 
Tax Guides 317,835 0.012 0.042 0.000 0.409 
Below See equation (5.6) Tax Guides 317,835 0.012 0.043 0.000 0.409 
Above See equation (5.7) Tax Guides 317,835 0.010 0.029 0.000 0.273 
Higher See equation (5.8) Tax Guides 317,835 0.015 0.031 0.000 0.155 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 See equation (5.10) Tax Guides 317,835 0.318 0.066 0.000 0.409 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 Same as 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓; however, for non-profitable targets set to zero Tax Guides; SDC Platinum; 
Compustat North America; 
Compustat Global 
55,715 0.007 0.034 0.000 0.395 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  Same as 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓; however, for profitable targets set to zero Tax Guides; SDC Platinum; 
Compustat North America; 
Compustat Global 
55,715 0.003 0.021 0.000 0.409 
STR STR in candidate acquirer country, including typical local taxes Tax Guides 317,835 0.291 0.071 0.125 0.409 
ExemptionMethod Binary dummy variable coded 1 if candidate acquirer country unilaterally applies the exemption method to avoid 
double taxation of foreign dividends, and 0 if it unilaterally applies the credit method  
Tax Guides 294,697 0.606 0.489 0 1 
lnGDPpercapita GDP per capita in candidate acquirer country (natural logarithm) World Bank 317,835 10.416 0.620 7.942 11.284 
GDPgrowth Growth of GDP in candidate acquirer country (in %) World Bank 317,835 3.095 3.168 –7.821 15.240 
StockmarketSize Stock market capitalization of listed domestic companies in candidate acquirer country (in % of GDP) World Bank 317,835 121.5 175.6 15.767 1,254.5 
PrivateCredit Domestic credit to private sector in candidate acquirer country (in % of GDP) World Bank 317,835 115.3 39.525 31.081 233.4 
lnDistance Simple distance (in km) between most populated cities of candidate acquirer and target country (natural logarithm) Mayer and Zignago (2011) 317,835 8.498 1.100 4.088 9.883 
CommonLanguage Common language index between candidate acquirer and target country (0 (low similarity) to 1 (high similarity)) Melitz and Toubal (2014) 317,835 0.242 0.217 0.000 0.983 
ColonialRelationship Binary dummy variable coded 1 if candidate acquirer and target country were ever in a colonial relationship, and 
0 otherwise 
Mayer and Zignago (2011) 317,835 0.095 0.294 0 1 
CommonLegalSystem Binary dummy variable coded 1 if legal system of candidate acquirer and target country have common legal 
origins, and 0 otherwise 
Head et al. (2010) 317,835 0.319 0.466 0 1 
TargetAssets Pre-deal consolidated target total assets in the last year before the effective M&A date (natural logarithm) SDC Platinum; Compustat 
North America; Compustat 
Global 
52,809 18.118 2.297 11.513 28.060 
TargetROA Pre-deal consolidated target pre-tax income in the last year before the effective M&A date divided by pre-deal 
consolidated target total assets in the last year before the effective M&A date 
SDC Platinum; Compustat 
North America; Compustat 
Global 
52,809 –0.036 0.844 –11.800 18.000 
TargetSales Pre-deal consolidated target net sales in the last year before the effective M&A date (natural logarithm) SDC Platinum; Compustat 
North America; Compustat 
Global 
78,495 17.667 2.320 6.908 26.216 
TargetEBITDA Pre-deal consolidated target EBITDA in the last year before the effective M&A date (natural logarithm) SDC Platinum; Compustat 
North America; Compustat 
Global 
34,405 16.369 2.093 7.601 24.300 
Data on country fixed effects are not reported but are available upon request. 
 
5 Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules and Cross-Border M&A Activity 129 
 
Table 29. Effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of being acquirer country. 
Explanatory variables (1) 
Conditional 
logit (I) 
(2) 
Conditional 
logit (II) 
(3) 
Mixed logit 
(III) 
(4) 
Mixed logit 
(IV) 
(5) 
Mixed logit 
(V) 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 –0.0523a     
 (0.0407)     
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓  –1.4569*** –1.2387*** –1.2387**  
  (0.3277) (0.3482) (0.5606)  
Below     –2.5882*** 
     (0.4015) 
Above     –5.8277*** 
     (1.1959) 
Higher     –4.5472*** 
     (0.6634) 
STR –2.0538*** –1.7568*** –2.0903*** –2.0903** –1.9648*** 
 (0.6319) (0.6330) (0.6442) (0.8423) (0.7104) 
lnGDPpercapita 1.0541*** 1.0452*** 1.1104*** 1.1104*** 1.1838*** 
 (0.1619) (0.1625) (0.1652) (0.2118) (0.1710) 
GDPgrowth –0.0034 –0.0032 –0.0041 –0.0041 –0.0041 
 (0.0076) (0.0075) (0.0076) (0.0099) (0.0078) 
StockmarketSize 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005 0.0005*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
PrivateCredit 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0005 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0011) (0.0007) 
lnDistance –0.5852*** –0.5789*** –0.5906*** –0.5906*** –0.6185*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0217) (0.0128) 
CommonLanguage 1.8148*** 1.8112*** 1.8494*** 1.8494*** 1.9616*** 
 (0.0620) (0.0620) (0.0629) (0.1289) (0.0653) 
ColonialRelationship 0.3020*** 0.2868*** 0.2994*** 0.2994*** 0.3168*** 
 (0.0360) (0.0359) (0.0364) (0.0569) (0.0378) 
CommonLegalSystem 0.1029*** 0.1145*** 0.1117*** 0.1117** 0.1107*** 
 (0.0251) (0.0252) (0.0254) (0.0470) (0.0259) 
Acquirer country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations 317,835 317,835 317,835 317,835 317,835 
Log-likelihood –32,188 –32,178 –32,165 –32,165 –32,091 
Regressions of probability of being the acquirer country on (potential) CFC rule application; see equation 
(5.3). For each deal, the dependent variable equals one if country i is the actual acquirer’s country of origin, 
and zero if country i is a counterfactual acquirer country. For variable definitions and data sources, see 
Table 28. Only cross-border M&As where the direct acquirer country is equal to the acquirer ultimate 
parent country are considered. All regressions control for acquirer country fixed effects, which are 
available upon request. The variables of interest follow a random distribution in the mixed logit 
regressions. Regressions (1) and (2) are estimated by a conditional logit model and regressions (3), (4) and 
(5) are estimated by a mixed logit model. Regression (4) is identical to regression (3) except for standard 
errors, which are robust to clustering on the target-country/year level. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
a The level of statistical significance is 19.9%. 
 
In regression (3), we observe that applying the mixed logit model does not change the basic 
results as 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 remains significantly negative at the 1% level and quantitatively stable. 
In regression (4), we cluster the standard errors at the target-country/year level and observe 
that 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 is significant at the 5% level. In regression (5), we split the targets as described 
in equations (5.6), (5.7) and (5.8). Figure 17 shows a kernel density estimate of the simulated 
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coefficients of the variables of interest. The significantly negative coefficient of Below 
confirms the results from previous regressions and also the significantly negative coefficient 
of Higher is as expected. This finding shows that it is less likely that a CFC rule acquirer 
buys a target, which is located in a country with a higher STR than the CFC rule acquirer. 
This finding supports Hypothesis 1c. However, the significantly negative coefficient of 
Above is counterintuitive as we hypothesized that firms from CFC rule countries are more 
likely to be the acquirer if the target is located in a country with an STR below the acquirer 
STR but above the tax rate threshold of the CFC rule. Hence, we reject Hypothesis 1c in 
the acquirer perspective. 
 
Figure 17. Distribution of coefficients of Below, Above and Higher in 
the acquirer perspective. 
 
This figure provides a graph of the Epanechnikov kernel density function of 
the simulated coefficients of Below, Above and Higher in regression (5) of Table 
29 using simulated maximum likelihood with 50 Halton draws. The mean 
(standard deviation) of the simulated coefficients is –2.59 (0.40) for Below, 
–5.83 (1.20) for Above and –4.55 (0.66) for Higher. Density is on the y-axis and 
the coefficient is on the x-axis. Sources: Corporate taxation system data set 
and cross-border M&A data set. 
 
Most control variables are highly significant and show the expected signs. Regarding STR, 
we find a negative effect on the likelihood to be the successful bidder if the bidder is located 
in a high-tax country. This finding is in line with Becker and Riedel (2012), who find a 
negative effect of parent STR on investment in foreign subsidiaries. Helpman et al. (2004) 
show that the productivity level of firms influences their investments abroad and firms with 
the highest productivity engage in FDI. Similar to other studies, we use lnGDPpercapita and 
GDPgrowth as proxies for productivity levels in an acquirer country and find that 
lnGDPpercapita has a significantly positive coefficient, while GDPgrowth is insignificant. 
Hence, a high level of GDP per capita has a positive impact on cross-border M&A activity. 
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StockmarketSize has the expected positive coefficient, which indicates that well-developed 
stock markets in the acquirer country offer good financing conditions to raise capital to 
fund cross-border M&As. The size of the private credit market captured by PrivateCredit has 
an insignificant effect. Cross-border M&A literature finds that lower bilateral transaction 
costs between the acquirer and target due to less cultural and geographic distance positively 
affect M&A activity (e.g., di Giovanni (2005)). In line with these findings, we observe that 
lnDistance, CommonLanguage, ColonialRelationship and CommonLegalSystem show the expected 
signs and are highly significant. 
Table 30 provides the results from our check on whether our baseline results are robust to 
specification variations. In regression (1), we include a dummy variable capturing the 
unilateral double taxation avoidance method for foreign dividends (i.e., the credit method 
or the exemption method). The significantly positive coefficient of ExemptionMethod 
indicates that the likelihood of being the acquirer increases if the acquirer resides in a 
country that exempts foreign dividends of the target from taxation, which is in line with 
the result of Feld et al. (2016a). In regressions (2), (3) and (4), we vary the calculation of our 
variable of interest by considering target EATRs (𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅), potential non-application 
of CFC rules within the EEA (𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐴)95 and the included income by CFC rules 
(𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒). In regression (5), we additionally randomize STR and in regression (6), we 
exclude acquirers from Australia, Canada and New Zealand because their CFC rules do not 
explicitly mention a tax rate threshold, where our identification is coming from. Regression 
(7) excludes the largest acquirer countries (Canada, UK and USA), which account for 
around half of our observations. The exclusion of the USA further checks for a potential 
bias due to the so-called check-the-box rule, which was introduced in the USA in 1997 and 
may allow for an escape from CFC rules for US MNEs under specific circumstances by 
using hybrid entities (e.g., Altshuler and Grubert (2006), Mutti and Grubert (2009)). We 
observe that all robustness tests validate our baseline results, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. 
 
 
                                              
95 Ruf and Weichenrieder (2013) investigate the Cadbury-Schweppes ruling of the ECJ in 2006 (European Court of 
Justice (2006)), which triggered a substantial mitigation of the application of CFC rules within the EEA. In line with 
this argumentation, the authors find evidence for a relative increase in passive investments in low-tax EEA subsidiaries 
and a parallel decrease in passive investments in non-EEA subsidiaries. 
5 Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules and Cross-Border M&A Activity 132 
 
Table 30. Robustness analysis I of the effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of being acquirer country. 
Explanatory variables (1) 
Controlling for 
double taxation 
avoidance method 
(2) 
Using target EATR 
(3) 
Considering EEA 
exemption (post 
2006) 
(4) 
Considering included 
income of CFC rule 
(5) 
Randomizing STR 
(6) 
Excl. acquirers 
from AU&CA&NZ 
(7) 
Excl. acquirers 
from CA&UK&US 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 –0.6035*    –1.2130*** –1.6977*** –1.0453* 
 (0.3472)    (0.3507) (0.3588) (0.5643) 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅  –1.2961***      
  (0.3162)      
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐴   –1.5406***     
   (0.3491)     
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒    –1.7810***    
    (0.3993)    
STR –2.3967*** –1.9075*** –1.9575*** –2.0217*** –2.1346*** –1.6298** –1.9436*** 
 (0.6431) (0.6363) (0.6440) (0.6433) (0.6472) (0.6774) (0.7260) 
ExemptionMethod 0.8440***       
 (0.0859)       
lnGDPpercapita 1.2497*** 1.0501*** 1.1225*** 1.1152*** 1.0906*** 1.1571*** 1.0672*** 
 (0.1661) (0.1621) (0.1655) (0.1653) (0.1666) (0.1680) (0.1805) 
GDPgrowth –0.0071 –0.0034 –0.0040 –0.0044 –0.0046 0.0051 –0.0106 
 (0.0077) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0085) (0.0086) 
StockmarketSize 0.0006*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0003** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
PrivateCredit 0.0012* 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0006 0.0010 
 (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0010) 
lnDistance –0.5657*** –0.5890*** –0.5884*** –0.5948*** –0.5919*** –0.5696*** –0.6515*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0115) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0119) (0.0143) (0.0175) 
CommonLanguage 1.9151*** 1.8596*** 1.8491*** 1.8603*** 1.8598*** 1.9419*** 2.2097*** 
 (0.0641) (0.0625) (0.0630) (0.0631) (0.0627) (0.0676) (0.0770) 
ColonialRelationship 0.2454*** 0.3005*** 0.2971*** 0.3004*** 0.2937*** 0.2334*** 0.4303*** 
 (0.0370) (0.0360) (0.0364) (0.0365) (0.0371) (0.0388) (0.0475) 
CommonLegalSystem 0.0946*** 0.1030*** 0.1139*** 0.1136*** 0.1122*** 0.1244*** 0.1925*** 
 (0.0258) (0.0251) (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0256) (0.0258) (0.0277) 
Acquirer country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations 294,697 317,835 317,835 317,835 317,835 243,136 151,651 
Log-likelihood –30,936 –32,175 –32,164 –32,161 –32,164 –25,945 –19,203 
Regressions of probability of being the acquirer country on (potential) CFC rule application; see equation (5.3). For each deal, the dependent variable equals one if country i is the actual acquirer’s 
country of origin, and zero if country i is a counterfactual acquirer country. For variable definitions and data sources, see Table 28. Only cross-border M&As where the direct acquirer country is equal 
to the acquirer ultimate parent country are considered. All regressions control for acquirer country fixed effects, which are available upon request, and are estimated by a mixed logit model. The variables 
of interest follows a random distribution. Regression (1) additionally controls for double taxation avoidance method, regression (2), (3) and (4) check whether our variable of interest is robust to using 
EATR, considering potential non-application of CFC rules within the EEA and considering the included income by CFC rules. In regression (5), also STR follows a random distribution. Regressions 
(6) and (7) exclude certain countries. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
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Table 31 provides further robustness tests. In regression (1), we exclude all control variables 
except for the acquirer country fixed effects to check if there is a bias due to correlation 
between 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 and the control variables. We find that 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 decreases substantially 
and remains significant. Further, we check whether our results are robust to differentiating 
between profitable and loss-making targets in regression (2). Due to missing firm level 
variables, the sample decreases substantially. We find that the coefficients of 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  
and 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 remain significantly negative. Interestingly, the effect is more 
pronounced for loss-making targets; the difference between the coefficients is significant 
at a p-value of 0.019 (two-sided). One possible reason could be that non-CFC rule acquirers 
are more interested in acquiring low-tax loss-making targets than CFC rule acquirers, 
because non-CFC rule acquirers may shift profits to the loss-making targets and, thereby, 
net out the losses—or even use existing loss carryforwards if possible—of these targets. 
Finally, regressions (3), (4) and (5) control for target-specific financial data (total assets, 
ROA, sales and EBITDA) by interacting these consolidated profit and loss statement and 
balance sheet items with each candidate acquirer country. While again the sample size 
decreases substantially, we observe that 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 remains significantly negative. 
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Table 31. Robustness analysis II of the effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of being acquirer 
country. 
Explanatory variables (1) 
Excl. 
control 
variables 
(2) 
Profitable vs. 
non-profitable 
targets 
(3) 
Incl. target 
assets & target 
ROA 
(4) 
Incl. target 
sales 
(5) 
Incl. target 
EBITDA 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 –4.1258***  –3.1934*** –2.8136*** –2.1391* 
 (0.3294)  (1.1995) (0.7548) (1.2086) 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒   –1.9250**    
  (0.9653)    
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒   –5.5943***    
  (1.7488)    
STR  0.8489 0.4872 –0.6872 –0.5640 
  (1.5131) (1.5582) (1.2818) (1.8920) 
lnGDPpercapita  1.6639*** 1.8388*** 1.2574*** 1.1308** 
  (0.3762) (0.3851) (0.3246) (0.5062) 
GDPgrowth  0.0383** 0.0455** 0.0166 0.0272 
  (0.0195) (0.0202) (0.0176) (0.0258) 
StockmarketSize  0.0003 –0.0002 –0.0000 –0.0007 
  (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
PrivateCredit  0.0001 0.0003 –0.0010 –0.0008 
  (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0023) 
lnDistance  –0.5018*** –0.4904*** –0.4932*** –0.5148*** 
  (0.0313) (0.0338) (0.0266) (0.0422) 
CommonLanguage  1.7924*** 1.6550*** 1.5999*** 1.4257*** 
  (0.1765) (0.1951) (0.1562) (0.2360) 
ColonialRelationship  0.2783*** 0.2070** 0.1570** 0.1919* 
  (0.0862) (0.0921) (0.0731) (0.1080) 
CommonLegalSystem  0.2239*** 0.3270*** 0.3013*** 0.3555*** 
  (0.0654) (0.0713) (0.0560) (0.0860) 
Acquirer country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations 317,835 55,715 52,809 78,495 34,405 
Log-likelihood –35,450 –5,495 –5,157 –7,715 –3,287 
Regressions of probability of being the acquirer country on (potential) CFC rule application; see 
equation (5.3). For each deal, the dependent variable equals one if country i is the actual acquirer’s country 
of origin, and zero if country i is a counterfactual acquirer country. For variable definitions and data sources, 
see Table 28. Only cross-border M&As where the direct acquirer country is equal to the acquirer ultimate 
parent country are considered. All regressions control for acquirer country fixed effects, which are available 
upon request, and are estimated by a mixed logit model. The variables of interest follow a random 
distribution. Regression (1) drops all control variables and regression (2) distinguishes between profitable 
and non-profitable targets. Regression (3) includes the interaction between acquirer country fixed effects 
and TargetAssets and the interaction between acquirer country fixed effects and TargetROA. Regression (4) 
includes the interaction between acquirer country fixed effects and TargetSales. Regression (5) includes the 
interaction between acquirer country fixed effects and TargetEBITDA. The coefficients and standard errors 
of these interactions are shown in Table A 5 in Appendix to Section 5. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
 
5.3.4.2 Target perspective 
With the same econometric idea as in Section 5.3.4.1 but with a target perspective, we 
analyze for each given acquirer the origin of the eventual target country among a choice set 
of various target countries (target perspective). Table 32 provides definitions, data sources 
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and summary statistics of all variables and Table 33 presents the baseline results from 
different multinomial choice models to test Hypothesis 1b on the influence of CFC rules 
on the likelihood of being chosen as the target country of a given acquirer. For each deal, 
the dependent variable equals one for the actual target country of origin and zero for all 
other counterfactual target countries. Due to a different perspective and additional control 
variables, the data set differs from the former data set in Section 5.3.4.1. 
In the conditional logit regression (1), 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 has a significantly negative coefficient, 
which indicates that potential CFC rule application on a candidate target’s income has a 
negative effect on actually choosing the target country as a location. 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 measures in 
more detail the magnitude of a potential additional tax burden due to CFC rule application 
and—similar to the result in Section 5.3.4.1—the significance level increases compared to 
the mere dummy variable approach (𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦). In line with Hypothesis 1b, this finding 
indicates that potential CFC rule application on target’s income negatively influences the 
target location choice of a given acquirer. From a global perspective and with an increasing 
number of countries introducing or strengthening CFC rules, this finding may further 
indicate higher overall tax revenue due to less profit shifting opportunities. 
To cope with a possible violation of the IIA (see Section 5.3.4.1), we use again a mixed logit 
estimator and randomize our variables of interest in the remaining regressions. Again, we 
observe that the estimated standard deviations of the normal distribution are highly 
significant; therefore, we prefer this approach and apply mixed logit regressions in the 
remaining regressions. We observe a further decrease of 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 and the significance level 
remains stable in regression (3) and regression (4), where we cluster the standard errors at 
the acquirer-country/year level. In regression (5), we observe a similar pattern as in Section 
5.3.4.1 and Figure 18 shows a kernel density estimate of the simulated coefficients of the 
variables of interest. Again, the coefficients of Below and Higher are significantly negative, 
which is in line with Hypothesis 1c and suggests that the likelihood of target location choice 
decreases if the target potentially falls under the scope of CFC rule or has a higher STR 
than the acquirer. However, we again observe that Above is significantly negative, which is 
counterintuitive, because we would expect that targets are more likely to be acquired if they 
are located in a country with an STR below the acquirer STR but above the tax rate 
threshold of the acquirer’s CFC rule. Hence, also in the target perspective, we reject 
Hypothesis 1c. 
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Table 32. Definitions, data sources and summary statistics of variables for analyzing the effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of being target country. 
Variable Definition Data source No. of obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 Binary dummy variable coded 1 if target country STR is smaller than acquirer country’s tax rate threshold of 
CFC rule or acquirer country applies CFC rules without a tax rate threshold, and 0 otherwise 
Tax Guides 317,444 0.345 0.475 0 1 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 Difference between acquirer country STR and target country STR if target country STR is smaller than 
acquirer country’s tax rate threshold of CFC rule or acquirer country applies CFC rules without a tax rate 
threshold, and 0 otherwise 
Tax Guides 317,444 0.037 0.063 0.000 0.284 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅 Difference between acquirer country STR and target country STR if target country EATR is smaller than 
acquirer country’s tax rate threshold of the CFC rule or acquirer country applies CFC rules without a tax rate 
threshold, and 0 otherwise 
Tax Guides; Oxford University Centre 
for Business Taxation 
317,444 0.031 0.057 –0.033 0.284 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐴 Same as 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓; however, set to zero if acquirer and target country are both EEA member states and M&A 
year is after 2006 
Tax Guides 317,444 0.035 0.062 0.000 0.284 
Below See equation (5.6) Tax Guides 317,444 0.037 0.063 0.000 0.284 
Above See equation (5.7) Tax Guides 317,444 0.008 0.026 0.000 0.258 
Higher See equation (5.8) Tax Guides 317,444 0.014 0.030 0.000 0.259 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 See equation (5.10) Tax Guides 317,444 0.305 0.058 0.125 0.409 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  Same as 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓; however, for non-profitable targets set to zero Tax Guides; SDC Platinum; Compustat 
North America; Compustat Global 
53,270 0.026 0.057 0.000 0.284 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  Same as 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓; however, for profitable targets set to zero Tax Guides; SDC Platinum; Compustat 
North America; Compustat Global 
53,270 0.013 0.042 0.000 0.277 
STR STR in candidate target country, including typical local taxes Tax Guides 317,444 0.287 0.071 0.125 0.409 
lnGDPpercapita GDP per capita in candidate target country (natural logarithm) World Bank 317,444 10.267 0.687 7.942 11.284 
GDPgrowth Growth of GDP in candidate target country (in %) World Bank 317,444 3.221 3.206 –7.821 15.240 
StockmarketSize Stock market capitalization of listed domestic companies in candidate target country (in % of GDP) World Bank 317,444 124.1 178.4 17.020 1,254.5 
PrivateCredit Domestic credit to private sector in candidate target country (in % of GDP) World Bank 317,444 109.5 47.091 13.353 233.4 
lnDistance Simple distance (in km) between most populated cities of acquirer and candidate target country (natural 
logarithm) 
Mayer and Zignago (2011) 317,444 8.609 1.046 5.153 9.883 
CommonLanguage Common language index between acquirer and candidate target country (0 (low similarity) to 1 (high 
similarity)) 
Melitz and Toubal (2014) 317,444 0.235 0.212 0.000 0.991 
ColonialRelationship Binary dummy variable coded 1 if acquirer and candidate target country were ever in a colonial relationship, 
and 0 otherwise 
Mayer and Zignago (2011) 317,444 0.103 0.304 0 1 
CommonLegalSystem Binary dummy variable coded 1 if legal system of acquirer and candidate target country have common legal 
origins, and 0 otherwise 
Head et al. (2010) 317,444 0.329 0.470 0 1 
CorruptionControl Corruption control index of candidate target country (–3 (low control) to 3 (high control)) World Bank 317,444 1.072 0.976 –1.088 2.527 
BusinessStartupCost Cost of business start-up procedures in candidate target country (in % of GNI per capita) World Bank 317,444 9.601 12.746 0.000 78.400 
UnemploymentRate Unemployment rate in candidate target country (in % of total labor force) World Bank 317,444 7.031 5.050 2.493 27.140 
lnDomesticFirms Number of listed domestic companies in candidate target country (natural logarithm) World Bank 317,444 6.426 1.232 3.714 8.638 
BusinessDisclosure Business extent of disclosure index of in candidate target country (0 (less disclosure) to 10 (more disclosure)) World Bank 264,159 7.188 2.344 0 10 
AcquirerAssets Pre-deal consolidated acquirer total assets in the last year before the effective M&A date (natural logarithm) SDC Platinum; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
215,197 20.280 2.808 11.513 28.710 
AcquirerROA Pre-deal consolidated acquirer pre-tax income in the last year before the effective M&A date divided by pre-
deal consolidated acquirer total assets in the last year before the effective M&A date 
SDC Platinum; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
215,197 0.035 5.999 –191.9 360.5 
AcquirerSales Pre-deal consolidated acquirer net sales in the last year before the effective M&A date (natural logarithm) SDC Platinum; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
206,176 19.979 2.732 8.219 26.834 
AcquirerEBITDA Pre-deal consolidated acquirer EBITDA in the last year before the effective M&A date (natural logarithm) SDC Platinum; Compustat North 
America; Compustat Global 
180,202 18.594 2.365 9.210 24.723 
Data on country fixed effects are not reported but are available upon request. 
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Table 33. Effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of being target country. 
Explanatory variables (1) 
Conditional 
logit (I) 
(2) 
Conditional 
logit (II) 
(3) 
Mixed logit 
(III) 
(4) 
Mixed logit 
(IV) 
(5) 
Mixed logit 
(V) 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 –0.1078**     
 (0.0450)     
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓  –1.7115*** –2.8880*** –2.8880***  
  (0.3921) (0.5306) (0.8075)  
Below     –4.7124*** 
     (0.5975) 
Above     –8.6127*** 
     (1.0042) 
Higher     –1.1460** 
     (0.5413) 
STR 2.6019*** 2.4139*** 2.0753*** 2.0753** 1.6429** 
 (0.6293) (0.6309) (0.6398) (0.8535) (0.6891) 
lnGDPpercapita –0.0639 –0.0388 –0.0848 –0.0848 –0.1192 
 (0.1740) (0.1739) (0.1744) (0.3059) (0.1788) 
GDPgrowth 0.0142* 0.0143* 0.0134* 0.0134 0.0128 
 (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0112) (0.0082) 
StockmarketSize –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
PrivateCredit –0.0019** –0.0019** –0.0021*** –0.0021** –0.0022*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0011) (0.0008) 
lnDistance –0.5799*** –0.5740*** –0.5736*** –0.5736*** –0.5934*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0188) (0.0123) 
CommonLanguage 1.9043*** 1.9006*** 1.9162*** 1.9162*** 1.9734*** 
 (0.0639) (0.0638) (0.0641) (0.1225) (0.0671) 
ColonialRelationship 0.2992*** 0.2777*** 0.2712*** 0.2712*** 0.2252*** 
 (0.0375) (0.0377) (0.0378) (0.0489) (0.0387) 
CommonLegalSystem 0.0172 0.0311 0.0345 0.0345 0.0672** 
 (0.0269) (0.0271) (0.0272) (0.0483) (0.0278) 
CorruptionControl 0.1651* 0.1644* 0.1600* 0.1600 0.1542* 
 (0.0859) (0.0860) (0.0863) (0.1337) (0.0884) 
BusinessStartupCost –0.0073** –0.0072** –0.0075** –0.0075* –0.0069** 
 (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0044) (0.0033) 
UnemploymentRate –0.0004 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004 –0.0002 
 (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0085) (0.0065) 
lnDomesticFirms 0.1775** 0.1651* 0.1834** 0.1834 0.2095** 
 (0.0848) (0.0846) (0.0848) (0.1338) (0.0853) 
Target country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations 317,444 317,444 317,444 317,444 317,444 
Log-likelihood –31,158 –31,151 –31,144 –31,144 –31,064 
Regressions of probability of being the target country on (potential) CFC rule application in acquirer 
country; see equation (5.3). For each deal, the dependent variable equals one if country i is the actual 
target’s country of origin, and zero if country i is a counterfactual target country. For variable definitions 
and data sources, see Table 32. Only cross-border M&As where the direct acquirer country is equal to the 
acquirer ultimate parent country are considered. All regressions control for target country fixed effects, 
which are available upon request. The variables of interest follow a random distribution in the mixed logit 
regressions. Regressions (1) and (2) are estimated by a conditional logit model and regressions (3), (4) 
and (5) are estimated by a mixed logit model. Regression (4) is identical to regression (3) except for 
standard errors, which are robust to clustering on the acquirer-country/year level. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in 
parentheses. 
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Figure 18. Distribution of coefficients of Below, Above and Higher in 
the target perspective. 
 
This figure provides a graph of the Epanechnikov kernel density function of 
the simulated coefficients of Below, Above and Higher in regression (5) of Table 
33 using simulated maximum likelihood with 50 Halton draws. The mean 
(standard deviation) of the simulated coefficients is –4.71 (0.60) for Below, 
–8.61 (1.00) for Above and –1.15 (0.54) for Higher. Density is on the y-axis and 
the coefficient is on the x-axis. Sources: Corporate taxation system data set and 
cross-border M&A data set. 
 
Regarding significant control variables, we observe that STR has a positive effect on target 
location choice, which is an unexpected result as FDI literature generally suggests a negative 
effect of host country STR on host country investment (e.g., Feld and Heckemeyer (2011)). 
An explanation for this result could be that cross-border M&As are less sensitive to host 
country STRs (e.g., Hebous et al. (2011), Herger et al. (2016)) or that profit shifting 
structures within the acquiring MNE mitigate this effect (e.g., Arulampalam et al. (2017)). 
Additionally, variation of STR is also used to compose our variable of interest, which may 
lead to interdependencies. Finally, the significantly positive effect of STR does not prove 
to be robust. 
Regarding control variables, lnGDPpercapita and StockmarketSize have insignificant 
coefficients, whereas GDPgrowth has a significantly positive effect in some regressions, i.e., 
targets located in growing economies are more likely to be acquired. Further, PrivateCredit 
has a significantly negative effect on target location choice. The explanation for this finding 
may be the following: If a target is located in a country with a low ratio of private credits 
granted to the private sector, the supply of credits may be limited. Consequently, credit 
supply for internal expansion is limited, which makes targets in these countries more likely 
to be acquired (Arulampalam et al. (2017)). Similar to the findings in Section 5.3.4.1, we 
observe that lower bilateral transaction costs between the acquirer and target positively 
affect target location choice: lnDistance, CommonLanguage and ColonialRelationship have the 
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expected significant coefficient; CommonLegalSystem has an expected positive though 
insignificant estimate. Finally, the control variables for the institutional framework in the 
candidate target country have significant explanatory power. A high degree of corruption 
control, a large number of listed firms and low business start-up costs increase the chances 
to be chosen as target location; unemployment rate has an insignificant effect. 
In Table 34, we provide similar robustness tests as in Table 30 and yield similar results. 
Regressions (1), (2), and (3) take into account target EATRs (𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅), potential non-
application of CFC rules within the EEA (𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐴) and the included income by CFC 
rules (𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒). In regression (4), we additionally randomize STR and in regression (5), 
we exclude acquirers from Australia, Canada and New Zealand because their CFC rules do 
not explicitly mention a tax rate threshold. Regression (6) excludes the largest target 
countries (Germany, UK and USA), which account for almost half of our observations. In 
regression (7), we include BusinessDisclosure as a further variable for the institutional 
framework in the candidate target country. This variable is not included in our baseline 
results since its inclusion substantially drops the observation number. We observe that all 
robustness tests resemble our baseline results, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
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Table 34. Robustness analysis I of the effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of being target country. 
Explanatory variables (1) 
Using target 
EATR 
(2) 
Considering EEA 
exemption (post 
2006) 
(3) 
Considering 
included income 
of CFC rule 
(4) 
Randomizing 
STR 
(5) 
Excl. 
acquirers from 
AU&CA&NZ 
(6) 
Excl. 
targets from 
DE&UK&US 
(7) 
Incl. business 
disclosure index 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓    –2.9635*** –3.0176*** –1.9885*** –2.1462*** 
    (0.5612) (0.5315) (0.6091) (0.5646) 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅 –1.6836***       
 (0.4775)       
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝐸𝐸𝐴  –3.2489***      
  (0.5360)      
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒   –1.3819a     
   (0.9350)     
STR 2.3923*** 1.9682*** 3.8860*** 1.8021*** 2.2549*** –0.7337 1.8860** 
 (0.6354) (0.6407) (1.0668) (0.6577) (0.6744) (0.9266) (0.7650) 
lnGDPpercapita –0.0710 –0.0803 –0.1884 –0.3431* 0.0169 –0.5203*** 0.3354 
 (0.1744) (0.1749) (0.1798) (0.1848) (0.1825) (0.1978) (0.2291) 
GDPgrowth 0.0139* 0.0137* 0.0140* 0.0119 0.0109 0.0186** 0.0204** 
 (0.0081) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0087) (0.0093) (0.0087) 
StockmarketSize –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0002 –0.0001 –0.0003 –0.0002 –0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
PrivateCredit –0.0020** –0.0022*** –0.0018** –0.0022*** –0.0029*** –0.0034*** –0.0025*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0009) 
lnDistance –0.5834*** –0.5712*** –0.5919*** –0.5985*** –0.5562*** –0.6799*** –0.5717*** 
 (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0122) (0.0125) (0.0145) (0.0166) (0.0123) 
CommonLanguage 1.9332*** 1.9217*** 1.9710*** 2.0260*** 1.9892*** 2.0413*** 1.9405*** 
 (0.0639) (0.0640) (0.0670) (0.0684) (0.0685) (0.0805) (0.0687) 
ColonialRelationship 0.2986*** 0.2636*** 0.2760*** 0.2637*** 0.2214*** 0.3984*** 0.2497*** 
 (0.0377) (0.0378) (0.0384) (0.0387) (0.0403) (0.0485) (0.0413) 
CommonLegalSystem 0.0139 0.0364 0.0282 0.0315 0.0482* 0.0919*** 0.0162 
 (0.0269) (0.0272) (0.0278) (0.0280) (0.0278) (0.0341) (0.0291) 
CorruptionControl 0.1784** 0.1504* 0.1641* 0.1525* 0.1277 0.0777 0.3170*** 
 (0.0860) (0.0865) (0.0875) (0.0889) (0.0922) (0.1113) (0.1135) 
BusinessStartupCost –0.0074** –0.0074** –0.0076** –0.0081** –0.0052 –0.0071* –0.0064* 
 (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0036) 
       (Continued) 
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Table 34. Continued.        
UnemploymentRate 0.0003 0.0002 –0.0026 –0.0032 0.0033 –0.0134* 0.0055 
 (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0081) (0.0071) 
lnDomesticFirms 0.1715** 0.1794** 0.2252*** 0.2844*** 0.2078** 0.2547*** 0.0623 
 (0.0848) (0.0849) (0.0861) (0.0876) (0.0883) (0.0907) (0.1015) 
BusinessDisclosure       0.0820 
       (0.0686) 
Target country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations 317,444 317,444 317,444 317,444 255,172 161,910 264,159 
Log-likelihood –31,155 –31,140 –31,136 –31,119 –26,594 –19,327 –26,172 
Regressions of probability of being the target country on (potential) CFC rule application in acquirer country; see equation (5.3). For each deal, the dependent 
variable equals one if country i is the actual target’s country of origin, and zero if country i is a counterfactual target country. For variable definitions and data sources, 
see Table 32. Only cross-border M&As where the direct acquirer country is equal to the acquirer ultimate parent country are considered. All regressions control for 
target country fixed effects, which are available upon request, and are estimated by a mixed logit model. The variables of interest follow a random distribution in the 
mixed logit regressions. Regression (1), (2) and (3) check whether our variable of interest is robust to using EATRs, considering potential non-application of CFC 
rules within the EEA and considering the included income by CFC rules. In regression (4), also STR follows a random distribution. Regressions (5) and (6) exclude 
certain countries and regression (7) considers a further control variable (BusinessDisclosure). *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
a The level of statistical significance is 13.9%. 
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Table 35 provides further robustness tests yielding similar results as presented in Table 31. 
In regression (1), we exclude all control variables except for the target country fixed effects 
to check if there is a bias due to correlation between 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 and the control variables. 
Again, we find that 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓  decreases substantially and remains significant. Further, we 
check whether our results are robust to differentiating between profitable and loss-making 
targets in regression (2). We find that the coefficients of 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒  and 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 remain significantly negative; however, in this robustness test, there is 
no significant difference between the coefficients of 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 and 𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 . 
Finally, in regressions (3), (4) and (5), we include acquirer-specific financial data (total assets, 
ROA, sales and EBITDA) by interacting these consolidated profit and loss statement and 
balance sheet items with each candidate target country. We again observe a substantial 
sample decrease due missing firm level variables, but the results prove to be robust. 
  
5 Controlled Foreign Corporation Rules and Cross-Border M&A Activity 143 
 
Table 35. Robustness analysis II of the effect of acquirer CFC rules on probability of being target country. 
Explanatory variables (1) 
Excl. 
control 
variables 
(2) 
Profitable vs. 
non-profitable 
targets 
(3) 
Incl. acquirer assets 
& acquirer ROA 
(4) 
Incl. 
acquirer 
sales 
(5) 
Incl. acquirer 
EBITDA 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 –6.4155***  –3.5409*** –3.4268*** –3.2957*** 
 (0.4292)  (0.6830) (0.6655) (0.7050) 
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒   –6.4673***    
  (1.6700)    
𝐶𝐹𝐶𝑛𝑜𝑛_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒   –7.2323***    
  (1.9287)    
STR  –1.8795 2.4216*** 2.7097*** 2.7031*** 
  (1.7514) (0.7889) (0.7979) (0.8450) 
lnGDPpercapita  0.2851 –0.1952 –0.0804 –0.3150 
  (0.5944) (0.2289) (0.2319) (0.2494) 
GDPgrowth  –0.0329 0.0119 0.0107 0.0096 
  (0.0227) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0111) 
StockmarketSize  –0.0003 0.0000 –0.0002 –0.0000 
  (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
PrivateCredit  –0.0050*** –0.0027*** –0.0029*** –0.0026** 
  (0.0018) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) 
lnDistance  –0.4524*** –0.5450*** –0.5504*** –0.5388*** 
  (0.0303) (0.0145) (0.0152) (0.0162) 
CommonLanguage  2.0888*** 1.6471*** 1.5955*** 1.4247*** 
  (0.1776) (0.0896) (0.0895) (0.1006) 
ColonialRelationship  0.2331*** 0.2761*** 0.2821*** 0.2991*** 
  (0.0901) (0.0462) (0.0468) (0.0489) 
CommonLegalSystem  0.1076 0.1376*** 0.1668*** 0.2000*** 
  (0.0681) (0.0363) (0.0363) (0.0388) 
CorruptionControl  0.0070 0.1240 0.0248 0.0192 
  (0.2145) (0.1076) (0.1088) (0.1168) 
BusinessStartupCost  –0.0087 –0.0122*** –0.0110*** –0.0091** 
  (0.0089) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0046) 
UnemploymentRate  –0.0252 –0.0091 –0.0124 –0.0128 
  (0.0160) (0.0081) (0.0082) (0.0087) 
lnDomesticFirms  0.4353* 0.1074 0.0945 0.1462 
  (0.2224) (0.1060) (0.1069) (0.1119) 
Target country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations 317,444 53,270 215,197 206,176 180,202 
Log-likelihood –34,219 –5,028 –20,617 –19,818 –17,463 
Regressions of probability of being the target country on (potential) CFC rule application in acquirer country; see 
equation (5.3). For each deal, the dependent variable equals one if country i is the actual target’s country of origin, and 
zero if country i is a counterfactual target country. For variable definitions and data sources, see Table 32. Only cross-
border M&As where the direct acquirer country is equal to the acquirer ultimate parent country are considered. All 
regressions control for target country fixed effects, which are available upon request, and are estimated by a mixed logit 
model. The variables of interest follow a random distribution in the mixed logit regressions. Regression (1) drops all 
control variables and regression (2) distinguishes between profitable and non-profitable targets. Regression (3) includes 
the interaction between target country fixed effects and AcquirerAssets and the interaction between target country fixed 
effects and AcquirerROA. Regression (4) includes the interaction between target country fixed effects and AcquirerSales. 
Regression (5) includes the interaction between target country fixed effects and AcquirerEBITDA. The coefficients and 
standard errors of these interactions are shown in Table A 6 in Appendix to Section 5. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
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5.4 CFC rules and the direction of  cross-border M&As 
5.4.1 Hypothesis development 
In this section, we consider the direction of cross-border M&As. In particular, we 
investigate whether CFC rules affect the decision which firm becomes the parent firm of a 
newly created MNE through a cross-border M&A. Following the finding of Voget (2011) 
that CFC rules trigger the relocation of headquarters, we argue that CFC rules negatively 
influence the direction of a cross-border M&A between two firms from different countries, 
i.e., we expect that it is more probable that the non-CFC rule firm acquires the CFC rule 
firm. The reasoning is as follows: If the non-CFC rule firm becomes the new MNE’s parent, 
potential (new) profit shifting strategies may arise by setting up or using an already existing 
tax haven subsidiary within the MNE, which potentially decreases the overall tax burden. 
These (new) profit shifting strategies would not exist if the CFC rule firm became the 
acquirer due to potential CFC rule application on low-tax subsidiaries’ income. We, 
therefore, hypothesize the following, stated in alternative form: 
Hypothesis 2: The probability of being the acquiring firm in cross-border M&As is higher 
for firms in non-CFC rule countries compared to firms in CFC rule countries. 
This analysis is different to the analysis presented in Section 5.3, where we investigate 
whether CFC rules affect the decision to acquire a target if CFC rules are potentially applied 
to this target’s income. By analyzing the effect of CFC rules on the direction of cross-border 
M&As, we consider whether CFC rules negatively affect the choice of who becomes the 
parent of the newly created MNE. 
5.4.2 Empirical approach 
To analyze the direction of observed cross-border M&As, we assume that firm a acquires 
firm b; a and b do not reside in the same country. Under the assumption that M&As reflect 
synergies from combining these two firms and that investors value the individual firms and 
the M&A correctly, it follows that the value when a acquires b (𝑉𝑎𝑏) is higher than the value 
when b acquires a (𝑉𝑏𝑎), i.e., 𝑉𝑎𝑏 − 𝑉𝑏𝑎 > 0. Based on Hypothesis 2 derived under 5.4.1, 
we argue that CFC rules have an impact on this valuation. In particular, CFC rules lead to 
a competitive disadvantage for parent firms as those firms have less profit shifting 
opportunities and have to fear potential CFC rule application on low-tax subsidiaries’ 
income. We consider the following model to analyze the direction in cross-border M&As, 
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depending on the CFC rules of the two involved firms and given that we know that the 
transaction takes place: 
𝑃(𝑉𝑎𝑏 > 𝑉𝑏𝑎|𝑋) = 𝐸(𝑌|∆𝐶𝐹𝐶 + ∆𝑋) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽(∆𝐶𝐹𝐶 + ∆𝑋))
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝛽(∆𝐶𝐹𝐶 + ∆𝑋))
 
𝑌 {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑎𝑏 − 𝑉𝑏𝑎 > 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑎𝑏 − 𝑉𝑏𝑎 ≤ 0
 
(5.11) 
Using logit regression models, we aim to calculate 𝑃(𝑉𝑎𝑏 > 𝑉𝑏𝑎|𝑋), i.e., we always consider 
the setting that a acquires b (𝑉𝑎𝑏 − 𝑉𝑏𝑎 > 0 in equation (5.11)). This consideration implies 
that y, our dependent variable, always takes the value 1.96 The variable of interest is ∆𝐶𝐹𝐶, 
which measures the difference in CFC rules between a and b. We consider two approaches 
in calculating ∆𝐶𝐹𝐶. 
First, we construct a CFC dummy variable (∆CFCdummy) that measures whether CFC rules 
are present in the residence countries of a and b. If, for example, the country of a does not 
apply CFC rules (0) and the country of b applies CFC rules (1) in the M&A year, 
∆CFCdummy takes the value 0-1 = -1. 
Second, we consider individual characteristics of CFC rules to allow for more heterogeneity 
among CFC rules. We construct a CFC variable (∆CFCvalue), which is coded zero for non-
CFC rule countries and one for CFC rule countries. In addition to that, we consider the 
CFC rule countries in more detail and group them regarding their CFC rule harshness 
among the two main CFC rule features, which can be derived from all observed CFC rules: 
The lowest possible tax haven STR and the passive-to-active-income ratio accepted by CFC 
rules. This approach can increase ∆CFCvalue up to the value 3. Among the CFC rule 
countries, the lowest possible tax haven STR is set to the tax rate threshold of the CFC 
rule.97 For CFC rule countries with a tax haven STR equal or above its median value of 15%, 
we add 1 to ∆CFCvalue. Similarly, we consider the passive-to-active-income ratio, which 
determines the amount of passive income that is allowed so that CFC rules are not 
triggered. The median value of the passive-to-active-income ratio is 10%; for CFC rule 
countries with a passive-to-active-income ratio below 10%, we add 1 to ∆CFCvalue.98 Table 
36 provides one country example for each of the four categories of ∆CFCvalue. 
  
                                              
96 The presented binary choice model is based on Huizinga and Voget (2009), pp. 1229ff. 
97 For EEA member states in the years after the decision of the ECJ in the case “Cadbury-Schweppes” (C-194/04) 
in 2006 (European Court of Justice (2006)), we set the tax haven tax rate equal to the lowest STR within the EU, 
because since this decision, CFC rules are de facto not applicable within the EU. In support of this reasoning, Ruf and 
Weichenrieder (2013) provide evidence for an increase of profit shifting within the EEA after this decision (see 
footnote 95). 
98 These thresholds are subjective; however, they split the CFC rule countries into two equal halves and allow a 
grouping of the CFC rule countries according to their relative CFC rule harshness. 
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Table 36. Country examples for the four categories of ∆CFCvalue. 
∆CFCvalue of 
country 
Exemplary country CFC rules? Tax rate 
threshold 
≥ 15%? 
Passive-to-
active-income 
ratio < 10%? 
0 Netherlands no n/a n/a 
1 China (from 2008) yes (since 2008) no (12.5%) no (50%) 
2 Republic of Korea yes yes (15%) no (50%) 
3 Japan yes yes (20%) yes (no ratio) 
 
If, for example, a firm residing in the Netherlands acquires a firm residing in the Republic 
of Korea, ∆CFCvalue takes the value 0–2 = –2. We expect a negative coefficient for both 
∆CFCdummy and ∆CFCvalue, indicating that it is more likely that the firm without CFC rules 
or with less harsh CFC rules becomes the acquiring firm. 
Following Huizinga and Voget (2009), we control for firm characteristics and 
macroeconomic conditions in the two countries captured by ∆𝑋. On the firm level, we 
include the firms’ consolidated financial data. We control for relative size of the two firms 
(∆Size) and expect a positive coefficient, as larger firms are considered more likely to acquire 
smaller firms. ∆Leverage considers the difference in leverage ratio between the two firms. 
Following Desai and Hines (2002), we argue that firms with higher leverage have lower 
borrowing costs. Thus, these firms have higher borrowing capacity, which makes them 
more likely to be the acquirer. ∆PTI measures the relative difference between pre-tax 
income of the two firms. Similar to our expectation of ∆Size, we expect that firms with 
higher profits are more likely to acquire firms with lower profits. 
On the country-level, we control for the difference in STRs (∆STR). We have no 
expectation on its coefficient as high-tax countries may have a better investment 
environment whereas low-tax country may attract firms due to tax savings. Based on the 
finding of Huizinga and Voget (2009) that taxation of dividend repatriation affects M&A 
direction, we include the difference in both countries’ double taxation avoidance method 
on foreign dividends (∆DTM), where 0 (1) stands for the credit (exemption) method. We 
expect a positive coefficient for this variable. We also include the two countries’ relative 
stock market size (∆StockMrk), which proxies for the relative ease to raise capital at stock 
markets and we expect a positive coefficient. In addition, we include the two countries’ 
relative difference between domestic credits granted to the private sector (∆CreditMrk). 
Similar to the argumentation in Section 5.3.4.2, we argue that if a company is located in a 
country with a low ratio of credits granted to the private market, the supply of credit may 
be limited and, hence, the possibility to finance an acquisition via credit is limited. Thus, we 
expect a positive coefficient. Finally, to control for the price level in an economy, we include 
the difference in the inflation rate (∆Inflation) between both countries. We have a negative 
expectation on its coefficient. 
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Further, we include country fixed effects that reflect whether the country is the acquirer or 
the target country: For each M&A, the acquirer country gets the value of 1 and the target 
country gets the value of -1; all other countries get the value of 0 for the respective M&A. 
Following Huizinga and Voget (2009), our logit regression is estimated using maximum 
likelihood estimation without a constant. The reason is straightforward: Since we always 
consider the setting that firm a acquires firm b (𝑉𝑎𝑏 − 𝑉𝑏𝑎 > 0 in equation (5.11)), the 
dependent variable is always one and, consequently, there is no variation in the dependent 
variable and the constant would be a perfect fit. 
5.4.3 Data 
The M&A data analyzed in this section are the same as described in Section 5.3.3 with two 
exceptions. First, we relax the restriction to the 30 most frequent acquirer or target 
locations. Second, we require that the direct acquirer and the direct target reside in the same 
country as their respective ultimate parent to reduce the possibility of a subsidiary in a third 
country being involved in the M&A. In addition, as outlined above, we need consolidated 
financial data of both firms as control variables, which reduces our sample to 1,199 cross-
border M&As involving 30 countries.99 Table 37 gives an overview of the number of 
acquirer ultimate parents and target ultimate parents in this cross-border M&A sample per 
country. Further, this table provides information on whether CFC rules are implemented 
in those countries. For definitions, data sources and summary statistics of all variables see 
Table 38. 
  
                                              
99 We experience this sharp decrease in cross-border M&A observation due to the lack of important financial control 
variables. However, this decrease is not due to specific countries or a specific financial control variable. Hence, we 
assume that the smaller sub-sample is a representative subset of the larger one and that focusing on this subset does 
not bias our subsequent empirical work. This argumentation follows Huizinga and Voget (2009), p. 1228, who face 
the same problem using firm level data from SDC Platinum and who observe a similar decrease in sample size. To 
expand our sub-sample, we follow Huizinga and Voget (2009) and use Compustat North America and Compustat 
Global that are together global in coverage to fill-up firm level control variables. We use CUSIP and SEDOL firm 
identification codes to link the Compustat databases with SDC Platinum. 
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Table 37. Cross-border M&A sample (2002–2014) for analyzing the effect of CFC rules on 
direction of cross-border M&As. 
Country CFC 
rule 
No. of 
acquirers 
No. of 
targets 
Country CFC 
rule 
No. of 
acquirers 
No. of 
targets 
Australia 1 43 57 Luxembourg 0 3 6 
Austria 0 7 3 Mexico 1 7 5 
Belgium 0 21 27 Netherlands 0 41 19 
Brazil 1 3 24 New Zealand 1 4 4 
Canada 1 70 101 Norway 1 9 24 
Chile 0 2 6 Poland 0 1 5 
China 1 14 6 Portugal 1 2 1 
Denmark 1 7 9 Republic of Korea 1 9 9 
France 1 64 83 Russian Federation 0 6 2 
Germany 1 55 65 South Africa 1 20 10 
India 0 32 12 Spain 1 29 40 
Ireland 0 32 14 Sweden 1 5 5 
Israel 1 21 16 Switzerland 0 40 18 
Italy 1 30 21 United Kingdom 1 156 338 
Japan 1 55 9 United States 1 411 260 
    Total  1,199 1,199 
This table shows number of acquirer ultimate parents and targets ultimate parents per country in our 
cross-border M&A sample to investigate Hypothesis 2. In this context, cross-border M&As are defined 
as acquirer ultimate parent and target ultimate parent residing in different countries; the direct acquirer 
and acquirer ultimate parent reside in the same country and also the direct target and target ultimate 
parent reside in the same country. CFC rule takes the value one, if the country has implemented CFC 
rules in 2014. Each country has at least one acquiring firm and one target firm to ensure that maximum 
likelihood estimation yields finite likelihood. 
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Table 38. Definitions, data sources and summary statistics of variables for analyzing the effect of CFC rules on direction of cross-border M&As. 
Variable Definition Data source No. of obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
∆CFCvalue Difference in CFC value of the two firms (see Section 5.4.2) Tax Guides 1,199 0.059 1.536 –3 3 
∆CFCdummy Difference in CFC rule of the two firms (see Section 5.4.2) Tax Guides 1,580 –0.069 0.466 –1 1 
∆STR Difference in STRs, including typical local taxes, of the two firms (in %) Tax Guides 1,199 1.149 9.233 –26.706 26.823 
∆DTM Difference in method to avoid double taxation on foreign dividends of two 
firms where 0 (1) represents the credit (exemption) method 
Tax Guides 1,199 –0.008 0.690 –1 1 
∆Size Difference in total assets of the two firms divided by the sum of the firms’ 
total assets 
SDC Platinum; Compustat 
North America; Compustat 
Global 
1,199 0.799 0.301 –0.990 1.000 
∆PTI Difference in pre-tax incomes of the two firms divided by the sum of the 
firms’ pre-tax incomes, where non-positive values of pre-tax income are 
replaced by 0.001 to avoid low values in the denominator 
SDC Platinum 1,199 0.645 0.550 –1.000 1.000 
∆Leverage Difference in leverage ratios of the two firms (total liabilities/total assets, in 
%) 
SDC Platinum; Compustat 
North America; Compustat 
Global 
1,199 –0.082 0.942 –22.413 4.314 
∆StockMrk Difference in stock market capitalizations of the two countries divided by the 
sum of the countries’ stock market capitalization volume 
World Bank 1,199 0.104 0.783 –1.000 1.000 
∆CreditMrk Difference in domestic credits to private sector of the two countries divided 
by the sum of the countries’ domestic credit volume  
World Bank 1,199 0.089 0.732 –0.997 0.998 
∆Inflation Difference in inflation rates of the two countries (in %) World Bank 1,199 0.037 2.106 –13.352 11.742 
Data on country fixed effects are not reported but are available upon request. These statistics show relative values of the variables when firm a acquires firm b, see equation (5.11). 
For example, if firm a has a leverage ratio of 0.45 and firm b has a leverage ratio of 0.50 then ∆Leverage takes the value –0.05 (=0.45–0.50). 
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5.4.4 Regression analysis 
Table 39 shows the results from the binary choice model to test Hypothesis 2 on the 
influence of CFC rules on the direction of cross-border M&As between two firms, i.e., 
which firm becomes the acquirer. 
 
Table 39. Effect of CFC rules on direction of cross-border M&As. 
Explanatory variables Level of 
direct acquirer 
& direct target 
Level of 
acquirer ultimate parent & target ultimate parent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
∆CFCvalue –1.127**  –1.438**  –2.025a  
 (0.530)  (0.701)  (1.558)  
∆CFCdummy  –2.027*  –3.543**  –10.944*** 
  (1.132)  (1.754)  (2.620) 
∆STR 0.168* 0.096** 0.278*** 0.062 0.693*** 0.079 
 (0.086) (0.038) (0.105) (0.043) (0.254) (0.058) 
∆DTM –0.242 0.201 –0.910 –0.399 –1.833** –0.881 
 (0.652) (0.671) (0.853) (0.879) (0.927) (1.040) 
∆Size 5.101*** 5.509*** 5.480*** 5.698*** 7.523*** 6.037*** 
 (0.398) (0.409) (0.501) (0.477) (1.403) (0.886) 
∆PTI 1.177*** 1.128*** 1.399*** 1.307*** 1.571 0.906 
 (0.407) (0.375) (0.466) (0.366) (1.040) (0.844) 
∆Leverage 0.158** 0.216** 0.123* 0.206** –0.098 –0.372 
 (0.068) (0.086) (0.068) (0.083) (0.983) (0.638) 
∆StockMrk 4.914*** 2.802** 6.446*** 3.004** 9.175*** 2.896 
 (1.615) (1.292) (2.278) (1.459) (3.105) (2.410) 
∆CreditMrk –6.363*** –2.533* –8.826*** –3.069 –9.829* 0.013 
 (1.848) (1.403) (2.851) (1.884) (5.900) (4.130) 
∆Inflation 0.193 0.083 0.321 0.132 0.245 0.002 
 (0.205) (0.171) (0.245) (0.210) (0.534) (0.427) 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
No. of observations 1,199 1,580 989 1,305 418 492 
No. of countries 30 31 30 30 29 29 
Log-likelihood –99.2 –133.6 –70.2 –100.7 –24.8 –38.1 
Time period 2002–2014 1995–2014 2002–2014 1995–2014 2002–2014 1995–2014 
Logit regressions of probability of being the acquirer country on (potential) CFC rules in a cross-border 
M&A; see equation (5.11). For variable definitions and data sources, see Table 38. All regressions control 
for country fixed effects, which are available upon request. Regressions (1) and (2) consider M&As where 
the direct acquirer and direct target reside in the same country as their respective ultimate parents. 
Regressions (3) and (4) are the same as (1) and (2), but require that the direct acquirer and the direct target 
are the respective groups’ ultimate parents. Regressions (5) and (6) are the same as (3) and (4), but exclude 
M&As involving the USA. Regressions (2), (4) and (6) consider in addition years 1995–2001; due to a lack 
of more detailed historic CFC rule data ∆CFCvalue cannot be constructed for the time period 1995–2001. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors 
are provided in parentheses. 
a The level of statistical significance is 19.4%. 
 
In regressions (1) and (2), we find that CFC rules negatively affect the probability which 
firm becomes the acquirer. In particular, we find a significant coefficient at the 5% level for 
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∆CFCvalue. This finding suggests that when two firms perform a cross-border M&A, it is 
less likely that the firm with the harsher CFC rule becomes the acquiring firm. For the 
dummy variable approach (∆CFCdummy), we observe a significantly negative coefficient at 
the 10% level. Hence, also the mere presence of CFC rules seems to affect cross-border 
M&A direction. These results prove to be robust in regressions (3) and (4), where we 
analyze a slightly smaller sample by considering only cross-border M&As directly between 
the ultimate parents, i.e., the acquirer is the acquirer ultimate parent and the target is the 
target ultimate parent. In regressions (5) and (6), we consider the same setting as in 
regressions (3) and (4), but exclude M&As that involve the USA. We do this to check that 
the results are not biased by potential check-the-box rule application in the USA, which 
may allow for an escape from CFC rules for US MNEs under specific circumstances by 
using hybrid entities (e.g., Altshuler and Grubert (2006), Mutti and Grubert (2009)). 
Although this exclusion decreases the sample by more than half, we still observe a 
significantly negative estimate for ∆CFCdummy. The coefficient of ∆CFCvalue remains also 
negative; however, its p-value drops to 0.194. 
Taken together, we provide evidence for Hypothesis 2 that the direction of cross-border 
M&As between firms is negatively affected by the presence and harshness of CFC rules. 
This finding contributes to previous research documenting that headquarters relocation is 
influenced by CFC rules (Voget (2011)). Our interpretation of this finding is that if the non-
CFC rule firm acquirers the CFC rule firm, new profit shifting opportunities may potentially 
come up within the newly formed MNE, which may decrease the tax burden and yield 
higher cash flows in the future. If the CFC rule firm acquires the non-CFC rule firm, these 
profit shifting opportunities are rather unattractive due to CFC rules in the new parent 
country. In addition, the CFC rule firm has to fear potential CFC rule application on low-
tax subsidiaries’ income if such subsidiaries are already present in the acquired firm. The 
firms involved in the M&As are quite large with an average value of total assets of the 
acquirers (targets) of 38.3 (2.4) billion USD. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that at least 
some of the involved firms are already MNEs with implemented profit shifting strategies 
within their group if no CFC rules are present in the ultimate parent country. 
Regarding control variables, we find, as expected, that firm size has a significantly positive 
impact on the likelihood of being the acquiring firm and, in most regressions, firm 
profitability, firm leverage, STR and stock market size have a significantly positive effect 
on M&A direction. Credit market size has an unexpected negative effect in most 
regressions. We observe non-significant estimates for inflation rate and the method to avoid 
double taxation. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
In this study, we investigate the impact of an increasingly important anti tax avoidance 
measure on cross-border M&A activity of firms on a global scale. In particular, we consider 
important characteristics of CFC rules from a variety of countries and apply different logit 
regression models on a large worldwide cross-border M&A data set. Considering individual 
M&As, we find that the probability of being the acquirer of low-tax targets decreases if 
CFC rules may be applicable on this target’s income. This finding implies that acquirers 
from non-CFC rule countries have a competitive advantage in bidding for targets in low-
tax countries. This is explained by possibly higher reservation price of these non-CFC rules 
acquirers due to potential firm value increasing profit shifting opportunities after the M&A. 
Further, we show that the acquirer’s location choice of a target is negatively affected if the 
target may fall under the scope of CFC rules of an acquirer. The reasoning behind this result 
is the same as before but the underlying perspective is different. Thereby, we find evidence 
that CFC rules affect M&A activity on the bidding side, i.e., non-CFC rule acquirers have 
competitive advantages in bidding for a given low-tax target, and on the target side, i.e., 
low-tax targets are rather acquired by non-CFC rule acquirers. These two findings provide 
robust evidence that CFC rules distort ownership of low-tax targets. Finally, we show that 
CFC rules negatively affect the direction of cross-border M&A, i.e., countries with CFC 
rules are less likely to attract parent firms in a newly created MNE after M&As. 
However, our results should not necessarily be interpreted as suggesting that countries 
should refrain of CFC rules. Moreover, our findings suggest that CFC rules seem to reach 
the intended goal of reducing profit shifting opportunities with low-tax subsidiaries in our 
cross border M&A context. In other words, our results suggest that the specific way of 
investing in foreign low-tax countries to shift profits afterwards is limited by existing CFC 
rules in the acquirer country. Therefore, CFC rules can be used by countries to counteract 
tax avoidance behavior of their MNEs, which could result in an increase in tax revenue. 
Nevertheless, the parallel presence and non-presence of CFC rules across countries is 
problematic from an economic perspective due to competitive disadvantages on the cross-
border M&A market and potentially tax-biased ownership structures on a global scale. 
Thereby, we contribute to a strand of literature where little research has been undertaken 
so far. Further, our findings are particularly interesting in light of current tax policy 
developments. While the BEPS project of the OECD suggests an implementation of 
effective CFC rules in the OECD and G20 countries (OECD/G20 (2015a)), the European 
Council issued a legally binding directive requiring EU member states to implement CFC 
rules by 2019 (European Court of Justice (2006)). In other words, at the latest from 2019 
onwards, firms residing in the EU may face competitive disadvantages in global M&A 
activities due to tax legislation, compared to firms residing in OECD and G20 member 
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states, which do not follow the BEPS project’s suggestion to implement effective CFC 
rules. This finding indicates that more coordination regarding countries’ international tax 
law seems to be necessary if tax avoidance behavior of MNEs is considered unfavorable 
and intended measures to counteract this behavior are supposed to be fruitful on a global 
scale. 
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6 Nutzen deutsche Konzerne Belgien als 
Finanzierungsstandort? – Eine Fallstudie100 
 
Zusammenfassung: Belgien ermöglicht es Unternehmen einen Eigenkapital-
Zinsaufwand steuerlich zu berücksichtigen. Dies eröffnet multinationalen Konzernen die 
Möglichkeit, Gewinne in belgische Finanzierungsgesellschaften zu verlagern und dort 
praktisch zum Nulltarif zu versteuern. Diese Fallstudie stellt zunächst dar, wie eine solche 
Finanzierungsgesellschaft aufgesetzt werden kann. Anschließend wird mittels eines 
einzigartigen Datensatzes untersucht, inwieweit DAX und MDAX Konzerne 
Steuerplanung mittels Finanzierungsgesellschaften in Belgien betreiben. Es werden sieben 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften identifiziert; sieben weitere Konzerne betreiben eine operativ 
tätige Finanzierungsgesellschaft. In einem weiteren Schritt wird approximiert, dass jährlich 
Gewinne in Höhe von 914 Mio. Euro verlagert und dadurch Steuern in Höhe von 179 bis 
242 Mio. Euro gespart werden. Für diesen Datensatz wird ein Steueraufkommensverlust 
für Belgien aufgrund des Eigenkapital-Zinsaufwands in Höhe von 11 bis 36 Mio. Euro 
jährlich geschätzt. 
 
Schlüsselwörter: DAX & MDAX • Notional Interest Deduction • Kapitalstruktur • 
Gewinnverlagerung • Steuerplanung in Belgien 
 
JEL-Classification: F23 • H25 • H26 • H32 • H73 • M41 
 
Publication: This paper is published in the Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung 69 (4): 
441–475. The author thanks the publisher Springer for granting a license to reuse the paper 
in this dissertation. 
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100 This paper is joint work with Oliver Hahn, M.Sc., and Fabian Nicolas Pönnighaus, M.Sc. 
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Do German corporations use Belgium as a financing 
location? – A case study 
 
Abstract: For tax purposes, Belgium allows companies to take into account an NID on 
their equity. This regime enables companies to tax corporate profits in Belgian finance 
companies virtually for free. This case study presents in a first step how such finance 
companies can be set up. Then, using a unique hand-collected data set, it examines the 
extent to which DAX und MDAX corporations avail of tax planning strategies using 
finance companies in Belgium. This case study identifies seven finance companies; seven 
other DAX and MDAX corporations have a finance company that seems to be 
operationally active. In a further step, this case study approximates that profits of 
914 million Euro are shifted to Belgium per year, which results in tax savings of 179 
to 242 million Euro. For this data set, Belgium’s tax revenue loss due the NID on equity is 
estimated to equal 11 to 36 million Euro per year. 
 
Keywords: DAX & MDAX • Notional interest deduction • Capital structure • Profit 
shifting • Tax planning in Belgium 
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6.1 Einleitung 
Die Bekämpfung von Gewinnverkürzung und Gewinnverlagerung wird auf höchster 
politischer Ebene diskutiert (vgl. z.B. Bundesministerium der Finanzen (2015), 
OECD/G20 (2015a)). Dabei standen lange Zeit insbesondere amerikanische Konzerne wie 
Apple, Amazon und Starbucks im Fokus der öffentlichen Debatte, während Steuerplanung 
deutscher Konzerne keine wesentliche Rolle spielte.101 In jüngster Zeit stehen jedoch auch 
die Steuerplanungsmodelle deutscher Konzerne in der öffentlichen Diskussion. So 
berichteten im Jahr 2013 Spiegel Online und Süddeutsche Zeitung über Steuerplanung 
deutscher Konzerne mittels belgischer Finanzierungsgesellschaften (vgl. Spiegel Online 
(2013), Süddeutsche Zeitung (2013)).102 Die Berichterstattung über „Luxemburg-Leaks“ 
hat weitere deutsche Konzerne ins Zentrum der Debatte gerückt (vgl. z.B. Süddeutsche 
Zeitung (2014a), Süddeutsche Zeitung (2014b)). 
Neben dieser anekdotischen Evidenz gibt es auch empirische Evidenz, dass deutsche 
Konzerne internationale Gewinnverlagerung betreiben. Allerdings gehen die Schätzungen 
zum genauen Ausmaß der Gewinnverlagerung deutscher Unternehmen weit 
auseinander.103 Analog zu den Studien, die ein relativ geringes Maß der Gewinnverlagerung 
konstatieren, gibt es Hinweise in der empirischen Literatur, dass Deutschland effektive 
Missbrauchsvorschriften, wie beispielsweise die Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung, etabliert hat 
(vgl. z.B. Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012), Schanz and Feller (2015)). 
Seit 2006 findet die Hinzurechungsbesteuerung jedoch faktisch keine Anwendung 
innerhalb der EU, was deutschen Konzernen Steuerplanungsmöglichkeiten eröffnet.104 
Gleichzeitig hat Belgien 2006 das NID Regime eingeführt, was den steuerlichen Abzug 
eines Eigenkapital-Zinsaufwandes ermöglicht (vgl. z.B. Gerard (2006a)). Mit dieser 
Kombination aus praktisch nicht greifender Hinzurechungsbesteuerung und NID Regime 
                                              
101 Vgl. für die beherrschende Meinung der öffentlichen Debatte z.B. Meck (2013). Auch im akademischen Diskurs 
lag der Fokus zunächst auf den Steuerplanungsmodellen von US-amerikanischen Unternehmen (vgl. z.B. Pinkernell 
(2012), Sullivan (2012)). 
102 Laut Spiegel Online hat eine belgische Tochtergesellschaft von Volkswagen im Jahr 2011 141 Mio. Euro steuerfrei 
vereinnahmt und eine belgische Tochtergesellschaft von BASF bzw. Bayer eine effektive Steuerquote von 2,4% 
bzw. 4,2% aufgewiesen. Zu einem ähnlichen Ergebnis kommt eine Studie im Auftrag der Europagruppe GRÜNE im 
Europäischen Parlament zur Steuerplanung von BASF, welche eine Steuerersparnis durch das NID Regime zwischen 
2010 und 2015 in Höhe von 202 Mio. Euro in Belgien konstatiert, was einer effektiven Steuerquote von 1,29% 
entspricht, vgl. Auerbach (2016). 
103 So beziffert Bach (2013) anhand der volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtrechnung die höchstmögliche 
Gewinnverlagerung für Deutschland auf etwa 90 Mrd. Euro für das Jahr 2008. Heckemeyer and Spengel (2008) 
hingegen korrigieren dieses Maß auf maximal 61 Mrd. Euro. Finke (2013) berechnet einen Steueraufkommensverlust 
von etwa 10 Mrd. Euro für das Jahr 2007 und Huizinga and Laeven (2008) berechnen einen Aufkommensverlust von 
lediglich 1,3 Mrd. Euro für das Jahr 1999 (bei damals deutlich höheren Steuersätzen). 
104 Seit dem Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofes vom 12.09.2006 in der Rechtssache Cadbury-Schweppes ist die 
Anwendung der Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung ausgeschlossen, wenn eine Tochtergesellschaft in einem Mitgliedstaat 
des Europäischen Wirtschaftsraums eine tatsächliche wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit ausübt und der Steuerpflichtige dies 
nachweist, vgl. European Court of Justice (2006). Empirische Hinweise für vermehrte Steuerplanung in der EU 
nach 2006 liefern Ruf and Weichenrieder (2013). 
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bietet Belgien für deutsche multinationale Konzerne sehr gute Bedingungen, um Gewinne 
mittels konzerninterner Fremdfinanzierung aus Hochsteuerländern wie Deutschland oder 
Frankreich steuerfrei zu vereinnahmen und anschließend an die Konzernmuttergesellschaft 
auszuschütten.105 
Die ökonomische Fundierung findet das NID Regime in den Arbeiten von Boadway and 
Bruce (1979), Wenger (1983) sowie Boadway and Bruce (1984). Durch den Abzug von 
Eigenkapital-Zinsaufwand sichert die zinsbereinigte Einkommensteuer verzerrungsfreie 
Finanzierungs- und Investitionsentscheidungen und wird auch als Allowance for Corporate 
Equity (ACE) bezeichnet (vgl. Institute of Fiscal Studies (1991)). Auch heute noch ist die 
Diskussion um die ACE aktuell. So empfiehlt beispielsweise der Mirrlees Review von 2011 
die Einführung eines ACE Regimes für Großbritannien (vgl. Mirrlees (2011)). Zudem sieht 
der Richtlinien-Entwurf der Europäischen Kommission für eine Gemeinsame 
Körperschaftsteuer-Bemessungsgrundlage eine ACE-ähnliche Regelung vor (vgl. Artikel 11 
in European Commission (2016b)). 
Empirisch befassen sich Hebous and Ruf (2017) mit der Wirkung von NID Regimen auf 
ausländische Tochtergesellschaften deutscher Unternehmen. Sie ermitteln, dass sich die 
Fremdkapitalquote von Tochtergesellschaften in Staaten mit NID Regimen um drei bis 
fünf Prozentpunkte verringert. Zudem stellen sie fest, dass die Einführung eines NID 
Regimes zwar einen Anstieg des passiven Investments einer Tochtergesellschaft induziert, 
jedoch keine Erhöhung des Sachanlagevermögens nach sich zieht. Empirische Hinweise, 
dass sich die Einführung des NID Regimes in Belgien auf die Kapitalstruktur von 
belgischen Unternehmen ausgewirkt hat, liefern Princen (2012) und Panier et al. (2015). Sie 
stellen fest, dass die Fremdkapitalquote belgischer Unternehmen nach Einführung des NID 
Regimes signifikant sinkt. Speziell für belgische Banken berechnet Schepens (2016) eine 
Erhöhung der Eigenkapitalquote um etwa 19%. 
Diese empirischen Studien zeigen, dass sich das NID Regime erheblich auf die 
Kapitalstruktur von belgischen Unternehmen auswirken kann. Darüber hinaus kommen 
ökonometrische Analysen zum Einfluss des Steuersatzes auf die Kapitalstruktur von 
Unternehmen zu dem Ergebnis, dass eine Erhöhung des Steuersatzes um 10 Prozentpunkte 
eine Erhöhung der Fremdkapitalquote von 1,5 bis 3 Prozentpunkten bewirkt.106 
                                              
105 Belgien ist nicht der erste Staat, der ein NID Regime eingeführt hat. Bereits in den 1990er Jahren ließen Italien, 
Kroatien und Österreich einen Abzug von Eigenkapital-Zinsaufwand zu. Allerdings haben diese Staaten das Regime 
zwischen 2001 und 2004 wieder abgeschafft. 2011 hat Italien das NID Regime zwar wiedereingeführt, allerdings liegt 
die effektive Steuerentlastung durch das NID Regime in Belgien über der Entlastung in Italien im hier betrachteten 
Zeitraum, sodass Belgien europaweit der attraktivste Standort zur Nutzung des NID Regimes ist. Zudem haben 
Lettland (2009–2013), Liechtenstein (ab 2011) und Portugal (2008–2013) ein NID Regime eingeführt, vgl. Massimi 
and Petroni (2012) und Zangari (2014). 
106 Vgl. z.B. Desai et al. (2004), Mintz and Weichenrieder (2005), Buettner et al. (2009), Overesch and Wamser (2009), 
Buettner et al. (2012) oder Feld et al. (2013). 
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Dies ist ökonomisch betrachtet jedoch kein sonderlich großer Einfluss, was vielschichtige 
Gründe haben kann. Ein Grund könnte darin liegen, dass die Steuerplanungsmöglichkeiten 
der Unternehmen in den jeweiligen Datensätzen sehr heterogen sind. So werden in den 
Studien beispielsweise auch kleine multinationale Unternehmen betrachtet, die 
Steuerplanung verglichen mit großen multinationalen Unternehmen wohl eher in geringem 
Umfang betreiben. Diese Argumentation wird durch Rego (2003) unterstützt, die 
herausfindet, dass große multinationale Konzerne von Skaleneffekten bei der 
Steuerplanung profitieren. 
Mit dem hier vorgenommenen Fallstudienansatz, das heißt dem expliziten Betrachten von 
Einzelbilanzen belgischer Tochtergesellschaften der DAX und MDAX Konzerne, wird der 
Fokus auf die größten und umsatzstärksten deutschen börsennotierten Konzerne gelegt. 
Dazu wird im Folgenden auf eine Regressionsanalyse verzichtet und stattdessen eine 
Fallstudie anhand eines einzigartigen und detaillierten Datensatzes, der die Daten aller 
unkonsolidierten Einzelabschlüsse belgischer Tochtergesellschaften der DAX und MDAX 
Konzerne enthält, entwickelt. Anhand des Detailgrades des Datensatzes können mittels 
dieses Fallstudienansatzes einzelne Finanzierungsgesellschaften identifiziert und in ihrer 
Bilanzstruktur sowie der Zusammensetzung ihres Geschäftes analysiert werden. Es ist 
ebenfalls möglich, Abschätzungen zum Umfang der Gewinnverlagerung und deren 
Effektivität auf Ebene der einzelnen Gesellschaften vorzunehmen. Dadurch wird deutlich, 
welche Konzerne Belgien als Standort für ihre Finanzierungsgesellschaften nutzen, 
inwieweit diese Gesellschaften neben dem Finanzierungsgeschäft für den Konzern auch 
operativ tätig sind und welche Steuerersparnis die Konzerne durch konzerninterne 
Darlehensvergabe einer belgischen Tochtergesellschaft generieren können. 
Der Detailgrad der erhobenen Abschlüsse ist deutlich höher als der in gängigen 
Unternehmensdatenbanken wie Amadeus (Bureau van Dijk) oder Compustat North 
America (Standard & Poor‘s). Zudem kann im Rahmen der Fallstudie ein vollständiges Bild 
aller belgischen Tochtergesellschaften der deutschen DAX und MDAX Konzerne 
garantiert werden. Die Fallstudie bietet somit einen deutlich besseren Einblick in 
Steuerplanungsaktivitäten deutscher DAX und MDAX Konzerne in Belgien als es durch 
Verwendung einer gängigen Unternehmensdatenbank möglich wäre. 
Die Fallstudie ist wie folgt strukturiert: Zunächst wird anhand einer Steuerwirkungsanalyse 
erläutert, wie Unternehmensgewinne in Belgien praktisch zum Nulltarif versteuert werden 
können und wie die Bilanz einer typischen belgischen Finanzierungsgesellschaft aufgebaut 
sein sollte. Anschließend werden die einzelnen Bilanzen der belgischen DAX und MDAX 
Tochtergesellschaften analysiert und Finanzierungsgesellschaften identifiziert. Sodann 
werden Abschätzungen zur Gewinnverlagerung und Steuerersparnis dieser Gesellschaften 
sowie zum Steueraufkommen Belgiens durch Einführung des NID Regimes 
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vorgenommen. Zum Schluss wird durch Verwendung von Daten aus Amadeus versucht, 
ein vergleichbares Bild für belgische Tochtergesellschaften französischer Konzerne sowie 
europäischer Tochtergesellschaften deutscher Konzerne zu zeichnen. Dadurch werden die 
Limitationen einer unternehmensdatenbankgestützten Analyse deutlich. 
6.2 Notional Interest Deduction und steueroptimierte 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften 
6.2.1 Rechtliche Grundlagen zur Notional Interest Deduction 
Belgien verfügt über verschiedene steuerliche Regelungen, die es als Standort für 
Gewinnverlagerung attraktiv machen. So senkt das NID Regime die Steuerlast auf mit 
Eigenkapital finanzierte Investitionen, das Patentbox Regime erlaubt niedrige Steuersätze 
auf Lizenzerträge107 und das Excess Profit Regime erlaubt es, die 
Steuerbemessungsgrundlage belgischer Tochtergesellschaften multinationaler Konzerne 
um 50% bis 90%108 zu verringern. Die Europäische Kommission sieht in ihrer 
Entscheidung vom 11.01.2016 diese Regelung jedoch als einen Verstoß gegen den in den 
EU-Beihilfevorschriften verankerten Fremdvergleichsgrundsatz und somit eine unerlaubte 
Staatshilfe (vgl. European Commission (2016a)). Trotz dieser Entscheidung findet das 
Excess Profit Regime während des gesamten hier betrachteten Zeitraums uneingeschränkte 
Anwendung. Allerdings nutzt keine der in Table 42 identifizierten 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften dieses Regime.109 Zudem verfügt Belgien über eine hohe Zahl 
von Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (DBA)110, sodass Quellensteuereinflüsse auf die 
Gewinnverlagerung gering ausfallen dürften. Innerhalb der EU fallen zudem aufgrund der 
Zins- und Lizenzrichtlinie sowie der Mutter-Tochter-Richtlinie keine Quellensteuern auf 
Zins- und Lizenzzahlungen sowie Dividenden an. 
Das in dieser Fallstudie betrachtete NID Regime erlaubt es Unternehmen, einen 
Eigenkapital-Zinsaufwand für steuerliche Zwecke vom zu versteuernden Einkommen 
abzuziehen. Begünstigt werden neben belgischen Unternehmen auch Betriebstätten 
                                              
107 Artikel 205/1–205/4 des belgischen Einkommensteuergesetzes erlaubt es Kapitalgesellschaften und deren 
Betriebstätten 80% der Erträge aus selbsterstellten Patenten von dem zu versteuernden Einkommen abzuziehen, 
soweit diese Erträge dem Fremdüblichkeitsgrundsatz entsprechen. Die effektive Steuerbelastung für Einkommen aus 
Patenten beträgt bei dem belgischen Körperschaftsteuersatz von 33,99% folglich nur 6,8% (vgl. z.B. PwC (2016)). 
108 Der tatsächliche aus belgischer Geschäftstätigkeit stammende Gewinn wird dabei aufgeteilt in einen hypothetischen 
Durchschnittsgewinn eines eigenständigen Unternehmens und einen Mehrgewinn („excess profit“), der nur deshalb 
entsteht, weil die Gesellschaft Teil eines Konzerns ist. Die Steuerbemessungsgrundlage wird dann proportional 
verringert.  
109 Mit der BASF ist zwar ein DAX Konzern unter den begünstigten Gesellschaften, die betreffende Gesellschaft 
(BASF Antwerpen) wird in Abschnitt 6.4.1 jedoch nicht als Finanzierungsgesellschaft identifiziert. 
110 Belgien verfügt 2014 über 94 DBA, Deutschland z.B. über 98 DBA. 
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ausländischer Unternehmen111, solange diese der belgischen Körperschaftsteuer 
unterliegen, sowie ausländische Unternehmen, die Immobilien in Belgien besitzen oder die 
Eigentumsrechte an solchen Immobilen halten. Ausgeschlossen sind hingegen 
Unternehmen, die bereits anderen Vergünstigungsregimen unterliegen, wie etwa der 
Tonnagebesteuerung oder dem Coordination Center Regime.112 Der Basissatz für das NID 
Regime wird jährlich festgelegt und bestimmt sich aus dem monatlichen Durchschnitt 
risikofreier 10-jähriger belgischer Staatsanleihen während des Kalenderjahres vor dem 
jeweiligen Steuerjahr. Mit diesem Abzug sollen die ökonomischen Eigenkapitalkosten 
abgebildet werden und die steuerliche Diskriminierung von Eigenkapital gegenüber 
Fremdkapital reduziert werden (vgl. Gerard (2006b)). 
Mit der belgischen Unternehmenssteuerreform von 2013 wird der maximale Eigenkapital-
Zinssatz des NID Regimes auf 3% für große Unternehmen113 beschränkt; Änderungen 
dieses Zinssatzes dürfen nicht mehr als einen Prozentpunkt betragen. Gleichzeitig wird der 
bis dahin mögliche siebenjährige NID Vortrag abgeschafft. Der bis zum Steuerjahr 2012 
angesammelte NID Vortrag kann weiterhin vorgetragen werden. Die jeweils gültigen 
Zinssätze für das NID Regime für die Jahre 2011 bis 2014 sind in Table 40 dargestellt. 
  
                                              
111 Nach alter Rechtslage (eingeschränkte Selbständigkeitsfiktion) waren Finanzierungsbetriebstätten aus deutscher 
Sicht nicht möglich, da die Zinserträge dem Stammhaus zugerechnet wurden (Zentralfunktion des Stammhauses). 
Nach neuer Rechtslage (uneingeschränkte Selbständigkeitsfiktion, ab 2013) können gemäß § 17 BsGaV Konzerne zwar 
generell ausländische Betriebstätten zur Erbringung konzerninterner Finanzdienstleistungen 
(Finanzierungsbetriebstätte) einrichten, welche die Liquiditätssteuerung für eine oder mehrere andere Betriebstätten 
desselben Unternehmens ausüben. Einer Finanzierungsbetriebstätte werden jedoch nach § 17 Absatz 2 und 5 BsGaV 
regelmäßig weder die Zinsaufwendungen noch das benötigte Eigenkapital zugeordnet, sodass kaum nennenswerte 
Gewinne in der Betriebstätte anfallen dürften. Sofern die Kapitalerträge aus diesen Finanzierungsaktivitäten einer 
niedrigen Besteuerung unterliegen, greift in Deutschland im hier betrachteten Zeitraum zudem § 20 Absatz 2 AStG 
(Switch-over-Klausel), sodass die Kapitalerträge mit dem deutschen Besteuerungsniveau belastet werden und der 
Steuersatzvorteil verloren geht. Im Folgenden wird daher auf eine Untersuchung von Finanzierungsbetriebstätten 
verzichtet. 
112 Dies gilt für Unternehmen, die das Coordination Center Regime gemäß des Königlichen Erlasses Nummer 187 
vom 30.12.1982 nutzen. Das Coordination Center Regime, welches die Vorgängerregelung des NID Regimes darstellt, 
war für Firmen, die bereits 2003 ein Coordination Center waren, mit einer 10-jährigen Verlängerung noch maximal 
bis 2015 anwendbar. Somit hat das Coordination Center Regime bereits seit 2003 keine steuerplanerische Relevanz 
mehr. Für einen Überblick der gesetzlich vorgesehenen Anwendungsausnahmen vgl. Federal Public Service Finance 
(2012). 
113 Ein großes Unternehmen ist ein Unternehmen, das mindestens zwei der drei Größenkriterien erfüllt: 
i) Nettoumsatz von mindestens 7,3 Mio. Euro, ii) eine Bilanzsumme von mindestens 3,65 Mio. Euro und iii) 
mindestens 50 Mitarbeiter (vgl. Artikel 15 des belgischen Körperschaftsteuergesetzes). 
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Table 40. Eigenkapital-Zinssätze des 
belgischen NID Regimes. 
Steuerjahr NID Regime Satz 
2011 3,800% 
2012 3,425% 
2013 3,000% 
2014 2,630% 
Gezeigt werden die Eigenkapital-
Zinssätze des belgischen NID Regimes 
für die Jahre 2011–2014. 
 
Der steuerliche Abzug bemisst sich nach dem qualifizierten Eigenkapital. Dies ist das in der 
Eröffnungsbilanz des jeweiligen Steuerjahres ausgewiesene Eigenkapital, welches gemäß 
belgischer Rechnungslegungsvorschriften ermittelt wurde. Enthalten sind darin unter 
anderem eingezahltes Unternehmenskapital, Aktienagios, nicht realisierte 
Neubewertungsgewinne, stille Reserven, Gewinn- oder Verlustvorträge, Gewinnrücklagen 
sowie Subventionen (Investitionszuschüsse und Investitionszulagen). Um eine künstliche 
Überbewertung des Eigenkapitals und eine doppelte Nutzung von Steuervorteilen zu 
verhindern, sind unter anderem folgende Posten vom Eigenkapital abzuziehen: i) der 
steuerliche Nettowert eigener Anteile, ii) der steuerliche Nettowert von Anteilen und 
Aktien, die dem belgischen Schachtelprivileg unterliegen, iii) das ausländische 
Betriebstättenvermögen, sofern Belgien mit dem Belegenheitsstaat ein DBA abgeschlossen 
hat, sowie iv) der steuerbefreite Anteil von Neubewertungsgewinnen, Subventionen und 
Steuergutschriften für Forschung und Entwicklung (vgl. IBFD (2014) Abschnitt 1.9.6.). 
6.2.2 Steuerplanerische Möglichkeiten mit Finanzierungsgesellschaften 
Aus dem belgischen Besteuerungssystem ergeben sich steuerplanerisch attraktive 
Möglichkeiten für deutsche Konzerne. So lässt sich durch die Kombination des belgischen 
NID Regimes mit der europäischen Mutter-Tochter-Richtlinie und der faktischen 
Nichtanwendung der deutschen Hinzurechungsbesteuerung innerhalb des Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsraumes (vgl. Fußnote 104) eine Finanzierungsgesellschaft mit einer 
theoretischen effektiven Steuerquote von 0% errichten. Diese Möglichkeit wird im 
Folgenden systematisch dargestellt und anhand einer Steuerwirkungsanalyse erläutert. 
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Figure 19. Konzerninterne Fremdfinanzierung mittels Finanzierungsgesellschaft in 
Belgien. 
 
Quelle: Eigene Darstellung. 
 
Wie in Figure 19 gezeigt, würde eine deutsche Konzernmuttergesellschaft zur Erreichung 
einer niedrigen effektiven Steuerquote das benötigte Kapital für eine Investition nicht direkt 
an eine operative Gesellschaft geben, sondern stattdessen eine Einlage in eine belgische 
Kapitalgesellschaft tätigen. Diese Einlage würde gleichzeitig das gesamte Eigenkapital (𝐸𝐾) 
der Finanzierungsgesellschaft darstellen. Die belgische Finanzierungsgesellschaft könnte 
die Einlage als Darlehen (𝐷) an eine andere Konzerngesellschaft weitergeben und würde 
im Gegenzug Zinszahlungen in Höhe von 𝑖 ∗ 𝐷 für die Überlassung des Darlehens 
erhalten, wobei 𝑖 der fremdvergleichsübliche Zinssatz ist. Der Zahlungsüberschuss nach 
Steuern (𝑍Ü𝑁
𝐵𝐸) der Finanzierungsgesellschaft ergibt sich nach folgender Gleichung, wobei 
𝑛 der fiktive Eigenkapital-Zinssatz ist und 𝑠𝐾
𝐵𝐸 der belgische Körperschaftsteuersatz114: 
𝑍Ü𝑁
𝐵𝐸 = 𝑖 ∗ 𝐷 − 𝑠𝐾
𝐵𝐸 ∗ [𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑖 ∗ 𝐷 − 𝑛 ∗ 𝐸𝐾 −min (𝑉𝑁; 𝑉𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥)); 0]. (6.1) 
𝑉𝑁 bezeichnet den 2013 abgeschafften Vortrag für ungenutzten Eigenkapital-Zinsaufwand 
und 𝑉𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 = max (1 𝑀𝑖𝑜. €; 𝑖 ∗ 𝐷 ∗ 0,6) den durch die Mindestbesteuerung begrenzten 
maximal abzugsfähigen ungenutzten Eigenkapital-Zinsaufwand. In einer idealtypischen 
Finanzierungsgesellschaft, welche nur zur Steueroptimierung etabliert wurde, sollte es im 
Allgemeinen jedoch nicht zur Bildung eines NID Vortrags kommen, da niedrige Kosten 
(z.B. fixe Personalkosten) hohen verlagerten Gewinnen gegenüberstehen sollten. Daher 
                                              
114 𝑠𝐾
𝐵𝐸  beträgt 33,99% und ist der kombinierte Steuersatz für Kapitalgesellschaften aus Körperschaftsteuersatz (33%) 
und dem Sanierungsprogrammzuschlag (contribution complémentaire de crise) (3%). 
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wird im Folgenden vereinfachend davon ausgegangen, dass der Vortrag ungenutzten 
Eigenkapital-Zinsaufwands null beträgt (𝑉𝑁 = 0).115 
Wenn 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛, sind die Gewinne aus dem konzerninternen Darlehen in Belgien steuerfrei. 
Wenn 𝑖 > 𝑛, wird auf die Differenz zwischen den Zinszahlungen und dem Eigenkapital-
Zinsaufwand (𝑖 ∗ 𝐷 − 𝑛 ∗ 𝐸𝐾) der Körperschaftsteuersatz angewandt. In diesem Fall 
könnte es aus Konzernsicht steuerlich sinnvoller sein, eine Finanzierungsgesellschaft in 
einem anderen EU-Mitgliedstaat zu gründen. Die Nutzung des NID Regimes in Belgien ist 
deswegen nur solange vorteilhaft gegenüber vergleichbaren Strukturen, wie gilt, dass der 
Zahlungsüberschuss nach Steuern in Belgien (𝑍Ü𝑁
𝐵𝐸) höher ist als der Zahlungsüberschuss 
nach Steuern in anderen EU-Mitgliedstaaten (𝑍Ü𝑁
𝐴 ). Anders ausgedrückt muss gelten, dass 
𝑍Ü𝑁
𝐵𝐸 = 𝑖 ∗ 𝐷 − 𝑠𝐾
𝐵𝐸 ∗ [𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑖 ∗ 𝐷 − 𝑛 ∗ 𝐸𝐾); 0] 
≥ 𝑖 ∗ 𝐷 − 𝑠𝐾
𝐴 ∗ 𝑖 ∗ 𝐷 = 𝑍Ü𝑁
𝐴 , 
(6.2) 
wobei 𝑠𝐾
𝐴 den ausländischen Körperschaftsteuersatz in Staat A darstellt. Sind die 
Zinserträge aus Darlehen an verbundenen Unternehmen kleiner als der Eigenkapital-
Zinsaufwand (𝑖 ∗ 𝐷 − 𝑛 ∗ 𝐸𝐾 ≤ 0), beträgt die belgische Körperschaftsteuer null, da 
durch das NID Regime weder eine Steuererstattung noch ein Verlustvortrag begründet 
werden kann. 
Sind die Zinserträge aus Darlehen an verbundenen Unternehmen größer als der 
Eigenkapital-Zinsaufwand (𝑖 ∗ 𝐷 − 𝑛 ∗ 𝐸𝐾 ≥ 0), ergibt sich ein Grenzzinssatz 𝑖∗ von:116 
𝑖∗ ≤
𝑛 ∗ 𝑠𝐾
𝐵𝐸
𝑠𝐾
𝐵𝐸 − 𝑠𝐾
𝐴 ∗
𝐸𝐾
𝐷
. 
(6.3) 
Der Grenzzinssatz bezeichnet die Höhe des Zinssatzes, bis zu der es vorteilhaft ist, die 
Finanzierungsgesellschaft in Belgien anstatt im Staat A zu gründen. Für (𝑠𝐾
𝐵𝐸 ≥ 𝑠𝐾
𝐴) sinkt 
ceteris paribus der Grenzzinssatz mit steigender Differenz der Körperschaftsteuersätze 
(𝑠𝐾
𝐵𝐸 − 𝑠𝐾
𝐴). Hingegen steigt der Grenzzinssatz, je höher das Verhältnis von Eigenkapital 
zu Darlehen an verbundenen Unternehmen ist (𝐸𝐾 𝐷⁄ ). Des Weiteren steigt der 
Grenzzinsatz, je höher der Zinssatz des NID Regimes (𝑛) ist. Da der Wert für 𝑛 über die 
Jahre variiert, ergeben sich in jeder Periode unterschiedliche Werte für 𝑖∗. 
Belgien ist demnach der günstigste Standort für eine Finanzierungsgesellschaft innerhalb 
der EU, solange die Differenz aus Zinsertrag aus konzerninternen Darlehen und dem NID-
                                              
115 Diese Annahme steht im Einklang mit Ergebnissen in Unterkapitel 6.4.1, wonach reine Finanzierungsgesellschaften 
niedrige Mitarbeiterzahlen, aber einen überdurchschnittlich hohen Gewinn aufweisen.  
116 Diese Betrachtung beschränkt sich auf Steuerplanung innerhalb der EU. Bezieht man Staaten mit ein, in denen die 
Mutter-Tochter-Richtlinie nicht zur Anwendung kommt, müssen zusätzlich etwaige Quellensteuern auf 
Dividendenzahlungen berücksichtigt werden. 
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Abzug niedriger besteuert wird als der gesamte Zinsertrag in den Staaten mit dem 
niedrigsten Körperschaftsteuersatz innerhalb der EU (Bulgarien, Irland und Zypern).117 
Unter der Annahme, dass das Eigenkapital der Finanzierungsgesellschaft den ausgereichten 
Darlehen (𝐷) entspricht118, ergeben sich für 2012 (𝑛 = 3,425%) Grenzwerte für den 
maximalen Zinssatz 𝑖∗ von 4,85% (Bulgarien) sowie 5,42% (Irland und Zypern). Dies sind 
durchaus realistische Grenzwerte für Zinssätze deutscher Konzerne im Jahr 2012,119 sodass 
das NID Regime in Belgien auch gegenüber Niedrigsteuerländern in der EU vorteilhaft ist. 
Da die deutsche Hinzurechnungsbesteuerung bei Finanzierungsgesellschaften außerhalb 
der EU greift, kann Belgien aus steuerlicher Sicht weltweit als der attraktivste Standort für 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften deutscher Konzerne angesehen werden. Es sollte allerdings 
darauf hingewiesen werden, dass Konzerne in der Wahl des verwendeten Zinssatzes durch 
Transferpreisregelungen eingeschränkt werden können (Fremdvergleichsgrundsatz), 
sodass es durchaus möglich ist, dass die tatsächlich verwendeten Zinssätze noch deutlich 
unter dem Grenzzinssatz liegen. 
6.3 Daten 
Die Studie betrachtet die am 31.12.2014 im DAX und MDAX gelisteten Konzerne. Der 
DAX enthält die umsatzstärksten deutschen Unternehmen und repräsentiert etwa 60% des 
Grundkapitals deutscher börsennotierter Unternehmen und 80% der Börsenumsätze in 
deutschen Aktien. Zudem bildet der Index die Branchenstruktur der deutschen 
Volkswirtschaft weitgehend ab. Der MDAX enthält deutsche Konzerne, welche nach 
Marktkapitalisierung und Börsenumsatz direkt auf die im DAX enthaltenen Werte folgen 
(vgl. boerse.de (2016a), boerse.de (2016b)). Somit spiegeln der DAX und MDAX die 
wirtschaftliche Situation von multinationalen Konzernen mit Sitz in Deutschland wider. 
Der Fokus dieser Analyse liegt auf der Bilanzstruktur von belgischen Tochtergesellschaften 
der DAX und MDAX Konzerne. Da Unternehmen aus dem Banken- und 
Versicherungssektor aufgrund zusätzlicher regulatorischer und institutioneller 
Rahmenbedingungen eine von Industrieunternehmen sehr unterschiedliche Bilanzstruktur 
aufweisen, werden vier DAX und drei MDAX Konzerne aus diesem Sektor von der 
Analyse ausgeschlossen.120 Zudem wird die 2014 im MDAX gelistete MAN AG 
                                              
117 Die Steuersätze für die Jahre 2011 bis 2014 betragen 10% für Bulgarien und 12,5% für Irland. Zypern hat 2011 und 
2012 einen Steuersatz von 10% und 2013 und 2014 einen Steuersatz von 12,5%. 
118 Diese Annahme entspricht näherungsweise den Ergebnissen in Unterkapitel 6.4.1. Steigt das Verhältnis von 
Eigenkapital zu Fremdkapital – etwa durch höhere liquide Mittel – nimmt der Grenzwert für den maximalen Zinssatz 
𝑖∗ zu. 
119 Laut einer Studie des Centrums für Bilanzierung und Prüfung an der Universität des Saarlandes liegen die 
durchschnittlichen Zinssätze für festverzinsliche Anleihen untersuchter DAX Konzerne im Jahr 2012 zwischen 1,7% 
(SAP SE) und 4,0% (HeidelbergCement AG) (vgl. Hansen et al. (2013)). 
120 Ausgeschlossen werden Allianz SE, Commerzbank AG, Deutsche Bank AG und Münchener Rückversicherungs-
Gesellschaft AG für den DAX sowie Aareal Bank AG, Hannover Rück SE und Talanx AG für den MDAX. Der 
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ausgeschlossen, an der die im DAX gelistete Volkswagen AG seit 2011 mehrheitlich 
beteiligt ist, um belgische Tochtergesellschaften der MAN AG nicht doppelt zu erfassen. 
Des Weiteren werden die Airbus Group SE und die RTL Group SA ausgeschlossen, da 
diese zwar im MDAX gelistet sind, ihren Konzernsitz aber nicht in Deutschland haben. 
Für die 70 restlichen Konzerne werden im jeweiligen Konzernabschluss 2014 alle 
belgischen Tochtergesellschaften herausgesucht, an denen der Konzern für die Jahre 2011 
bis 2014 durchgängig zu über 50% (Mehrheitsbeteiligung) beteiligt ist.121 Drei DAX 
Konzerne (Deutsche Börse AG, Infineon Technologies AG und Fresenius Medical Care 
AG & Co. KGaA) sowie 21 MDAX Konzerne verfügen über keine Mehrheitsbeteiligung 
an belgischen Tochtergesellschaften im hier betrachteten Zeitraum und werden somit von 
der Analyse ausgeschlossen. Für die verbleibenden 46 Konzerne beträgt die 
Grundgesamtheit an belgischen Tochtergesellschaften 170. 
Für diese 170 Gesellschaften werden die unkonsolidierten testierten Jahresabschlüsse für 
die Jahre 2011 bis 2014 von der Bilanzzentrale der Belgischen Nationalbank (Central 
Balance Sheet Office of the National Bank of Belgium) heruntergeladen. Die Bilanzzentrale 
sammelt und verarbeitet die Jahresabschlüsse praktisch aller in Belgien tätigen juristischen 
Personen und stellt diese öffentlich zur Verfügung.122 Für zwei Gesellschaften kann jedoch 
nicht für jedes Jahr ein Jahresabschluss gefunden werden; diese Gesellschaften werden aus 
dem Datensatz entfernt, wodurch der Konzern ProSiebenSat.1 Media SE komplett 
ausgeschlossen wird. Zudem werden 13 Gesellschaften ausgeschlossen, die jeweils in allen 
vier Jahren Verluste erwirtschaftet haben. Da nur im Falle eines Gewinnes die Anwendung 
des NID Regimes möglich ist (vgl. Unterkapitel 6.2.1), können diese Gesellschaften in 
keinem Jahr einen Vorteil aus dem Eigenkapital-Zinsaufwand ziehen.123 Schließlich werden 
zwei Gesellschaften ausgeschlossen, die jeweils in allen vier Jahren eine Bilanzsumme von 
null haben. Damit beträgt die endgültige Anzahl belgischer Tochtergesellschaften 153, die 
sich auf die 45 DAX und MDAX Konzerne wie in Table 41 dargestellt verteilen. 
  
                                              
Ausschluss von Unternehmen aus dem Finanzdienstleistungssektor in der Analyse von Gewinnverlagerung 
multinationaler Konzerne ist ein übliches Vorgehen in der empirischen Literatur (vgl. z.B. Weichenrieder (2009), 
Overesch and Schreiber (2010), Buettner et al. (2012)). 
121 Der Ausschluss von Minderheitsbeteiligungen in der Analyse von Gewinnverlagerung multinationaler Konzerne ist 
ein übliches Vorgehen in der empirischen Literatur (vgl. z.B. Huizinga and Laeven (2008), Huizinga et al. (2008), Beer 
and Loeprick (2015)). Theoretisch wird Gewinnverlagerung ausschließlich in 100%igen Tochtergesellschaften 
erwartet, da ansonsten die Vorteile der Gewinnverlagerung unter allen Anteilseignern geteilt und Informationen über 
die Steuerpolitik eines Konzerns (zumindest im Kreis der Anteilseigner der niedrig besteuerten Gesellschaft) öffentlich 
würden. Tatsächlich werden alle identifizierten Finanzierungsgesellschaften zu 100% gehalten (vgl. Table 42). 
122 Die Rechtsgrundlage für die Aufstellung und Hinterlegung der Jahresabschlüsse bei der Bilanzzentrale erfolgt gemäß 
europäischer und belgischer gesetzlicher Bestimmungen. Für weitere Informationen vgl. Bilanzzentrale der Belgischen 
Nationalbank (Central Balance Sheet Office of the National Bank of Belgium). 
123 Der Ausschluss von Verlustunternehmen in der Analyse von Gewinnverlagerung multinationaler Konzerne ist ein 
übliches Vorgehen in der empirischen Literatur (vgl. z.B. Rego (2003)). 
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Table 41. Überblick über untersuchte DAX und MDAX Konzerne und belgische Tochtergesellschaften. 
Konzern Anzahl 
belg. 
Tochterge-
sellschaften 
⌀ Bilanz-
summe der 
belg. Ges. 
(Mio. €) 
Anteil Bilanzsumme 
der belg. Ges. an 
Bilanzsumme des 
Konzerns 
⌀ Mitar-
beiteran-
zahl der 
belg. Ges. 
Anteil Mitarbeiter 
der belg. Ges. an 
Mitarbeiter des 
Konzerns 
Adidas AG 2 10 0,1% 33 0,1% 
Aurubis AG 1 904 20,8% 488 8,4% 
Axel Springer SE 1 9 0,2% 99 0,8% 
BASF SE 6 19.509 30,1% 3.557 3,3% 
BMW AG 5 2.510 1,8% 487 0,5% 
Bayer AG 4 10.349 18,3% 1.534 1,4% 
Beiersdorf AG 3 160 2,8% 106 0,6% 
Bilfinger SE 4 53 0,8% 843 1,4% 
Brenntag AG 2 146 2,5% 218 1,6% 
Celesio AG 3 132 1,6% 359 1,0% 
Continental AG 4 612 2,2% 658 0,4% 
DMG Mori Seiki AG 1 7 0,4% 20 0,3% 
Daimler AG 12 996 0,6% 1.051 0,4% 
Deutsche Lufthansa AG 2 24 0,1% 509 0,4% 
Deutsche Post AG 12 469 1,3% 3.377 0,7% 
Deutsche Telekom AG 1 9 0,0% 75 0,0% 
E.ON SE 1 78 0,1% 15 0,0% 
Evonik Industries AG 2 789 4,8% 1.027 3,1% 
Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA 2 43 0,1% 95 0,1% 
Fuchs Petrolub SE 1 17 1,5% 54 1,4% 
GEA Group AG 4 81 1,3% 238 1,0% 
Gerresheimer AG 1 40 2,5% 524 4,9% 
HeidelbergCement AG 9 2.316 8,3% 982 2,0% 
Henkel AG & Co. KGaA 2 169 0,9% 379 0,8% 
Hugo Boss AG 2 15 0,9% 105 0,8% 
Jungheinrich AG 1 34 1,2% 174 1,6% 
K+S AG 2 1.372 19,6% 15 0,1% 
KION Group AG 1 18 0,3% 112 0,5% 
KUKA AG 2 13 0,9% 39 0,5% 
Klöckner & Co SE 2 26 0,6% 86 0,8% 
Krones AG 1 18 0,8% 42 0,4% 
Lanxess AG 2 1.076 15,1% 1.336 8,0% 
Leoni AG 1 6 0,3% 10 0,0% 
Linde AG 1 13 0,0% 33 0,1% 
Merck KGaA 3 42 0,2% 139 0,4% 
Metro Group AG 20 723 2,3% 5.028 1,9% 
RWE AG 2 309 0,4% 137 0,2% 
SAP SE 1 182 0,6% 250 0,4% 
STADA Arzneimittel AG 1 106 3,4% 96 1,1% 
Siemens AG 4 988 0,9% 1.667 0,4% 
Symrise AG 2 92 3,5% 2 0,0% 
Südzucker AG 3 1.343 15,7% 962 5,4% 
ThyssenKrupp AG 4 155 0,4% 487 0,3% 
Volkswagen AG 12 20.632 6,7% 3.362 0,6% 
Wincor Nixdorf AG 1 26 2,6% 158 9,7% 
Gesamt 153 66.622  30.967  
Betrachtet werden die am 31.12.2014 im DAX und MDAX gelisteten Konzerne und ihre belgischen 
Tochtergesellschaften (Mehrheitsbeteiligung) über den Zeitraum 2011–2014. Ausgeschlossen werden sieben 
Konzerne aus dem Banken- und Versicherungssektor, die MAN AG, die zur Volkswagen AG gehört, sowie die Airbus 
Group SE und RTL Group SA, welche ihren Konzernsitz nicht in Deutschland haben. 24 Konzerne haben keine 
Mehrheitsbeteiligung an belgischen Tochtergesellschaften; ein Konzern fällt heraus, da bei seiner (einzigen) belgischen 
Tochtergesellschaft nicht für jedes Jahr ein Jahresabschluss vorhanden ist. 
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Table 41 zeigt, dass die untersuchten DAX und MDAX Konzerne im Durchschnitt über 
die Jahre 2011 bis 2014 insgesamt etwa 67 Mrd. Euro Vermögenswerte124 in Belgien 
aufweisen, wobei drei Konzerne das Bild dominieren: BASF SE, Bayer AG und 
Volkswagen AG machen etwa 76% dieser Vermögenswerte aus. Auch bei der 
durchschnittlichen Mitarbeiteranzahl über die untersuchten Jahre ergibt sich ein 
heterogenes Bild: Neun Konzerne beschäftigen mehr als 1.000 Mitarbeiter in Belgien, 
während etwa die K+S AG nur 15 Mitarbeiter beschäftigt, jedoch knapp 1,4 Mrd. Euro 
Vermögenswerte in Belgien aufweist. 
Die Vorgehensweise des Konsultierens der Konzernabschlüsse und der Bilanzzentrale der 
Belgischen Nationalbank (Central Balance Sheet Office of the National Bank of Belgium) 
hat zwei essenzielle Vorteile im Rahmen dieser Analyse. Erstens werden die Daten direkt 
aus den Primärquellen erhoben, zum einen aus den Konzernabschlüssen bezüglich der 
Beteiligungsdaten an belgischen Tochtergesellschaften und zum anderen aus der 
Bilanzzentrale bezüglich der testierten Jahresabschlüsse dieser Gesellschaften. Damit kann 
ein korrekter sowie vollständiger Datensatz garantiert werden. Zweitens haben die 
Jahresabschlüsse einen hohen Detailgrad, den klassische Unternehmensdatenbanken wie 
etwa Amadeus oder Compustat North America nicht aufweisen, der für die weitere Analyse 
jedoch von grundlegender Bedeutung ist. So kann bei den Finanzanlagen und bei den 
Forderungen etwa ermittelt werden, in welcher Höhe Beteiligungen und Forderungen 
gegenüber verbundenen Unternehme bestehen. Aus der Bilanz der belgischen 
Tochtergesellschaften werden die folgenden Positionen erhoben:125 
 Beteiligungen an verbundenen Unternehmen (280) 
 Sonstige Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen Unternehmen (281 bzw. 9281) 
 Forderungen aus Lieferung und Leistung (290 und 40) 
 Liquide Mittel (50/53 und 54/58) 
 Eigenkapital (10/15) 
 Bilanzsumme (20/58) 
Zudem enthält der Anhang zum Jahresabschluss relevante Daten zu Forderungen 
gegenüber verbundenen Unternehmen (9291), worin aber auch Forderungen aus Lieferung 
und Leistung enthalten sein können, die aus dem operativen Geschäft der belgischen 
Tochtergesellschaft stammen und nicht in Zusammenhang mit Darlehen an verbundene 
Unternehmen stehen. Um diese Position von Forderungen aus Lieferung und Leistung zu 
bereinigen, werden die in der Bilanz mit der Bilanzposition 290 und 40 aufgeführten 
                                              
124 Die Vermögenswerte entsprechen der Bilanzsumme abzüglich dem Buchwert der Beteiligung an belgischen 
Tochtergesellschaften. 
125 Zahlen in Klammern hinter den Variablen beziehen sich auf die Position im standardisierten Jahresabschluss der 
Bilanzzentrale der Belgischen Nationalbank (Central Balance Sheet Office of the National Bank of Belgium). 
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Forderungen aus Lieferung und Leistung von der Position abgezogen. Dadurch werden 
zwar eventuell auch Forderungen aus Lieferung und Leistung gegenüber Konzerndritten 
abgezogen, das ist allerdings unkritisch, da auf diese Weise die Forderungen gegenüber 
verbundenen Unternehmen in der weiteren Analyse höchstens unterschätzt126 werden und 
eine idealtypische Finanzierungsgesellschaft kein operatives Geschäft unterhält. Im 
Weiteren werden zu dieser Position die unter Finanzanlagen aufgeführten sonstigen 
Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen Unternehmen (281 bzw. 9281) hinzuaddiert, da diese 
in der Position 9291 nicht enthalten sind. Diese Variable deckt nun alle Forderungen 
gegenüber verbundenen Unternehmen ab, die nicht aus dem operativen Geschäft stammen. 
Schließlich wird für die belgischen Tochtergesellschaften noch die Anhangangabe zur 
durchschnittlichen Mitarbeiteranzahl in Vollzeitäquivalenten (9087) erhoben. 
Aus der Gewinn- und Verlustrechnung der belgischen Tochtergesellschaften werden die 
folgenden Positionen erhoben: 
 Operativer Ertrag (70/74) 
 Operativer Gewinn (9901) 
 Finanzertrag (75) 
 Sonstiger Finanzertrag (752/9)127 
 Finanzaufwand (65) 
 Zinsaufwand (650) 
 Gewinn (Verlust) vor Steuern (9903) 
 Ertragsteueraufwand (67/77) 
 Gewinn (Verlust) (9904) 
Für die 45 DAX und MDAX Konzerne werden für die Jahre 2011 bis 2014 aus Amadeus 
das Eigenkapital, die Bilanzsumme, der Gewinn (Verlust) vor Steuern, der 
Ertragsteueraufwand und die Mitarbeiteranzahl aus ihren konsolidierten 
Konzernabschlüssen heruntergeladen. 
6.4 Deskriptiv-empirische Analyse der Notional Interest Deduction 
6.4.1 Identifikation von Finanzierungsgesellschaften 
Die idealtypische Finanzierungsgesellschaft würde ausschließlich mit Eigenkapital 
finanziert und das gesamte Eigenkapital in Form von Darlehen an Konzerngesellschaften 
weiterreichen (vgl. Unterkapitel 6.2.2). Folglich würde die Aktivseite der Bilanz nur aus 
                                              
126 Das verwendete Maß kann auch negativ werden. In diesem Fall wird der Wert auf null gesetzt. 
127 Der sonstige finanzielle Ertrag ist eine Unterposition vom Finanzertrag (75) und enthält Erträge aus 
Währungseffekten, Optionen und Finanzprodukten. 
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Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen Unternehmen bestehen. In der Praxis ist jedoch eine 
deutliche Abweichung von dieser idealtypischen Bilanz zu erwarten. So könnte eine solche 
Finanzierungsgesellschaft auch über erhebliche liquide Mittel verfügen, die aus noch nicht 
vergebenen oder bereits beglichenen Darlehen sowie aus Zinszahlungen stammen könnten. 
Als wichtigstes Kriterium für die Identifikation einer Finanzierungsgesellschaft wird daher 
der Anteil der Summe der Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen Unternehmen, die nicht 
aus Lieferung und Leistung stammen (im Folgenden „Forderungen gegenüber 
verbundenen Unternehmen“), und der liquiden Mitteln an der Bilanzsumme der 
Gesellschaft herangezogen. Dieser Anteil muss in jedem der vier Jahre über 50% liegen. 
Dies bedeutet, dass sich mehr als die Hälfte der Vermögenswerte aus konzerninternen 
Darlehen oder liquiden Mitteln zusammensetzen. Grundsätzlich könnte dieser 
Schwellenwert auch höher oder niedriger liegen. Für die identifizierten 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften (vgl. Table 42) dürfte der Schwellenwert bis auf 71% steigen, 
damit alle identifizierten Finanzierungsgesellschaft auch weiterhin identifiziert werden. 
Über einen hohen Forderungsbestand gegenüber verbundenen Unternehmen hinaus sollte 
eine Finanzierungsgesellschaft auch ein relativ hohes Finanzergebnis aufweisen. Dazu wird 
das Verhältnis aus Finanzergebnis und operativem Ergebnis herangezogen, welches in 
jedem der vier Jahre im Betrag größer als eins sein muss. Zudem muss das Finanzergebnis 
positiv sein. Auch hier sind höhere oder niedrigere Schwellenwerte denkbar. Für die 
identifizierten Finanzierungsgesellschaften liegt der minimale Schwellenwert bei 2,3, damit 
alle identifizierten Finanzierungsgesellschaften auch weiterhin identifiziert werden. 
Zudem wird für jede Gesellschaft eine effektive Steuerquote128 von maximal 20% in jedem 
der vier Jahre vorausgesetzt. Somit wird sichergestellt, dass die Gesellschaft tatsächlich zu 
einer Senkung der effektiven Konzernsteuerquote beiträgt. Der Schwellenwert von 20% 
bedeutet eine deutliche Senkung des belgischen Körperschaftsteuersatzes (33,99%) und der 
durchschnittlichen effektiven Konzernsteuerquote der betrachteten DAX und MDAX 
Konzerne (28%) um 40% und 30%.129 
Schließlich muss die Bilanzsumme der belgischen Tochtergesellschaft mindestens 1% der 
jeweiligen Konzernbilanzsumme in jedem der vier Jahre betragen, um im Konzern von 
ausreichend ökonomischer Relevanz zu sein.130 
Unter Anwendung dieser Kriterien lassen sich sieben Finanzierungsgesellschaften 
identifizieren. Diese sind mit den wichtigsten Kennzahlen in Table 42 aufgelistet. 
                                              
128 Die effektive Steuerquote wird als Verhältnis des Steueraufwands zum Gewinn vor Steuern des jeweiligen Jahres 
definiert. 
129 Zu beachten ist hierbei, dass eine mögliche Steuerersparnis in Belgien bereits in der effektiven Konzernsteuerquote 
berücksichtigt ist. 
130 Für die BASF SE liegt der Schwellenwert z.B. im Jahr 2014 bei 714 Mio. Euro. Dies würde eine steuerfreie 
Gewinnverlagerung nach Belgien von mindestens 19 Mio. Euro (=714 Mio. Euro * 2,63%) im Jahr 2014 implizieren. 
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Table 42. Bilanzpositionen und Kennzahlen der Finanzierungsgesellschaften. 
Konzerna Bilanz-
summe 
(Mio. €) 
Anteil 
Ford. ggü. 
verb. Unt. 
an Bilanz-
summe 
Anteil 
liquider 
Mittel an 
Bilanz-
summe 
Eigen-
kapital-
quote 
Mitar-
beiter-
anzahlb 
Verhältnis Ge-
winn pro Mit-
arbeiter der 
Tochterges. 
zum Konzern 
Effek-
tive 
Steuer-
quote 
BASF SE 15.755 99% 0% 92% 216 5 2% 
Bayer AG 9.980 94% 0% 91% 805 10 6% 
Beiersdorf AG 107 59% 41% 100% 1 20 1% 
Heidelberg-Cement AG 1.357 98% 0% 100% 9 290 1% 
K+S AG 1.892 65% 6% 100% 3 478 17% 
Symrise AG 92 99% 1% 95% 1 80 5% 
Volkswagen AG 19.331 90% 9% 49%c 56 90 0% 
Aufgeführt sind alle DAX und MDAX Konzerne mit Finanzierungsgesellschaften für 2011–2014. Die Beteiligung 
beträgt in allen Fällen 100%. Die angewandten Kriterien sind für alle vier Jahre (1) eine Mindestbilanzsumme der 
Gesellschaft von 1% der jeweiligen Konzernbilanzsumme, (2) eine maximale effektive Steuerquote von 20%, (3) ein 
Anteil der Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen Unternehmen, die nicht aus Lieferung und Leistung stammen (wie 
in Unterkapitel 6.3 dargelegt), und der liquiden Mittel von mindestens 50% der Bilanzsumme sowie (4) ein 
Finanzergebnis, welches das operative Ergebnis übersteigt. Die Werte entsprechen dem arithmetischen Mittel der 
Jahre 2011–2014. 
a Für die angegebenen DAX und MDAX Konzerne wird jeweils eine mögliche belgische Finanzierungsgesellschaft 
identifiziert. Die Namen dieser Finanzierungsgesellschaften sowie weitere Bilanzdaten und Kennzahlen sind in Table 
A 7 im Anhang (Appendix to Section 6) aufgeführt. 
b Die Tochtergesellschaften der BASF SE und Bayer AG verfügen über substantielles Anlagevermögen (inklusive 
immaterieller Vermögenswerte). Zudem werden Umsätze von etwa 120 Mio. und 1,2 Mrd. Euro erreicht und 
Aufwendungen für Handelswaren, Hilfs- und Grundstoffe von etwa 40 und 850 Mio. Euro verbucht (Werte jeweils 
für das Jahr 2014). Die Gesellschaften scheinen also neben dem Finanzierungsgeschäft auch einen operativen 
Geschäftsteil zu haben, der unter anderem auch in der Forschung und Entwicklung tätig sein könnte. Dies könnte 
die verhältnismäßig hohe Mitarbeiteranzahl erklären. 
c Die Tochtergesellschaft der Volkswagen AG verfügt über einen hohen Anteil an Forderungen gegenüber 
verbundenen Unternehmen. Dieser übersteigt jedoch die Eigenkapitalquote deutlich. Folglich ist ein großer Anteil 
(mindestens 46%) dieser Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen Unternehmen nicht mit Eigenkapital, sondern mit 
Fremdkapital unterlegt. Das Fremdkapital stammt vermutlich jedoch nicht aus konzerninterner Darlehensaufnahme, 
sondern aus externer Darlehensaufnahme. So ist die Gesellschaft laut Homepage der Volkswagen AG Emittentin des 
„Euro 5,0 Mrd. Belgian Short-Term Treasury Notes Programme“. Die Volkswagen AG scheint also einen Teil der 
Konzernfremdfinanzierung durch die belgische Tochtergesellschaft zu betreiben (vgl. Volkswagen AG (2016)). 
 
Auffällig bei diesen sieben Gesellschaften sind insbesondere die hohen Eigenkapitalquoten, 
die auf eine Ausnutzung des NID Regimes hindeuten, die hohen Bestände an Forderungen 
gegenüber verbundenen Unternehmen und liquiden Mitteln sowie die niedrigen effektiven 
Steuerquoten. Zudem weisen die Gesellschaften einen sehr hohen Gewinn pro Mitarbeiter 
im Verhältnis zum Konzerngewinn pro Mitarbeiter auf. Die Mitarbeiter der belgischen 
Tochtergesellschaften sind also deutlich profitabler als die Mitarbeiter im Konzernschnitt. 
Dies könnte ebenfalls ein starkes Indiz für eine Finanzierungsgesellschaft sein, da zu 
vermuten ist, dass diese nur einen relativ geringen Personalbedarf haben, da die 
Fremdkapitalvergabe leicht skalierbar sein sollte. 
Weitere Indizien dafür, dass die identifizierten Gesellschaften Finanzierungsgesellschaften 
sein könnten, kann zudem der Vergleich der Gruppe der Finanzierungsgesellschaften mit 
allen anderen im Datensatz enthaltenen Gesellschaften geben. In Table 43 sind daher einige 
Kennzahlen im Vergleich der Gruppen aufgeführt.     
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Table 43. Weitere Kennzahlen der Finanzierungs- und Nicht-Finanzierungsgesellschaften. 
 Verhältnis 
Bilanz-
summe zu 
Mitarbei-
teranzahl 
(Mio. €) 
Anteil Ford. 
ggü. verb. 
Unt. und li-
quider Mittel 
an Bilanz-
summe 
Verhältnis 
Forderungen 
aus Lieferung 
und Leistung 
zu Bilanz-
summe 
Eigen-
kapital-
quote 
Verhältnis 
Finanzer-
gebnis zu 
operativem 
Ergebnis 
Verhältnis Ge-
winn pro Mit-
arbeiter der 
Tochterges. 
zum Konzern 
Effek-
tive 
Steuer-
quote 
Finanzierungsges. 118 99% 0% 97% 10 73 2% 
Nicht-
Finanzierungsges. 
0,3 19% 19% 35% 0 1 24% 
Als Finanzierungsgesellschaften werden die in Table 42 identifizierten sieben Gesellschaften aufgeführt. Die anderen 146 
Gesellschaften werden unter den Nicht-Finanzierungsgesellschaften subsumiert. Die Werte entsprechen jeweils dem 
Mittelwert des Medians der Jahre 2011–2014. 
 
Auffällig ist hierbei, dass die Kennzahlen, die den Gewinn und die Bilanzsumme ins 
Verhältnis zur Mitarbeiteranzahl setzen, für die Finanzierungsgesellschaften deutlich höher 
sind. Die Mitarbeiter der sieben identifizierten Gesellschaften sind also nicht nur deutlich 
profitabler, die Gesellschaften weisen im Vergleich zur Mitarbeiteranzahl auch eine sehr 
hohe Bilanzsumme auf. Beides deutet in Verbindung mit dem sehr hohen Anteil an 
Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen Gesellschaften und Beständen an liquiden Mitteln an 
der Bilanzsumme darauf hin, dass diese sieben Gesellschaften zur Gewinnverlagerung 
durch Finanzierung genutzt werden. Für ein Ausnutzen des NID Regimes durch die 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften spricht zudem die deutlich höhere Eigenkapitalquote der 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften. Des Weiteren verfügen die Finanzierungsgesellschaften auch 
nicht über Forderungen aus Lieferungen und Leistungen und das Verhältnis des 
Finanzergebnisses zum operativen Ergebnis ist deutlich höher. Beides sind Hinweise dafür, 
dass die Finanzierungsgesellschaften nicht oder nur in geringem Umfang operativ tätig sind. 
Zudem ist die effektive Steuerquote der Finanzierungsgesellschaften deutlich niedriger. 
Auch wenn dies auf eine Vielzahl an Gründen, wie beispielsweise steuerfreien Einnahmen, 
zurückzuführen sein könnte, deutet es doch zumindest darauf hin, dass diese 
Gesellschaften das NID Regime ausnutzen, um ihre Steuerlast drastisch zu senken. 
Allerdings ist es nicht nur möglich, konzerninterne Finanzierung durch eigenständige 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften durchzuführen. Genauso könnte die Finanzierungsfunktion 
durch eine operativ tätige Tochtergesellschaft durchgeführt werden. Im nächsten Schritt 
werden daher die relativ strikten Annahmen über das Verhältnis von Finanzergebnis zu 
operativem Ergebnis gelockert, um auch Tochtergesellschaften in Belgien identifizieren zu 
können, die operativ tätig sind und gleichzeitig als Finanzierungsgesellschaft fungieren. Es 
wird nach zusätzlichen Gesellschaften gesucht, die in allen vier betrachteten Jahren 
mindestens 25% der Bilanzsumme in Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen Unternehmen 
und liquiden Mitteln aufweisen. Zudem wird wiederum eine Mindestbilanzsumme von 1% 
der jeweiligen Konzernbilanzsumme in allen vier Jahren vorausgesetzt. Anhand dieser 
Nutzen deutsche Konzerne Belgien als Finanzierungsstandort? – Eine Fallstudie 172 
 
Kriterien lassen sich sieben weitere Gesellschaften identifizieren, die in Table 44 dargestellt 
sind. 
 
Table 44. Bilanzpositionen und Kennzahlen operativ tätiger Finanzierungsgesellschaften. 
Konzern Bilanz-
summe 
(Mio. €) 
Anteil Ford. 
ggü. verb. 
Unt. an Bi-
lanzsumme 
Anteil 
liquider 
Mittel an 
Bilanzsumme 
Eigen-
kapital-
quote 
Mitar-
beiter-
anzahl 
Verhältnis Gewinn 
pro Mitarbeiter der 
Tochterges. zum 
Konzern 
Effek-
tive 
Steuer-
quote 
Aurubis AG 986 51% 1% 80% 488 0 13% 
Continental AG 423 68% 0% 83% 488 4 19% 
Evonik Ind. AG 
398 37% 0% 74% 1.025 1 19% 
391 0% 65% 82% 2 696 26%d 
Jungheinrich AG 34 0% 33% 24% 174 1 35% 
Lanxess AG 858 55% 7% 37% 914 0 11% 
STADA Arzn. AG 106 4% 54% 49% 96 9 33% 
Aufgeführt sind alle DAX und MDAX Konzerne mit operativ tätigen Finanzierungsgesellschaften für 2011–2014. Die 
Beteiligung beträgt in allen Fällen mindestens 99,99%. Die angewandten Kriterien sind für alle vier Jahre (1) eine 
Mindestbilanzsumme der Gesellschaft von 1% der jeweiligen Konzernbilanzsumme und (2) ein Anteil der Forderungen 
gegenüber verbundenen Unternehmen, die nicht aus Lieferung und Leistung stammen (wie in Unterkapitel 6.3 
dargelegt), und der liquiden Mittel von mindestens 25% der Bilanzsumme. Die Werte entsprechen dem arithmetischen 
Mittel der Jahre 2011–2014. 
d Diese Gesellschaft der Evonik Industries AG wird aufgrund ihrer relativ hohen effektiven Steuerquote nicht in Table 
42 als Finanzierungsgesellschaft identifiziert. 
 
Beim Vergleich von Table 42 mit Table 44 fällt die Mitarbeiteranzahl ins Auge, die im 
Durchschnitt bei den operativ tätigen Finanzierungsgesellschaften höher ist. 
Korrespondierend ist der Gewinn pro Mitarbeiter im Vergleich niedriger, mit Ausnahme 
einer Tochtergesellschaft der Evonik Industries AG. Die Gesellschaften können aber trotz 
ihrer teilweise hohen Eigenkapitalquoten und hohen Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen 
Unternehmen an der Bilanzsumme nicht als Finanzierungsgesellschaften in Table 42 
identifiziert werden, da entweder das Finanzergebnis das operative Ergebnis nicht in allen 
vier Jahren übersteigt oder die Summe aus Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen 
Unternehmen und Bestände an liquiden Mitteln an der 50% Schwelle scheitert. 
Um zu überprüfen, ob die strikte Definition einer Finanzierungsgesellschaft weitere 
Gesellschaften von einer Identifikation ausschließt, zeigt Table 45 weitere, bisher noch 
nicht identifizierte Gesellschaften. Es wird nicht mehr auf die ökonomische Signifikanz der 
Gesellschaft für den Konzern (Mindestbilanzsumme der Gesellschaft kann unter 1% der 
jeweiligen Konzernbilanzsumme liegen, muss aber mindestens 10 Mio. Euro betragen) und 
die effektive Steuerquote abgestellt (maximale effektive Steuerquote kann über 20% liegen). 
Zudem müssen die weiteren Kriterien (Anteil der Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen 
Unternehmen, die nicht aus Lieferung und Leistung stammen, und der liquiden Mittel von 
mindestens 50% der Bilanzsumme sowie ein Finanzergebnis, welches das operative 
Ergebnis übersteigt) nur in einem der vier Jahre erfüllt sein. 
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Table 45. Bilanzpositionen und Kennzahlen der Finanzierungsgesellschaften (erweiterte Definition). 
Konzern Bilanz-
summe 
(Mio. €) 
Anteil Ford. 
ggü. verb. 
Unt. an 
Bilanzsumme 
Anteil 
liquider 
Mittel an Bi-
lanzsumme 
Eigen-
kapital-
quote 
Mitar-
beiter-
anzahl 
Verhältnis Gewinn 
pro Mitarbeiter der 
Tochterges. zum 
Konzern 
Effek-
tive 
Steuer-
quote 
BMW AG 597 1% 99% 99% 25 2 3% 
Metro Group AG 90 56% 20% 11% 105 39 1% 
Siemens AG 43 32% 0% 94% 1 134 –1% 
Aufgeführt sind alle zusätzlichen Finanzierungsgesellschaften der DAX und MDAX Konzerne nach einer erweiterten 
Definition. Die angewandten Kriterien sind für mindestens ein Jahr (1) ein Anteil der Forderungen gegenüber 
verbundenen Unternehmen, die nicht aus Lieferung und Leistung stammen (wie in Unterkapitel 6.3 dargelegt), und der 
liquiden Mittel von mindestens 50% der Bilanzsumme, (2) ein Finanzergebnis, welches das operative Ergebnis übersteigt, 
sowie (3) eine Bilanzsumme der Gesellschaft von mindestens 10 Mio. Euro. Die Werte entsprechen dem arithmetischen 
Mittel der Jahre 2011–2014. 
 
Die in Table 45 aufgeführten Gesellschaften wurden bislang ausgeschlossen, da sie für den 
Konzern ökonomisch unbedeutend sind. Die auffälligste Gesellschaft ist ein Coordination 
Center der BWM AG, die über ausschließlich eigenkapitalfinanzierte liquide Mittel verfügt. 
Diese Mittel scheinen jedoch in der Gesellschaft zu verbleiben und nicht als konzerninterne 
Darlehen vergeben zu werden. Ebenfalls auffällig ist die Tochtergesellschaft der Siemens 
AG mit hoher Eigenkapitalquote und niedriger Steuerquote sowie niedriger 
Mitarbeiteranzahl. Allerdings machen die internen Forderungen und liquiden Mittel in 
Summe nur durchschnittlich ein Drittel der Bilanzsumme aus. Die Tochtergesellschaft der 
Metro Group AG verfügt zwar über hohe Bestände an Forderungen und liquiden Mitteln, 
aber auch über eine hohe Mitarbeiteranzahl sowie niedrige Eigenkapitalquote. Eine 
Finanzierungstätigkeit kann daher nicht ausgeschlossen, aber ein vollständiges Ausnutzen 
des NID Regimes kann nicht angenommen werden. 
6.4.2 Approximation der Gewinnverlagerung und Steuervermeidung 
Im vorherigen Unterkapitel wurden Finanzierungsgesellschaften identifiziert. Konkrete 
Rückschlüsse auf das Ausmaß der möglichen Gewinnverlagerung lassen die obigen 
Analysen nicht zu. Dies liegt unter anderem daran, dass die Forderungen keinen konkreten 
Konzerngesellschaften zugeordnet werden können und die Zinssätze der Darlehen nicht 
bekannt sind. 
Doch auch mit den vorhandenen Informationen lassen sich Werte berechnen, die das 
Ausmaß der Gewinnverlagerung und des Steueraufkommensverlustes für die beteiligten 
Staaten zumindest approximieren können. Nimmt man an, dass die (operativ tätigen) 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften zur Gewinnverlagerung mittels Fremdfinanzierung genutzt 
werden, so entspricht der jeweilige Zinsertrag der Obergrenze der Gewinnverlagerung in 
die belgische Gesellschaft. Die Steuerersparnis durch Zinsabzug der jeweiligen 
Konzerngesellschaft 𝑗 ermittelt sich dann wie folgt: 
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𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑗 = 𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐷𝑗 ∗ 𝑠𝑗 . (6.4) 
Da jedoch der Ort der jeweiligen Konzerngesellschaft und folglich der Steuersatz 𝑠𝑗 ebenso 
wie die Darlehenshöhe 𝐷𝑗 und der Zinssatz 𝑖𝑗 unbekannt bleiben, muss die Steuerersparnis 
auf Konzernebene wie folgt geschätzt werden:131 
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑠𝐾𝑜𝑛𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑛 = 𝐹𝐼𝐵𝐸 ∗ 𝑠𝐾𝑜𝑛𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑛 − 𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑧𝑎ℎ𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑔𝐵𝐸 . (6.5) 
Hierbei entspricht 𝐹𝐼𝐵𝐸 dem Finanzertrag der belgischen Tochtergesellschaft, welcher um 
den sonstigen Finanzertrag (z.B. Erträge aus Währungseffekten) gekürzt wurde, sodass der 
Zinsertrag übrig bleibt.132 𝑠𝐾𝑜𝑛𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑛 entspricht der effektiven Konzernsteuerquote, die ein 
sinnvoller Maßstab ist, um die gesparten Steuern in den Tochtergesellschaften außerhalb 
Belgiens zu approximieren, da sie die durchschnittliche Steuerbelastung im Konzern 
abbildet. Alternativ wird für 𝑠𝐾𝑜𝑛𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑛 der deutsche Steuersatz (30,175%) angenommen, der 
zum einen die Steuerbelastung in Hochsteuerländern, aus denen sich Gewinnverlagerung 
besonders lohnt, approximiert und zum anderen die Steuerlast auf Gewinne im Sitzstaat 
der Konzerne bestimmt. 𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑧𝑎ℎ𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑔𝐵𝐸 entspricht der Steuerzahlung der belgischen 
Gesellschaft und kann dem Jahresabschluss direkt entnommen werden. 
Ist die Eigenkapitalquote größer als der Anteil der Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen 
Unternehmen an der Bilanzsumme, kann die Steuerzahlung bezogen auf den Finanzertrag 
gekürzt um die NID alternativ wie folgt berechnet werden:133 
𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑧𝑎ℎ𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑔𝐵𝐸 = 
𝑠𝐾
𝐵𝐸 ∗ [𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝐹𝐼𝐵𝐸 −min (𝑛 ∗ 𝐸𝐾; 𝐺𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑛); 0)]. 
(6.6) 
Ist die Eigenkapitalquote kleiner als der Anteil der Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen 
Unternehmen an der Bilanzsumme, ergibt sich eine Steuerzahlung von 
                                              
131 In dieser Gleichung laufen zwei Effekte aus der Schätzung gegeneinander. Erstens stammt 𝐹𝐼 nicht ausschließlich 
aus konzerninternen Darlehen. Die identifizierten Finanzierungsgesellschaften haben jedoch zum größten Teil nahezu 
100% Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen Unternehmen, sodass – nach Kürzung des sonstigen Finanzertrags – 
davon ausgegangen werden kann, dass der Finanzertrag nahezu ausschließlich aus Zinserträgen besteht. Eine 
Überschätzung der Steuerersparnis dürfte damit ausgeschlossen sein. Zweitens enthält die effektive Steuerquote des 
Konzerns die Steuerersparnis der belgischen Gesellschaft bereits. Da vor allem Gewinne aus Hochsteuerländern nach 
Belgien verlagert werden dürften, sollte die Verwendung der effektiven Konzernsteuerquote die tatsächliche 
Steuerersparnis unterschätzen. 
132 Diese Kürzung wird vorgenommen, da sonstiger Finanzertrag, wie z.B. Erträge aus Währungseffekten, nicht zu 
korrespondierendem Zinsaufwand im Konzernverbund geführt hat. Darüber hinaus wird angenommen, dass sonstiger 
Finanzertrag nicht bei der Gewinnverlagerung berücksichtigt wird und exogen ist. Deswegen wird nur der reine 
Zinsertrag in den folgenden Berechnungen betrachtet. 
133 Diese Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen Unternehmen sind per Annahme zu 100% eigenkapitalfinanziert. 
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𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑧𝑎ℎ𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑔𝐵𝐸 = 𝑠𝐾
𝐵𝐸 ∗ [𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝐹𝐼𝐵𝐸 − 𝐹𝐸𝐵𝐸 ∗
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑑.𝑔𝑔ü.𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏.𝑈𝑛𝑡.−𝐸𝐾
𝐹𝐾
−𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑛 ∗ 𝐸𝐾, 𝐺𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑣𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑡𝑒𝑢𝑒𝑟𝑛); 0)]. 
(6.7) 
Hinter dem im Vergleich zu Gleichung (6.6) eingefügten Teil der Steuerzahlung in 
Gleichung (6.7) steckt die Idee, dass bei einer kleineren Eigenkapitalquote ein Teil der 
ausgegebenen Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen Unternehmen durch Fremdkapital 
(𝐹𝐾) finanziert sein muss (𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑑. 𝑔𝑔ü. 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑏. 𝑈𝑛𝑡. −𝐸𝐾). Auf diesen Teil entfällt 
wiederum Zinsaufwand (𝐹𝐸𝐵𝐸). Folglich wird in Höhe des Zinsaufwands auf den Anteil 
der nicht durch Eigenkapital unterlegten Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen 
Unternehmen am Fremdkapital eine Gewinnkorrektur vorgenommen. 
Table 46 stellt die berechneten maximalen Gewinnverlagerungen, also den Finanzertrag 
gekürzt um sonstigen Finanzertrag der jeweiligen belgischen Tochtergesellschaft, sowie die 
Steuerersparnis auf Basis von Gleichung (6.5) dar. 
Auffällig ist, dass das Verhältnis der tatsächlichen Steuerersparnis (Spalte 5) zu der 
maximalen Gewinnverlagerung (Spalte 2) von 19,6% recht hoch ist. Bei einer 
durchschnittlichen effektiven Konzernsteuerquote der DAX und MDAX Konzerne 
von 28% in den Jahren 2011 bis 2014 bedeutet dies, dass das Steuersparpotential zu einem 
großen Teil ausgenutzt wird. Allerdings könnte das Steuersparpotential noch höher 
ausfallen, wenn der durchschnittliche Körperschaftsteuersatz in den Staaten, in denen die 
Zinsaufwendungen anfallen, höher ist als die effektive Konzernsteuerquote im jeweiligen 
Jahr. Dieser Effekt ist in Spalte 6 sichtbar, da hier mit einem deutschen Steuersatz von 
30,175% für alle Konzerne in allen Jahren gerechnet wird. In diesem Fall steigt der Anteil 
auf 26,5%.     
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Table 46. Approximation der Gewinnverlagerung und Steuervermeidung auf Konzernebene. 
Konzern Maxi-
male Ge-
winnver-
lagerung 
(Mio. €) 
Anteil 
Gewinn-
verlagerung 
am Konzern-
gewinn vor 
Steuern 
Approximierte 
Steuerersparnis aus 
Konzernfremdfinan-
zierung (Mio. €) auf 
Basis der effektiven 
Konzernsteuerquote 
Berechnete Steuer-
ersparnis mit tatsäch-
lichen Steuerzahlun-
gen (Mio. €) auf Basis 
der effektiven Kon-
zernsteuerquote 
Berechnete Steuer-
ersparnis mit tatsäch-
lichen Steuerzahlun-
gen (Mio. €) auf Basis 
des deutschen 
Steuersatzes 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften 
BASF SE 260 4% 57 55 77 
Bayer AG 302 8% 66 56 74 
Beiersdorf AG 1 0% 0 0 0 
HeidelbergCement 
AG 
45 6% 9 9 13 
K+S AG 77 12% 15 8 11 
Symrise AG 3 1% 1 1 1 
Volkswagen AG 167 1% 35 35 50 
Operativ tätige Finanzierungsgesellschaften 
Aurubis AG 22 5% 6 6 7 
Continental AG 6 0% 1 1 2 
Evonik Ind. AG 
1 0% 0 0 0 
12 1% 2 3 3 
Jungheinrich AG 0 0% 0 0 0 
Lanxess AG 17 5% 3 4 4 
STADA Arzn. AG 0 0% 0 0 0 
Gesamt 914 3%e 195 179 242 
Aufgeführt sind alle Gesellschaften, die in Table 42 und Table 44 als (operativ tätige) Finanzierungsgesellschaften identifiziert 
wurden. Die dargestellten Werte entsprechen dem arithmetischen Mittel der Jahre 2011–2014 der jeweiligen Gesellschaft. In 
Spalte 2 ist die maximale Gewinnverlagerung berechnet als Finanzertrag abzüglich sonstigem Finanzertrag dieser 
Gesellschaften dargestellt. In Spalte 3 ist der Anteil des maximal in die belgische Tochtergesellschaft verlagerten Gewinns 
am gesamten Konzerngewinn dargestellt. In Spalte 4 ist die approximierte Steuerersparnis – wie in Gleichungen (6.5), (6.6) 
und (6.7) – dargestellt. In Spalte 5 ist die Steuerersparnis auf Basis der tatsächlichen Steuerzahlungen der Gesellschaften 
dargestellt (Gewinnverlagerung * effektive Konzernsteuerquote – tatsächliche Steuerzahlung). Die tatsächliche Steuerzahlung 
wurde für die operativ tätigen Finanzierungsgesellschaften berechnet, indem die Steuerzahlung der Gesellschaft mit dem 
Verhältnis des Finanzergebnisses zur Summe aus operativem Ergebnis und Finanzergebnis multipliziert wurde, um eine 
Steuerzahlung nur für den Finanzierungsteil der Gesellschaft zu approximieren. In Spalte 6 ist das Ergebnis der fünften Spalte 
mit dem statuarischen deutschen Steuersatz in Höhe von 30,175% für alle Jahre anstelle der jeweiligen effektiven 
Konzernsteuerquote berechnet. 
e Dieser Wert entspricht dem arithmetischen Mittel der Anteile der Gewinnverlagerung am Konzerngewinn der identifizierten 
Gesellschaften über die Jahre 2011–2014. 
 
Bei genauerer Betrachtung von Table 46 fällt zudem auf, dass die approximierte 
Steuerersparnis in Spalte 4 der auf Basis der tatsächlichen Steuerzahlungen berechneten 
Steuerersparnis in Spalte 5 nahe kommt. Da die approximierte Steuerersparnis nur die 
Möglichkeit einer Steuersenkung durch das NID Regime berücksichtigt, scheinen diese 
Gesellschaften (für ihren Finanzierungsteil) über das NID Regime hinaus keine weiteren 
Steuerplanungsmodelle, welche die Steuerlast der belgischen Gesellschaft weiter reduzieren 
könnten, zu verfolgen. In Verbindung mit Table 42 zeigt sich somit, dass die in 
Unterkapitel 6.2.2 beschriebene idealtypische Finanzierungsgesellschaft auch tatsächlich 
von deutschen Konzernen umgesetzt wird. Das NID Regime scheint also durchaus die 
beschriebenen Anreize für die Gründung einer Finanzierungsgesellschaft in Belgien zu 
bieten. 
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Auffällig ist allerdings auch, dass die absolute Höhe der Steuerersparnis der (operativ 
tätigen) Finanzierungsgesellschaften mit 179 bis 242 Mio. Euro relativ niedrig ist. Dies liegt 
insbesondere daran, dass die absolute Höhe der (maximalen) nach Belgien verlagerten 
Gewinne mit durchschnittlich 914 Mio. Euro für alle identifizierten Gesellschaften 
zusammen nicht sonderlich hoch ist. Gemessen am Konzerngewinn vor Steuern entspricht 
dies 3% der gesamten Gewinne der Konzerne. Insgesamt lässt sich somit konstatieren, dass 
einige DAX und MDAX Konzerne in Belgien mit diesem Steuerplanungsmodell zwar 
effizient Steuern sparen, dies allerdings nur in einem geringen Umfang betreiben. Eine 
Unterschätzung dieses Umfanges kann jedoch nicht ausgeschlossen werden, da nicht 
bekannt ist, aus welchen Konzerngesellschaften Gewinne verlagert werden. 
Es sind drei mögliche Erklärungen für den geringen identifizierten Umfang der 
Steuerersparnis durch Gewinnverlagerung denkbar: Erstens zeigt die bisherige Literatur, 
dass die aggregierte Gewinnverlagerung deutscher Konzerne niedrig ist. So weist 
beispielsweise Finke (2013) lediglich einen Betrag von 10 Mrd. Euro für alle deutschen 
Konzerne aus. Zudem weisen Riedel et al. (2015) nach, dass die Steuer-Sensitivität des 
ausgewiesenen Einkommens in der betrachteten Periode von 1999 bis 2009 rückläufig ist. 
Zweitens stellen Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) in einer Meta-Studie fest, dass 70% der 
Gewinnverlagerung nicht auf die steueroptimale Finanzierung grenzüberschreitender 
Investitionen, sondern auf eine steueroptimale Strukturierung von Transaktionen im 
Konzern, wie etwa grenzüberschreitende Lizensierungsvereinbarungen, zurückzuführen 
ist. Derartige Steuerplanungsmodelle (z.B. „Double Irish with a Dutch Sandwich“) werden 
von Pinkernell (2012), Sullivan (2012) und Fuest et al. (2013) beschrieben. Letztere stellen 
fest, dass die Unternehmen, die ihre Steuerlast drastisch reduzieren, allesamt IP aufweisen. 
Diese Studien legen somit den Schluss nahe, dass Fremdfinanzierung eine eher 
untergeordnete Rolle bei der Gewinnverlagerung spielt. Drittens besteht natürlich auch die 
Möglichkeit, dass Konzerne bereits Fremdfinanzierungsstrukturen in anderen Staaten als 
Belgien etabliert haben und diese aus internen Erwägungen nicht verlagern wollen.134  
6.4.3 Approximation der Steueraufkommenswirkung für Belgien 
Die vorhergehenden Ausführungen legen den Schluss nahe, dass das NID Regime für 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften nur geringe Anreizwirkungen entfaltet. Welche 
Steueraufkommenswirkung das NID Regime für Belgien im vorliegenden Datensatz hat, 
soll im Folgenden approximiert werden. 
Hierzu wird die These aufgestellt, dass die identifizierten Finanzierungsgesellschaften aus 
Table 42 entweder gar nicht in Belgien wären (für die Finanzierungsgesellschaften) oder 
                                              
134 Ein Beispiel hierfür liefert Bergin (2013), der zeigt, dass die SAP SE eine Finanzierungsgesellschaft in Irland 
unterhält. 
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keine Finanzierungsfunktion ausüben würden (für die auch operativ tätigen 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften).135 Folglich kann das Steueraufkommen ermittelt werden, das 
diese Gesellschaften aus ihrer Finanzierungstätigkeit generieren, indem die tatsächliche 
Steuerzahlung dieser Gesellschaften für ihre Finanzierungstätigkeit summiert wird. Dies 
entspricht den Steuermehreinnahmen Belgiens durch das NID Regime. Auf der anderen 
Seite sieht sich Belgien mit Steuermindereinnahmen durch all die Gesellschaften 
konfrontiert, die nicht durch steuerliche Anreize durch das NID Regime in Belgien tätig 
werden, aber dennoch vom NID Regime profitieren. Die Aufkommenswirkungen für die 
Körperschaftsteuer sind in Table 47 dargestellt. 
 
Table 47. Approximation der Steuermehr- und Steuermindereinnahmen durch Ausnutzung des NID 
Regimes in Belgien durch die identifizierten Finanzierungsgesellschaften.  
2014 2013 2012 2011 
Steuermehreinnahmen Belgiens durch NID Regime in Mio. Eurof 28 34 39 24 
Steuermindereinnahmen Belgiens durch NID Regime in Mio. Euro –39 –49 –61 –60 
Approximierte Steueraufkommensveränderung in Mio. Euro –11 –15 –22 –36 
Aufgeführt sind die berechneten Steuermehreinnahmen, die sich durch Multiplikation des belgischen 
Körperschaftsteuersatzes mit der Summe aus dem Zinsertrag der belgischen Finanzierungsgesellschaften 
abzüglich der Steuerermäßigung durch das NID Regime ergeben. Die Steuermindereinnahmen ergeben sich aus 
der Summe des jeweiligen Eigenkapitals der Nicht-Finanzierungsgesellschaften der DAX und MDAX Konzerne 
in Belgien multipliziert mit dem Satz des NID Regimes und dem belgischen Körperschaftsteuersatz des 
jeweiligen Jahres. 
f Vor Einführung des NID Regimes gab es eine Vorgängerregelung (Coordination Center Regime), die mit einer 
Verlängerung um maximal zehn Jahre noch bis ins Jahr 2015 anwendbar war. Eine Nutzung des NID Regimes 
ist ausgeschlossen, wenn man noch von der Vorgängerregelung profitiert. Daher werden alle Gesellschaften 
ausgeschlossen, die im Namen „Coordination Center“ führen. Die in Table 42 identifizierte Tochtergesellschaft 
der BASF SE ist eine von zwei im Datensatz enthaltenen Unternehmen, die diesen Namenszusatz führen. Die 
zweite Gesellschaft ist die in Table 45 identifizierte Tochtergesellschaft der BMW AG. 
 
Es zeigt sich, dass Belgien in allen vier Jahren einen Verlust des 
Körperschaftsteueraufkommens hat.136 Zudem fällt auf, dass dieser Verlust in den vier 
Jahren rückläufig ist, was auch auf die sinkenden Eigenkapital-Zinssätze des NID Regimes 
im hier betrachteten Zeitraum zurückzuführen ist (vgl. Table 40). Es ist jedoch 
anzumerken, dass diese Rechnung außer Acht lässt, dass auch bei den Nicht-
Finanzierungsgesellschaften steuerliche Anreize durch das NID Regime bestehen können 
und dass es Spillover-Effekte geben dürfte (z.B. Lohnsteuermehreinnahmen durch 
zusätzliche Arbeitsplätze). Der vorliegende Datensatz ermöglicht jedoch keine Betrachtung 
                                              
135 Wie Table A 7 im Anhang (Appendix to Section 6) zu entnehmen ist, bestehen einige der identifizierten 
Gesellschaften schon länger als das NID Regime in Belgien angewandt wird. Falls diese Gesellschaften nicht wegen 
des Coordination Center Regimes, der Vorgängerregelung des NID Regimes, gegründet wurden, besteht die 
Möglichkeit, dass diese Gesellschaften auch aus nicht-steuerlichen Gründen in Belgien aktiv sind. Allerdings dürften 
sich die Mitnahmeeffekte in Grenzen halten, da die Finanzierungsgesellschaften keine andere Tätigkeit auszuüben 
scheinen. Mögliche Mitnahmeeffekte der operativ tätigen Finanzierungsgesellschaften haben auf die Schätzungen 
ebenfalls keinen Einfluss, da der Steuereffekt lediglich für den Finanzierungsteil geschätzt wird. 
136 Finke et al. (2014) simulieren auch für Deutschland, dass die Einführung eines NID Regimes einen Rückgang des 
Steueraufkommens aus Körperschaftsteuer, Gewerbesteuer und Solidaritätszuschlag zur Folge hätte. Die Studie 
berechnet den Rückgang insgesamt auf durchschnittlich 18% (9 Mrd. Euro) und betrachtet die Jahre 2005–2007. 
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dieser Effekte. Die Steuermindereinnahmen Belgiens sind daher nur als grobe Abschätzung 
zu verstehen. 
6.4.4 Robustheitsanalyse 
In Unterkapitel 6.4.1 werden sieben DAX und MDAX Konzerne mit 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften identifiziert. Die Ausführungen in Unterkapitel 6.2 zu der 
Vorteilhaftigkeit Belgiens als Finanzierungsstandort hätten eine höhere Zahl an Konzernen 
vermuten lassen. Im Folgenden werden deswegen mittels Amadeus zwei 
Robustheitsanalysen vorgenommen: Zum einen soll untersucht werden, ob die 
betrachteten Konzerne über Finanzierungsgesellschaften in anderen EU-Mitgliedstaaten137 
verfügen; zum anderen soll untersucht werden, ob in Frankreich ansässige Konzerne über 
belgische Finanzierungsgesellschaften verfügen.138 
Es ist anzumerken, dass Amadeus keinen so hohen Detailgrad wie der oben verwendete 
Datensatz bietet. Insbesondere gibt es keine Position zu Forderungen gegenüber 
verbundenen Unternehmen, welche eine entscheidende Position zur Identifikation von 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften darstellt. Diese Forderungen können nur grob mittels der 
Position „sonstiges Anlagevermögen“ approximiert werden. Aufgrund der unspezifischen 
Position ist zu erwarten, dass ein Teil der mittels Amadeus identifizierten 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften keine tatsächlichen Finanzierungsgesellschaften sind, da sich 
hinter der Position „sonstiges Anlagevermögen“ beispielsweise auch Beteiligungen an 
verbundenen Unternehmen verbergen können. 
Für den ersten Test werden alle in Amadeus vorhandenen, europäischen 
Tochtergesellschaften der deutschen Konzerne betrachtet. Für den zweiten Test werden 
alle verfügbaren belgischen Tochtergesellschaften der in Amadeus vorhandenen 
französischen Konzerne betrachtet. 
Table 48 zeigt, dass unter Anwendung derselben Bedingungen wie in Unterkapitel 6.4.1 
fünf Finanzierungsgesellschaften deutscher Konzerne in EU-Mitgliedstaaten identifiziert 
werden, wovon zwei in Belgien sind und bereits oben identifiziert wurden. Die anderen 
Gesellschaften sitzen in Deutschland, den Niederlanden und Spanien. Es wird eine 
Tochtergesellschaft in Belgien eines französischen Konzerns ermittelt. Diese 
Tochtergesellschaft weist jedoch mit 17% eine niedrige Eigenkapitalquote auf, was 
vermuten lässt, dass diese das NID Regime in Belgien nur in geringem Maße ausnutzt. 
                                              
137 Der Fokus liegt auf EU-Mitgliedstaaten, da Amadeus nur für europäische Unternehmen Finanzdaten enthält. 
138 Es wird Frankreich als Vergleichsland gewählt, da es ebenso wie Deutschland eine gemeinsame Grenze mit Belgien 
hat und jeweils eine gemeinsame Sprache gesprochen wird. Zudem ist Frankreich eine vergleichbar große 
Volkswirtschaft wie Deutschland: Im Jahr 2014 betrug das Bruttoinlandsprodukt in Frankreich (Deutschland) 
2,83 (3,87) Billionen USD. 
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Table 48. Bilanzpositionen und Kennzahlen von DAX und MDAX Konzernen mit europäischen 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften und von französischen Konzernen mit belgischen 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften. 
Konzern Staat Bilanz-
summe 
(Mio. €) 
Anteil Ford. 
ggü. verb. 
Unt. an Bi-
lanzsummeg 
Anteil 
liquider 
Mittel an Bi-
lanzsumme 
Eigen-
kapital-
quote 
Mitar-
beiter-
anzahl 
Verhältnis 
Gewinn pro 
Mitarbeiter der 
Tochterges. 
zum Konzern 
Effek-
tive 
Steuer-
quote 
DAX und MDAX Konzerne mit europäischen Finanzierungsgesellschaften 
BASF SE BE 15.755 100% 10% 92% 217 5 2% 
BASF SE NL 9.589 86% 0% 88% 665 33 0% 
Bayer AG BE 9.980 97% 0% 91% 805 11 6% 
Beiersdorf AG ES 159 96% 0% 98% 8 100 1% 
Beiersdorf AG DE 554 82% 7% 64% 906 3 18% 
Französische Konzerne mit europäischen Finanzierungsgesellschaften 
Edenred BE 1.163 94% 2% 17% 156 8 3% 
Aufgeführt sind alle DAX und MDAX Konzerne mit europäischen Finanzierungsgesellschaften. Für die 
französischen Konzerne sind alle belgischen Finanzierungsgesellschaften aufgeführt. Die Beteiligung beträgt in allen 
Fällen mindestens 90%. Die angewandten Kriterien sind für alle vier Jahre (1) eine Mindestbilanzsumme der 
Gesellschaft von 1% der jeweiligen Konzernbilanzsumme, (2) eine maximale effektive Steuerquote von 20%, (3) ein 
Anteil des sonstigen Anlagevermögens von mindestens 50% der Bilanzsumme sowie (4) ein Finanzergebnis, welches 
das operative Ergebnis übersteigt. Die Werte entsprechen dem arithmetischen Mittel der Jahre 2011–2014. 
g Die Forderungen gegenüber verbundenen Unternehmen können nur grob mittels der in Amadeus angegebenen 
Position „sonstiges Anlagevermögen“ approximiert werden. 
 
Insgesamt ist festzustellen, dass mit Amadeus nur sehr wenige Finanzierungsgesellschaften 
identifiziert werden können. Dies kann natürlich daran liegen, dass die deutschen und 
französischen Konzerne tatsächlich nur über wenige Finanzierungsgesellschaften in 
Europa bzw. Belgien verfügen. Überraschend ist aber insbesondere, dass für die deutlich 
größere Grundgesamtheit an französischen Konzernen lediglich eine belgische 
Finanzierungsgesellschaft identifiziert wird. Zudem können fünf der sieben in Unterkapitel 
6.4.1 identifizierten belgischen Finanzierungsgesellschaften deutscher Konzerne nicht mit 
Amadeus identifiziert werden. Dies legt den Schluss nahe, dass Amadeus den Fallstudien-
Datensatz unvollständig abdeckt. Zudem können aufgrund der geringeren Detailtiefe von 
Amadeus auch fälschlicherweise identifizierte Unternehmen enthalten sein. 
Zusammenfassend gesagt legen diese zwei Robustheitsanalysen den Schluss nahe, dass die 
vorgestellte Fallstudie deutlich präzisere Ergebnisse liefert als eine Untersuchung, die sich 
lediglich auf Daten aus Amadeus stützt. 
6.5 Zusammenfassung 
Diese Fallstudie zeigt, dass einige DAX und MDAX Konzerne Steuerplanung in Belgien 
mittels des NID Regimes effizient betreiben. Es werden sieben Finanzierungsgesellschaften 
sowie sieben auch operativ tätige Finanzierungsgesellschaften identifiziert. Es ist auffällig, 
dass die Finanzierungsgesellschaften neben einer sehr niedrigen effektiven Steuerquote und 
einem sehr hohen Verhältnis von Zinserträgen zu operativem Ergebnis ein über 73-fach 
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höheres Verhältnis von Gewinn pro Mitarbeiter der Finanzierungsgesellschaft zum 
Konzern aufweisen als die Nicht-Finanzierungsgesellschaften. Daneben weisen die 
Finanzierungsgesellschaften eine hohe Eigenkapitalquote auf. 
Mit den vorliegenden Daten kann die Gewinnverlagerung und die daraus resultierende 
Steuerersparnis approximiert werden. Unsere Schätzungen ergeben, dass die identifizierten 
Konzerne jährlich Gewinne in Höhe von 914 Mio. Euro durch konzerninterne 
Fremdfinanzierung nach Belgien verlagern, woraus eine Steuerersparnis von jährlich 
zwischen 179 und 242 Mio. Euro resultiert. Auffällig an der beobachteten 
Gewinnverlagerung ist, dass die Konzerne das sich ergebende Steuersparpotential aus den 
verlagerten Gewinnen nahezu vollständig ausschöpfen: Es wird durchschnittlich eine 
Steuerersparnis von 20% bis 27% der verlagerten Gewinne erzielt. Allerdings kann der 
verwendete Schätzansatz das Volumen der Steuerersparnis unterschätzen, da nicht bekannt 
ist, aus welchen Konzerngesellschaften Gewinne verlagert werden, und folglich nur mit der 
effektiven Konzernsteuerquote gerechnet werden kann. 
Setzt man jedoch die Höhe der verlagerten Gewinne ins Verhältnis zu den 
Konzerngewinnen, so fällt auf, dass dieses Verhältnis mit etwa 3% sehr niedrig ist. Die 
Konzerne scheinen also mittels Fremdfinanzierung in Belgien keine ökonomisch 
bedeutsame Gewinnverlagerung zu betreiben. Im Einklang damit stellen andere empirische 
Untersuchungen eine allgemein niedrige Gewinnverlagerung deutscher Konzerne sowie 
eine untergeordnete Rolle der konzerninternen Fremdfinanzierung im Vergleich zu 
anderen konzerninternen Transaktionen, wie beispielsweise Lizenzierungen, fest.  
In einer groben Schätzung wird gezeigt, dass das NID Regime bezogen auf die Aktivitäten 
der DAX und MDAX Konzerne für Belgien insoweit ein Verlustgeschäft ist, als die 
Körperschaftsteuerverluste durch das NID Regime nicht durch die zusätzlichen 
Körperschaftsteuereinnahmen der Finanzierungsgesellschaften ausgeglichen werden. 
Weitere interessante Forschungsansätze zum NID Regime könnten darin bestehen, die 
tatsächliche Gewinnverlagerung multinationaler Konzerne und die damit verbundene 
Aufkommenswirkung für Belgien noch präziser zu schätzen. Darüber hinaus könnten 
belgische Finanzierungsgesellschaften anderer europäischer Konzerne untersucht werden, 
um festzustellen, ob die für deutsche Konzerne identifizierte geringe Nutzung Belgiens als 
Finanzierungsstandort auch für andere Staaten bestätigt werden kann. Des Weiteren könnte 
die Attraktivität Belgiens für nicht-europäische Konzerne im Vergleich zu europäischen 
Konzernen untersucht werden. Zudem wäre es interessant zu analysieren, ob 
Finanzierungsaktivität in multinationalen Konzernen eine hohe Mobilität aufweist. Dazu 
bietet sich etwa die Einführung des NID Regimes im Jahr 2006 in Belgien ebenso an wie 
die abnehmende Attraktivität des belgischen NID Regimes durch stetig sinkende 
Eigenkapital-Zinssätze (für 2017 beträgt der Satz nur noch 1,131%). 
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7 Main Conclusions 
Profit shifting by MNEs is of high interest in tax research and in the public debate. In this 
thesis, I take three perspectives on profit shifting that have not yet received much attention 
in empirical tax research. Thereby, I contribute to research in several ways and provide 
interesting insights for policy makers. 
In my first perspective, I analyze the effects of R&D intensity and firm size on firm ETRs 
in a meta-regression analysis. I observe heterogeneous results on these effects in primary 
studies and provide a negative consensus estimate on the relation between R&D intensity 
and ETR and a positive estimate on the size-ETR relation. Further, I identify sources of 
bias and variation that significantly influence the effects. In additional analyses, I find that 
a profit shifting and a tax accounting effect, as well as R&D tax credits, drive the relation 
between R&D intensity and ETR. For the size-ETR relation, I find that profit shifting 
related elements, social acceptance of hierarchies and governance issues drive this relation. 
Future research could further explore the findings of my additional analyses. In particular, 
due to the aggregated level of the meta-data set, I am not able to explore in detail which 
specific firm characteristics drive the profit shifting and tax accounting effect and how 
different designs of R&D tax credits across countries affect the relation between R&D 
intensity and ETR. Regarding additional analyses on the size-ETR relation, future research 
could extend my work on profit shifting related elements that drive this relation. For 
example, future research could analyze whether firms’ size-ETR relation depends on the 
specific industry of firms as profit shifting opportunities may vary between industries. 
In my second perspective, I analyze the influence of corporate taxation systems on cross-
border M&A activity, a relationship where relatively little empirical research has been 
undertaken so far. I find that exempting foreign dividends in the acquirer country increases 
M&A prices while capital gains taxation in the acquirer country has no effect on M&A 
prices. As most countries have changed their taxation system from a credit system to an 
exemption system for foreign dividends over the last years, these findings are interesting 
for US tax policy makers, who are currently considering a change to the exemption system. 
Further, I detect that limiting profit shifting opportunities via CFC rules negatively affects 
M&A activity. Against this background, the mandatory EU-wide implementation of CFC 
rules by 2019 can be seen critically as this implementation may lead to competitive 
disadvantages of European firms on the global cross-border M&A market. 
Future research could address and quantify the economic and tax revenue effects of my 
suggestion to implement a dividends exemption system without CFC rules. In the short 
run, governments will potentially face tax revenue losses; however, empirical literature 
shows positive economic spillover effects of extensive cross-border M&A activity on 
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domestic investment. Hence, in the long-term, an exemption system without CFC rules, 
which is found to boost cross-border M&A activity, may lead to efficiency gains, an increase 
in domestic investment, and tax revenue gains. 
In my third perspective, I analyze whether German DAX and MDAX MNEs implement 
Belgian finance companies to benefit from the Belgian NID regime. I detect seven finance 
companies, a rather low number given the proximity of Belgium to Germany and the 
relative ease of implementing such financing structures. Still, the findings are of interest for 
German and Belgian tax policy makers as I detect that profits of around one billion Euro 
are shifted to Belgium within these MNEs each year. However, given that non-finance 
companies also benefit from the NID regime, this regime does not necessarily lead to tax 
revenue gains for Belgium. For the considered data set, I calculate that Belgium makes an 
overall tax revenue loss of around 36 million Euro annually due to the NID regime. 
Future research could extend this analysis by investigating whether MNEs from other 
European countries use the Belgian NID regime to a greater or lesser extent than German 
MNEs. Further, future research could analyze the regime’s attractiveness for non-European 
MNEs as Belgium may be an attractive holding location for non-European MNEs for their 
European business activities. However, constantly decreasing NID interest deduction rates 
over the past years may mitigate Belgium’s attractiveness as a holding location. 
In summary, my thesis analyzes the intensely discussed topic of MNE-wide profit shifting. 
I provide further insights into the topic by finding that profit shifting related firm 
characteristics affect firms’ ETRs and that large German MNEs set up Belgian finance 
companies as profit shifting vehicles. Further, I find that anti profit shifting measures, in 
particular CFC rules, distort cross-border M&A activity, a highly important form of FDI. 
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Appendices 
Appendix to Section 1 
Figure A 1. Synopsis of Sections 2 and 3. 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
Topic 
Research 
questions 
Data set 
Empirical approach 
Main results 
Meta-regression analysis on the influence of R&D intensity and firm size on the ETR 
Firm size consensus estimate is 0.1 (political cost theory). 
Further aspects affecting the size-ETR relation are profit shifting 
opportunities, social acceptance of hierarchies & governance issues. 
WLS regression model 
393 observations from 49 previous empirical studies (hand-collected) 
Period: 1975–2012 
Firm size analysis: 
Does the political cost or political power theory hold? 
Are further aspects, such as profit shifting opportunities, 
affecting size-ETR relation? 
R&D intensity consensus estimate ranges between –0.17 and –0.25. 
Profit shifting effect to tax accounting effect is 2:1. 
10% of profit shifting effect is due to R&D tax credits. 
R&D intensity analysis: 
Does a profit shifting or tax accounting effect dominate? 
Which role do R&D tax credits play? 
What is the consensus estimate for R&D intensity and firm size across previous empirical studies? 
Which factors are possible sources of variation and bias in previous empirical studies? 
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Figure A 2. Synopsis of Sections 4 and 5. 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
  
Topic 
Research 
questions 
Data set 
Empirical approach 
Main results 
Influence of acquirer’s corporate taxation system on cross-border M&A activity 
Presence of CFC rules negatively affects 
 probability of acquiring low-tax targets, 
 acquirer’s location choice of targets, and 
 cross-border M&A direction. 
Logit and OLS regression models 
14,000 cross-border M&As (SDC Platinum) 
Period: 2002–2014 
What is the effect of dividends and capital gains taxation as well 
as profit shifting opportunities on cross-border M&A prices? 
Dividends taxation and profit shifting limitation via CFC 
rules in the acquirer country negatively affect M&A prices. 
Acquirer capital gains taxation has no effect on M&A prices. 
What is the effect of CFC rules 
on cross-border M&A activity? 
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Figure A 3. Synopsis of Section 6. 
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
 
Topic 
Research 
questions 
Data set 
Empirical approach 
Main results 
Case study on Belgian finance companies of DAX and MDAX MNEs 
DAX and MDAX MNEs have 14 Belgian finance companies; seven of them seem to be also operationally active. 
Circa 1 billion Euro profits are shifted to Belgium by DAX and MDAX MNEs annually, which save 242 million Euro taxes. 
In this data set, the approximate annual loss of Belgium due to the NID regime is up to 36 million Euro. 
Descriptive case study 
All 153 majority-owned Belgian subsidiaries of DAX and MDAX MNEs (hand-collected) 
Period: 2011–2014 
Do DAX and MDAX MNEs use Belgian finance companies? 
What is the amount of shifted profits and saved tax payments due to applying the NID regime? 
What is the implication for Belgium’s tax revenue due to the NID regime? 
Appendices 207 
 
Appendix to Section 3 
 
Table A 1. Grouping of 49 primary studies regarding direction of size-ETR relation. 
Studies reporting non-significant 
size-ETR relation 
Average 
sample 
year 
Studies reporting significantly 
positive size-ETR relation 
Average 
sample 
year 
Studies reporting significantly 
negative size-ETR relation 
Average 
sample 
year 
Studies reporting significantly 
positive and negative size-ETR 
relation 
Average 
sample 
year 
Jacob (1996) 1989 Gupta and Mills (2002) 1993 Mills et al. (1998) 1991 Gupta and Newberry (1997) 1986 
Harris and Feeny (1999) 1995 Wilkinson et al. (2001) 1993 Harris and Feeny (2003) 1996 Kim and Limpaphayom (1998) 1990 
Phillips (2003) 1997 Rego (2003) 1994 Guha (2007) 1997 Buijink et al. (1999) 1993 
McGuire et al. (2014) 1999 Robinson et al. (2010) 1999 Jennings et al. (2012) 1997 Janssen (2003) 1997 
Liu and Cao (2007) 2002 Noor et al. (2010) 2000 Chen et al. (2010)Chen et al. (2010) 1998 Chyz et al. (2013) 1999 
Armstrong et al. (2012) 2004 Fernández-Rodríguez and Martínez-
Arias (2012) 
2001 Richardson and Lanis (2007) 2000 Hoopes et al. (2012) 2000 
Hoi et al. (2013) 2006 Richter et al. (2009) 2001 Boone et al. (2013) 2001 Kubick et al. (2015) 2002 
Taylor and Richardson (2012) 2008 Higgins et al. (2015) 2002 Huseynov and Klamm (2012) 2004 Gallemore and Labro (2015) 2002 
Lanis and Richardson (2012) 2009 Wu et al. (2013) 2003 Lee and Swenson (2012) 2006 Wu et al. (2012a) 2004   
Wu et al. (2012b) 2003 
  
Donohoe (2015) 2004   
Zeng (2010) 2003 
  
Fernández-Rodríguez and Martínez-
Arias (2014) 
2005 
  
Mills et al. (2013) 2004 
  
    
Jaafar and Thornton (2015) 2005 
  
    
Dyreng et al. (2016) 2005 
  
    
Klassen et al. (2014) 2006 
  
    
McGuire et al. (2012) 2006 
  
    
Lazăr (2014) 2006 
  
    
Hope et al. (2013) 2006 
  
    
Kraft (2014) 2008 
  
    
Herbert and Overesch (2014) 2010 
  
  
The level of statistical significance is at 10% level (two-sided). 
 
Table A 2. Definitions, data sources and summary statistics of country-specific indices. 
Country-specific index Description Directionality Source No. of obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Power Distance Index Measures the social acceptance of 
hierarchies in a certain country 
less acceptance to more 
acceptance of hierarchies 
Hofstede and Hofstede 385 49.883 19.836 11.000 104.000 
         
Transparency Index Measures whether economic, social, and 
political information is available to all 
relevant stakeholders in a timely and 
reliable way in a certain country 
less transparent to more 
transparent 
Williams 367 67.738 14.140 37.000 81.000 
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Appendix to Section 4 
A.4.1 Model adjustments 
A.4.1.1 Creating capital gains instead of capital losses 
In reality, one can observe that some investors, such as private equity investors, buy targets 
to restructure them and sell them (possibly at a profit) a few years later. Obviously, these 
investors know already at the planning stage of an acquisition that they do not want to keep 
the target until it ceases to exist. As these investors likely realize capital gains and not capital 
losses upon the sale, capital gains taxation imposes a tax payment instead of a tax repayment 
to them. Therefore, for this special group of acquirers, it is reasonable to question the 
assumption of creating a capital loss. 
This question is theoretically addressed in the following paragraphs. In short, adjusting our 
model to a two period model with subsequent acquisitions, we demonstrate that assuming 
capital losses is still reasonable, even if the first acquirer sells the target after one period. In 
particular, we show that capital gains only occur under one of the following rather unlikely 
circumstances: a) The first acquirer has a very high power in negotiations, resulting in paying 
a very low M&A price to the original seller and receiving a very high M&A price from the 
second acquirer, or b) the target creates an (overall) loss during the holding period of the 
first acquirer and profits afterwards. However, within the scope of our model, higher 
synergies and/or preferential tax treatment of the second acquirer are not an explanation 
as the second acquirer would have acquired the target in the first place. 
The model will be adjusted as follows: Acquirer A from Country A wants to acquire the 
target at the beginning of the first period and plans to sell this firm to acquirer B from 
Country B at the end of the first period. Acquirer B then plans to liquidate the target at the 
end of the second period. This transforms the model into a two period model with two 
acquisitions taking place. The reservation price of the first acquirer (A) therefore looks as 
follows under the full profit shifting assumption: 
𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐴
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
= (𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐴) ∙
(1−𝜏𝑇𝐻𝐴)∙𝛼𝐴,𝑇𝐻𝐴∙(1−𝜏𝐴)
1+𝑟
+
𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐵
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
−(𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐵
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
−𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐴
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
)∙𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺∙𝛽𝐴
1+𝑟
. 
(4.7) 
Rearranging equation (4.7) yields: 
𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐴
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
= (𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐴) ∙
(1−𝜏𝑇𝐻𝐴)∙𝛼𝐴,𝑇𝐻𝐴∙(1−𝜏𝐴)
1+𝑟−𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺∙𝛽𝐴
+
𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐵
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
∙(1−𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺∙𝛽𝐴)
1+𝑟−𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺∙𝛽𝐴
. 
(4.8) 
Equation (4.8) shows that the value increasing effect of the book value depreciation still 
remains. Additionally, a second effect is now introduced, which results in an additional 
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value increase associated with the M&A price acquirer A receives for selling the target to 
acquirer B. This second value increasing effect is reduced by the tax imposed on the capital 
gains. As long as the reservation price of acquirer B is positive (𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐵
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
> 0), this value 
increasing effect is present. 
In the considered two period model, acquirer A’s alternative to selling the firm to acquirer 
B is to hold the participation in the target until the end of the second period and then 
liquidate the target. Consequently, acquirer A’s alternative reservation price calculation 
under the assumption of immediate repatriation is: 
𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐴
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
= (𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐴) ∙
(1+𝑟)2−1
𝑟
∙
(1−𝜏𝑇𝐻𝐴)∙𝛼𝐴,𝑇𝐻𝐴∙(1−𝜏𝐴)
(1+𝑟)2−𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺𝛽𝐴
. 
(4.9) 
Setting equations (4.8) and (4.9) equal results in the following minimum M&A price that 
acquirer B must pay so that the proposed deal structure is beneficial for acquirer A: 
𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐵
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
≥ (𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐴) ∙ (1 − 𝜏
𝑇𝐻𝐴) ∙ 𝛼𝐴,𝑇𝐻𝐴 ∙ (1 − 𝜏𝐴) ∙
1+𝑟
(1+𝑟)2−𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺∙𝛽𝐴
. (4.10) 
Acquirer B’s reservation price at the end of the first period can be drawn from 
equation (4.1) plugging in 𝑡 = 1. It then looks as follows: 
𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐵
𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑆
= (𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐵) ∙
(1−𝜏𝑇𝐻𝐵)∙𝛼𝐵,𝑇𝐻𝐵∙(1−𝜏𝐵)
1+𝑟−𝜏𝐵,𝐶𝐺∙𝛽𝐵
. 
(4.11) 
Setting equations (4.10) and (4.11) equal yields the following condition: 
(𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐵) ∙ (1 − 𝜏
𝑇𝐻𝐵) ∙ 𝛼𝐵,𝑇𝐻𝐵 ∙ (1 − 𝜏𝐵) ∙
1
1 + 𝑟 − 𝜏𝐵,𝐶𝐺 ∙ 𝛽𝐵
 
≥ (𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐴) ∙ (1 − 𝜏
𝑇𝐻𝐴) ∙ 𝛼𝐴,𝑇𝐻𝐴 ∙ (1 − 𝜏𝐴) ∙
1+𝑟
(1+𝑟)2−𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺∙𝛽𝐴
. 
(4.12) 
There could be two reasons why acquirer B’s reservation price (left side of equation (4.12)) 
exceeds the minimum reservation price that acquirer A needs (right side of equation (4.12)). 
It could be that acquirer B’s taxation system is more favorable139 or that acquirer B creates 
a higher synergy140. However, both of these assumptions are rather unlikely as acquirer B 
would be the preferred bidder at the beginning of the first period and acquirer A would 
never be successful in acquiring the target. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the 
synergies of acquirer A and B as well as their taxation systems are identical. Consequently, 
equation (4.12) collapses to: 
1
1+𝑟−𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺∙𝛽𝐴
≥
1+𝑟
(1+𝑟)2−𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺∙𝛽𝐴
. (4.13) 
                                              
139 
(1−𝜏𝑇𝐻𝐵)∙𝛼𝐵,𝑇𝐻𝐵∙(1−𝜏𝐵)
1+𝑟−𝜏𝐵,𝐶𝐺∙𝛽𝐵
≥
(1−𝜏𝑇𝐻𝐴)∙𝛼𝐴,𝑇𝐻𝐴∙(1−𝜏𝐴)∙(1+𝑟)
(1+𝑟)2−𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺∙𝛽𝐴
 
140 ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐵≥ ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞,𝐴 
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As a result, acquirer B’s reservation price equals the required price by acquirer A only if 
either interest rates are zero (𝑟 = 0) or if capital gains are exempted (𝛽𝐴 = 0). Under these 
assumptions, acquirer B’s reservation price cannot exceed the minimum reservation price 
demanded by acquirer A and, therefore, acquirer A will always create capital losses upon 
disposal at the end of the first period. However, capital losses are lower than the ones A 
would face upon liquidation at the end of the second period. The reasoning behind this 
result is that capital gains taxation occurs either twice after one period (acquirer A realizes 
a capital loss at the end of the first period and acquirer B realizes a capital loss at the end 
of the second period) or only once after two periods (acquirer A keeps the target). 
Consequently, either the time value of money must be identical (interest rate is zero) or 
capital gains taxation has no value (capital gains are untaxed). 
Given that interest rates are positive and capital gains are taxed, acquirer B’s reservation 
price will always be lower than acquirer A’s reservation price if he intends to sell. The value 
increasing effect of the sale remains present, but acquirer A still realizes a capital loss upon 
the sale. The only difference between the setting with and without subsequent acquisitions 
is that the overall capital loss is split up between acquirer A and acquirer B in the setting 
with subsequent acquisitions. 
Given this analysis, it seems as if there could never be capital gains upon a sale. This of 
course is not true. First, assume that the target generates an overall loss until sold and profits 
thereafter. In this case, capital gains could occur as the price acquirer A is willing to pay at 
the beginning of the first period is lower than the price acquirer B is willing to pay at the 
end of the first period. Second, assume that acquirer A pays a lower M&A price for the 
target than his reservation price due to high negotiation power. Consequently, acquirer A’s 
reservation price decreases (and subsequently his tax payment upon disposal increases), 
while acquirer B’s reservation price must not be affected at all. Modelling this implies that 
acquirer A already knows the final M&A price paid for the target while determining his 
reservation price. However, this assumption contradicts the idea of determining a 
reservation price. 
To sum up, capital gains should not occur within the scope of our model if the target is 
profitable and acquirer A pays his reservation price. Consequently, subsequent acquisitions 
can maximally lead to an indifference between selling and keeping the target and this 
indifference occurs only if either interest rates are zero or capital gains are exempted. 
A.4.1.2 Costs of profit shifting 
Under the full profit assumption, we assume that profits can be shifted without costs from 
the target to the tax haven subsidiary. However, several empirical (e.g., Swenson (2000), 
Huizinga and Laeven (2008), Maffini (2012), Markle (2016)) and theoretical papers assume 
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that profit shifting imposes costs. Therefore, full profit shifting might be an assumption 
that is too far reaching. Following a strand of theoretical literature that focuses on the costs 
of profit shifting via transfer pricing adjustments (e.g., Haufler and Schjelderup (2000), 
Johannesen (2010), Becker and Fuest (2012), Devereux et al. (2015)), we include an 
increasing convex cost function for profit shifting denote by 𝐶(𝛱𝐴𝑐𝑞). Thereby, costs for 
tax advisors to declare such price adjustments or possible fines to be paid should be covered 
by our cost function. The cost function is zero for no profit shifting (𝐶(𝛱𝐴𝑐𝑞) =
0; 𝛱𝐴𝑐𝑞 = 0) and positive for any positive values of profit shifting (𝐶(𝛱𝐴𝑐𝑞) > 0; 𝛱𝐴𝑐𝑞 >
0). Further, it is important to know in which countries costs arise and what their tax 
treatment looks like. Obviously, declaration costs should arise between the countries 
involved in profit shifting. In our model, this includes the target country (T) and the tax 
haven country of the MNE (TH). Additionally, costs might arise in the country where the 
MNE is located (A). All costs should, in principle, be deductible for tax purposes. However, 
some costs (e.g., fines) are often non-deductible. Consequently, a portion of the costs can 
also be assumed to be non-deductible. As a result, the cost function looks as follows: 
𝐶(Π𝐴𝑐𝑞) = 𝜒𝐴𝑐𝑞
𝑇 (Π𝐴𝑐𝑞) + 𝜒𝐴𝑐𝑞
𝑇𝐻 (Π𝐴𝑐𝑞) + 𝜒𝐴𝑐𝑞
𝐴 (Π𝐴𝑐𝑞) + 𝜙𝐴𝑐𝑞(Π𝐴𝑐𝑞). (4.14) 
𝜒𝐴𝑐𝑞
𝑗
 indicates the costs deductible for tax purposes in country j. 𝜙𝐴𝑐𝑞 denotes the costs of 
profit shifting that are non-deductible and is simply the difference between all costs and 
the costs deductible for tax purposes in the other countries.141 
Taking into account this cost function, the acquirer’s reservation price looks as follows: 
𝑃𝐴𝑐𝑞 =
[(𝜀+∆𝐴𝑐𝑞−Π𝐴𝑐𝑞−𝜒𝐴𝑐𝑞
𝑇 )]∙(1−𝜏𝑇)∙(1−𝜏𝑊𝐻𝑇
𝑇 )∙𝛼𝐴,𝑇∙(1−𝜏𝐴)
(1+𝑟)𝑡−𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺𝛽𝐴
∙ 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 +
(Π𝐴𝑐𝑞−𝜒𝐴𝑐𝑞
𝑇𝐻 )∙(1−𝜏𝑇𝐻)∙𝛼𝐴,𝑇𝐻∙(1−𝜏𝐴)
(1+𝑟)𝑡−𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺𝛽𝐴
∙ 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡 −
𝜒𝐴𝑐𝑞
𝐴 ∙(1−𝜏𝐴)−𝜙𝐴𝑐𝑞
(1+𝑟)𝑡−𝜏𝐴,𝐶𝐺𝛽𝐴
∙ 𝑇𝑉𝐹𝑡. 
(4.15) 
Without specifying the cost function in more detail, it is now impossible to calculate the 
indifference price of the acquirer. We assume that the height of profit shifting costs depend 
on specific provisions in the respective country’s law. Consequently, the cost function will 
be potentially different for each combination of acquirer, target and tax haven countries, 
depending on provisions for example for interest deductibility, transfer pricing regulations 
or CFC rules. For the full profit assumption in our empirical analysis, we argue that costs 
for profit shifting arising in the target country are captured by dummy variables controlling 
for limitations on debt financing and transfer pricing manipulations. Additionally, we argue 
that no or just very low costs should be created in the tax haven, as high profit shifting 
costs in the tax haven would contradict its attractiveness. Costs in the residence country of 
                                              
141 These costs occur per definition in Country A. This simplification has the effect that there is no difference between 
tax base and profit that can be paid out as dividends. 
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the acquirer—if at all related directly to the shifting—should be captured by implementing 
tax haven specific tax rates taken from the CFC rules of that country. Therefore, only non-
deductible costs are left. As good tax planning involves not paying fines—and these are the 
most likely type of tax planning costs that are non-deductible—we expect non-deductible 
costs to be rather small. Consequently, we are able to take costs of profit shifting into 
account in the empirical application without specifying the cost function in more detail. 
A.4.2 Tables and Figures 
Table A 3. Overview of countries applying the four corporate taxation systems. 
  Dividends 
  Credit method Exemption method 
C
ap
it
al
 g
ai
n
s C
re
d
it
 m
et
h
o
d
 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Japan (until 2008), Malta (until 
2006), Mexico, Norway (until 2003), Poland, Portugal 
(until 2013), Republic of Korea, Romania, South 
Africa (until 2004), Turkey (until 2005), United States 
Australia (until 2003), Croatia, Estonia (from 2008)*, 
Hungary, Iceland (until 2007), Italy (until 2003), Japan 
(from 2009), Latvia, Lithuania, Russian Federation 
(from 2008)**, Slovenia (from 2006), South Africa (from 
2005), Sweden (until 2002) 
E
xe
m
p
ti
o
n
 m
et
h
o
d
 
New Zealand (until 2008), United Kingdom (until 2008) 
Australia (from 2004), Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, 
Denmark, France (from 2007)***, Germany, Iceland 
(from 2008), Italy (from 2004), Luxembourg, Malta 
(from 2007), Netherlands, New Zealand (from 2009), 
Norway (from 2004), Portugal (from 2014), Slovenia 
(until 2005), Spain, Sweden (from 2003), Switzerland, 
Turkey (from 2006), United Kingdom (from 2009) 
  
   *Estonia deducted foreign capital gains taxes until 2007 and is therefore not included before 2008. 
 **Russian Federation operated a no relief system with regards to dividends until 2007 and is therefore 
     not included before 2008. 
***France deducted foreign capital gains taxes until 2006 and is therefore not included before 2007. 
 
Figure A 4. Changes in tax rates on foreign dividends and capital gains for Canada (2002–2015). 
 
Source: Corporate taxation system data set. 
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Figure A 5. Changes in tax rates on foreign dividends and capital gains for India (2002–2015). 
 
Source: Corporate taxation system data set. 
 
Figure A 6. Changes in tax rates on foreign dividends and capital gains for Israel (2002–2015). 
 
Source: Corporate taxation system data set. 
 
Figure A 7. Changes in tax rates on foreign dividends and capital gains for South Africa (2002–2015). 
 
Source: Corporate taxation system data set. 
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Table A 4. Liquidity effects with indefinite profit retention, profit shifting and tax credit in MNE’s 
residence country. 
  𝑡 = 1 𝑡 = 2… 𝑡 = 𝑛 
T
ax
 h
av
en
 
Profit after taxes 
(𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞)
∙ (1 − 𝜏𝑇𝐻) 
(𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (1 − 𝜏
𝑇𝐻) 
+ Interest income after taxes  (𝑛 − 1) ∙ (𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (1 − 𝜏
𝑇𝐻)2 ∙ 𝑟 
./. Dividends paid out  (𝑛 − 1) ∙ (𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (1 − 𝜏
𝑇𝐻)2 ∙ 𝑟 
= Cash flow (value increase) 
(𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞)
∙ (1 − 𝜏𝑇𝐻) 
(𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (1 − 𝜏
𝑇𝐻) 
M
N
E
 
New loan 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑞  𝑛 ∙ 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑞  
./. Repayment of old loan  (𝑛 − 1) ∙ 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑞  
./. Interest expense  (𝑛 − 1) ∙ 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑞 ∙ 𝑟 
+ Dividends received  (𝑛 − 1) ∙ (𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (1 − 𝜏
𝑇𝐻)2 ∙ 𝑟 
./. Taxes  
[((𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (1 − 𝜏
𝑇𝐻) − 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (𝑛 − 1) ∙ 𝑟] ∙ 𝜏
𝐴 −
𝑚𝑖𝑛 [(𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (1 − 𝜏
𝑇𝐻) ∙ (𝑛 − 1) ∙ 𝑟 ∙ 𝜏𝑇𝐻; [((𝜀 +
∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (1 − 𝜏
𝑇𝐻) − 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (𝑛 − 1) ∙ 𝑟] ∙ 𝜏
𝐴]  
= Cash flow (distribution) 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑞  
𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑞 + ((𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (1 − 𝜏
𝑇𝐻)2 − 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (𝑛 − 1) ∙ 𝑟 −
{[((𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (1 − 𝜏
𝑇𝐻) − 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (𝑛 − 1) ∙ 𝑟] ∙ 𝜏
𝐴 −
𝑚𝑖𝑛 [(𝜀 + ∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (1 − 𝜏
𝑇𝐻) ∙ (𝑛 − 1) ∙ 𝑟 ∙ 𝜏𝑇𝐻; [((𝜀 +
∆𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (1 − 𝜏
𝑇𝐻) − 𝐷𝐴𝑐𝑞) ∙ (𝑛 − 1) ∙ 𝑟] ∙ 𝜏
𝐴]}  
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Appendix to Section 5 
Table A 5. Supplemental regression results for candidate acquirer country fixed effects interacted with target-specific financial data. 
Regression (3) of Table 31 Regression (4) of Table 31 Regression (5) of Table 31 
Australia*TargetAssets –0.1275** Australia*TargetSales –0.1167*** Australia*TargetEBITDA –0.1229* 
 (0.0526)  (0.0417)  (0.0696) 
Austria*TargetAssets 0.0927 Austria*TargetSales 0.0242 Austria*TargetEBITDA 0.2592** 
 (0.0960)  (0.0851)  (0.1150) 
Belgium*TargetAssets 0.0394 Belgium*TargetSales –0.0256 Belgium*TargetEBITDA 0.0561 
 (0.0890)  (0.0693)  (0.1021) 
Canada*TargetAssets –0.1606*** Canada*TargetSales –0.1735*** Canada*TargetEBITDA –0.1486** 
 (0.0541)  (0.0380)  (0.0643) 
China*TargetAssets 0.0502 China*TargetSales –0.0781 China*TargetEBITDA –0.0301 
 (0.0579)  (0.0507)  (0.1096) 
Denmark*TargetAssets 0.0591 Denmark*TargetSales 0.0749 Denmark*TargetEBITDA 0.0275 
 (0.1467)  (0.1215)  (0.1813) 
Finland*TargetAssets –0.0130 Finland*TargetSales –0.1980*** Finland*TargetEBITDA 0.0561 
 (0.1863)  (0.0728)  (0.0490) 
France*TargetAssets 0.1841*** France*TargetSales 0.1561*** France*TargetEBITDA 0.1999*** 
 (0.0477)  (0.0420)  (0.0603) 
Germany*TargetAssets 0.1779*** Germany*TargetSales 0.1239*** Germany*TargetEBITDA 0.2245*** 
 (0.0482)  (0.0479)  (0.0636) 
HongKong*TargetAssets –0.0375 HongKong*TargetSales –0.0809* HongKong*TargetEBITDA –0.0597 
 (0.0544)  (0.0477)  (0.0725) 
India*TargetAssets –0.1437** India*TargetSales –0.0593 India*TargetEBITDA –0.3182*** 
 (0.0591)  (0.0369)  (0.0755) 
Ireland*TargetAssets –0.1022** Ireland*TargetSales –0.0565 Ireland*TargetEBITDA –0.1737** 
 (0.0504)  (0.0410)  (0.0714) 
Israel*TargetAssets –0.0013 Israel*TargetSales –0.0859 Israel*TargetEBITDA 0.0781 
 (0.0810)  (0.0572)  (0.1288) 
Italy*TargetAssets 0.0162 Italy*TargetSales 0.0067 Italy*TargetEBITDA 0.0309 
 (0.0585)  (0.0457)  (0.0794) 
Japan*TargetAssets 0.1112** Japan*TargetSales 0.1007** Japan*TargetEBITDA 0.0818 
 (0.0461)  (0.0404)  (0.0696) 
KoreaRep*TargetAssets 0.0875 KoreaRep*TargetSales –0.0338 KoreaRep*TargetEBITDA 0.2206 
 (0.1026)  (0.0893)  (0.2751) 
Malaysia*TargetAssets –0.1075 Malaysia*TargetSales –0.1171* Malaysia*TargetEBITDA –0.2086 
 (0.1090)  (0.0707)  (0.1310) 
Netherlands*TargetAssets 0.1765*** Netherlands*TargetSales 0.0893* Netherlands*TargetEBITDA 0.1696** 
 (0.0504)  (0.0458)  (0.0699) 
NewZealand*TargetAssets –0.0111 NewZealand*TargetSales 0.2038** NewZealand*TargetEBITDA –0.1343 
 (0.1395)  (0.0951)  (0.1243) 
Norway*TargetAssets –0.2134*** Norway*TargetSales –0.1773*** Norway*TargetEBITDA –0.2307** 
 (0.0732)  (0.0423)  (0.1167) 
RussianFederation*TargetAssets 0.0481 RussianFederation*TargetSales –0.1325 RussianFederation*TargetEBITDA 0.2715 
 (0.2429)  (0.1597)  (0.1787) 
Singapore*TargetAssets –0.0009 Singapore*TargetSales –0.0877 Singapore*TargetEBITDA –0.0784 
 (0.0640)  (0.0580)  (0.0812) 
Spain*TargetAssets 0.2229*** Spain*TargetSales 0.1261** Spain*TargetEBITDA 0.1338 
 (0.0759)  (0.0589)  (0.0972) 
Sweden*TargetAssets 0.3177*** Sweden*TargetSales –0.0665 Sweden*TargetEBITDA 0.0543 
 (0.1215)  (0.0901)  (0.1561) 
Switzerland*TargetAssets 0.1798*** Switzerland*TargetSales 0.0347 Switzerland*TargetEBITDA 0.1748** 
 (0.0563)  (0.0557)  (0.0872) 
UnitedKingdom*TargetAssets –0.0638 UnitedKingdom*TargetSales –0.1709*** UnitedKingdom*TargetEBITDA –0.0150 
 (0.0475)  (0.0314)  (0.0577) 
Australia*TargetROA 0.0451     
 (0.1562)     
Austria*TargetROA –0.3821**     
 (0.1873)     
Belgium*TargetROA 0.0782     
 (0.3381)     
Canada*TargetROA 0.0885     
 (0.2366)     
China*TargetROA –0.3323**     
 (0.1653)     
Denmark*TargetROA 0.3034     
 (0.2514)     
Finland*TargetROA 0.4007**     
 (0.1818)     
France*TargetROA 0.1699     
 (0.1596)     
Germany*TargetROA –0.3493**     
 (0.1597)     
HongKong*TargetROA 0.0771     
 (0.1329)     
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Table A 5. Continued.      
India*TargetROA 0.0564     
 (0.1776)     
Ireland*TargetROA 0.2417*     
 (0.1374)     
Israel*TargetROA –0.3429**     
 (0.1377)     
Italy*TargetROA –0.1279     
 (0.1952)     
Japan*TargetROA 0.4780***     
 (0.1482)     
KoreaRep*TargetROA –0.3778**     
 (0.1693)     
Malaysia*TargetROA 0.1243     
 (0.1701)     
Netherlands*TargetROA 0.3409     
 (0.2256)     
NewZealand*TargetROA 0.3107**     
 (0.1298)     
Norway*TargetROA –0.0062     
 (0.1873)     
RussianFederation*TargetROA 0.1880     
 (0.3663)     
Singapore*TargetROA –0.2435*     
 (0.1407)     
Spain*TargetROA 0.1719     
 (0.2793)     
Sweden*TargetROA 7.1903**     
 (3.2794)     
Switzerland*TargetROA –0.2943*     
 (0.1715)     
UnitedKingdom*TargetROA 0.2905**     
 (0.1420)     
Table reports supplemental results from regressions (3), (4) and (5) of Table 31. In particular, the coefficient of the interaction between candidate 
acquirer country fixed effects with target-specific consolidated financial data (target total assets, target ROA, target net sales and target EBITDA) 
are shown. In all regressions, the USA represent the base category. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
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Table A 6. Supplemental regression results for candidate target country fixed effects interacted with acquirer-specific financial data. 
Regression (3) of Table 35 Regression (4) of Table 35 Regression (5) of Table 35 
Australia*AcquirerAssets –0.0867*** Australia*AcquirerSales –0.0542*** Australia*AcquirerEBITDA –0.0819*** 
 (0.0194)  (0.0199)  (0.0230) 
Belgium*AcquirerAssets –0.0737** Belgium*AcquirerSales –0.0633** Belgium*AcquirerEBITDA –0.1133*** 
 (0.0302)  (0.0301)  (0.0389) 
Brazil*AcquirerAssets 0.0321 Brazil*AcquirerSales 0.1174*** Brazil*AcquirerEBITDA 0.1288*** 
 (0.0301)  (0.0373)  (0.0361) 
Canada*AcquirerAssets –0.1900*** Canada*AcquirerSales –0.1707*** Canada*AcquirerEBITDA –0.1391*** 
 (0.0244)  (0.0245)  (0.0298) 
China*AcquirerAssets –0.1894*** China*AcquirerSales –0.1697*** China*AcquirerEBITDA –0.1784*** 
 (0.0212)  (0.0201)  (0.0279) 
Denmark*AcquirerAssets –0.0393 Denmark*AcquirerSales –0.0148 Denmark*AcquirerEBITDA –0.0599 
 (0.0754)  (0.0855)  (0.0968) 
Finland*AcquirerAssets –0.0406 Finland*AcquirerSales 0.0486 Finland*AcquirerEBITDA –0.1441 
 (0.0725)  (0.0660)  (0.1023) 
France*AcquirerAssets –0.0699*** France*AcquirerSales –0.0638*** France*AcquirerEBITDA –0.1531*** 
 (0.0168)  (0.0174)  (0.0216) 
Germany*AcquirerAssets –0.0929*** Germany*AcquirerSales –0.0944*** Germany*AcquirerEBITDA –0.1481*** 
 (0.0156)  (0.0160)  (0.0196) 
HongKong*AcquirerAssets –0.2496*** HongKong*AcquirerSales –0.2166*** HongKong*AcquirerEBITDA –0.2576*** 
 (0.0345)  (0.0277)  (0.0399) 
India*AcquirerAssets 0.0178 India*AcquirerSales 0.0684* India*AcquirerEBITDA 0.0444 
 (0.0334)  (0.0371)  (0.0420) 
Ireland*AcquirerAssets –0.0215 Ireland*AcquirerSales –0.0067 Ireland*AcquirerEBITDA –0.0489 
 (0.0349)  (0.0344)  (0.0421) 
Italy*AcquirerAssets 0.0233 Italy*AcquirerSales 0.0241 Italy*AcquirerEBITDA –0.0159 
 (0.0291)  (0.0300)  (0.0359) 
Japan*AcquirerAssets 0.0125 Japan*AcquirerSales –0.0390 Japan*AcquirerEBITDA –0.0462 
 (0.0403)  (0.0456)  (0.0554) 
KoreaRep*AcquirerAssets 0.0294 KoreaRep*AcquirerSales 0.0095 KoreaRep*AcquirerEBITDA 0.0552 
 (0.0504)  (0.0494)  (0.0542) 
Malaysia*AcquirerAssets –0.2115*** Malaysia*AcquirerSales –0.1429*** Malaysia*AcquirerEBITDA –0.2109*** 
 (0.0426)  (0.0421)  (0.0558) 
Mexico*AcquirerAssets –0.3658*** Mexico*AcquirerSales –0.1508*** Mexico*AcquirerEBITDA –0.0526 
 (0.0316)  (0.0437)  (0.0550) 
Netherlands*AcquirerAssets –0.0799*** Netherlands*AcquirerSales –0.0567*** Netherlands*AcquirerEBITDA –0.1291*** 
 (0.0209)  (0.0215)  (0.0259) 
NewZealand*AcquirerAssets –0.1727*** NewZealand*AcquirerSales –0.1197*** NewZealand*AcquirerEBITDA –0.3288*** 
 (0.0307)  (0.0266)  (0.0381) 
Norway*AcquirerAssets –0.1155*** Norway*AcquirerSales –0.0915*** Norway*AcquirerEBITDA –0.1021*** 
 (0.0273)  (0.0262)  (0.0340) 
Poland*AcquirerAssets –0.0356 Poland*AcquirerSales –0.0602 Poland*AcquirerEBITDA –0.0928* 
 (0.0452)  (0.0441)  (0.0500) 
RussianFederation*AcquirerAssets –0.0841 RussianFederation*AcquirerSales –0.1421** RussianFederation*AcquirerEBITDA –0.0242 
 (0.0558)  (0.0607)  (0.0884) 
Singapore*AcquirerAssets –0.1589*** Singapore*AcquirerSales –0.1096*** Singapore*AcquirerEBITDA –0.1836*** 
 (0.0315)  (0.0268)  (0.0356) 
SouthAfrica*AcquirerAssets –0.1952*** SouthAfrica*AcquirerSales –0.1524*** SouthAfrica*AcquirerEBITDA –0.1421*** 
 (0.0376)  (0.0371)  (0.0543) 
Spain*AcquirerAssets –0.0371 Spain*AcquirerSales –0.0328 Spain*AcquirerEBITDA –0.0454 
 (0.0317)  (0.0312)  (0.0358) 
Switzerland*AcquirerAssets –0.0841*** Switzerland*AcquirerSales –0.0741*** Switzerland*AcquirerEBITDA –0.0619* 
 (0.0264)  (0.0285)  (0.0350) 
UnitedKingdom*AcquirerAssets –0.0884*** UnitedKingdom*AcquirerSales –0.0762*** UnitedKingdom*AcquirerEBITDA –0.1113*** 
 (0.0174)  (0.0179)  (0.0214) 
Australia*AcquirerROA –0.0370     
 (0.0295)     
Belgium*AcquirerROA 0.0158***     
 (0.0057)     
Brazil*AcquirerROA –0.0375     
 (0.0277)     
Canada*AcquirerROA –0.0413     
 (0.0390)     
China*AcquirerROA –0.0043     
 (0.0112)     
Denmark*AcquirerROA 0.0424     
 (0.5075)     
Finland*AcquirerROA –0.1937     
 (0.1496)     
France*AcquirerROA 0.0021     
 (0.0058)     
Germany*AcquirerROA 0.0108**     
 (0.0053)     
HongKong*AcquirerROA –0.0648*     
 (0.0355)     
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Table A 6. Continued.      
India*AcquirerROA –0.0484     
 (0.0374)     
Ireland*AcquirerROA –0.0134     
 (0.0453)     
Italy*AcquirerROA –0.0068     
 (0.0254)     
Japan*AcquirerROA –0.0642*     
 (0.0346)     
KoreaRep*AcquirerROA –0.0577*     
 (0.0337)     
Malaysia*AcquirerROA 0.0007     
 (0.0079)     
Mexico*AcquirerROA –0.0010     
 (0.0081)     
Netherlands*AcquirerROA –0.0154     
 (0.0531)     
NewZealand*AcquirerROA 0.0195     
 (0.0137)     
Norway*AcquirerROA –0.0151     
 (0.0344)     
Poland*AcquirerROA –0.0394     
 (0.0410)     
RussianFederation*AcquirerROA –0.0564*     
 (0.0339)     
Singapore*AcquirerROA –0.0539     
 (0.0349)     
SouthAfrica*AcquirerROA 0.0006     
 (0.0076)     
Spain*AcquirerROA –0.0365     
 (0.0386)     
Switzerland*AcquirerROA 0.0027     
 (0.0058)     
UnitedKingdom*AcquirerROA –0.0098     
 (0.0196)     
Table reports supplemental results from regressions (3), (4) and (5) of Table 35. In particular, the coefficient of the interaction between candidate 
target country fixed effects with acquirer-specific consolidated financial data (acquirer total assets, acquirer ROA, acquirer net sales and acquirer 
EBITDA) are shown. In all regressions, the USA represent the base category. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. 
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Appendix to Section 6 
Table A 7. Überblick über Finanzierungsgesellschaften sowie weitere Bilanzdaten und Kennzahlen. 
Konzern Name der Tochtergesellschaft Bilanz-
summe 
(Mio. €) 
Ford. ggü. 
verb. Unt. 
(Mio. €) 
Operativer 
Ertrag (Mio. €) 
Finanzerlö-
se (Mio. €) 
Gewinn vor 
Steuern 
(Mio. €) 
Steuer-
aufwand 
(Mio. €) 
Effektive 
Steuer-
quote 
Mitarbei-
teranzahl 
Grün-
dungs-
jahr 
Jahr 2014            
Finanzierungsgesellschaften          
BASF SE BASF Belgium Coordination Center 15.39 15.224 120 756 113 0 0% 244 2003 
Bayer AG Bayer Antwerpen 14.005 13.412 1.163 1.095 310 15 5% 794 1991 
Beiersdorf AG Beiersdorf Finance         2007 
HeidelbergCement AG CBR International Services 1.417 1.408 2 41 40 0 1% 7 1991 
K+S AG K+S Finance Belgium 2.126 1.083 0 75 74 13 17% 3 2009 
Symrise AG Symrise Group Finance Holding 2 94 92 0 3 3 0 5% 1 2010 
Volkswagen AG Volkswagen Group Services 21.546 20.828 40 237 189 0 0% 61 1991 
Operativ tätige Finanzierungsgesellschaften          
Aurubis AG Aurubis Belgium 895 470 2.279 19 –4 0 1% 518 2005 
Continental AG Continental Automotive Benelux 440 292 256 6 –9 0 1% 492 2010 
Evonik Industries AG 
Evonik Degussa Antwerpen 459 193 680 0 35 7 19% 1.040 1991 
Evonik Oxeno Antwerpen 445 0 663 5 25 6 22% 3 2002 
Jungheinrich AG Jungheinrich 35 0 62 0 3 1 35% 186 1991 
Lanxess AG Lanxess 729 400 669 68 –31 2 –5% 887 2004 
STADA Arzn. AG Eurogenerics 184 30 162 1 20 6 30% 126 1991 
Jahr 2013            
Finanzierungsgesellschaften          
BASF SE BASF Belgium Coordination Center 14.977 14.758 120 565 16 0 0% 240 2003 
Bayer AG Bayer Antwerpen 8.965 8.289 1.122 721 279 21 7% 803 1991 
Beiersdorf AG Beiersdorf Finance 107 78 0 0 0 0 3% 1 2007 
HeidelbergCement AG CBR International Services 1.377 1.367 2 41 40 0 1% 8 1991 
K+S AG K+S Finance Belgium 1.812 1.166 0 75 74 13 18% 3 2009 
Symrise AG Symrise Group Finance Holding 2 102 101 0 3 3 0 6% 1 2010 
Volkswagen AG Volkswagen Group Services 21.028 19.601 40 212 158 0 0% 58 1991 
Operativ tätige Finanzierungsgesellschaften          
Aurubis AG Aurubis Belgium 966 492 2.554 33 21 3 12% 502 2005 
Continental AG Continental Automotive Benelux 420 279 199 7 15 3 20% 499 2010 
Evonik Industries AG 
Evonik Degussa Antwerpen 422 159 600 0 37 7 20% 1.031 1991 
Evonik Oxeno Antwerpen 408 0 696 6 46 12 27% 2 2002 
Jungheinrich AG Jungheinrich 32 0 62 0 3 1 37% 178 1991 
Lanxess AG Lanxess 688 380 703 109 –50 1 –1% 916 2004 
STADA Arzn. AG Eurogenerics 85 0 155 0 10 4 35% 87 1991 
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Table A 7. Continued.           
Jahr 2012            
Finanzierungsgesellschaften          
BASF SE BASF Belgium Coordination Center 14.673 14.512 111 1.343 77 3 4% 221 2003 
Bayer AG Bayer Antwerpen 8.585 8.054 1.167 575 309 23 8% 811 1991 
Beiersdorf AG Beiersdorf Finance 107 83 0 0 0 0 0% 1 2007 
HeidelbergCement AG CBR International Services 1.338 1.308 159 47 43 0 1% 10 1991 
K+S AG K+S Finance Belgium 1.83 1.36 0 81 80 14 17% 3 2009 
Symrise AG Symrise Group Finance Holding 2 88 87 0 3 3 0 1% 1 2010 
Volkswagen AG Volkswagen Group Services 17.564 15.888 42 246 153 0 0% 57 1991 
Operativ tätige Finanzierungsgesellschaften          
Aurubis AG Aurubis Belgium 1.062 602 2.836 39 47 6 14% 473 2005 
Continental AG Continental Automotive Benelux 421 263 231 10 56 15 26% 481 2010 
Evonik Industries AG 
Evonik Degussa Antwerpen 374 131 576 1 36 7 20% 1.023 1991 
Evonik Oxeno Antwerpen 368 0 697 19 74 23 30% 1 2002 
Jungheinrich AG Jungheinrich 33 0 57 0 3 1 36% 170 1991 
Lanxess AG Lanxess 1.026 691 750 172 29 7 25% 922 2004 
STADA Arzn. AG Eurogenerics 80 0 150 0 13 4 33% 88 1991 
Jahr 2011            
Finanzierungsgesellschaften          
BASF SE BASF Belgium Coordination Center 17.981 17.916 53 1.003 96 3 3% 161 2003 
Bayer AG Bayer Antwerpen 8.365 7.979 1.029 612 255 11 4% 813 1991 
Beiersdorf AG Beiersdorf Finance 107 27 0 1 1 0 0% 1 2007 
HeidelbergCement AG CBR International Services 1.296 1.242 163 52 48 0 0% 11 1991 
K+S AG K+S Finance Belgium 1.798 1.262 0 79 79 12 15% 3 2009 
Symrise AG Symrise Group Finance Holding 2 84 83 0 3 3 0 9% 1 2010 
Volkswagen AG Volkswagen Group Services 17.186 13.773 38 249 141 0 0% 49 1991 
Operativ tätige Finanzierungsgesellschaften          
Aurubis AG Aurubis Belgium 1.021 442 3.112 37 42 11 27% 460 2005 
Continental AG Continental Automotive Benelux 410 307 284 8 73 21 29% 478 2010 
Evonik Industries AG 
Evonik Degussa Antwerpen 337 108 555 3 30 5 18% 1.007 1991 
Evonik Oxeno Antwerpen 342 0 666 17 65 15 24% 1 2002 
Jungheinrich AG Jungheinrich 36 0 58 0 3 1 34% 161 1991 
Lanxess AG Lanxess 987 431 730 124 63 17 27% 930 2004 
STADA Arzn. AG Eurogenerics 76 0 154 0 18 6 33% 83 1991 
Als Gründungsjahr wurde das erste Jahr eingetragen, für das ein Jahresabschluss bei der Bilanzzentrale der Belgischen Nationalbank (Central Balance Sheet Office of the National Bank of 
Belgium) hinterlegt ist. Für Jahre vor 1991 gibt es keine Abschlüsse. 
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